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 SUMMARY IN DUTCH 
 Grenzen aan de Bescherming van Fundamentele Rechten door de EU:  
De Mogelijkheden voor een Ontwikkeling van Positieve Verplichtingen 
 Uit fundamentele rechten vloeit traditioneel gezien een negatieve verplichting voor staten 
voort. Staten dienen zich te onthouden van het maken van inbreuken op fundamentele 
rechten, zoals het recht op leven en het recht op vrijheid van meningsuiting. Inmiddels 
is in verschillende rechtssystemen erkend dat staten in dit kader ook positieve 
verplichtingen moeten vervullen, wat inhoudt dat zij actieve maatregelen dienen 
te treff en om deze rechten te beschermen. In Europa, in het bijzonder, is al geruime 
tijd een ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen zichtbaar in de jurisprudentie van 
het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens (EHRM). Staten moeten volgens 
deze rechtspraak bijvoorbeeld een onderzoek instellen wanneer een persoon onder 
verdachte omstandigheden is overleden. Ook kan worden verlangd dat een algemeen 
wettelijk kader wordt geboden om bescherming te bieden, bijvoorbeeld tegen de risico ’ s 
van gevaarlijke installaties of fabrieken, of dat juist meer organisatorische of praktische 
maatregelen worden genomen zodat wordt voorkomen dat er inbreuken plaatsvinden, 
zoals in het geval van rellen tijdens een demonstratie. 
 In dit onderzoek is nader bestudeerd welke ruimte er binnen het recht van de Europese 
Unie (EU-recht) bestaat voor het erkennen van positieve verplichtingen. Ook is 
onderzocht hoe het Hof van Justitie van de EU (Hof van Justitie) vorm kan geven aan 
de ontwikkeling van een doctrine van positieve verplichtingen. Hoewel het EU-recht 
van oorsprong is gericht op economische integratie tussen de Europese staten, strekt 
het zich inmiddels uit tot een groot aantal andere rechtsterreinen, zoals het asiel- en 
migratierecht en het privacyrecht. Op die terreinen is het duidelijk van belang dat 
bescherming van fundamentele rechten wordt verleend. Zowel de EU-instellingen als de 
lidstaten, wanneer zij het EU-recht ten uitvoer leggen, dienen zich dan ook te onthouden 
van het maken van inbreuken op deze rechten. De vraag is echter in hoeverre er ook 
positieve verplichtingen voor de EU-instellingen en de lidstaten kunnen worden erkend. 
 In de literatuur wordt hierover discussie gevoerd en worden verschillende mogelijkheden 
voor een ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen onder het EU-recht aangewezen. 
Sommige auteurs zijn van mening dat de EU op een meer actieve manier dient bij 
te dragen aan de beschermen van fundamentele rechten in Europa. Daarbij wijzen zij 
op het feit dat het concept van positieve verplichtingen volgens de rechtspraak van 
het EHRM een essentieel onderdeel vormt van fundamentele rechten en dat daaraan 
Intersentiax
Summary in Dutch
ook betekenis behoort toe te komen binnen het EU-recht. Ook zien verschillende 
auteurs potentieel voor een ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen op basis van 
het Handvest van de grondrechten van de EU (Handvest), dat sinds 2009 verbindende 
kracht heeft . Het Handvest bevat eenzelfde reeks fundamentele rechten als het Europees 
Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens (EVRM), met daarnaast onder meer een reeks 
sociale en economische rechten. Vooral van die laatste rechten is vanuit de literatuur 
en rechtspraak bekend dat de bescherming ervan veelal afh ankelijk is van de vervulling 
van positieve verplichtingen door staten. 
 Tegelijkertijd hebben verschillende wetenschappelijke auteurs erop gewezen dat het 
EU-recht beperkingen kent die een ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen in de weg 
lijken te staan. Zo beschikt de EU over bevoegdheden op een beperkt aantal terreinen 
en is het tot op heden onduidelijk in hoeverre de EU een bevoegdheid toekomt om 
regelgevend, en dus op een actieve manier, op te treden om de bescherming van 
fundamentele rechten te kunnen verzekeren. Daarom hebben verschillende auteurs de 
conclusie getrokken dat er geen of maar zeer beperkte ruimte is voor het erkennen 
van positieve verplichtingen ter bescherming van fundamentele rechten binnen 
het EU-recht. Sommige auteurs stellen zich daarbij op het standpunt dat door deze 
beperking hiaten kunnen ontstaan in de bescherming van fundamentele rechten binnen 
het EU-recht en dat niet kan worden verzekerd dat fundamentele rechten eff ectief 
kunnen worden beschermd door de EU. 
 Met dit onderzoek is beoogd nadere inzichten te verschaff en in zowel de mogelijkheden 
als de begrenzingen die het EU-recht kent voor een ontwikkeling van positieve 
verplichtingen. Ten eerste is in dit onderzoek inzichtelijk gemaakt wat de ontwikkeling 
van positieve verplichtingen onder het EVRM heeft  betekend en op welke wijze het 
EHRM invulling heeft  gegeven aan een doctrine van positieve verplichtingen. Daarna 
is op basis van de EU-Verdragen, het Handvest, de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie 
en de literatuur bepaald welke ruimte het EU-recht biedt voor een ontwikkeling van 
positieve verplichtingen. Ten derde is een analyse uitgevoerd naar de rechtspraak van 
het Hof van Justitie waaruit blijkt dat er verschillende situatietypen zijn waarin positieve 
verplichtingen al zijn erkend. Aan de hand van deze rechtspraak zijn verdere conclusies 
getrokken over de ruimte voor een ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen door 
het Hof van Justitie en de begrenzingen die het EU-recht daarbij stelt. Ook zijn in dit 
onderzoek aanbevelingen gedaan aan het Hof van Justitie over de wijze waarop aan 
een verdere ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen onder het EU-recht vorm kan 
worden gegeven. 
 Deel I: Het Concept van Positieve Verplichtingen onder het EVRM 
 Het EVRM is van bijzonder belang voor de uitleg van fundamentele rechten binnen 
het EU-recht. In zijn rechtspraak heeft  het Hof van Justitie er vaak voor gekozen om 
aansluiting te zoeken bij het EVRM en de uitspraken van het EHRM om zo de betekenis 
en de reikwijdte van fundamentele rechten te kunnen verduidelijken. Sinds het Handvest 
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in 2009 bindend is geworden, verwijst het Hof van Justitie weliswaar minder vaak naar 
het EVRM, maar nog steeds wijst het met enige regelmaat op de rechtspraak van het 
EHRM in zaken over soortgelijke kwesties. Dit is in het belang van de uniformiteit van 
de uitleg van fundamentele rechten binnen Europa. Ook bepaalt het Handvest specifi ek 
dat, voor zover de rechten die in het Handvest zijn neergelegd corresponderen met de 
rechten uit het EVRM, de inhoud en de reikwijdte daarvan hetzelfde dient te zijn. Het 
is daarmee voor de ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen binnen het EU-recht van 
belang om aansluiting te zoeken bij het EVRM en de rechtspraak van het EHRM. 
 Het EHRM speelt een gezaghebbende rol bij de uitleg van fundamentele rechten binnen 
Europa. Van grote betekenis hierbij is het individuele klachtrecht dat in het EVRM is 
vastgelegd. Dit klachtrecht stelt individuen in staat om na de uitputting van nationale 
rechtsmiddelen een klacht te brengen bij het EHRM tegen een staat wegens een schending 
van  é é n van de rechten uit het EVRM. Door het veelvuldig gebruik van dit individuele 
klachtrecht is het EHRM in staat gesteld om een groot corpus aan jurisprudentie op 
te bouwen. Het EHRM heeft  daarmee ook positieve verplichtingen in zijn rechtspraak 
kunnen ontwikkelen. Het EHRM heeft  al in de jaren 70 een belangrijke fundering voor 
de ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen neergelegd in zaken zoals  Marckx t. Belgi ë , 
 Airey t. Ierland en  X. en Y. t. Nederland . Daarin heeft  het uitgelegd dat staten, naast hun 
negatieve verplichtingen onder het Verdrag, ook positieve verplichtingen hebben. Door 
deze ontwikkeling heeft  het EVRM beoogd om de fundamentele rechten die in het 
EVRM zijn opgenomen op een praktische en eff ectieve manier te beschermen. Hiermee 
wil het voorkomen dat deze rechten louter theoretisch zijn of illusoir blijken. 
 Er bestaat volgens de rechtspraak van het EHRM een aantal verschillen tussen positieve 
en negatieve verplichtingen. In bepaalde opzichten past het EHRM daarom ook een 
andere benadering toe om te bepalen of staten hun negatieve en positieve verplichtingen 
onder het EVRM nakomen. Zo past het EHRM in het geval van positieve verplichtingen, 
in beginsel, een  ‘ fair balance-toets ’ toe om te beoordelen of staten aan hun positieve 
verplichtingen onder het EVRM hebben voldaan. Ook hanteert het als uitgangspunt 
dat staten enige keuzevrijheid hebben ten aanzien van de wijze waarop zij aan deze 
verplichtingen voldoen. Daarnaast erkent het EHRM in zijn rechtspraak verschillende 
beperkingen ten aanzien van de reikwijdte van positieve verplichtingen. Het kan 
bijvoorbeeld van belang zijn of een staat daadwerkelijk kennis had of had kunnen 
hebben van het bestaan van een schending ingeval er actief optreden door de staat 
wordt gevraagd. Ook mogen volgens het EHRM geen onmogelijke en disproportionele 
lasten voor staten worden gecre ë erd door het opleggen van positieve verplichtingen. 
Het is daarmee van belang om te begrijpen waar het onderscheid tussen negatieve en 
positieve verplichtingen precies in bestaat. 
 Uit de jurisprudentie van het EHRM is, ten eerste, af te leiden dat negatieve 
verplichtingen, in tegenstelling tot positieve verplichtingen, traditioneel volgen uit de, 
merendeels negatief geformuleerde, rechten in het EVRM. Positieve verplichtingen 
worden, daarentegen, in de rechtspraak in concrete gevallen vastgesteld. Ten tweede 
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ontstaan negatieve verplichtingen voor staten in beginsel wanneer zij bepaalde 
handelingen verrichten, terwijl positieve verplichtingen ontstaan doordat staten 
juist nalaten om actief op te treden. Het derde verschil tussen positieve en negatieve 
verplichtingen bestaat erin dat het bij negatieve verplichtingen altijd duidelijk is wat 
van staten verwacht mag worden. Het gaat om een resultaatsverplichting: staten dienen 
zich te onthouden van het maken van een inbreuk. Bij positieve verplichtingen wordt in 
beginsel een keuze gelaten ten aanzien van de maatregelen die staten dienen te nemen, 
in die zin dat staten verschillende soorten maatregelen kunnen treff en om aan hun 
positieve verplichting te voldoen. Het EHRM heeft  bovendien verduidelijkt dat het bij 
positieve verplichtingen gaat om een inspanningsverplichting. 
 Deze verschillen tussen positieve en negatieve verplichtingen verklaren in zeker 
opzicht waarom het EHRM een andere benadering toepast op positieve verplichtingen 
in vergelijking met negatieve verplichtingen. Positieve en negatieve verplichtingen 
kunnen echter dicht tegen elkaar aan liggen. In veel gevallen blijkt bijvoorbeeld dat 
een staat al wel bepaald beleid heeft  getroff en om fundamentele rechten te beschermen, 
maar dat het daarbij nog niet specifi ek rekening heeft  gehouden met de rechtspositie 
van bepaalde groepen individuen, zoals minderheden. Er zijn dan zowel handelingen 
als omissies in het spel, zodat zowel positieve als negatieve verplichtingen kunnen 
worden opgelegd. Het EHRM is in zijn rechtspraak niet altijd even duidelijk over de 
vraag hoe de verplichtingen dan moeten worden gekwalifi ceerd. 
 Verder inzicht in de inhoud en betekenis van positieve verplichtingen is geboden 
door de verschillende typologie ë n die voor positieve verplichtingen zijn ontwikkeld. 
Er bestaan bijvoorbeeld materi ë le en procedurele typen positieve verplichtingen. 
Materi ë le positieve verplichtingen kunnen diverse vormen aannemen, zoals een 
verplichting om wetgeving aan te nemen zodat de rechten van partners van gelijk 
geslacht worden beschermd of een verplichting om praktische maatregelen te treff en 
zodat een demonstratie op een vreedzame manier kan verlopen. Bij procedurele 
positieve verplichtingen gaat het veeleer om de organisatorische wijze waarop staten 
fundamentele rechten beschermen. De bescherming van het recht op een eerlijk 
proces of het recht op eff ectieve remedies vergt bijvoorbeeld dat er verschillende 
procedurele voorzieningen worden geboden. Gelet op het soort maatregelen dat van 
staten kan worden vereist, kan er eveneens een onderscheid tussen het wetgevende, 
het bestuursrechtelijke en het praktische of organisatorische type positieve verplichting 
worden gemaakt. Verder bestaan er positieve verplichtingen van een verticaal of een 
horizontaal type. Verticale positieve verplichtingen zien op de verhouding tussen de 
staat en het individu, terwijl het bij horizontale verplichtingen gaat om de verhouding 
tussen individuen onderling. Daarnaast vallen positieve verplichtingen met een sociale 
dimensie te onderkennen, waarbij een individu vanwege zijn of haar kwetsbare positie 
in de samenleving inbreuken op fundamentele rechten kan ondervinden en hulp van de 
staat nodig heeft . Tot slot is er een typologie ontwikkeld waarbij de negatieve verplichting 
als basis fungeert om het type positieve verplichting te karakteriseren. In die lezing 
bestaan er bijvoorbeeld afh ankelijke positieve verplichtingen die ontstaan doordat de 
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staat een inbreuk heeft  gemaakt op zijn negatieve verplichting. Als de staat de vrijheid 
heeft  ontnomen van een individu door het opleggen van een gevangenisstraf, kan de 
staat daardoor verantwoordelijk worden gehouden voor het treff en van maatregelen 
om het recht op priv é leven van het individu in de gevangenis te beschermen. Bij een 
meer autonome positieve verplichting is het verband met een negatieve verplichting 
van de staat minder rechtstreeks te leggen. Een dergelijke positieve verplichting kan 
er bijvoorbeeld in bestaan dat de staat mensenhandel of terrorisme dient te bestrijden. 
 Het EHRM heeft  er bij de ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen duidelijk voor 
gekozen om een niet al te restrictieve benadering ten aanzien van de uitleg van 
fundamentele rechten toe te passen. Uit de benadering van het EHRM blijkt dat de staat 
een belangrijke rol speelt waar het gaat om de bescherming van fundamentele rechten, die 
zich ook uit kan strekken tot gevallen waarin schendingen plaatsvinden in horizontale 
rechtsverhoudingen en gevallen waar sociale en economische verplichtingen voor 
staten kunnen ontstaan. Het EHRM heeft  zich in verschillende uitspraken uitgelaten 
over de rationale die het aan de ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen ten grondslag 
heeft  gelegd. Zo speelt mee dat staten vanwege sociale en technische ontwikkelingen 
steeds beter in staat zijn om eff ectieve bescherming te bieden. Daarnaast heeft  het 
EVRM verklaard dat het ervan uitgaat dat, zodra de staat de keuze maakt om op een 
bepaalde rechtsterrein regelgevend op te treden, de staat er ook voor dient te zorgen 
dat bescherming van fundamentele rechten aan elke persoon toekomt. Zodra de staat 
bepaald handelen van private actoren goedkeurt, bijvoorbeeld door het verlenen van 
een vergunning voor bepaalde activiteiten, kan in ieder geval worden aangenomen dat 
de staat aansprakelijk is voor de schendingen van fundamentele rechten die daardoor 
plaats kunnen vinden. Staten kunnen in zo ’ n situatie geacht worden kennis te hebben 
van schendingen en kunnen dan niet meer stilzitten. Het Hof houdt rekening met zijn 
positie ten opzichte van de nationale rechters en de nationale autoriteiten. In beginsel 
geeft  het ook geen concrete aanwijzingen over de manier waarop staten precies invulling 
moeten geven aan positieve verplichtingen op nationaal niveau. 
 Toch heeft  onder het EVRM de ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen gezorgd voor 
een verruiming van verplichtingen van de staten. Door de vaststelling van positieve 
verplichtingen kunnen staten in verschillende situatietypen en voor verschillende 
soorten inbreuken op fundamentele rechten aansprakelijk worden gehouden. Zo 
kunnen staten verantwoordelijk worden gesteld voor de bescherming van fundamentele 
rechten in het geval van een schending in de priv é sfeer of wanneer de schending te 
maken heeft  met de kwetsbare positie waarin bepaalde individuen in de samenleving 
verkeren, zoals migranten en mensen met een mentale of fysieke beperking. Doordat 
het EHRM positieve verplichtingen op een casu ï stische manier vaststelt, cre ë ert 
het een bepaalde onzekerheid ten aanzien van de verplichtingen die staten toekomt 
en het soort gevallen waarvoor zij verantwoordelijk worden gehouden. Van staten 
wordt tegelijkertijd verwacht dat zij een proactieve rol vervullen waar het gaat om de 
bescherming van fundamentele rechten, en dat zij zich onthouden van het maken van 
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inbreuk op die grondrechten. Het is soms moeilijk om daartussen de juiste balans te 
vinden. Als gevolg van de ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen is bovendien de 
positie van individuen ten opzichte van staten versterkt. Door het aanbrengen van een 
klacht bij het EHRM over het nalaten van het optreden van staten, kunnen zij ervoor 
zorgen dat staten hun gehele beleid aanpassen of nieuwe wetgeving aannemen. 
 De ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen door het EHRM is op kritiek gestuit. 
Zowel in de literatuur als door sommige rechters van het EHRM is weleens de vraag 
opgeworpen of er voldoende basis bestaat voor het afl eiden van positieve verplichtingen 
uit de bepalingen van het EVRM. Fundamentele rechten zijn er met name op gericht 
om bescherming te verlenen tegen het handelen van de staat. Sommige auteurs zijn 
daarom van oordeel dat een te ruime ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen niet 
past bij de aard van de bescherming van fundamentele rechten. Daarnaast wordt het als 
problematisch ervaren dat de staat verantwoordelijk wordt gehouden voor schendingen 
van fundamentele rechten in horizontale rechtsverhoudingen. Het kan lastig zijn 
om in dit soort situaties precies af te bakenen wanneer de staat verantwoordelijk 
kan worden gesteld. Een ander punt van kritiek op de ontwikkeling van positieve 
verplichtingen heeft  te maken met de rechtspolitieke keuzes die de vaststelling van 
positieve verplichtingen kan impliceren. Het bepalen van de maatregelen die de staat 
dient te treff en is in beginsel een aangelegenheid waarvoor democratisch gekozen 
vertegenwoordigers de verantwoording behoren te dragen. Er ontstaat daarom een 
zekere spanning als rechters, die niet rechtstreeks zijn gekozen, besluiten nemen over 
de actieve maatregelen van staten. Het EHRM is daarbij in het bijzonder bekritiseerd 
vanwege zijn positie als een supranationaal hof dat ver afstaat van de Europese staten 
en daardoor mogelijk minder zicht en kennis heeft  van de specifi eke omstandigheden 
waarin staten een belangenafweging dienen te maken. Tot slot is een problematische 
kant van de casu ï stische ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen dat dit een zekere 
mate van onvoorspelbaarheid tot gevolg heeft . Positieve verplichtingen komen vaak pas 
in concrete situaties in de rechtspraak aan de orde. De nationale wetgevers of bestuurlijke 
autoriteiten kunnen daarbij niet altijd voorzien op welke wijze fundamentele rechten 
eff ectief moeten worden beschermd. 
 Deel II: Parameters van het EU-recht en het EU-systeem voor de Bescherming van 
Fundamentele Rechten 
 Om te kunnen bepalen welke ruimte er binnen het EU-recht bestaat voor een 
ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen, is in dit onderzoek rekening gehouden 
met verschillende algemene en meer specifi eke kenmerken van het EU-recht en het 
specifi eke systeem waarbinnen fundamentele rechten in de EU-rechtsorde worden 
beschermd. Daarbij gaat het om de institutionele positie en de rechterlijke stijl van 
het Hof van Justitie, het beginsel van de begrensde bevoegdheden van de EU en het 
beperkte toepassingsgebied van fundamentele rechten onder het EU-recht. 
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 In algemene zin moet in het oog worden gehouden dat de EU van oorsprong geen 
mensenrechtenorganisatie is en lange tijd niet over een eigen grondrechtencatalogus 
beschikte. Door de jaren heen zijn verschillende stappen gezet door het Hof van Justitie 
en de politieke instellingen van de EU om bescherming van fundamentele rechten te 
kunnen bieden binnen de EU-rechtsorde. Een eerste aanleiding om bescherming van 
fundamentele rechten te erkennen binnen het EU-recht werd gevormd door de zorgen 
die de nationale constitutionele hoven uitten nadat het Hof van Justitie de beginselen 
van voorrang en de rechtstreekse werking van het EU-recht vaststelde. Deze beginselen 
beperkten de ruimte om op nationaal niveau bescherming van de fundamentele 
rechten te bieden via de nationale constituties. Het Hof van Justitie besloot daarop 
dat het noodzakelijk was om bescherming van fundamentele rechten op EU-niveau 
op autonome wijze te bieden, zodat de eenheid en de eff ectiviteit van het EU-recht 
kon worden gegarandeerd. De bescherming van de voorrang, eenheid en eff ectiviteit 
blijft  betekenis houden binnen het EU-recht, ook in het kader van de bescherming 
van fundamentele rechten. Tegelijkertijd is de rationale van de bescherming van 
fundamentele rechten binnen het EU-recht als onderdeel van het rechtstaatgedachte 
zichtbaar geworden. Het is van belang dat zowel de handelingen van de EU-instellingen 
als die van de lidstaten, voor zover zij het EU-recht ten uitvoer brengen, op de diverse 
terreinen van het EU-recht gebonden worden aan de normen van fundamentele rechten. 
 Binnen het EU-recht heeft  het Handvest, dat sinds 2009 bindend is geworden, een 
belangrijke plek gekregen. Nationale rechters stellen in toenemende mate vragen over 
de toepassing van het Handvest en over de betekenis van de verschillende rechten en 
beginselen die daarin zijn opgenomen. Bij de beantwoording van deze vragen stelt 
het Hof van Justitie de bepalingen uit het Handvest centraal en laat het een zekere 
autonome benadering zien ten aanzien van de uitleg van fundamentele rechten. Het 
Hof van Justitie wijst er daarbij op dat de EU niet gebonden is aan het EVRM. De 
inspanningen die zijn betracht om de EU te laten toetreden tot het EVRM zijn tot 
dusver op niets uitgelopen. In  Opinie 2/13 heeft  het Hof van Justitie gewezen op het 
specifi eke karakter van het EU-recht, dat volgens het Hof, zonder nadere afspraken, 
in de weg staat aan de toetreding tot de EU. Hoewel het Hof van Justitie zich dus niet 
formeel gebonden acht aan het EVRM, zoekt het nochtans aansluiting bij de uitspraken 
van het EHRM om fundamentele rechten binnen Europa op een uniforme wijze uit te 
leggen. Het Handvest laat daarnaast toe dat er een ruimere betekenis aan fundamentele 
rechten wordt gegeven dan het minimumniveau dat onder het EVRM geldt. 
 Het Hof van Justitie heeft , sinds het Handvest bindende werking heeft  gekregen, met 
name vragen van de nationale rechters ontvangen over het precieze toepassingsgebied 
van het Handvest. Daarbij heeft  het verduidelijkt dat er ruimte blijft  bestaan voor de 
toepassing van het nationale (constitutionele) recht, maar dat deze ruimte begrensd 
is door de bescherming van de eenheid, eff ectiviteit en de voorrang van het EU-recht. 
Deze beperking lijkt met name van belang te zijn voor die situaties waarin lidstaten 
geen discretie hebben bij het ten uitvoer brengen van het EU-recht. Een ander 
Handvestonderwerp waarover nog veel vragen bestaan betreft  het onderscheid dat 
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wordt gemaakt tussen rechten en beginselen. Uit het Handvest blijkt dat er een zekere 
terughoudendheid dient te worden betracht ten aanzien van de toepassing van de 
beginselen. Onduidelijk is nog welke bepalingen in het Handvest precies beginselen 
bevatten, maar de verwachting is dat het gaat om de verschillende sociale  ‘ rechten ’ die 
in het Handvest zijn opgenomen. Voor een ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen 
ten aanzien van deze beginselen lijkt daardoor weinig ruimte te bestaan onder het 
EU-recht. 
 Voor een nadere beoordeling van de ruimte voor de ontwikkeling van positieve 
verplichtingen binnen het EU-recht is verder rekening gehouden met de specifi eke stijl 
van de uitspraken van het Hof van Justitie, met de procedures die bij het Hof kunnen 
worden benut, en met de institutionele positie van het Hof. Ten aanzien van deze 
aspecten zijn belangrijke verschillen te zien met de situatie bij het EHRM. Het Hof van 
Justitie legt, in beginsel, een vrij formele redenering ten grondslag aan zijn uitspraken. 
Tot dusver bieden de uitspraken van het Hof op het terrein van fundamentele rechten 
weinig inzicht in de theoretische uitgangspunten en doctrines die het toepast. Hierover 
wordt wel meer duidelijkheid geboden in de conclusies van Advocaten-Generaal die bij 
de voorliggende zaken bij het Hof van Justitie ter advies worden uitgebracht. Uit deze 
conclusies blijkt dat het concept van positieve verplichtingen in verschillende zaken 
onderwerp van discussie kon zijn, zoals in het geval van de horizontale doorwerking 
van het EU-recht en daarnaast in het asielrecht. Anders dan in de rechtspraak van het 
EHRM komen dergelijke aspecten in de uiteindelijke uitspraak echter niet of nauwelijks 
naar voren. 
 Verder worden vragen over de uitleg van fundamentele rechten binnen het EU-recht 
doorgaans via de prejudici ë le verwijzingsprocedure aan het Hof van Justitie voorgelegd. 
In zeer beperkte omstandigheden kan een individu rechtstreeks een beroep brengen bij 
het Hof van Justitie. De prejudici ë le verwijzingsprocedure kan (alleen) door nationale 
rechters worden aangewend specifi ek om vragen te stellen over de interpretatie en de 
geldigheid van bepalingen van het EU-recht. Nationale rechters spelen in deze procedure 
een belangrijke rol doordat zij de vragen formuleren waarop zij een antwoord van het 
Hof van Justitie willen ontvangen. Anders dan het EHRM is het Hof van Justitie niet 
snel geneigd op eigen initiatief uitleg te geven aan bepalingen van fundamentele rechten 
en richt het zich met name op bepalingen van secundair EU-recht, zoals verordeningen 
en richtlijnen, die in een concreet geval al de basis voor bescherming kunnen bieden. 
Hieruit blijkt dat nationale rechters een belangrijke rol hebben te spelen voor een 
mogelijke ontwikkeling en sturing van positieve verplichtingen onder het EU-recht. 
 Voor een ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen onder het EU-recht is ook 
de specifi eke institutionele positie van het Hof van Justitie van belang. Het Hof van 
Justitie behoudt namelijk een zekere afstand tot de wetgevende instellingen van 
de EU. In politieke, sociale en technische vraagstukken is het Hof niet snel geneigd 
om EU-wetgeving nietig te verklaren en beoogt het de beoordelingsruimte van de 
EU-instellingen te eerbiedigen. Het Hof heeft  verschillende technieken ontwikkeld om 
op een marginale wijze EU-wetgeving te kunnen toetsen. Met het toepassen van een 
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zogenaamde  ‘ reconciliatory interpretation ’, bijvoorbeeld, beoogt het Hof van Justitie 
de bepalingen van secundair EU-recht dusdanig uit te leggen conform de beginselen 
van het EU-recht, zoals fundamentele rechten, dat daarmee de wetgeving zelf in stand 
kan worden gelaten. Opvallend is dat bij deze toetsing een bepaalde ruimte voor een 
ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen ontstaat. Een voorbeeld daarvan biedt de 
zaak  N.S. en anderen , waarin het Hof van Justitie uitleg gaf over de bepalingen van de 
Dublin-verordening, op basis waarvan lidstaten asielzoekers dienen terug te sturen naar 
de lidstaat waar de asielzoeker voor het eerst de EU is binnengekomen en die daarmee 
verantwoordelijk is voor de behandeling van het asielverzoek. Het Hof van Justitie 
heeft  in dit arrest verduidelijkt dat deze terugkeer geen doorgang kan vinden ingeval 
er ten aanzien van een bepaalde lidstaat een ernstige vrees is dat de asielprocedures 
en de opvangvoorzieningen voor asielzoekers tekortschieten en er een onmenselijke 
of vernederende behandeling plaatsvindt. In N.S. en anderen had het Hof van Justitie 
ook kunnen besluiten om de verordening nietig te verklaren wegens strijd met 
fundamentele rechten, en daarmee de EU-wetgever verantwoordelijk kunnen houden 
voor een (potentiële) schending van het Handvest bij het overdragen van asielzoekers. 
Het Hof van Justitie koos er echter voor om niet de EU-wetgever, maar de lidstaten 
verantwoordelijk te stellen voor het voorkomen van schendingen van fundamentele 
rechten in andere lidstaten. Alleen in bepaalde gevallen kiest het Hof voor een minder 
terughoudende benadering tegenover de EU-wetgever. Indien er sprake is van zodanig 
ernstige schendingen van fundamentele rechten dat de wetgeving zelf niet in stand kan 
worden gelaten, heeft  het Hof van Justitie, zeker in de afgelopen jaren, wel degelijk 
bereidheid getoond om nietigheid aan te nemen. Dit deed het bijvoorbeeld in het geval 
van de Dataretentierichtlijn, die serieuze tekortkomingen toonde ten aanzien van de 
bescherming van het recht op privacy. 
 Toch bewaart het Hof ook ten opzichte van de nationale autoriteiten een zekere 
afstand. Dit doet het in ieder geval waar het gaat om de toepassing van het EU-recht in 
het nationale recht. Onder de prejudici ë le verwijzingsprocedure geldt als uitgangspunt 
dat het Hof van Justitie als taak heeft  om het EU-recht te interpreteren en dat de 
nationale rechter de juiste toepassing daarvan dient te verzekeren binnen het nationale 
recht. Indien er in primaire en secundaire EU-wetgeving geen specifi eke vereisten zijn 
gesteld ten aanzien van de handelingen van het EU-recht, kiest het Hof van Justitie 
er regelmatig voor om die discretie te benadrukken indien een nationale rechter daar 
vragen over heeft  gesteld. Waar het bijvoorbeeld gaat om de procedurele standaarden 
die op nationaal niveau moeten worden toegepast om het EU-recht te eff ectueren, 
gaat het Hof van Justitie uit van het beginsel van procedurele autonomie, zolang er op 
nationaal niveau procedurele voorzieningen kunnen worden getroff en. 
 Een andere factor van belang is de rol die het Hof van Justitie beoogt te spelen op 
het terrein van fundamentele rechten, evenals de verwachtingen die daarover bestaan. 
Sommige auteurs verwachten dat het Hof van Justitie een belangrijke rol op dit gebied 
inneemt en in sterke mate bescherming biedt. Deze rol wordt noodzakelijk geacht 
vanwege de democratische tekorten die er in de EU bestaan. Met name sinds het 
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Handvest bindend is geworden en het Hof van Justitie dit instrument op een autonome 
wijze uitlegt, heerst ook de verwachting dat het Hof van Justitie fundamentele 
rechtendoctrines zal ontwikkelen, zoals een doctrine van positieve verplichtingen. 
Het Hof van Justitie heeft  zich daartoe tot dusver niet bereid getoond. Het behoudt in 
meer of mindere mate zijn formele stijl van uitspraken, hoewel sommige auteurs die 
minder goed vinden passen in zaken waar fundamentele rechten op het spel staan. 
Tegelijkertijd zijn er ook geluiden te horen dat het Hof van Justitie niet de positie van een 
mensenrechtenhof dient in te nemen. Het moet (ook) andere belangen in overweging 
nemen, zoals de bescherming van het vrije verkeer, de verdere economische integratie 
tussen de lidstaten en de toepassing van het beginsel van wederzijds vertrouwen op 
terreinen zoals het migratierecht en het strafrecht. Het Hof van Justitie heeft  dus te 
maken met verschillende verwachtingen omtrent de rol die het speelt op het terrein 
van mensenrechten. Uit dit onderzoek is in ieder geval gebleken dat het Hof van Justitie 
aansluiting zou kunnen zoeken bij de doctrines die door het EHRM zijn ontwikkeld, 
vooral vanwege de kennis en ervaring die het EHRM in huis heeft  als het gaat om 
de uitleg van fundamentele rechten en vanwege de wens om uniformiteit in de uitleg 
van fundamentele rechten binnen Europa te bewaren. Het overnemen van bepaalde 
doctrines laat bovendien voldoende ruimte aan het Hof van Justitie om een autonome 
uitleg van het EU-recht te geven en bepaalde specifi eke eigenschappen van het EU-recht 
te bewaken. Voor een ontwikkeling van een doctrine van positieve verplichtingen is het 
dan van belang dat rekening wordt gehouden met de beperkte bevoegdheden van de 
EU en het beperkte toepassingsgebied van de EU-fundamentele rechten. 
 Het vraagstuk van de bevoegdheden van de EU om maatregelen te kunnen nemen 
om fundamentele rechten te beschermen is al geruime tijd voorwerp van debat in 
de literatuur. Op basis van het attributiebeginsel kan de EU alleen handelen op de 
gebieden waarop het specifi eke bevoegdheden toebedeeld heeft  gekregen, maar ten 
opzichte van de ruimte die er bestaat om fundamentele rechten te beschermen is 
onduidelijk  ó f en wat voor soort bevoegdheden de EU toebedeeld heeft  gekregen. Dit 
wordt in de literatuur met name als problematisch ervaren met het oog op de positieve 
verplichtingen die uit de bescherming van fundamentele rechten kunnen voortvloeien 
en de wetgevende, bestuursrechtelijke en rechterlijke maatregelen die daarbij kunnen 
worden verlangd. Toch nemen verschillende auteurs aan dat de EU bepaalde, zij het 
beperkte, bevoegdheden heeft  om regelgevend op te kunnen treden om fundamentele 
rechten te beschermen. Ten eerste heeft  de EU specifi eke bevoegdheden om op het 
gebied van de bescherming van persoonsgegevens en het non-discriminatierecht 
op te treden. Ten tweede kan worden betoogd dat de EU een indirecte of accessoire 
bevoegdheid heeft  om bescherming van fundamentele rechten te kunnen bieden zodat 
het kan verzekeren dat alle handelingen die worden getroff en op zijn verschillende 
bevoegdheidsgebieden verenigbaar zijn met fundamentele rechten. In art. 51, eerste 
lid, van het Handvest, wordt immers bepaald dat EU-instellingen en de lidstaten, voor 
zover zij het EU-recht ten uitvoer brengen, de rechten van het EU-Handvest dienen 
te eerbiedigen, de daarin opgenomen beginselen moeten naleven en de rechten en 
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beginselen dienen te bevorderen. Deze indirecte bevoegdheid is wel aan bepaalde 
grenzen gebonden. In het EU-Verdrag en in het Handvest wordt benadrukt dat de 
bevoegdheden van de EU niet mogen worden uitgebreid op basis van de bescherming 
van fundamentele rechten. Een indirecte bevoegdheid om fundamentele rechten te 
beschermen dient dus altijd als accessoir aan de bestaande bevoegdheden van de EU te 
worden opgevat. De bescherming van fundamentele rechten door de EU kan daarmee 
nooit een doel op zichzelf worden, waardoor deze benadering goed past binnen het 
attributiebeginsel. 
 De ruimte voor het treff en van maatregelen op basis van deze indirecte bevoegdheid 
is belangrijk in het licht van een ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen. In de 
EU-Verdragen en in het Handvest is een belangrijke rechtsbasis te vinden voor het 
opleggen van positieve verplichtingen op verschillende rechtsterreinen. Een dergelijke 
rechtsbasis kan, onder meer, worden gevonden in het loyaliteitsbeginsel dat is 
neergelegd in art. 4, derde lid, EU-Verdrag en dat van de lidstaten verwacht dat zij alle 
algemene en bijzondere maatregelen treff en die benodigd zijn om de verplichtingen 
onder het EU-recht te verzekeren. Daarnaast kan ook aan art. 19, eerste lid, van het 
EU-Verdrag bijzondere betekenis toekomen, omdat daarin van de lidstaten wordt vereist 
dat zij voorzien in de nodige rechtsmiddelen om daadwerkelijke rechtsbescherming 
te verzekeren binnen het kader van het EU-recht. Het Handvest biedt onder meer in 
art. 52, derde lid, een belangrijke basis voor de doorwerking van de positieve verplichtingen 
die door het EHRM zijn ontwikkeld in het EU-recht. Ten slotte kan uit art. 52, eerste lid, 
van het Handvest een verplichting worden afgeleid om een wetgevend kader te cre ë ren 
waarmee inbreuken op fundamentele rechten kunnen worden voorkomen. 
 Hoewel er dus bepaalde bevoegdheden kunnen worden geconstrueerd op grond 
waarvan de EU maatregelen kan treff en om fundamentele rechten te beschermen, 
zijn er aanvullende beginselen benodigd om te kunnen vaststellen wanneer de EU 
van zijn bevoegdheden gebruik kan maken. Op de meeste terreinen is er namelijk 
sprake van gedeelde en ondersteunende bevoegdheden, waardoor ook de lidstaten 
bevoegd zijn om maatregelen te treff en om fundamentele rechten te beschermen. Uit 
het subsidiariteitsbeginsel volgt dat de EU op die terreinen slechts optreedt indien 
en voor zover de doelstellingen van het overwogen optreden niet voldoende door de 
lidstaten op centraal, regionaal of lokaal niveau kunnen worden verwezenlijkt, maar 
vanwege de omvang of de gevolgen van het overwogen optreden beter door de EU 
kunnen worden bereikt. Vanuit subsidiariteitsoogpunt kan worden beredeneerd dat 
het bij de implementatie van het EU-recht in beginsel beter is om op nationaal niveau 
een afweging van belangen te maken, omdat dan keuzes kunnen worden gemaakt 
die het beste bij het rechtssysteem van een lidstaat passen. Indien er echter sprake is 
van grensoverschrijdende problematiek om fundamentele rechten eff ectief te kunnen 
beschermen, zou er wel een belangrijke reden kunnen bestaan voor de EU om bepaalde 
wetgevende maatregelen te treff en. 
 Toepassing van de subsidiariteitstoets kan in de praktijk lastig zijn. Fundamentele 
rechten hebben een bijzondere aard, wat het moeilijk maakt om te bepalen wanneer 
uniforme regels op dit terrein daadwerkelijk kunnen bijdragen aan de eff ectieve werking 
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van het EU-recht. Ook is lastig in te schatten of er een grensoverschrijdende impact 
bestaat. Daarom zijn in dit onderzoek andere overwegingen voorgesteld aan de hand 
waarvan kan worden bepaald of de EU gebruik dient te maken van zijn bevoegdheden 
om fundamentele rechten op een actieve manier te beschermen. Deze overwegingen 
kunnen van belang zijn voor de EU-wetgever, maar ook voor het Hof van Justitie 
wanneer het zich in een concreet geval geconfronteerd ziet met een bepaalde lacune in 
de wetgeving en de vraag rijst of het een positieve verplichting dient op te leggen aan de 
EU-instellingen of aan de lidstaten. 
 In de eerste plaats kan regelgevend optreden nodig zijn om te voorkomen dat er een 
 ‘ race naar de bodem ’ wordt ingezet in de standaarden die door de lidstaten worden 
toegepast vanwege het vrije verkeer binnen de EU. Het risico van een race naar de 
bodem zou zich bijvoorbeeld kunnen voordoen op het asielrechtelijk terrein, waarvan 
het bekend is dat de lidstaten vaak terughoudend zijn om regelingen te treff en die 
gunstiger zijn dan de minimale verplichtingen waaraan ze al onder het EU-recht en 
het EVRM dienen te voldoen. Een andere overweging die regelgevend optreden door 
de EU van belang kan maken is als er een duidelijk verband kan worden gelegd tussen 
de handelingen van de EU en de inbreuken die op fundamentele rechten plaatsvinden. 
Indien de EU, bijvoorbeeld, een nieuw handelsregime introduceert waar ondernemingen 
schade van zouden kunnen ondervinden, dan is het logisch om ook aan te nemen dat de 
EU maatregelen treft  waarmee compensatie en remedies worden geboden om het recht 
op eigendom te beschermen. Een andere overweging, ten slotte, kan de bescherming 
van de voorrang, de uniformiteit en de eff ectiviteit van het EU-recht betreff en. Juist 
de divergerende standaarden van de lidstaten op het terrein van het arbeidsrecht, 
bijvoorbeeld, kunnen in de weg staan aan de eff ectiviteit van het vrije verkeer van 
werknemers en het vrije verkeer van vestiging. Deze verschillende overwegingen 
kunnen door elkaar heen lopen en dus ook in combinatie een grond vormen voor 
regelgevend optreden op EU-niveau om fundamentele rechten te beschermen. 
 In verband met de beperkte bevoegdheden van de EU geldt verder dat EU-fundamentele 
rechten slechts in beperkte situaties kunnen worden toegepast. Dit derde bijzondere 
kenmerk van het EU-recht werpt de vraag op of het leerstuk van de positieve 
verplichtingen eigenlijk wel toepassing kan vinden in het EU-recht. Het gaat bij 
positieve verplichtingen immers om situaties waarin er nog geen specifi eke regels of 
maatregelen zijn getroff en door de EU, waarmee de conclusie kan worden getrokken dat 
deze situaties buiten het toepassingsgebied van het EU-recht vallen. Deze conclusie zou 
echter onwenselijk zijn in het geval er bepaalde lacunes bestaan in EU-wetgeving en de 
implementatie daarvan op nationaal niveau waardoor schendingen van fundamentele 
rechten zouden kunnen plaatsvinden. Om voor die gevallen toch positieve verplichtingen 
binnen het EU-recht te kunnen erkennen, kan het noodzakelijk zijn om een zekere 
fl exibele interpretatie te geven aan het toepassingsgebied van fundamentele rechten. 
Eén van de conclusies bij dit onderzoek is dat het Hof van Justitie in een voorkomend 
geval aansluiting zou kunnen zoeken bij de positieve verplichtingen die al op nationaal 
niveau zijn erkend en waaraan al invulling is gegeven. Indien er op nationaal niveau 
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immers al een zekere consensus is bereikt over bepaalde maatregelen die dienen te 
worden getroff en om fundamentele rechten te beschermen, kan het Hof van Justitie in 
redelijkheid van de lidstaten verlangen dat zij dergelijke maatregelen ook treff en om 
bescherming te bieden aan fundamentele rechten in de context van het EU-recht. Dat 
zou dan alleen voor sommige lidstaten kunnen betekenen dat zij nieuwe maatregelen en 
remedies dienen te treff en. In zo ’ n situatie is het uiteraard wel van belang dat de EU een 
zekere bevoegdheid toekomt om op het betreff ende terrein maatregelen op te leggen. 
Het kan dan om een specifi eke of een indirecte bevoegdheid gaan, zoals hierboven al 
is beschreven. Verder is het van belang dat het Hof van Justitie nagaat welke specifi eke 
keuzes de EU-wetgever heeft  gemaakt op het betreff ende terrein. Het kan immers juist 
zo zijn dat er voor is gekozen dat er discretie wordt gelaten aan de lidstaten om bepaalde 
voorzieningen te treff en. In dat geval is de ruimte voor de ontwikkeling van positieve 
verplichtingen sterk beperkt. 
 In dit verband is van belang dat het Hof van Justitie verschillende soorten situaties 
binnen het toepassingsgebied van EU fundamentele rechten heeft  gebracht. In de 
meeste gevallen gaat het om situaties waarin de lidstaten rechtstreeks bepalingen van 
secundair EU-recht implementeren of tenuitvoerleggen, de zogenaamde  ‘ agency ’ -
situatie. Het uitgangspunt is dat de lidstaten in zo ’ n geval namens de EU handelen, 
zodat logischerwijs kan worden verwacht dat zij daarbij bescherming bieden aan de 
bepalingen van fundamentele rechten onder het EU-recht. In dat geval kunnen er zowel 
negatieve als positieve verplichtingen aan de lidstaten worden opgelegd. In de regel 
zal het daarbij gaan om een afh ankelijk type positieve verplichting, dat wil zeggen een 
positieve verplichting die er voor zorgt dat er bij de uitvoering van het EU-recht geen 
negatieve inbreuken op fundamentele rechten worden gemaakt. Voor het ontstaan van 
de verplichting dient er immers al een bepaalde handeling van de EU aanwezig te zijn 
waardoor fundamentele rechten kunnen worden toegepast. 
 Het Hof van Justitie heeft  verder erkend dat lidstaten de fundamentele rechten onder 
het EU-recht dienen te beschermen indien zij afwijken van het vrij verkeersrecht en 
indien zij een discretionaire bevoegdheid hebben onder het EU-recht om toepassing 
te geven aan nationaal beleid. In deze situaties is er minder ruimte voor het Hof 
van Justitie om positieve verplichtingen te ontwikkelen. De lidstaten handelen dan 
immers overwegend op basis van de bevoegdheden die hen onder het nationale recht 
toekomen, ofwel ten aanzien van gevoelige beleidsterreinen waarmee de ruimte voor de 
ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen sterk wordt beperkt. 
 Deel III: Analyse van Concrete Voorbeelden van Positieve Verplichtingen binnen het 
EU-recht en Conclusies 
 In beginsel is er volgens dit onderzoek binnen het EU-recht weinig ruimte voor een 
ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen door het Hof van Justitie. De EU-wetgever 
kan in secundair EU-recht, zoals richtlijnen of verordeningen, al bepaalde concretisering 
hebben gegeven aan de handelingen die door de EU-instellingen of door de lidstaten 
dienen te worden verricht om fundamentele rechten te beschermen. De EU-wetgever kan 
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er ook al voor hebben gekozen om binnen het EU-recht gevolg te geven aan de positieve 
verplichtingen die bijvoorbeeld door het EHRM zijn geformuleerd. Zodra er al een 
dergelijke concretisering is gegeven in EU-wetgeving, zal het niet noodzakelijk zijn voor 
het Hof van Justitie om positieve verplichtingen vast te stellen op basis van bepalingen van 
fundamentele rechten. Tegelijkertijd kunnen situaties ontstaan waarin het (secundaire) 
EU-recht voor de EU-instellingen of de lidstaten geen helderheid brengt in de maatregelen 
die zij dienen te treff en om fundamentele rechten te beschermen, bijvoorbeeld omdat 
die situatie niet is voorzien. Een positieve verplichting zal dan ook doorgaans worden 
vastgesteld in een concrete casus die laat zien dat er bepaalde maatregelen nodig zijn om 
een omissie in wetgeving te repareren. Het Hof van Justitie kan in zo’n situatie worden 
gevraagd zich uit te spreken over de vraag welke positieve verplichtingen uit specifi eke 
bepalingen van fundamentele rechten kunnen worden afgeleid. 
 De analyse van de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie heeft  laten zien dat er 
inmiddels al verschillende soorten positieve verplichtingen zijn ontwikkeld binnen 
het EU-recht. Van belang hierbij is dat bij de bestudering van deze rechtspraak een 
aangepaste defi nitie van het concept positieve verplichtingen is toegepast. Het gaat, 
net zoals in de rechtspraak van het EHRM, weliswaar om verplichtingen om actieve 
maatregelen te treff en ter bescherming van fundamentele rechten, maar daarbij geldt 
voor de rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie dat deze maatregelen niet al als zodanig 
zijn verdisconteerd in wettelijke bepalingen van primair of secundair EU-recht. De 
verrichte analyse richt zich daarmee op de situatie waarin positieve verplichtingen in de 
rechtspraak door het Hof van Justitie worden vastgesteld. Deze situatie laat duidelijke 
parallellen zien met de ontwikkeling van positieve verplichtingen onder het EVRM, die 
alleen heeft  plaatsgevonden in de rechtspraak van het EHRM. 
 De rechtspraak van het Hof van Justitie laat met name verschillende soorten 
procedurele positieve verplichtingen zien die de lidstaten moeten vervullen bij het 
ten uitvoer brengen van het EU-recht op nationaal niveau. Zo heeft  het Hof van 
Justitie van nationale rechters vereist dat zij voorlopige voorzieningen treff en of dat 
zij bepaalde rechtsgangen cre ë ren ter bescherming van het beginsel van eff ectieve 
rechterlijke bescherming. Vooral op nationale rechters wordt vaak een beroep gedaan 
om te verzekeren dat fundamentele rechten in de EU-context worden beschermd. 
In de geschillen die zijn ontstaan over het opleggen van een rechterlijk verbod aan 
internet service providers in verband met de bescherming van het intellectueel 
eigendomsrecht, heeft  het Hof van Justitie bijvoorbeeld vereist dat nationale rechters 
er bij de belangenafweging voor zorgen dat de verschillende fundamentele rechten van 
de private partijen in ogenschouw worden genomen. Dat laat zien dat er een zekere 
horizontale dimensie aan positieve verplichtingen in de rechtspraak van het Hof van 
Justitie toekomt. Ook is het mogelijk dat er een bepaalde sociale dimensie is bij het 
opleggen van een positieve verplichting binnen het EU-recht. Het Hof van Justitie heeft  
bijvoorbeeld verduidelijkt dat er voorlopige voorzieningen dienen te worden getroff en 
om een ernstig zieke vreemdeling te beschermen die in afwachting is van het beroep 
tegen zijn uitzetting en daarnaast te voorzien in zijn of haar basisvoorzieningen. In 
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al deze gevallen wordt daarvoor geen concretisering geboden in secundair EU-recht, 
maar leidt het Hof van Justitie die positieve verplichtingen af uit onder meer het recht 
op een eff ectief rechtsmiddel en het verbod van  refoulement . Tegelijkertijd is voor al 
deze situaties van belang dat de positieve verplichtingen nauw samenhangen met, 
of  – in de EHRM-terminologie – afh ankelijk zijn van het feit dat er in het secundaire 
EU-recht al bepaalde verplichtingen en maatregelen zijn vastgelegd. 
 Tot het vaststellen van wetgevende verplichtingen gaat het Hof van Justitie niet snel 
over. Het formuleren van een wetgevende verplichting voor de lidstaten door het Hof 
van Justitie levert direct spanning op met het attributiebeginsel. Bij uitzondering heeft  
het Hof van Justitie vastgesteld dat nationale wetgevers bij de implementatie van de 
minimumperiode van ouderschapsverlof die onder het EU-recht is bepaald, rekening 
dienen te houden met de bescherming van het beginsel van gelijke behandeling van 
ouders van tweelingen. Ook is in nog beperkte mate een ontwikkeling van positieve 
verplichtingen voor de EU-instellingen zichtbaar. Het gaat hier dan alleen om positieve 
verplichtingen van een procedurele aard. 
 De verwachting is dat positieve verplichtingen zich niet op veel grotere schaal in het 
EU-recht zullen laten zien. Dit heeft  in belangrijke mate te maken met het beperkte 
toepassingsgebied van het EU-recht en, daarmee verband houdend, de beperkte 
bevoegdheden van de EU. Dit onderzoek concludeert dat dit niet direct als problematisch 
dient te worden ervaren, omdat tot op zekere hoogte het nationale rechtssysteem voor 
de bescherming kan zorgen die nodig is bij de implementatie van het EU-recht. In de 
meeste gevallen heeft  de EU gedeelde of ondersteunende bevoegdheden ten aanzien van 
de lidstaten waarmee ruimte bestaat om op nationaal niveau bescherming te bieden. 
Het kan specifi ek zijn bepaald in richtlijnen en verordeningen dat de relevante kwesties 
door de lidstaten en niet door de EU dienen te worden gereguleerd. Daarbij kan het 
wenselijk worden geacht dat er op nationaal niveau keuzes worden gemaakt die het 
beste passen bij het rechtssysteem. Indien echter het nationale beschermingsniveau 
kennelijk tekortschiet, kan er aanleiding zijn om op het niveau van de EU de benodigde 
regelingen te treff en. Bijzondere redenen kunnen er bijvoorbeeld in zijn gelegen dat er 
grensoverschrijdende problematiek rondom de bescherming van fundamentele rechten 
plaatsvindt of dat zich een race naar de bodem voordoet in de standaarden die op nationaal 
niveau plaatsvinden als gevolg van het vrije verkeer van de EU. Ook de bescherming 
van de eff ectiviteit, uniformiteit en voorrang van het EU-recht kan een belangrijke 
reden vormen om juist op EU-niveau te bepalen dat bepaalde maatregelen dienen 
te worden getroff en voor de bescherming van fundamentele rechten. In die gevallen 
bestaat er voldoende rechtsbasis binnen het EU-recht om positieve verplichtingen te 
formuleren, die kan worden gevonden in de EU-Verdragen en in het Handvest. Ook kan 
er ruimte zijn voor het aannemen van positieve verplichtingen vanwege het bestaan van 
een indirecte bevoegdheid voor de EU, waarbij uiteraard wel de begrenzingen van het 
attributie- en het subsidiariteitsbeginsel in acht moeten worden genomen. 
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 Specifi eke situaties in de rechtspraakanalyse laten wel zien dat wanneer er nog 
geen bepalingen zijn getroff en binnen het EU-recht om fundamentele rechten te 
bescherming en daartoe noodzaak is, het lastig kan blijken voor het Hof van Justitie om 
in zo ’ n geval positieve verplichtingen op te leggen. Juist indien er nog geen bepalingen 
zijn getroff en binnen het EU-recht, kan worden gesteld dat zo ’ n situatie buiten het 
toepassings- en bevoegdheidsgebied van het EU-recht valt. Het Hof van Justitie zal zich 
in zo ’ n situatie moeten uitlaten over de vraag hoe een formulering van een positieve 
verplichting kan worden ingepast in het toepassings- en bevoegdheidsgebied van het 
EU-recht. Verder zou het Hof van Justitie kunnen worden bekritiseerd vanwege een 
activistische benadering zodra het besluit bepaalde positieve verplichtingen op te 
leggen. Andersom kan het Hof van Justitie bij het afzien van het opleggen van positieve 
verplichtingen worden bekritiseerd doordat het de bescherming van fundamentele 
rechten niet serieus genoeg neemt. Al heeft  dit onderzoek verschillende handvatten 
geboden die het Hof van Justitie op dit complexe spanningsveld kan benutten bij de 
ontwikkeling van een doctrine van positieve verplichtingen, het maken van de juiste 
keuze zal daarmee lastig blijven. 
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 Th e Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU: Th e Scope for the 
Development of Positive Obligations 
 Th e protection of fundamental rights traditionally gives rise to negative obligations 
for states. States need to ensure that they refrain from interfering with rights such 
as the right to life or the freedom of expression. By now various legal systems also 
recognise that states acquire positive obligations to protect fundamental rights. Th is 
means that they need to take active measures to protect those rights. In Europe, positive 
obligations have, in particular, been developed over a number of years in the case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Based on this case-law, states may be 
required to undertake investigations into suspicious deaths. Th ey may also be expected 
to adopt a general legal framework to protect against the dangers and nuisance caused 
by certain factories or installations. States may further be required to undertake certain 
organisational or practical measures to prevent disturbances occurring, for example, in 
the case of riots during demonstrations. 
 Th is study has explored the scope for the development of positive obligations under 
European Union law (EU law). Th e manner in which the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (ECJ) might develop a doctrine of positive obligations has also been 
examined. Originally, EU law has focused on an economic type of integration between 
the European states. Over the years, however, EU law has expanded into many other 
areas of law such as asylum and migration law, and privacy law. In such areas, it is 
apparent that fundamental rights must be protected by the EU. Th e EU institutions and 
the member states must refrain from interfering with these rights when implementing 
EU law. Th e question is, however, to what extent there also is scope for the development 
of positive obligations within the context of EU law. 
 Th is topic has formed part of a debate in the literature which suggests that there are 
various ways in which positive obligations could be developed under EU law. Some 
authors have debated whether the EU may need to undertake further action to protect 
fundamental rights. Th ey point out that the concept of positive obligations can be seen 
as an essential component of fundamental rights following from the case-law of the 
ECtHR. Th erefore, positive obligations also need to be incorporated into EU law. Some 
authors have suggested that there is potential for the development of positive obligations 
on the basis of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) which became 
binding in 2009. Th e Charter contains the same rights as the European Convention on 
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Human Rights (ECHR) as well as a range of social and economic rights. Th e literature as 
well as the case-law have revealed that the protection of the latter types of fundamental 
rights are dependent in particular on the fulfi lment of positive obligations by states. 
 At the same time, scholars have pointed out that there are several restrictions that 
follow from EU law which limit the scope for the development of positive obligations. 
Th e EU has limited competences to undertake regulatory action in certain fi elds and so 
far it is unclear to what extent the EU is indeed competent to undertake action to ensure 
the protection of fundamental rights. Th erefore, several authors have concluded that 
there is no, or at least very limited, scope for recognising positive obligations within the 
context of EU law. Some scholars even suggest that, as a result of this limitation, certain 
gaps may appear in the system of fundamental rights protection by the EU and that the 
protection of fundamental rights by the EU remains ineff ective if such gaps cannot be 
fi lled. 
 Th is study aims to bring further insight into the potential and the limits for the 
development of positive obligations under EU law. 
 While questions have oft en been raised in academic debates about potential confl icts 
with the doctrine of the limited competences of the EU, it has so far not been analysed 
if and how positive obligations could be incorporated into EU law, nor what exact 
limitations apply to this development. Th is study has, fi rst, provided an insight into 
the implications following from the development of positive obligations by the ECtHR 
and how the ECtHR has developed a doctrine of positive obligations. Next, this study 
has determined what scope there is for the development of positive obligations under 
EU law on the basis of the EU Treaties, the Charter, the case-law of the ECJ and the 
literature. Th irdly, the case-law of the ECJ has been studied to reveal that there exist 
various situations in which positive obligations have already been developed by the 
ECJ. On the basis of this case-law, further conclusions have been reached as to the 
scope for the development of positive obligations and the limits imposed by EU law. 
Th is study also provides recommendations as to how the ECJ might develop positive 
obligations within the context of EU law. 
 Part I: Th e Concept of Positive Obligations within the Context of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
 Th e Convention is of particular importance for the interpretation of fundamental rights 
under EU law. In its case-law, the ECJ developed a practice whereby it has referred to 
the provisions of the Convention, as well as to the judgments of the ECtHR to determine 
the meaning and scope of fundamental rights within the context of EU law. Since the 
Charter became binding in 2009, the ECJ has made fewer references to the Convention, 
although it continues to make references to the judgments of the ECtHR on similar 
matters. Th is is in the interest of securing a uniform interpretation of fundamental 
rights in Europe. Th e Charter also stipulates that in so far as the right laid down in the 
Charter correspond to the rights in the ECHR, the same scope and meaning is to be 
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given to those rights. Th erefore, in respect of the development of a doctrine of positive 
obligations under EU law, it is of interest to take the Convention and the judgments of 
the ECtHR into account. 
 Th e ECtHR plays an authoritative role in the interpretation of fundamental rights 
in Europe. In this regard, the right to individual petition under the Convention has 
proved to be of great importance. Th e individual right to petition under the Convention 
allows individuals, having exhausted all domestic remedies, to bring a complaint 
before the ECtHR against one of the states parties for violations of the rights under the 
Convention. Due to the many individual complaints that have been made, the ECtHR 
has been able to build up a great deal of case-law. Since the 1970s, the ECtHR has 
therefore also been able to develop a concept of positive obligations. Th e ECtHR has 
laid down some foundational principles for its development of positive obligations 
in cases such as  Marckx v. Belgium ,  Airey v. Ireland and  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands . 
In these cases, the ECtHR has explained that states can acquire positive obligations in 
addition to their negative obligations under the Convention. By developing positive 
obligations, the ECtHR has aimed to ensure that fundamental rights become practical 
and eff ective, and to prevent these rights from being theoretical and illusory. 
 Following the case-law of the ECtHR, a certain distinction between positive and 
negative obligations is maintained. Th e ECtHR applies, in some respects, a diff erent 
approach when it analyses whether states have fulfi lled their positive obligations as 
compared to when it analyses states ’ negative obligations under the Convention. In 
principle, the ECtHR applies a fair balance test to determine the existence of states ’ 
positive obligations. Th e ECtHR also, in general, leaves a choice with regard to the 
manner in which states fulfi l their positive obligations. Th e ECtHR further recognises 
several limitations on the scope of positive obligations. Th e ECtHR may require that 
states need to have known, or ought to have known of certain interferences to be able 
to impose positive obligations on the state. Th e ECtHR also considers that positive 
obligations cannot impose impossible or disproportionate burdens on the state. For 
these reasons, it is important to be able to clearly distinguish between these two types 
of fundamental rights obligations. 
 Th e case-law of the ECtHR fi rstly reveals that negative obligations, as opposed to 
positive obligations, follow directly from the provisions of the Convention which are 
moreover negatively formulated. Positive obligations, however, need to be implied in 
individual cases. Secondly, negative obligations are related to states ’ acts, while positive 
obligations relate to states ’ omissions. Th irdly, positive obligations have an  ‘ alternative ’ 
structure, which means that they leave a choice as to the measures which need to be 
taken by states. Negative obligations leave only one choice for the state, that is, to refrain 
from acting. Th ey concern obligations of result. 
 Th ese diff erences between positive and negative obligations may explain the 
approach of the ECtHR in cases concerning positive obligations. Positive and negative 
obligations can, however, sometimes be very closely related. Oft en it is shown that a 
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state has already taken certain positive action to ensure fundamental rights protection, 
but that it has failed to take suffi  cient account of the rights of certain individuals, such 
as minorities which are in a vulnerable position. Th e ECtHR has not always made very 
clear in its case-law what type of obligations it has imposed in such situations. 
 Further insight has been given into the content and meaning of positive obligations 
by discussing the various typologies of positive obligations which have been 
developed. Th e ECtHR itself distinguishes between material and procedural types of 
positive obligations. Material positive obligations may take various forms, such as an 
obligation to adopt legislative measures to guarantee the rights of same-sex couples 
or an obligation to adopt practical measures to ensure that a demonstration proceeds 
peacefully. Procedural positive obligations are concerned with the organisational 
dimension of fundamental rights protection. Th e right to a fair trial and the right to 
eff ective remedies in particular require states to guarantee several procedural rights. 
Looking at the types of measures which states could take to implement the positive 
obligations under the Convention, one could further distinguish between legislative, 
administrative or organisational and practical measures. Next, a distinction can be 
made between vertical and horizontal types of positive obligations. Vertical positive 
obligations are imposed on states to ensure the protection of fundamental rights in 
their relations with the state, whereas horizontal positive obligations are concerned 
with the protection of fundamental rights in the relations between individuals. In 
addition positive obligations with a social dimension could be recognised. Such 
positive obligations are concerned with the realisation of the eff ective enjoyment of 
fundamental rights in social reality. Th ey can become especially relevant in situations 
where certain groups of individuals are particularly vulnerable, such as the elderly or 
immigrants. Lastly, there is a typology that focuses on the degree to which positive 
obligations follow from the negative obligations that can legitimately be derived from 
the provisions of the Convention. So-called dependent types of positive obligations, 
for example, are imposed on states when they breach the negative obligation not to 
interfere in the lives of individuals. As an example, when states have interfered with the 
right to freedom of individuals by detaining them, states can be held responsible for 
ensuring the protection of the right to private life in detention conditions. In the case of 
more autonomous positive obligations, however, the positive obligations are far more 
detached from the concept of states ’ negative obligations, for example if states were to 
take measures to combat human traffi  cking or terroristic activities. 
 Th e ECtHR in particular has chosen not to apply a too restrictive approach towards 
the interpretation of fundamental rights in its development of positive obligations. In 
the approach which the ECtHR has adopted, states can be expected to play a rather 
proactive role in the protection of fundamental rights which may extend to situations of 
horizontal fundamental rights infringements and situations which give rise to social and 
economic obligations for states. In some of its judgments, the ECtHR has shed further 
light on the rationales which it uses to accept this broad array of positive obligations. 
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It takes into account that states (nowadays) are better able to provide such protection, 
because of social and technological developments. Th e ECtHR has also stated that the 
responsibility for fundamental rights violations of states results from the fact that they 
have (already) decided to undertake regulatory activities to control certain aff airs and 
thus also to ensure fundamental rights protection in the same area. Th e ECtHR has 
also justifi ed the recognition of positive obligations in its case-law by pointing out that 
states are to be considered responsible for the fundamental rights violations of certain 
private parties, if they have adopted acts that could explicitly condone, legalise or 
otherwise approve the behaviour of such private parties, for example by issuing licenses 
to regulate the acts of private parties. In those situations, states can be expected to have 
knowledge of fundamental rights interference and may no longer simply refrain from 
taking any actions. Th e ECtHR takes into account that it has a diff erent position  vis-
 à -vis national courts and national authorities. Th erefore, it does not, in principle, give 
concrete guidance as to how positive obligations should be fulfi lled at national level. 
 Th e development of positive obligations by the ECtHR has, however, led to an expansion 
of the obligations of states under the Convention. States now can be held accountable 
for various types of fundamental rights infringements and in various types of situations. 
Th is case-law of the ECtHR has, for example, implied that states can be held accountable 
for acts that take place in the private sphere, or for the interferences which have to do 
with the vulnerable position of some individuals, such as migrants or individuals with a 
mental or physical disability. By accepting positive obligations on a case-by-case basis, 
the ECtHR has created a certain amount of uncertainty over the obligations which 
states may incur and the types of situations in which they can be held accountable. At 
the same time, by recognising positive obligations on the basis of fundamental rights 
protection, states are expected to undertake a more proactive role as well as comply 
with their negative obligation to refrain from interfering in individuals’ rights. It may 
be diffi  cult to fi nd the right balance in that regard. Th e position of individuals  vis-
 à -vis the states parties is furthermore strengthened by accepting positive obligations. 
Individuals are able to address the omissions of states in their particular situation before 
the ECtHR, which can have great ramifi cations if states are indeed held accountable 
for such omissions and they need to adopt new legislative provisions or design new 
policies. 
 Th e development of positive obligations by the ECtHR has led to some criticism. First, 
there are scholars as well as judges who have questioned whether positive obligations 
can indeed be derived from the text of the Convention. Fundamental rights are 
principally addressed towards states and they mainly aim to protect individuals from 
the acts of state agents. Some authors therefore fi nd that an extensive development of 
positive obligations does not fi t with the nature of fundamental rights in general. It 
has further been regarded as problematic that states are held accountable especially 
for interferences that take place in horizontal types of situations. It is rather diffi  cult to 
determine clearly when states can be held accountable if the interferences are caused in 
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private relations. Th e next critical aspect to the development of positive obligations is 
that it may imply political decision making. Determining what types of measures need 
to be undertaken by states is a matter that needs to be resolved by a democratically 
elected and politically accountable institution. For that reason a certain tension arises if 
judges who have not directly been chosen, decide what active measures need to be taken 
by the state. Th e development of positive obligations by the ECtHR has particularly 
been criticised because of the specifi c position of the ECtHR as a supranational court 
which is at a distance from states and which may be insuffi  ciently informed of the facts 
of the case and of all the interests involved in order to be able to carry out a balanced 
assessment to determine the positive obligations of the states. Lastly, it continues to be 
regarded as problematic that the positive obligations are established in a rather casuistic 
manner. Positive obligations are only revealed in concrete circumstances. Th e national 
legislatures and policy-makers may therefore not always be able to foresee how they can 
eff ectively secure fundamental rights. 
 Part II: Parameters of EU Law and the EU System of Fundamental Rights Protection 
 To be able to determine the scope of positive obligations under EU law, an examination 
has been made of several general and some more specifi c characteristics of the EU 
system of fundamental rights protection. In particular, the institutional characteristics 
and judicial style of the ECJ, the limited competences of the EU and the scope of 
application of EU fundamental rights have been studied. 
 In general, it is important to take into account the fact that the EU was not set up as a 
 ‘ human rights organisation ’ and that it did not have its own catalogue of fundamental 
rights. Over the years, several steps have been taken by the ECJ and the political 
institutions of the EU to ensure that fundamental rights were recognised in the EU 
legal order. Initially fundamental rights were recognised as a response to the concerns 
that were raised by the national constitutional courts over the establishment of the 
principle of supremacy and direct eff ect by the ECJ. Th e ECJ thereupon decided that 
it was necessary to protect fundamental right autonomously under EU law, to secure 
the protection of the unity and eff ectiveness of EU law. Th e protection of the primacy, 
unity and eff ectiveness of EU law continues to play an important role within EU 
law, including in fundamental rights cases. At the same time, the rule of law as an 
important rationale for the protection of fundamental rights has also been made clear. 
It has become evident that the acts of the EU institutions as well as the acts of the 
member states in the implementation of EU law at national law need to comply with 
fundamental rights norms. 
 Since the Charter became legally binding in 2009, its importance has been growing. 
National courts are increasingly raising questions before the ECJ on the scope of 
application of the Charter and on the scope and meaning of the fundamental rights 
laid down in the Charter. In answering these questions, the ECJ has given a central role 
to the specifi c provisions of the Charter and it has developed a certain autonomous 
interpretation of EU fundamental rights. Th e ECJ has clarifi ed in that connection, that 
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the EU is not fully bound by the ECHR. All the eff orts that have been made to formalise 
the accession of the EU to the ECHR have not paid off . In  Opinion 2/13 , the ECJ has 
clarifi ed that the accession agreement that was reached did not provide suffi  cient 
protection for the specifi c character of the EU and of EU law. While the relations 
between the EU and the ECHR have therefore not been formalised by the accession, the 
ECJ continues to refer to the judgments of the ECtHR to secure the uniform protection 
of fundamental rights in Europe. Th e Charter further allows that a more extensive 
protection of fundamental rights is given beyond the minimum level of protection that 
needs to be guaranteed on the basis of the Convention. 
 Since the Charter has become binding, the ECJ has received many questions on the 
exact scope of application of the Charter. It has thereby clarifi ed that, at national level, 
there continues to be scope for application of the national (constitutional) rights as long 
as this does not comprise the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of EU law. Th is restriction 
particularly appears to play a role in areas where the member states are not given any 
discretion in the implementation of EU law at the national level. Another topic related 
to the Charter which still needs to be further clarifi ed is concerned with the distinction 
that has been made between principles and rights under the Charter. Th e Charter seems 
to hold that there is limited scope for the enforceability of principles, contrary to rights, 
on the basis of individual claims. So far, it is still somewhat unclear which provisions 
contain principles instead of rights. However it is expected that mainly social rights laid 
down in the Charter contain principles. Th erefore, there seems to be little scope for a 
development of positive obligations under EU law in connection with such principles. 
 To be able to further establish the scope for the development of positive obligations, 
an examination has been made of the specifi c judicial style of the ECJ, the specifi c 
procedures which can be initiated before the ECJ, and the institutional position of 
the ECJ. On these aspects, the ECJ shows clear diff erences with the ECtHR. Th e ECJ 
employs a rather formal style of reasoning in its judgments. So far the judgments of the 
ECJ on fundamental rights cases provide little insight into the rationales and theories 
which it applies. Instead, the Opinion of Advocates Generals, which provide advice 
to the ECJ on the interpretation of EU law, can be informative to the ECJ with regard 
to, for example, relevant legal doctrines. Th ese Opinions show that the doctrine of 
positive obligations has already been dealt with on several occasions, such as in cases 
on the horizontal eff ect of EU law and in asylum cases. Contrary to the judgments of 
the ECtHR, such doctrines do not become visible in the fi nal judgments of the ECJ, 
however. 
 Questions on fundamental rights are generally brought to the ECJ through the 
preliminary reference procedure. Th ere are very limited circumstances in which 
individuals are allowed to bring direct challenges to the ECJ. Th e preliminary reference 
procedure only can be used by national courts concerning questions on the interpretation 
and validity of EU law. National courts play an important role in this procedure because 
they can formulate the specifi c questions on EU law to the ECJ. Contrary to the ECtHR, 
the ECJ is not inclined to provide interpretations of fundamental rights on its own 
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initiative. It primarily focuses on provisions of secondary and primary EU law, such as 
Directives and Regulations which, in a given case, may already reveal which protection 
needs to be provided under EU law. National courts therefore have an important role to 
play in contributing to and developing positive obligations under EU law by referring 
relevant questions on this matter. 
 Th e specifi c institutional position of the ECJ also needs to be taken into account in 
determining the scope for the development of positive obligations. Th e ECJ has been 
said generally to exercise deferential review with respect to the legislative decisions 
that are taken by the EU institutions. Th e ECJ does not easily overturn EU legislation 
which is concerned with complex political, social and technical matters. Th e ECJ aims 
to respect the discretionary powers given to the EU legislature in such areas, and it 
has developed several ways of showing deferential review. Th e ECJ may, for example, 
decide to apply a technique of reconciliatory interpretation. Th e ECJ will then aim 
to interpret provisions of secondary EU law as much as possible in conformity with 
the principles of EU law, such as fundamental rights, so that EU legislation itself can 
remain valid. Interestingly, this technique allows room for a certain development of 
positive obligations under EU law. Th is is demonstrated by the case of  N.S. and others , 
in which the ECJ interpreted the provisions of the Dublin Regulation. Under the 
Dublin Regulation, member states are required to send asylum seekers to the member 
state in which they fi rst arrived and which is responsible for dealing with the asylum 
application. In its judgment in  N.S. and others , the ECJ determined that member states 
and their national courts cannot transfer an asylum seeker under the Dublin Regulation 
where they cannot be unaware of the fact that in the member state of fi rst arrival there 
is a serious risk of inhuman and degrading treatment. In this case, the ECJ also could 
have decided to declare the regulation invalid in light of fundamental rights, so that 
the EU legislature would be held responsible for potential violations of fundamental 
rights in relation to the transfer of asylum seekers. Instead, the ECJ decided to hold the 
member states responsible for preventing violations of fundamental rights taking place 
in other member states. In other circumstances, the ECJ may also decide to adopt less 
deference to the EU legislature. In some cases of serious interferences with fundamental 
rights, the ECJ has also shown that it is willing to declare EU legislation invalid, such 
as it has done in respect of the Data retention Directive which failed to secure suffi  cient 
protection of the right to privacy and personal data. 
 Th e ECJ also aims to express its subsidiary position towards the national authorities. 
It generally aims to refrain from determining how EU law must be applied in national 
law. Under the preliminary reference procedure, a certain division of tasks has already 
been set up to divide the competences of the ECJ and the national courts. Under this 
procedure, the ECJ has the prerogative of determining how EU law must be interpreted 
and of assessing the validity of the acts of the EU institutions, and the national courts 
have the task of ensuring that EU law is applied correctly at national level. If no 
specifi c requirements have been imposed under EU primary and secondary law as to 
the measures which member states would need to adopt, the ECJ generally also aims 
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to stress the discretion that is therefore given to the member states in answer to the 
questions of the national courts. Where it concerns the procedural standards that need 
to be applied at national level to secure the eff ective application of EU law at national 
level, for example, the ECJ oft en applies the principle of national procedural autonomy 
as long as arrangements have already been made at the national level. 
 Another aspect which relates to the institutional position of the ECJ concerns the 
specifi c role which the ECJ aims to play, or which it is expected to play, in the fi eld of 
fundamental rights protection. Some authors consider that the EU needs to play an 
important role in this fi eld and provide strong protection. In that respect, the ECJ is 
expected to make up for the democratic defi cits in the EU. It has also been held that it 
would be necessary for the ECJ to start developing fundamental rights doctrines, such 
as a doctrine of positive obligations, due to the fact that the Charter has become binding 
and the ECJ has decided to develop an autonomous approach to the interpretation 
of the rights of the Charter. So far, the ECJ has been slow to develop fundamental 
rights doctrines in its case-law, however. It has also retained its rather formal style of 
reasoning, even though that has been considered unsuitable for fundamental rights 
cases. Some authors rather argue that the ECJ must continue to play an important role 
in protecting other interests in fundamental rights cases, such as the protection of 
the rights of free movement, the further economic integration within the EU, and the 
application of the principle of mutual recognition by the member states in areas of civil, 
criminal and asylum law. Th us, there are diff erent expectations as to the role which the 
ECJ should play in the fi eld of fundamental rights protection. Th is study has shown 
that, in developing fundamental rights doctrines, the ECJ could draw clear inspiration 
from the case-law of the ECtHR, considering the expertise of the ECtHR in the area of 
fundamental rights and also considering the objective of the uniform interpretation of 
fundamental rights in Europe. Th is could still allow room for the ECJ to give expression 
to specifi c characteristics of EU law and to ensure protection of the specifi c principle 
of EU law. In particular in the development of a doctrine of positive obligations, it is 
of interest that the ECJ takes into account the limited competences of the EU and the 
scope of application of EU fundamental rights. 
 Th e question of what kind of competences the EU has to take action to protect 
fundamental rights has for some time formed a topic of academic debate. Th e EU can 
only take action if it has been conferred with a specifi c power to do so in a certain area. 
Th e scope for the adoption of measures by the EU to ensure the protection of fundamental 
rights and the imposition of positive obligations has raised many questions, given that 
the EU does not have a clear and general power to protect fundamental rights under 
the EU Treaty. Th is has been considered problematic especially in view of the positive 
obligations which may follow from the protection of fundamental rights and which may 
give rise to legislative, administrative and judicial measures. It has been argued that the 
EU does have some powers to protect fundamental rights. Firstly, the EU can be said 
to have specifi c fundamental rights powers relating to the areas of the protection of 
personal data and non-discrimination. Secondly, it can be argued that the EU has been 
Intersentiaxxxiv
Summary in English
given an indirect or accessory power to protect fundamental rights so that it can ensure 
that the actions of the EU in the exercise of its explicit powers do respect fundamental 
rights. Article 51(1) of the Charter indeed specifi cally requires that the EU institutions 
and the member states, in so far as they are implementing EU law, respect the rights, 
observe the principles and promote the application of the provisions of the Charter. Th e 
indirect competence of the EU to ensure active protection of fundamental rights must 
be construed narrowly, however. Th e EU Treaties and the Charter specifi cally stress 
that the competences of the EU cannot be expanded on the basis of the protection of 
fundamental rights. Given the principle of attributed powers, the actions which can 
be taken on the basis of such an indirect competence must be seen as accessory to the 
actions for which there is an explicit basis in the EU treaties. 
 Th e existence of an indirect power to ensure protection of fundamental rights can 
be of great value for the development of positive obligations under EU law. In this 
respect, the Charter and the EU Treaties provide various legal bases that could be 
used to impose positive obligations. Such legal bases can be found, for example, in 
Article 4(3) TEU, which requires the member states to take all appropriate measures to 
fulfi l the obligations arising out of the Treaty. Also of importance is Article 19(1) TEU 
which stipulates that remedies are provided for by the member states to secure eff ective 
protection of EU law at the national level. Next, Article 52(3) of the Charter provides 
an important legal basis for the incorporation into EU law of the positive obligations 
which have been developed by the ECtHR. Lastly, Article 52(1) of the Charter can give 
rise to the relevant obligation to adopt a legislative framework to prevent fundamental 
rights interferences. 
 While the EU may be said to have competences to take certain actions to protect 
fundamental rights, additional reasons are still needed to be able to decide why certain 
actions need to be taken at EU level rather than at the national level. In most cases 
where fundamental rights could be infringed under EU law, the EU enjoys shared or 
complementary competences, so that therefore the member states are also competent to 
take action to protect fundamental rights. On the basis of the principle of subsidiarity, 
action is secured best by the EU when certain objectives cannot adequately be achieved 
by the member states and the scale or eff ects of EU action also provide a benefi cial 
outcome. In many cases concerning fundamental rights it would seem that action is best 
taken at national level by the national authorities, since they are closest to the individual, 
the circumstances of a case, and the specifi cities and demands of their societies and 
legal systems. In circumstances which show a clear transnational dimensions, there 
could be reason to adopt action to protect fundamental rights at EU level. 
 It can be diffi  cult to apply the criterion of subsidiarity to fundamental rights cases 
in practice. Fundamental rights are of a specifi c nature which makes it diffi  cult to 
determine to what extent uniform rules would be considered necessary to ensure 
eff ective protection of EU law. It is also diffi  cult to establish a clear cross-border eff ect 
in fundamental rights. However, this study has developed other arguments that can be 
made to show that fundamental rights are protected more eff ectively at the EU level. 
Firstly, it can be held necessary to undertake action to protect fundamental rights at EU 
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level if there is a risk that EU free movement law will indirectly lead to a lowering of 
the fundamental rights standards of the member states. A risk of a race to the bottom in 
the standards of fundamental rights protection could potentially take place in the area 
of asylum law, where it is known that member states are generally unwilling to provide 
for higher levels of fundamental rights protection beyond the minimum standards 
under the Convention. Th e degree of interconnectedness of EU acts and fundamental 
rights infringements could also provide an important consideration, arguing for the 
establishment of additional actions by the EU. If the EU were, for example, to adopt 
a new trading scheme which aff ects the property rights of undertakings, it would be 
logical to assume that the EU would adopt certain preventive and remedial measures 
as well. Th e establishment of fundamental rights standards at the EU level might 
further be explained, because it is also in the interest of securing the primacy, unity and 
eff ectiveness of EU law itself. Th e divergences in the fundamental rights standards of 
the diff erent member states, for example, in the area of labour law could be considered 
to form obstacles to the free movement of workers and the freedom of establishment in 
the EU. Th ese diff erent arguments are relevant for the EU legislature in deciding when 
to take action, and they could also provide further support if the ECJ were to formulate 
a relevant positive obligation on the basis of EU law. 
 Following from the limited competences of the EU, there is a limited scope of 
application of fundamental rights. Th is third specifi c characteristic of the EU system of 
fundamental rights protection raises the important question to what extent there is in 
fact scope for the development of positive obligations under EU law. Positive obligations 
are in principle concerned with situations in which the state has failed to take actions. 
Th erefore, it could be decided that such situations fall outside the scope of application 
of EU law. Th is would be undesirable, however, if it is shown that there are gaps in the 
protection of fundamental right in EU legislation and in the implementation thereof 
at national level. To be able to protect fundamental rights and to be able to recognise 
positive obligations in those situations, it may be necessary to apply a certain fl exibility 
in the interpretation of the scope of application of EU law. Th is study has concluded that 
the ECJ could decide to have regard to the positive obligations which have already been 
recognised at national level, and it could have regard to the measures which member 
states have adopted to fulfi l such positive obligations. If there is already a consensus at 
the national level as regards the specifi c measures to be taken to ensure fundamental 
rights protection, the ECJ could more easily require the member states to extend their 
protection to cover situations of EU law as well. Th is may require (only) some member 
states to introduce new actions or remedies. Still, it remains of importance that there 
exists a certain competence under EU law for the ECJ to be able to impose a positive 
obligation in these situations. It may concern a specifi c or an indirect competence for 
the EU as was explained earlier. Th e ECJ would further need to examine whether a 
particular choice had been made by the EU legislature in that situation. It may be the 
case that discretion was deliberately provided to the member state in a given area, so 
that there is still limited scope for the development of positive obligations. 
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 Th is study has explained that there are three diff erent situations in which the ECJ has 
decided to hold the EU fundamental rights applicable. First, there is the agency situation, 
in which there seems, particularly, to be scope for the ECJ to accept positive obligations. 
Th is concerns the situation where member states take measures to implement specifi c 
provisions of secondary EU law, such as Directives and Regulations. It is clear that in 
this situation it needs to be ensured by EU law that fundamental rights are complied 
with by the member states. Th erefore, both negative and positive obligations to protect 
EU fundamental rights could be imposed on the member state. Th e ECJ is in principle, 
expected to formulate supportive positive obligations only, however, which specifi cally 
helps to ensure that the actions of the EU do not negatively interfere with fundamental 
rights. Th is is because it is always necessary that there is a certain action or provision of 
EU law to bring the situation within the scope of application of EU fundamental rights. 
 In the other two types of situations that have been defi ned by the ECJ, that is, where 
member states derogate from EU law, and where they make use of optioning powers  – 
it would be less logical to accept that the ECJ could develop positive obligations. It 
has been argued that in these situations, it is far less obvious that the actions taken by 
the member states directly derive from EU law; quite the contrary. Member states are 
instead developing their own policies for the most part based on national law, and these 
can concern quite sensitive policy areas for which there is no legislative competence for 
the EU to take action. 
 Part III: Analysis of Specifi c Examples of Positive Obligations under EU Law and 
Conclusions 
 Th is study has concluded that, in principle, there is limited room for the development 
of positive obligations by the ECJ under EU law. 
 Within the context of EU law, generally, provisions of secondary EU law spell out 
the specifi c rights which individuals may invoke and the corresponding obligations 
which states could acquire. Th e EU legislature may therefore already have decided to 
incorporate positive obligations, such as those developed by the ECtHR, into EU law. 
Th us, in contrast to the Convention, there is less need for the ECJ to defi ne positive 
obligations on the basis of general fundamental rights. 
 At the same time, situations could arise in which secondary EU law does not defi ne 
very clearly what actions would need to be taken by the EU institutions or the member 
states, because such situations were not foreseen. Positive obligations are generally 
established in concrete circumstances which reveal a certain omission in laws and 
policies. Th e ECJ could thus be required to determine whether there is a basis under 
EU law for deriving positive obligations. 
 Th e analysis of the case-law of the ECJ has demonstrated that positive obligations 
have been recognised under EU law in various situations. In this analysis, a specifi c 
defi nition of positive obligations was applied. Th e defi nition fi rst relates, similarly to the 
case-law of the ECtHR, to obligations to take active measures to protect fundamental 
rights. Within the case-law of the ECJ, it is important to distinguish that such measures 
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were not already specifi ed by EU primary and/or secondary EU law. In that scenario, 
positive obligations are only formulated in the case-law of the ECJ. In that respect, a 
certain parallel can be drawn with the development of positive obligations under the 
Convention, which also has only taken place in the case-law of the ECtHR. 
 Th e case-law of the ECJ demonstrates, in particular, a range of procedural types of 
positive obligations for the member states in the implementation of EU law at national 
level. Th e ECJ has, for example, imposed an obligation on national courts to adopt 
interim measures and to create certain remedies to ensure the principle of eff ective 
judicial protection. Oft en, the national court incurs responsibility to ensure that 
fundamental rights are actively protected within the context of EU law. In disputes about 
the imposition of injunctions on internet service providers in relation to intellectual 
property rights, for example, the ECJ has required national courts to provide for the 
protection of the various fundamental rights of private parties in the assessment that 
needs to be made. Th is shows that a certain horizontal dimension can be given to the 
procedural positive obligations which the ECJ imposes. Moreover, it is possible that the 
ECJ recognises positive obligations with a social dimension. Th e ECJ has, for example, 
required the member states to adopt interim measures as well as provide for the basic 
needs of a third-country national who is seriously ill and is awaiting the results of an 
appeal from a decision that he or she must return. In such examples, the protection 
could not be derived from provisions of secondary EU law. Instead, the ECJ has defi ned 
these obligations on the basis of fundamental rights, such as the principle of eff ective 
judicial protection and the principle of  non-refoulement . At the same time, it was indeed 
necessary that in these situations, the establishment of positive obligations could only 
take place in combination with specifi c provisions and obligations laid down in EU law. 
 Th e ECJ further has defi ned a legislative obligation for the member states in very 
few cases. Th e formulation of legislative obligations raises quite clear tensions with the 
principle of attributed powers. In an exceptional case, the ECJ has defi ned an obligation 
for the national legislature to ensure that account was taken of the principle of equal 
treatment in respect of parental leave for parents of twins. Also, there is a limited 
development of positive obligations in the case-law of the ECJ in respect of the EU 
institutions. So far, the ECJ only has developed positive obligations of a procedural 
type. 
 It is not to be expected that this development of positive obligations would take 
place on a much greater scale. Th is can, for the most part, be explained by the 
limited scope of application of EU fundamental rights, and in relation thereto, 
the limited competences of the EU. Th is study has concluded that the limited scope for the 
development of positive obligations is not necessarily to be regarded as problematic. To 
a certain extent, it may be expected that there is scope for the protection of fundamental 
rights, and the fulfi lment of positive obligations, on the basis of national law. In most 
situations where EU fundamental rights apply, the EU enjoys a shared competence 
or a complementary competence, which generally leaves discretion for the member 
states to provide for (farther-reaching) protection of fundamental rights. It may also 
Intersentiaxxxviii
Summary in English
be considered desirable that choices are made at national level which fi t well with the 
national legal systems. However, if the national authorities fail to provide adequate 
protection, there is good reason to adopt measures at the EU level instead. Specifi c 
reasons that may lead to the adoption of measures at EU level are, for example, the cross-
border eff ects of the protection of fundamental rights or the occurrence of a race to the 
bottom in the standards of fundamental rights at national level due to free movement 
within the EU. Th e protection of the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness may also provide 
a consideration to adopt measures at EU level to secure fundamental rights protection. 
In those situations, EU law provides for suffi  cient legal basis in the EU Treaties and in 
the Charter to impose positive obligations. It also can be accepted that there is scope 
for the development of positive obligations on the basis of the indirect competence of 
the EU to protect fundamental rights, although the use of this competences is restricted 
on the basis of the principle of attributed powers and the application of the principle 
of subsidiarity. 
 Specifi c situations in the analysis of the case-law of the ECJ do show, however, that 
when there are no specifi c provisions adopted under secondary EU law that determine 
what specifi c measures need to be taken to ensure the protection of fundamental 
rights, it can be quite be diffi  cult for the ECJ to defi ne positive obligations in those 
circumstances. When there is no specifi c provision that determines what measures need 
to be taken under EU law, it may easily be argued that the situation would fall outside 
the scope of application and the scope of competences of the EU. Th e ECJ would thus 
need to clarify how the establishment of a positive obligation in a given situation would 
be in conformity with the principle of the limited competences of the EU and with the 
limited scope of application of EU fundamental rights. Th e ECJ could be criticised of 
judicial activism if it were to defi ne a positive obligation in that situation. Conversely, 
the ECJ could be criticised for not taking fundamental rights seriously if it were to 
decide to refrain from formulating a positive obligation. Th is study may have provided 
various starting points which the ECJ could decide to apply in its case-law; making 
the right choices and meeting all expectations can still prove to be very diffi  cult in this 
particular context. 
Intersentia xxxix
CONTENTS
About the Author. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Summary in Dutch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Summary in English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxv
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xlvii
Table of Cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xlix
Chapter 1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1.1. Background to this Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1. Two Supranational Courts in Europe Deciding 
on Fundamental Rights Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.2. Th e Concept of Positive Obligations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1.3. Th e Debate about Positive Obligations within the 
Context of EU Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1.4. Th e Main Research Question of this Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2. Aims and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3. Methods and Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1. Defi ning the Concept of Positive Obligations and 
its Implications  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2. Identifying the Scope and Limits for the Development 
of Positive Obligations under EU Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.3. Studying Specifi c Case-law Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4. Working Defi nition of Positive Obligations within 
the Context of EU Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.5. Outline of this Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5.1. Part I: Th e Concept of Positive Obligations within the 
Context of the European Convention on Human Rights  . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5.2. Part II: Th e Scope for a Development of Positive Obligations 
within the Context of EU Law – An Analysis of the Specifi c 
Parameters of the EU Legal Order and the EU System 
of Fundamental Rights Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5.3. Part III: Synthesis  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Intersentiaxl
Contents
PART I: THE CONCEPT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Chapter 2. Th e System of Fundamental Rights Protection Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2. Background and Purpose of the European Convention 
on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3. Enforcement Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4. Subsidiary System of Protection of Fundamental Rights  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5. Th e Role of the ECtHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.6. Tools of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.1. Th e Principle of Eff ectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.6.2. Th e Principle of Dynamic or Evolutive Interpretation  . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.6.3. Th e Margin of Appreciation Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.7. Th e Eff ects of the European Convention on Human Rights 
in the National Legal Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.8. Horizontal Eff ect of Convention Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.9. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Chapter 3. Th e Development of Positive Obligations Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2. Th e Development of Positive Obligations by the ECtHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.1. Th e Belgian Linguistic Case: Introducing 
Positive Obligations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3.2.2. Defi ning the Concept of Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2.3. Th e Distinction between Negative and Positive Obligations  . . . . . . . 42
3.2.3.1. Traditional versus Implied Obligations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.3.2. State Action versus State Omission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.2.3.3. Conjunctive versus Alternative Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.4. Rationales for Recognising Positive Obligations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.5. Explicit Legal Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2.6. Methodology for Determining the Existence 
of Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3. Typologies of Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3.1. Typology Developed by the ECtHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.3.2. Typologies Developed in Academic Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4. Implications of Positive Obligations for the Protection 
of Convention Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.1. Th e Position of States Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4.2. Th e Position of Individuals  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
Intersentia xli
Contents
3.5. Limitations on the Scope of Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.1. Knowledge of Fundamental Rights Violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.5.2. Direct and Immediate Link/Minimum Level of Severity  . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.5.3. No Impossible or Disproportionate Burdens  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Chapter 4. A Critical Appraisal of the Development of Positive Obligations 
Under the European Convention on Human Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2. Are Positive Obligations Inherent in Fundamental 
Rights Protection? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.1. Criticism Based on Originalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.2. Contemporary Debates on the Nature of 
Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2.3. Th e Concern over Human Rights Infl ation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.3. Horizontal Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.1. Th e Limited Personal Scope of Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.2. Th e Determination of State Responsibility for 
Private Acts  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4. Th e Political Character of Positive Obligations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4.1. Lack of Democratic Legitimacy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.2. Empowerment of Individuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.5. Th e Supranational Position of the ECtHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6. Legal Uncertainty Regarding the Scope of Positive Obligations  . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.7. Ambiguous Methods of the ECtHR for Determining the 
Existence of Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.7.1. Critical Evaluation of the Fair Balance Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.7.1.1. Lack of Clarity, Structure and Fairness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.7.1.2. Th e Incorrect Use of the Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.7.1.3. Confused Approaches to Positive and 
Negative Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.7.2. Proposals to Improve the Structure of the Court’s Approach . . . . . . . 94
4.8. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
Chapter 5. Part I – Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.1. Th e Main Features Relating to the Development of Positive 
Obligations by the ECtHR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2. Th e Defi nition of Positive Obligations and the Distinction 
between Positive and Negative Obligations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Intersentiaxlii
Contents
5.3. Typologies of Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.4. Rationale and Eff ects of Recognising Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.5. Critical Evaluation of the Development of Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.6. Concluding Remarks Looking Forward 
to the Analysis in Part II  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
PART II: THE SCOPE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EU LAW – AN ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC 
PARAMETERS OF THE EU LEGAL ORDER AND THE EU SYSTEM OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION
Chapter 6. Main Principles of the EU System of Fundamental Rights Protection  . . . 109
6.1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
6.2. Origins and Historical Development of EU Fundamental 
Rights Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.3. Rationales of Fundamental Rights Protection within the 
EU Legal Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.4. Institutional Developments within the Field of Fundamental 
Rights Protection  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.5. Th e Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.6. Th e General Principles of EU Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.7. Th e Scope of Application of EU Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.7.1. Th e Vertical Scope of Application of EU 
Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.7.2. Th e Horizontal Scope of Application of the Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.8. Th e Scope for the Protection of National Fundamental Rights 
under EU law and the Principle of Mutual Recognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.9. Th e Relationship between the EU and the European Convention 
on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.9.1. Th e Status of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Judgments of the ECtHR under EU Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.9.2. Overlapping Jurisdiction between the ECtHR and the ECJ . . . . . . . 130
6.10. Th e Distinction between Rights and Principles 
under the Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
6.11. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
Chapter 7. Th e Institutional Characteristics and Judicial Culture of the ECJ . . . . . . 137
7.1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
7.2. Doing too Little or Rather too Much? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.2.1. Th e Bostock Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
7.2.2. Th e Chatzi Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Intersentia xliii
Contents
7.3. Th e Role and Judicial Style of the ECJ in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
7.4. Th e Specifi c Characteristics of the Procedures before the ECJ  . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7.4.1. Th e Preliminary Reference Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.4.1.1. Th e Specifi c Function of the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
7.4.1.2. Th e Dialogue with the National Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.4.2. Direct Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
7.5. Th e Institutional Position of the ECJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.5.1. Separation of Powers and the Supranational 
Position of the ECJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
7.5.2. Th e Role of the ECJ towards the EU Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
7.5.3. Th e Role of the ECJ towards the Member States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
7.6. Th e EU and the ECJ’s Role in the Field of Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.6.1. Th e EU as a Human Rights Organisation?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
7.6.2. Th e ECJ as a Human Rights Court? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.6.2.1. Th e Role of the ECJ Pre-Lisbon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
7.6.2.2. Th e Role of the ECJ Post-Lisbon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
7.6.2.3. Th e Development of Fundamental Rights 
Doctrines by the ECJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
7.7. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Chapter 8. EU Competences and Subsidiarity in Fundamental 
Rights Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
8.1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
8.2. Th e Principle of Attributed Competences and the Division 
of Powers between the EU and its Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
8.3. EU Competences to Protect Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.3.1. Silence in the EU Treaties and the Case-law of the ECJ  . . . . . . . . . . 183
8.3.2. A General Power to Protect Fundamental Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
8.3.3. Specifi c Power to Protect Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
8.3.4. Indirect Power to Protect Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.3.4.1. An Indirect, Accessory or Functional 
Rule-making Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
8.3.4.2. Article 4(3) TEU: Th e Principle 
of Loyal Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
8.3.4.3. Article 19(1) TEU: Provision of Remedies 
at National Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
8.3.4.4. Charter Rights Calling for Positive Measures  . . . . . . . . . . 194
8.3.5. Remaining Tensions: Competence Creep 
or Protection Gaps?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
8.4. Reasons for Actively Protecting Fundamental Rights at EU Level  . . . . . . . . 200
Intersentiaxliv
Contents
8.4.1. Diff erent Approaches for Incorporating a Th eory 
of Positive Obligations within EU Law  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
8.4.2. An Approach Based on the Division of Powers 
between the EU and the Member States  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
8.4.3. Subsidiarity and Proportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
8.4.4. Connections between EU Acts and Fundamental 
Rights Infringements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
8.4.5. Preventing a Race to the Bottom  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
8.4.6. Ensuring the Primacy, Unity and Eff ectiveness of EU Law . . . . . . . . 216
8.5. Providing Room for the Application of National or International 
Fundamental Rights Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
8.6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
Chapter 9. Th e Limited Scope of Application of EU Fundamental Rights  . . . . . . . . 221
9.1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
9.2. Article 51 of the Charter and its Eff ects on a Development of Positive 
Obligations by the ECJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
9.2.1. Background to Article 51 of the Charter and its Main 
Eff ects on the Development of Positive Obligations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
9.2.2. Gaps in Protection or Competence Creep? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
9.2.3. Responding to Gaps in the Protection of Fundamental 
Rights: Flexibility in the Interpretation of the Scope 
of Application of EU Fundamental Rights Law  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
9.3. Th e Interpretation of Article 51 by the ECJ  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
9.3.1. Th e Relation between the Limited Scope of Application of 
EU Fundamental Rights and the Limited Powers of the EU . . . . . . . 230
9.3.2. Th e Specifi c Situations within the Meaning of 
‘Implementing Union Law’  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
9.3.2.1. Th e Agency Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
9.3.2.2. Th e Situation of Derogation from the 
Free Movement Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
9.3.2.3. Th e Situation of Optioning Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
9.3.3. Th e Sovereign Powers of the Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
9.3.4. Th e Discretion for the Member States to Apply 
their own Fundamental Rights Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
9.4. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Chapter 10. Part II – Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
10.1. Th e Specifi c Parameters of EU Law Defi ning the Scope and 
the Limits for the Development of Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
10.2. Th e Development of Positive Obligations under the Preliminary 
Reference Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
Intersentia xlv
Contents
10.3. Th e Relevant Legal Framework for the Development of 
Positive Obligations under EU Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
10.4. Th e Limited Competences of the EU in Combination with the 
Limited Scope of Application of EU Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
10.5. Why and When Could the ECJ Accept Positive Obligations? . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
10.5.1. Reasons for Active Protection of Fundamental Rights 
at the EU level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
10.5.2. Th e Role of the ECJ in the Field of Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . 257
10.5.3. Th e Judicial Style of the ECJ  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
PART III: SYNTHESIS
Chapter 11. Th e Development of Positive Obligations within the Context 
of EU Law: Overview and Evaluation of the Case-Law of the ECJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
11.1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
11.2. Th e Distinction between Positive and Negative Obligations 
within the Context of EU Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
11.3. Examples of Positive Obligations in 
the Case-law of the ECJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
11.3.1. Positive Obligations for the EU Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
11.3.2. Positive Obligations for the Member States in 
the Agency Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
11.3.2.1. Positive Obligations for the 
Member States’ Judiciaries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
11.3.2.2. Positive Obligations for the Member 
States’ Administrative Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
11.3.2.3. Positive Obligations for the Member States’ 
Legislatures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
11.3.3. Positive Obligations for the Member States when 
Derogating from the Free Movement Rules  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
11.3.4. Positive Obligations for the Member States when 
Applying Optioning Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
11.4. Th e Types of Positive Obligation within the Context of EU Law . . . . . . . . . . 274
11.5. Respecting the Limits of EU Law? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
11.5.1. Th e Grant Case  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
11.5.2. Th e Chatzi Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
11.5.3. Th e N.S. and others Case  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
11.5.4. Th e Abdida Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
11.5.5. Th e T. Port Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
11.6. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292
Intersentiaxlvi
Contents
Chapter 12. Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
12.1. Incorporating Positive Obligations to Protect Fundamental 
Rights in EU Law?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
12.2. A Limited Scope for the Development of Positive Obligations 
under EU law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
12.2.1. Th e Relevance of Secondary EU Law as a Framework for the 
Protection of Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
12.2.2. Th e Development of Positive Obligations on the Basis 
of an Indirect Power to Protect Fundamental Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
12.2.3. Th e Division of Competences between the EU 
and the Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
12.2.4. Limited Scope of Application of EU Fundamental Rights  . . . . . . . . 302
12.3. Contrasts with the Development of Positive Obligations 
by the ECtHR  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
12.3.1. A Wide Variety of Types of Positive Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
12.3.2. Procedural Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
12.3.3. Th e Political Character of the Development of 
Positive Obligations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
12.3.4. Th e Specifi c Role and the Judicial Style of the ECJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
12.4. Recommendations for the Development of a Doctrine 
of Positive Obligations by the ECJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
12.5. Expansion of Competences or Gaps in the Protection 
of Fundamental Rights? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339
Intersentia xlvii
 ABBREVIATIONS 
 A-G  Advocate General 
 BVerfG  Bundesverfassungsgericht 
 EC  European Community 
 ECJ  European Court of Justice 
 ECHR  European Convention on Human Rights ( ‘ the Convention ’ ) 
 ECSR  European Committee on Social Rights 
 ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights 
 EU  European Union 
 GC  General Court of the European Union 
 IACHR  Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
 TEC  Treaty establishing the European Community 
 TEU  Treaty on European Union 
 TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
 UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
 UN  United Nations 
 US  United States of America 
 

Intersentia xlix
 TABLE OF CASES 
 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 ECtHR 23 May 2016, no. 17502/07,  Avoti ņ š v. Latvia  
 ECtHR 26 April 2016, no. 62649/10,  İ zzetin Do ğ an and others v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 2 February 2016, no. 3648/04,  Cavit Tinarlioglu v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 4 December 2015, no. 47143/06,  Zakharov v. Russia  
 ECtHR 20 October 2015, no. 15529/12,  Bal á zs v. Hungary  
 ECtHR 22 September 2015, no. 62116/12,  Nabil and others v. Hungary  
 ECtHR 16 June 2015, no. 64569/09,  Delfi  and others v. Estonia .  
 ECtHR 13 January 2015, no. 65681/13,  V é kony v. Hungary  
 ECtHR 4 November 2014, no. 29217/12,  Tarakhel v. Switzerland  
 ECtHR 3 October 2014, no. 12738/10,  Jeunesse v. the Netherlands  
 ECtHR 24 July 2014, nos. 60908/11 to 62338/11,  Brincat and others v. Malta  
 ECtHR 16 July 2014, no. 37359/09,  H ä m ä l ä inen v. Finland  
 ECtHR 24 June 2014, no. 33011/08,  A.K. v. Latvia  
 ECtHR 8 April 2014, no.17120/09,  Dhahbi v. Italy  
 ECtHR 26 March 2014, no. 8978/80,  O ’ Keeff e v. Ireland  
 ECtHR 12 December 2013, no. 5786/08,  S ö derman v. Sweden  
 ECtHR 5 December 2013, nos. 52806/09 and 22703/10,  Vilnes and others v. Norway  
 ECtHR 4 July 2013, no. 21788/06,  Balakin v. Russia  
 ECtHR 6 December 2012, no. 12323/11,  Michaud v. France  
 ECtHR 26 June 2012, no. 26828/06,  Kuri ć and others v .  Slovenia  
 ECtHR 23 February 2012, no. 27765/09,  Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy  
 ECtHR 10 January 2012, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08,  Ananyev and others v. Russia  
 ECtHR 20 December 2011, nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03,  Fingenov and others v. Russia  
 ECtHR 3 November 2011, no. 12793/03,  Balitskiy v. Ukraine  
 ECtHR 20 September 2011, nos. 3989/07 and 38353.07,  Ullens de Schooten 
and Rezabek v. Belgium  
 ECtHR 26 July 2011, no. 41416/08,  M. and others v. Bulgaria  
 ECtHR 26 July 2011, no. 9718/03,  Georgel and Georgeta Stoiescu v. Romania  
 ECtHR 26 May 2011, no. 27617/04,  R. R. V. Poland  
 ECtHR 24 March 2011, no. 23458/02,  Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy  
 ECtHR 10 February 2011, no. 30499/03,  Dubetska and others v. Ukraine  
 ECtHR 21 January 2011, no. 30696/09,  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece  
 ECtHR 18 January 2011, no. 272385/95,  Chapman v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 16 December 2010, no. 25579/05,  A.B. and C. v. Ireland  
 ECtHR 1 March 2010, nos. 46113/99 to 21819/04 (adm. dec.), 
 Demopoulos and others v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 7 January 2010, no. 25965/04,  Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia  
 ECtHR 15 October 2009, no. 17056/06,  Micallef v. Malta  
 ECtHR 17 September 2009, no. 10249/03,  Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2)  
Intersential
Table of Cases
 ECtHR 30 June 2009, no. 32772/02,  Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz 
(VgT) v. Switzerland (No. 2)  
 ECtHR 9 June 2009, no. 33401/02,  Opuz v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 9 April 2009, no. 71463/01,  Silih v. Slovenia  
 ECtHR 3 February 2009, no. 31276/05,  Women on Waves v. Portugal  
 ECtHR 16 December 2008, no. 23883/06,  Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden  
 ECtHR 4 December 2008, nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04,  S. and Marper v. 
the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 24 July 2008, no. 36376/04,  Kononov v. Latvia  
 ECtHR 27 May 2008, no. 26565/05,  N. v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 20 March 2008, nos. 15339/02 to 15343/02,  Budayeva and others v. Russia  
 ECtHR 22 January 2008, no. 43546/02,  E.B. v. France  
 ECtHR 4 December 2007, no. 44362/04,  Dickson v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 9 October 2007, no. 14484/04,  Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 31 May 2007, no. 7510/04,  Kontrov á v. Slovakia  
 ECtHR 31 May 2007, no. 26828/06 (adm. dec.),  Makuc and others v. Slovenia  
 ECtHR 26 April 2007, no. 25389/05,  Gebremedhin v. France  
 ECtHR 10 April 2007, no. 6339/05,  Evans v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 20 March 2007, no. 5410/03,  Tysia ç v. Poland  
 ECtHR 30 June 2006, no. 45036/98,  Bosphorus v. Ireland  
 ECtHR 29 March 2006, no. 36813/97,  Scordino v. Italy (No. 1)  
 ECtHR 23 February 2006, no. 51500/08,  Ç am v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 11 January 2006, nos. 52562/99 and 52620/99,  S ø rensen 
and Rasmussen v. Denmark  
 ECtHR 6 October 2005, no. 74025/01,  Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No. 2)  
 ECtHR 9 June 2005, no. 55723/00,  Fadeyeva v. Russia  
 ECtHR 4 February 2005, nos. 46827/99 to 46951/99,  Mamatkulov 
and Askarov v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 4 January 2005, no. 14462/03 (adm. dec.),  Pentiacova and 
48 others v. Moldova  
 ECtHR 20 December 2004, no. 50385/99,  Maraktzis v. Greece  
 ECtHR 2 December 2004, no. 4672/02,  Farbtuhs v. Latvia  
 ECtHR 30 November 2004, no. 48939/99,  Ö neryildiz v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 18 November 2004, no. 58255/00,  Propokovich v. Russia  
 ECtHR 16 November 2004, no. 4143/02,  G ó mez v. Spain  
 ECtHR 13 July 2004, no. 69498/01,  Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra  
 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 53924/00,  Vo v. France  
 ECtHR 24 June 2004, no. 59320/00,  Von Hannover v. Germany  
 ECtHR 22 June 2004, no. 31443/96,  Broniowski v. Poland  
 ECtHR 8 April 2004, no. 71503/01,  Assanidze v. Georgia  
 ECtHR 27 May 2004, no. 66746/01,  Connors v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 17 February 2004, no. 39748/98,  Maestri v. Italy  
 ECtHR 24 July 2003, no. 40016/98,  Karner v. Austria  
 ECtHR 8 July 2003, no. 36022/97,  Hatton and others v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 8 July 2003, no. 27677/02 (adm. dec.),  Sentges v. the Netherlands  
 ECtHR 11 July 2002, no. 28957/95,  Christina Goodwin v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 14 May 2002, no. 38621/97 (adm. dec.),  Zehnalova and 
Zehnal v. the Czech Republic  
 ECtHR 21 December 2001, no. 31465/96,  Sen v. the Netherlands  
 ECtHR 28 June 2001, no. 24699/94,  VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland  
Intersentia li
Table of Cases
 ECtHR 26 June 2001, no. 26390/95,  Beck v. Norway  
 ECtHR 10 May 2001, no. 29392/95,  Z. and others v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 23 January 2001, no. 28342/95,  Brum ă rescu v. Romania (Article 41)  
 ECtHR 18 January 2001, no. 24882/94,  Beard v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 18 January 2001, no. 27238/95,  Chapman v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 17 January 2001, no. 32967/96,  Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy  
 ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96,  Kudla v. Poland  
 ECtHR 13 July 2000, nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98,  Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy  
 ECtHR 11 July 2000, no. 29192/95,  Ciliz v. the Netherlands  
 ECtHR 16 March 2000, no. 23144/93,  Ö zg ü r G ü ndem v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 18 February 1999, no. 24833/94,  Matthews v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94,  Osman v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 9 June 1998, no. 23413/94,  L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 24 February 1998, no. 21439/93,  Botta v. Italy  
 ECtHR 19 February 1998, no. 14967/89,  Guerra and others v. Italy  
 ECtHR 19 February 1998, no. 22729/93,  Kaya v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 28 November 1996, no. 21702/93,  Ahmut v. the Netherlands  
 ECtHR 25 April 1996, no. 15573/89,  Gustafsson v. Sweden  
 ECtHR 19 February 1996, no. 23218/94,  G ü l v. Switzerland  
 ECtHR 31 October 1995, no. 14556/89,  Papamichalopoulos and 
others v. Greece (Article 50)  
 ECtHR 27 September 1995, no. 18984/91,  McCann and others v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 23 March 1995, no. 15318/89,  Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections)  
 ECtHR 9 December 1994, no. 16798/90,  L ó pez Ostra v. Spain  
 ECtHR 25 November 1994, no. 18131/91,  Stjerna v. Finland  
 ECtHR 24 November 1994, no. 17621/91,  Kemmache v. France (No. 3)  
 ECtHR 20 September 1994, no. 13470/84,  Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria  
 ECtHR 26 May 1994, no. 16969/90,  Keegan v. Ireland  
 ECtHR 29 April 1994, nos. 25088/94 to 28443/95,  Chassagnou and others v. France  
 ECtHR 25 March 1993, no. 13134/87,  Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 16 December 1992, no. 13710/88,  Niemitz  
 ECtHR 4 March 1991, nos. 15299/89 to 15318/89 (adm. dec.), 
 Chrysostomos, Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey  
 ECtHR 27 September 1990, no. 10843/84,  Cossey v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 21 February 1990, no. 9310/81,  Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 7 July 1989, no. 14038/88,  Soering v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 7 July 1989, no. 10454/83,  Gaskin v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 21 June 1988, no. 10126/82,  Plattform  “ Ä rtze f ü r das Leben ” v. Austria  
 ECtHR 29 April 1988, no. 10328/83,  Belilos v. Switzerland  
 ECtHR 8 July 1987, no. 9840/82,  B. v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 2 March 1987, no. 9267/81,  Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium  
 ECtHR 17 October 1986, no. 9532/81,  Rees v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 21 February 1986, no. 8793/79,  James and others v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/80 to 9474/81,  Abdulaziz, Cabales 
and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80,  X and Y v. the Netherlands  
 ECtHR 2 August 1984, no. 8691/79,  Malone v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 25 February 1982, nos. 7511/76 to 7743/76,  Campbell and 
Cosans v. the United Kingdom  
Intersentialii
Table of Cases
 ECtHR 13 August 1981, nos. 7601/76 and 7806/77,  Young, James and 
Webster v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. Ireland  
 ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium  
 ECtHR 26 April 1979, no. 653874,  Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 6 September 1978, no. 5029/71,  Klass and others v. Germany  
 ECtHR 25 April 1978, no. 5856/72,  Tyrer v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR, 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71,  Ireland v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 7 December 1976, no. 5493/72,  Handyside v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 7 December 1976, nos. 5095/71 to 5926/71,  Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen 
and Pedersen v. Denmark  
 ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71 to 5370/72,  Engel and others v. the Netherlands  
 ECtHR 6 February 1976, no. 5614/72,  Swedish Engine Driver ’ s Union v. Sweden  
 ECtHR 21 February 1975, no. 4451/70,  Golder v. the United Kingdom  
 ECtHR 10 March 1972, nos. 2832/66 to 2899/66,  De Wilde, Ooms 
and Versyp ( ‘ Vagrancy ’ ) v. Belgium (Article 50)  
 ECtHR 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62 to 2126/64,  Belgian Linguistic case  
 ECtHR 27 June 1968, no. 2122/64,  Wemhoff  v. Germany  
 ECtHR 1 July 1961, no. 332/57,  Lawless v. Ireland  
 EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
 ECJ 20 September 2016, Joined Cases C-8/15 and C-10/15,  Ledra Advertising , 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:701  
 ECJ 4 May 2016, C-358/14,  Poland v. Parliament and Council , ECLI:EU:C:2016:323  
 ECJ 4 May 2016, Joined cases C-477/14 and C-547/14,  Pillbox 38l , 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:324  
 ECJ 19 April 2016, C-441/14,  Danski Industri , ECLI:EU:C:2016:278  
 ECJ 5 April 2016, Joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15,  Aranyosi and C ă ld ă ru , 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:198.  
 ECJ 15 February 2016, C-601/115,  J.N. , ECLI:EU:C:2016:84  
 ECJ 6 October 2015, C-362/14,  Schrems , ECLI:EU:C:2015:650  
 ECJ 6 October 2015, C-61/14,  Orizzonte Salute , ECLI:EU:C:2015:655  
 ECJ 10 September 2015, C-408/14,  Wojchiechowski , ECLI:EU:C:2015:591  
 ECJ 9 September 2015, Joined Cases C-72/14 and C-197/14,  X. and T.A. van Dijk , 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:564  
 ECJ 9 September 2015, C-160/14,  Ferreira da Silva , ECLI:EU:C:2015:565  
 ECJ 18 June 2015, C-508/13,  Estonia v. Parliament and Council , 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:403  
 ECJ 7 May 2015, C-608/14,  Pondiche , ECLI:EU:C:2015:313  
 ECJ 7 May 2015, C-496/14,  V ặ raru , ECLI:EU:C:2015:312  
 ECJ 29 April 2015, C-528/13,  L é ger , ECLI:EU:C:2015:288  
 ECJ 16 April 2015, Joined cases C-446/12 to C-449/12,  Willems and others , 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:238  
 ECJ 18 December 2014, C-562/13,  Abdida , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2453  
 ECJ 18 December 2014, C-542/13,  M ’ Bodj , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2452  
 ECJ 18 December 2014,  Opinion 2/13 , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2431  
 ECJ 11 December 2014, C-249/13,  Boudjlida , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2431  
 ECJ 11 November 2014, C-333/13,  Dano , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358  
 ECJ 5 November 2014, C-166/13,  Mukarubega , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2229  
Intersentia liii
Table of Cases
 ECJ 17 September 2014, C-562/12,  Liivimaa Lihaveis , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2229  
 ECJ 17 July 2014, Joined Cases C-141/12 and C-372/12,  YS and others , 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2081  
 ECJ 17 July 2014, C-474/13,  Pham , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2096  
 ECJ 10 July 2014, C-198/13,  Julian Hern á ndez and others , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055  
 ECJ 3 July 2014, C-129/13,  Kamino International Logistics , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2041  
 ECJ 5 June 2014, C-146/14,  Mahdi , ECLI:EU:C:2014:1320  
 ECJ 22 May 2014, C-56/13,  É rsekcsan á di Mez ö gazdasagi , ECLI:EU:C:2014:352  
 ECJ 22 May 2014, C-356/12,  Glatzel , ECLI:EU:C:2014:350  
 ECJ 13 May 2014, C-131/12,  Google Spain , ECLI:EU:C:2014:317  
 ECJ 8 May 2014, C-483/12,  Pelckmans Turnhout , ECLI:EU:C:2014:304  
 ECJ 30 April 2014, C-390/12,  Pfl eger and others , ECLI:EU:C:2014:238  
 ECJ 8 April 2014, Joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12,  Digital Rights Ireland , 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238  
 ECJ 8 April 2014, C-288/12,  Commission v. Hungary , ECLI:EU:C:2014:237  
 ECJ 27 March 2014, C-314/12,  UPC Telekabel Wien , ECLI:EU:C:2014:192  
 ECJ 27 March 2014, C-265/13,  Torralbo Marcos , ECLI:EU:C:2014:187  
 ECJ 6 March 2014, C-206/13,  Siragusa , ECLI:EU:C:2014:126  
 ECJ 27 February 2014, C-79/13,  Saciri and others , ECLI:EU:C:2014:103  
 ECJ 15 January 2014, C-176/12,  AMS , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2  
 ECJ 26 November 2013, C-58/12 P,  Group Gascogne v. Commission , 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:770  
 ECJ 3 October 2013, C-583/11 P,  Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and others , 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:625  
 ECJ 18 July 2013, C-584/10 P,  Commission and others v Kadi , ECLI:EU:C:2013:518  
 ECJ 6 June 2013, C-648/11,  MA and others , ECLI:EU:C:2013:367  
 ECJ 4 June 2013, C-300/11,  ZZ , ECLI:EU:C:2013:363  
 ECJ 7 March 2013, C-128/12,  Sindicato dos Banc á rios do Norte and others , 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:149  
 ECJ 26 February 2013, C-399/11,  Melloni , ECLI:EU:C:2013:107  
 ECJ 26 February 2013, C-617/10,  Å kerberg Fransson , ECLI:EU:C:2013:105  
 ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11,  Sky  Ö sterreich , ECLI:EU:C:2013:28  
 ECJ 6 December 2012, Joined cases C-356/11 and C-357/11,  O and others , 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:776  
 ECJ 27 November 2012, C-370/12,  Pringle , ECLI:EU:C:2012:756  
 ECJ 22 November 2012, C-277/11,  M. , ECLI:EU:C:2012:744  
 ECJ 8 March 2011, C-34/09,  Zambrano , ECLI:EU:C:2011:124  
 ECJ 9 November 2010, Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, 
 Volker und Markus Schecke , ECLI:EU:C:2010:662  
 ECJ 8 November 2012, C-40/11,  Iida , ECLI:EU:C:2012:691  
 ECJ 6 November 2012, C-286/12,  Commission v. Hungary , ECLI:EU:C:2012:687  
 ECJ 26 April 2012, C-92/12,  Health Service Executive , ECLI:EU:C:2012:255  
 ECJ 24 April 2012, C-571/10,  Kamberaj , ECLI:EU:C:2012:233  
 ECJ 16 February 2012, C-182/10,  Solvay , ECLI:EU:C:2012:82  
 ECJ 24 January 2012, C-282/10,  Dominguez , ECLI:EU:C:2012:33  
 ECJ 21 December 2011, Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10,  N.S. and others , 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:865  
 ECJ 15 November 2011, C-256/11,  Dereci , ECLI:EU:C:2011:734  
 ECJ 1 March 2011, Case C-236/09,  Test-Achats , ECLI:EU:C:2011:100  
 ECJ 5 October 2010, C-400/10,  McB. , ECLI:EU:C:2010:582  
Intersentialiv
Table of Cases
 ECJ 22 December 2010, C-279/09,  DEB , ECLI:EU:C:2010:811  
 ECJ 22 December 2010, C-208/09,  Sayn-Wittgenstein , ECLI:EU:C:2010:806  
 ECJ 16 September 2010, C-149/10,  Chatzi , ECLI:EU:C:2010:534  
 ECJ 8 June 2010, C-58/08,  Vodafone and others , ECLI:EU:C:2010:321  
 ECJ 19 January 2010, C-555/07,  K ü c ü kdeveci , ECLI:EU:C:2010:21  
 ECJ 18 December 2008, C-349/07,  Soprop é , ECLI:EU:C:2008:746  
 ECJ 3 September 2008, C-402/05, Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461  
 ECJ 1 April 2008, C-267/06,  Maruko , ECLI:EU:C:2008:179  
 ECJ 29 January 2008, C-275/06,  Promusicae , ECLI:EU:C:2008:54  
 ECJ 18 December 2007, C-341/05,  Laval , ECLI:EU:C:2007:809  
 ECJ 11 December 2007, C-438/05,  Viking Line , ECLI:EU:C:2007:772  
 ECJ 11 September 2007, Joined cases C-76/05 and C-318/05,  Schwarz and Gootjes , 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:492  
 ECJ 27 June 2006, C-540/03,  Parliament v. Council , ECLI:EU:C:2006:429  
 ECJ 26 June 2007, C-305/05,  Ordre des barreaux francophone and 
germanophone and others , ECLI:EU:C:2007:383  
 ECJ 13 March 2007, C-432/05,  Unibet , ECLI:EU:C:2007:163  
 ECJ 22 November 2005, C-144/04,  Mangold , ECLI:EU:C:2005:709  
 ECJ 11 June 2005, C-98/14,  Berlington , ECLI:EU:C:2015:386  
 ECJ 16 December 2004, C-293/03,  My , ECLI:EU:C:2004:821  
 ECJ 11 November 2004, C-372/04,  Watts , ECLI:EU:C:2006:325  
 ECJ 14 October 2004, C-36/02,  Omega , ECLI:EU:C:2004:614  
 ECJ 6 November 2003, C-101/01,  Lindqvist , ECLI:EU:C:2003:596  
 ECJ 30 September 2003, C-224/01,  K ö bler , ECLI:EU:C:2003:513  
 ECJ 12 June 2003, C-112/00,  Schmidberger , ECLI:EU:C:2003:333  
 ECJ 10 December 2002, C-491/01,  Britisch American Tobacco (Investments) 
and Imperial Tobacco , ECLI:EU:C:2002:741  
 ECJ 22 October 2002, C-94/00,  Roquettes Fr è res , ECLI:EU:C:2002:603  
 ECJ 25 July 2002, C-50/00,  Uni ó n de Peque ñ os Agricultores v. Council , 
ECLI:EU:C:2002:462  
 ECJ 19 February 2002, C-309/99,  Wouters and others , ECLI:EU:C:2002:98  
 ECJ 5 October 2000, C-376/98,  Germany v. Parliament and Council , 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:544  
 ECJ 17 February 1998, C-249/96,  Grant , ECLI:EU:C:1998:63  
 ECJ 19 December 1997, C-309/96,  Annibaldi , ECLI:EU:C:1997:631  
 ECJ 9 December 1997, C-265/95,  Commission v. France , ECLI:EU:C:1997:595  
 ECJ 26 June 1997, C-368/95,  Familiapress , ECLI:EU:C:1997:325  
 ECJ 26 November 1996, C-68/95,  T. Port , ECLI:EU:C:1996:452  
 ECJ 30 April 1996, Case C-13/94,  P v S and Cornwall County Council , 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:170  
 ECJ 28 March 1996,  Opinion 2/94 , ECLI:EU:C:1996:140  
 ECJ 15 December 1995, C-415/93,  Bosman , ECLI:EU:C:1995:463  
 ECJ 9 November 1995, case C-465/93,  Atlanta Fruchthandelsgesellschaft  
and others (I) v. Budensansalt fuer Landwirtschaft  , ECLI:EU:C:1995:369  
 ECJ 24 March 1994, C-2/92,  Bostock , ECLI:EU:C:1995:83  
 ECJ 19 November 1991, Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90,  Francovich 
and Bonifaci v. Italy , ECLI:EU:C:1991:428  
 ECJ 25 July 1991, C-208/90,  Emmott , ECLI:EU:C:1991:333  
 ECJ 18 June 1991, C-260/89,  ERT , ECLI:EU:C:1991:254  
Intersentia lv
Table of Cases
 ECJ 28 February 1991, C-234/89,  Delimitis v. Henninger Br ä u , ECLI:EU:C:1991:91  
 ECJ 21 February 1991, Joined cases C-143/88 and C-92/89, 
 Zuckerfabrik Suederdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest , ECLI:EU:C:1991:65  
 ECJ 13 November 1990, C-106/89,  Marleasing , ECLI:EU:C:1990:395ECJ 
19 June 1990, C-213/89,  Factortame , ECLI:EU:C:1990:257  
 ECJ 21 September 1989, C-46/87,  Hoechst , ECLI:EU:C:1989:337  
 ECJ 13 July 1989, C-5/88  Wachauf , ECLI:EU:C:1989:321  
 ECJ 15 October 1987, C-222/86  Heylens , ECLI:EU:C:1987:442  
 ECJ 15 May 1986, C-222/84,  Johnston , ECLI:EU:C:1986:206  
 ECJ 23 April 1986, C-294/83,  Les Verts v Parliament , ECLI:EU:C:1986:166  
 ECJ 26 February 1986, C-152/84,  Marshall , ECLI:EU:C:1986:84  
 ECJ 11 July 1985, C-60/84,  Cin é th è que v. F é d é ration nationale des 
cin é mas fran ç ais , ECLI:EU:C:1985:329  
 ECJ 6 October 1982, C-283/81,  Cilfi t , ECLI:EU:C:1982:335  
 ECJ 13 December 1979, C-44/79,  Hauer , ECLI:EU:C:1979:290  
 ECJ 16 December 1976, C-33/76,  Rewe , ECLI:EU:C:1976:188  
 ECJ 8 April 1976, C-43/75,  Defrenne v. Sabena (No 2) , ECLI:EU:C:1976:56  
 ECJ 12 December 1974, C-36/74,  Walrave and Koch , ECLI:EU:C:1974:140  
 ECJ 14 May 1974, C-4/73,  Nold , ECLI:EU:C:1974:51  
 ECJ 7 February 1970, C-11/70,  Internationale Handelsgesellschaft  , 
ECLI:EU:C:1970:114  
 ECJ 12 November 1969, C-29/69,  Stauder , ECLI:EU:C:1969:57  
 ECJ 15 July 1964, C-6/64,  Costa v. ENEL , ECLI:EU:C:1964:66  
 ECJ 15 July 1963, C-25/62,  Plaumann v. Commission of the EEC , 
ECLI:EU:C:1963:17  
 ECJ 27 March 1963, Joined cases C-28/62 to 30/62,  Da Costa , 
ECLI:EU:C:1963:6  
 ECJ 5 February 1963, C-26/62,  Van Gend en Loos , ECLI:EU:C:1963:1  
 ECJ 15 July 1960, Joined cases C-36/59 and C-40/59,  Geitling v. High Authority , 
ECLI:EU:C:1960:36  
 ECJ 4 February 1959, C-1/58,  Stork  & Cie. v High Authority , ECLI:EU:C:1959:4  
 ECJ 29 November 1956, C-8/55,  F é d é ration charbonni è re de 
Belgique v. High Authority , ECLI:EU:C:1956:11  
 GENERAL COURT 
 GC 16 October 2014, T-208/11,  LTTE v. Council , ECLI:EU:T:2014:885  
 EUROPEAN COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL RIGHTS 
 ECSR 14 November 2014, no. 90/2103,  Conference of European 
Churches v. the Netherlands  
 INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 IACHR 29 July 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. Series C No 4,  V é lasquez Rodr í guez 
v. Honduras (Merits)  
Intersentialvi
Table of Cases
 AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE ’ S RIGHTS 
 African Commission on Human and People ’ s Rights No 211/89 (1 May 2001), 
 Legal Resources Foundation v. Zambia  
 PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 
 Permanent Court of International Justice,  Chorz ó w Factory (Germany v. Poland) 
(Indemnity) (Merits) , case PCIJ Rep Series A No 17  
 BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT (GERMAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT) 
 BVerfG 29 May 1974, 2 BvL 52/7,  Solange I  
 U.S. SUPREME COURT 
 U.S. Supreme Court 6 June 1994,  Farmer/Brennan , 511  U.S. 825 (1994)  
 U.S. Supreme Court 27 June 2005,  Castle Rock/Gonzales , 545  U.S. 189 (1989)  
Intersentia 1
 1  Th e term ‘human rights’ is also oft en used in this context and commonly refers to the right laid down 
in international human rights treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( ‘ UDHR ’ ). 
Th e term  ‘ fundamental rights ’ , which is used in this study, encompasses a broader category of rights, 
and also include the rights found in the constitutions of the member states. Furthermore, the term 
fundamental rights in this study does not include the  ‘ other ’ general principles of law that have been 
developed by the ECJ, nor the fundamental freedoms under EU law, which are sometimes also referred 
to as fundamental rights under EU law. 
 2  For a further historical overview of the ECtHR, see Bates (2010). 
 3  Harris, O ’ Boyle, Bates  & Warbrick (2014), p. 34. 
 4  Harris, O ’ Boyle, Bates  & Warbrick (2014), pp. 34 – 35. 
 CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 1.1.  BACKGROUND TO THIS STUDY 
 1.1.1.  TWO SUPRANATIONAL COURTS IN EUROPE DECIDING ON 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CASES 
 In today ’ s pluralistic European legal order there are two supranational courts that 
both interpret the scope and the meaning of fundamental rights. Fundamental rights 
are a set of individuals rights and freedoms which, for example, include the right to 
life and freedom of expression, and can also be found in national constitutions. 1 At 
the supranational level, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) fi rstly plays 
an important role in interpreting the fundamental rights set out in the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR or  ‘ the Convention ’ ). Th e ECtHR (and its 
predecessor, the European Commission of Human Rights), entered the scene in the 
1950s, allowing individuals, as well as states, to bring claims regarding violations of 
the mainly civil and political rights of the Convention. From that moment on, the 
ECtHR has delivered judgments in a wide range of cases where fundamental rights 
were allegedly interfered with, and in those judgments it has fl eshed out the meaning 
and scope of the rights laid down in the Convention. 2 Th e ECtHR has also played an 
important part in the development of fundamental rights doctrines. 3 Th e case-law of 
this Court has generated important eff ects on the way in which fundamental rights are 
protected at the national level. Th e states parties  inter alia have had to make legislative 
changes in response to specifi c judgments of the ECtHR on individual cases. 4 Today, 
the detailed case-law of the ECtHR and its fundamental rights doctrines are therefore 
of interest for various areas of law. 
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 5  Th e Court of Justice of the European Union is comprised of three courts: the Court of Justice, the 
General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal. In this study the term ECJ is used to refer primarily to 
the fi rst of these courts, i.e., the Court of Justice, which is the highest court. Only the Court of Justice 
is competent to respond to the questions referred to by the national courts under the preliminary 
reference procedure. Th e Court of Justice is further competent to deal with applications for annulment 
actions and actions for failure to fulfi l EU obligations, and with appeals against the judgments of the 
General Court. 
 6  See e.g. ECJ 13 May 2014, C-131/12,  Google Spain ; ECJ 6 October 2015, C-362/14,  Schrems ; ECJ 8 
April 2014, Joined cases C-293/12 and 594/12,  Digital Rights Ireland ; and ECJ 21 December 2011, 
Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10,  N.S. and others . 
 7  For a statistical overview of the numbers of questions that have been raised by national courts from 
2009 onwards, see European Commission, Staff  Working Document on the Application of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2015, SWD(2016), 158 fi nal, p. 8. 
 On the same European continent, albeit in respect of fewer states, the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (ECJ), now also plays a role in the protection of fundamental 
rights. 5 Th e ECJ interprets and safeguards the correct application of the law of the 
European Union (EU). Its primary aim is not to ensure respect for fundamental rights, 
since it was established for diff erent reasons. It was set up to focus on an economic 
type of integration between the European states. It has become clear, however, that 
actions taken by EU institutions and EU member states under EU law can aff ect the 
protection of fundamental rights. Th e right to property may, for example, be interfered 
with because of arrangements made at the EU level to establish an internal market. 
Moreover, the EU member states have agreed to cooperate in matters of immigration 
and civil and criminal matters in the area of freedom, security and justice, which can 
aff ect important fundamental rights such as the prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment. While, initially, the ECJ ensured through its case-law that fundamental 
rights were guaranteed as general principles of Community law, and later of EU law, the 
EU Treaties now clearly mandate for fundamental rights to be protected. Since 2009, 
the EU has its own written and binding catalogue of fundamental rights, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights ( ‘ the Charter ’ ). 
 So far, the foregoing will be a very familiar story for many readers, especially for those 
working in the fi eld of fundamental rights protection in Europe. Th ey will know that the 
ECJ has found a clear place alongside the ECtHR as a court that can off er protection of 
fundamental rights in Europe. Th e ECJ is competent to interpret fundamental rights in 
cases that fall within the scope of EU law, and it can decide that EU legislation or other 
decisions taken by the EU institutions are void if they fail to secure respect for these 
rights. In several areas, such as privacy law, asylum law and non-discrimination law, 
the ECJ has delivered important decisions and has recognised important principles. 6 
Increasingly, the ECJ is being requested to determine how fundamental rights are to be 
protected within the context of EU law, especially since the Charter has become legally 
binding. 7 
 Th e ECJ remains, however, quite a novel player in the fi eld of fundamental rights 
protection. It still needs to clarify how fundamental rights are to be protected within the 
context of EU law, especially on the basis of the EU Charter. Seeing that the ECJ has less 
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 8  Article 52(3) of the Charter also specifi cally requires such consistency. 
 9  See ECJ 18 June 1991, C-260/89,  ERT . 
 10  ECJ 18 December 2014,  Opinion 2/13 . 
 11  Th e lack of progress in the accession process since  Opinion 2/13 is also confi rmed in European 
Commission, 2015 Report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, SWD(2016), 
158 fi nal, p. 8. 
 12  See Gerards (2015), p. 47; Douglas-Scott (2011), p. 649; S á nchez (2012), p. 1592; Gerards (2011a), 
p. 90; and K ü hling (2009), p. 490. Th e ECJ has, however, paid an important contribution in developing 
the concepts of direct and indirect discrimination in its case-law, see Gerards (2015), p. 47. 
experience in dealing with fundamental rights cases, comparisons are oft en made to 
the way in which other courts interpret and apply fundamental rights. Th e ECtHR is an 
obvious comparator in this respect, because it protects the same range of fundamental 
rights as the ECJ and it is, moreover, also situated at the supranational level. 
 Another reason for choosing the ECtHR as a comparator is substantive in nature. It 
is considered desirable that fundamental rights are interpreted and applied in the same 
way in the context of EU law as they are under the Convention, especially since many 
states will need to comply with the judgments of both of these courts. 8 Th e ECJ itself 
has also explicitly relied on the interpretations which have been provided by the ECtHR 
in its case-law, and it declared early on that the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Convention are of special signifi cance in that respect. 9 It has even been agreed that 
the EU itself should accede to the Convention, and since 2010, negotiations have been 
taking place to make specifi c arrangements to realise such accession. As a consequence, 
the ECtHR would be able to hear claims brought by individuals against the EU for 
violation of the rights laid down in the Convention. In this way, the ECtHR would have 
an important role in ensuring that the EU complies with the minimum standards laid 
down in the Convention and to prevent divergence of the standards of fundamental 
rights between the Convention and the EU. However, in December 2014, the ECJ raised 
important objections to the arrangements laid down in a draft  accession agreement. 10 
Under the proposed arrangements, several of the specifi c characteristics and important 
principles of EU law would be interfered with. Since then, the accession process has 
been on hold, and it is expected to take quite some time before it is continued. 11 
 Th e ECJ thus still has the fi nal say on how fundamental rights are to be protected 
within the EU context. For reasons of consistency, however, it is generally expected 
that the ECJ would have resort to principles similar to those which the ECtHR has 
developed for the interpretation and application of fundamental rights. Th e ECtHR 
has, for example, developed its famous margin of appreciation doctrine, which leaves 
states a certain discretion in their legislative, administrative or judicial choices in areas 
where fundamental rights are at stake. It has also developed elaborate standards on 
the proportionality assessment that states must undertake to justify restrictions of 
fundamental rights. Th e ECJ has been somewhat slow in developing similar fundamental 
rights doctrines in its own case-law, and it has been criticised in that regard. 12 
Fundamental rights doctrines can help to bring clarity, certainty and predictability for 
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 13  K ü hling (2009), p. 490. 
 14  K ü hling (2009), p. 490; and Gerards (2012b). 
 15  Douglas-Scott (2011), p. 681. 
 16  For examples of judgments of such international bodies, see IACHR 29 July 1988, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. 
Series C No 4,  V é lasquez Rodr í guez v. Honduras (Merits), paras 160 – 166 and 174 – 177; and African 
Commission on Human and People ’ s Rights No 211/89 (1 May 2001),  Legal Resources Foundation v. 
Zambia , para. 62. For an overview of the recognition of positive obligations by diff erent international 
and national legal systems, see Dr ö ge (2003), pp. 268 – 284; and Stachel (2006), pp. 20 – 29. 
 17  See Mowbray (2004); and Xenos (2012). Th is development in particular is discussed in chapter 3. 
the actors who are subject to this particular fundamental rights regime. 13 Development 
of such doctrines is considered all the more necessary because of the concerns that 
continue to exist over the democratic legitimacy of decisions that are made at the EU 
level. 14 Moreover, by developing fundamental rights doctrines the ECJ could fi nally 
remove doubts over the reality of its intention to protect fundamental rights and it 
could change its current image, as a court that mainly protects interests of an economic 
kind. 15 
 At the same time, it should be noted that the ECJ is, indeed, a rather diff erent court 
compared to the ECtHR. It has diff erent interests to protect under EU law, it employs a 
rather diff erent judicial style, and also takes a diff erent position towards individuals and 
the national and EU authorities. It can therefore be questioned whether and to what 
extent certain fundamental rights doctrines can really be expected to be developed 
within the context of EU law in a similar way by these two diff erent courts. 
 Against this background, this study focuses on the potential for the development 
by the EU of one particular fundamental rights doctrine  – that of positive obligations. 
Originally developed by the ECtHR, the question is raised whether and to what extent 
it can be incorporated by the EU Courts, especially in light of the considerations 
discussed above. Th e following section fi rst briefl y explains what the concept of positive 
obligations means (section 1.1.2.) and, secondly, what types of questions have been 
raised regarding this concept in the academic debates on the EU system of fundamental 
rights protection (section 1.1.3.). Th e main question of this research is then presented 
(section 1.1.4.), followed by the aims and objectives of this study (section 1.2.), 
and the methods and approaches used to answer the main question of this study (section 
1.3.). Next, in order to set a solid baseline for the discussion that is undertaken in this 
study, a working defi nition is provided of the concept of positive obligations in relation 
to the notion of fundamental rights within the context of EU law (section 1.4.). Finally, 
the outline of this book is provided (section 1.5.). 
 1.1.2.  THE CONCEPT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 Various courts and bodies in (international) human rights law have recognised a 
concept of positive obligations in their judgments. 16 Th e ECtHR, in particular, has 
clearly accepted positive obligations in its case-law. 17 Th e ECtHR has explained that 
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 18  See e.g. the critiques of former judge Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion to ECtHR 13 June 1979, 
no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium ; and Van Kempen (2008). 
 19  See generally Fredman (2008). 
 20  Stubberfi eld (2012); Besson (2011a), p. 115; Ahmed  & Butler (2006), p. 794; De Schutter (2004); Van 
der Velde (2009), pp. 74 – 78; and Heringa  & Verhey (2001), pp. 19 – 20. 
 21  De Witte (1999), p. 882. 
 22  Others have also pointed to this case as an example of the formulation of a positive obligaton by the 
ECJ, see Weiler  & Fries (1999), p. 156. Section 1.4. provides a brief discussion of this case in order to 
explain the defi nition of positive obligations. Th e case of  T. Port is also discussed in section 11.5.5. 
the protection of fundamental rights traditionally requires states to abstain from 
interfering with the individual freedoms of citizens, which means that states incur a 
negative obligation. Fundamental rights protection can, in addition, give rise to positive 
obligations, meaning that states must take active measures to ensure the protection of 
individuals ’ fundamental rights in a practical and eff ective manner. Th is applies both in 
their relation to the state and in their private relations. Th e positive obligations which 
have been imposed by the ECtHR on states range from obligations in the legislative 
sphere that ensure respect for the right to privacy of same-sex couples, to obligations 
to take practical measures to ensure peaceful demonstrations, and to obligations to 
provide a more general framework in the legislative, policy or practical area to combat 
human traffi  cking. Th e case-law of the ECtHR has been criticised  inter alia for showing 
unwarranted judicial activism and disrespect for the principle of subsidiarity. 18 
Nonetheless, over time, the ECtHR has developed a highly infl uential case-law which 
reveals the standards and methods it uses in recognising these obligations. Th e 
recognition of positive obligations is generally considered to be justifi ed by the principle 
of the eff ective protection of fundamental rights. Th e concept of positive obligations has 
now been more broadly accepted in modern democracies. 19 
 1.1.3.  THE DEBATE ABOUT POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS WITHIN THE 
CONTEXT OF EU LAW 
 So far, it is diffi  cult to see a concept of positive obligations in the case-law of the ECJ. 20 
In 1999, De Witte noted that: 
 ‘ Th e ECJ ’ s case-law on human rights is, in fact, still developing. It has dealt only quite 
recently with another well-known issue of the fundamental rights doctrine of both national 
constitutional courts and the European Court of Human Rights, namely the question whether 
fundamental rights also impose  positive duties on governments (in our case, on the Community 
Institutions as well as on the Member States acting within the scope of EC law). ’ 21 
 De Witte was referring to one particular judgment, the case of  T. Port , in which the ECJ 
seemed to have defi ned a positive obligation for the Community institutions to protect 
the fundamental rights of undertakings in their transition to the common market, 
which is explained further at section 1.4. 22 Since then, only a few researchers have noted 
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 23  See in particular Prechal  & Widdershoven (2011); Van Cleynenbreugel (2012a); and Van 
Cleynenbreugel (2012b). 
 24  Stubberfi eld (2012), p. 125; Besson (2011b), p. 43; K ü hling (2009), p. 492; Ahmed  & Butler (2006); 
De Schutter (2004), pp. 3 – 4; and Alston  & Weiler (1999), pp. 10 – 11. Th e approach of the ECJ towards 
fundamental rights has, at least in the past, also been characterised as defensive and instrumental, see 
De Schutter (2004), pp. 3 – 16. 
 25  Ahmed  & Butler (2006), p. 794. Cf. also Stubberfi eld (2012), p. 125. 
 26  See in particular ECJ 28 March 1996,  Opinion 2/94 , para. 27; Besson (2011b), pp. 50 – 53; Van der Velde 
(2009), pp. 74 – 78; De Schutter (2004), pp. 29 – 31; Heringa  & Verhey (2001), pp. 19 – 20. 
 27  See Eeckhout (2002); Von Bogdandy (2008); Craig (2011a), p. 219; Craig  & De B ú rca (2015), p. 397; 
and the sources mentioned in  supra n. 26. 
 28  See also Gersdorf (1994), pp. 400 – 426. 
 29  Eeckhout (2002), p. 980. 
other types of positive obligations, which seem to have been developed incidentally in 
the case-law of the ECJ. In particular, such obligations have been identifi ed in the fi eld 
of national procedural law, where states have been required to introduce new remedies 
and powers for national authorities. 23 
 It has more oft en been held that EU fundamental rights have a predominantly 
negative character. 24 Th is is to say that fundamental rights essentially set limits on the 
exercise of powers by the EU. Ahmed and Butler, in particular, have held that: 
 ‘ Th e nature of human rights protection within the EU is essentially  ‘ negative ’. Th at is, the EU is 
seen to be under a duty not to violate human rights when it takes steps to fulfi l the obligations 
arising from the Treaty. It is considered to be under a duty not to violate human rights whenever 
it takes action, but without any general competence to take positive action on human rights. ’ 25 
 An important explanation that is oft en given for the more limited development of 
positive obligations under EU law is that the EU does not have a general competence 
to protect fundamental rights. 26 Indeed, it can be doubted whether positive obligations 
can be recognised if there are limited competences for the EU to take measures to 
protect fundamental rights, as such obligations would entail requirements to introduce 
legislative provisions or to implement fi nancially burdensome measures. 27 
 Th ere is, however, potential for the development of positive obligations, especially 
because of the way in which fundamental rights have been laid down in the Charter. 
Th e Charter contains a wide array of rights, some of which evidently require positive 
action to be taken. 28 Th ere are, for example, various socio-economic rights included 
in the  ‘ Solidarity ’ Title of the Charter which are generally expected to give rise to 
positive obligations for states if they are to be fully realised. Article 51(1) of the Charter 
also requires the EU institutions and member states, when implementing EU law, to 
respect the rights, observe the principles and  promote the application thereof. Clearly, 
this implies that the Charter contains more than a mere limit to the actions of the EU 
and a set of purely negative obligations. 29 Th e Charter also explicitly holds that the 
same meaning and scope must be given to the rights of the Charter that correspond to 
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 30  See Article 52(3) of the Charter. 
 31  Similar considerations are included in the fi ft h section of the preamble of the Charter; the second 
sentence of Article 51(1) of the Charter; the explanations to Article 51(2) of the Charter; the second 
sentence of Article 6(1) TEU; Declaration No. 1 to the Lisbon Treaty; as well as Articles 1(3) and 9(1) 
of the Draft  Agreement for the Accession of the EU to the European Convention for Human Rights, 
47 + 1(2013)008rev2, Final Report to the CDDH, 10 June 2013. 
 32  Prechal, De Vries  & Van Eijken (2010), p. 239. 
 33  Cf. Craig  & De B ú rca (2011), p. 397; Besson (2011b), pp. 44 – 55; Van der Velde (2009), pp. 74 – 78; De 
Schutter (2004), pp. 29 – 31; De B ú rca (2003), p. 2; Eeckhout (2002), p. 979; and Heringa  & Verhey 
(2001), pp. 19 – 20. 
 34  See Prechal, De Vries  & Van Eijken (2010), p. 239; Van der Velde (2009), pp. 74 – 78; and Heringa  & 
Verhey (2001), pp. 19 – 20. 
 35  Besson (2011a), p. 115. 
those laid down in the Convention. 30 Th erefore, it could be expected that the positive 
obligations which have been developed under the Convention could be incorporated 
into EU law. 
 At the same time, the fact remains that the limited competences of the EU to protect 
fundamental rights are stressed in various places in the Charter. Article 51(2) of 
the Charter, in particular, stipulates that:  ‘ [t]he Charter does not extend the fi eld of 
application of Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power 
or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as defi ned in the Treaties. ’ 31 
 Consequently, there is a continuing concern as to whether positive obligations could 
indeed be recognised within the limits that are placed on the protection of fundamental 
rights by the EU. In relation to Article 51(2) of the Charter, Prechal, De Vries and Van 
Eijken have remarked that: 
 Th e intentions of the draft er are clear. However, apart from being considered as judicially 
enforceable standards, in contemporary understanding fundamental rights are also tasks 
and mandates for the legislature, policymakers and the administration. Oft en they call for 
proactive measures that are necessary to realize fundamental rights, such as the right to a clean 
environment, the right to social protection, or adequate protection in criminal proceedings. In 
other terms, there is some intrinsic dynamism in these rights that puts limitations such as those 
in Article 51 of the Charter under pressure. 32 
 Th ere is thus a fear that the protection of fundamental rights by the EU may lead to an 
unwarranted expansion of its competences. 33 Some scholars fi nd it hard to see how the 
concept of positive obligations could be protected within the scope of EU law without 
widening the competences of the EU. 34 Th ere is a concomitant apprehension that the 
measures which could be required to fulfi l positive obligations simply could not be met 
by the EU, if it has only limited competences to protect fundamental rights. At the same 
time, there are also fears that by fi rmly adhering to, and even stressing, the concept 
that the limited competences of the EU must be preserved, it will not be possible for 
fundamental rights to be protected eff ectively within the context of EU law. 35 Some 
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 36  Ahmed  & Butler (2006), p. 795. 
 37  Some suggestions have been advanced in the literature. So far, however, they all seem to point in 
diff erent directions, and they draw diff erent conclusions as to the extent to which the concept of 
positive obligations can be accepted and whether gaps in the protection of fundamental rights under 
EU law may be expected. See, e.g. De Schutter (2004). Cf. Ahmed  & Butler (2006), p. 794. Th ese 
approaches are discussed in section 8.4.1. 
 38  Th is section, as well as the sections on the specifi c research questions, the delimitation of the research 
and its methodology, are based to a large extent on the proposal that was written by the present author 
to apply for the Research Talent Grant of 2011 of the Social Sciences of the Netherlands Organisation 
for Scientifi c Research. 
scholars have found that the ECJ has, so far, taken a far too cautious approach in its 
case-law towards the recognition of positive obligations. 36 
 Overall, looking at the Charter and the discussions surrounding the accession of the 
EU to the Convention, as well as the debate about the expanding competences of the EU, 
the development of positive obligations within the EU context raises many questions. 
What scope does EU law really leave for the development of positive obligations within 
the context of EU law ? To what extent does the ECJ already recognise a concept of 
positive obligations to protect fundamental rights in its case-law ? Is there some 
potential for the ECJ to develop further such obligations in the future ? It is uncertain 
whether positive action in relation to fundamental rights could actually be required 
within the context of EU law, what kinds of obligations this would encompass and how 
such obligations could be formulated without coming into confl ict with the specifi c 
character of EU law, such as the limited competences of the EU. A doctrine of positive 
obligations that would help to answer such questions needs to be developed. 37 
 1.1.4.  THE MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION OF THIS STUDY 
 Against this background, this study centres around the following question. To what 
extent is there scope for recognition of a concept of positive obligations to protect 
fundamental rights under EU law, and in what manner can the ECJ develop a doctrine 
of positive obligations ? 
 1.2.  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 Th e primary aim of this study is to attempt to bring more clarity as to how, if at all, 
positive obligations could be developed within the context of EU law. 38 Th e goal is to 
establish what scope EU law provides for a development of positive obligations, and 
what limits would apply to such a development under EU law. While questions have 
oft en been raised in academic debates about potential confl icts with the doctrine of 
limited competences of the EU, the question of if and how this doctrine would allow 
for positive obligations to be incorporated into EU law has not yet been analysed. It is 
Intersentia 9
Chapter 1. Introduction
 39  See Stubberfi eld (2012). Th e accession of the EU to the Convention also cannot aff ect the limited 
competences of the EU, see Article 6(2) TEU. 
therefore valuable to attempt to develop a doctrine of positive obligations that can be 
taken into account by the ECJ in its judgments and that fi ts well in the EU system and 
its underlying principles. 
 As such, this study does not seek to establish which positive obligations could be 
incorporated into specifi c areas of EU law. However, as explained in the following 
section, specifi c case-law examples are used as an illustration of the types of situations 
in which positive obligations could become relevant under EU law. Th ese examples can 
also help to determine the limits and the scope for a development of positive obligations. 
 By exploring the particular topic of positive obligations, more general insights into 
the specifi c system of EU fundamental rights protection will also be generated. Given 
the growing importance of fundamental rights in the EU, the EU Courts, national judges 
and legal practitioners, such as lawyers, are faced with an increasing number of cases 
involving EU fundamental rights. It is still unclear how the EU system of fundamental 
rights relates to core EU principles such as conferral of limited powers, subsidiarity and 
proportionality. It is, therefore, also unclear what kinds of fundamental rights cases can 
be dealt with by the ECJ and how far this Court is able to go. Th e aim of this study is to 
bring further clarifi cation of the specifi c system of protection of fundamental rights of 
the EU, which is also of particular interest for determining the scope for a development 
of positive obligations. Th is necessitates a discussion of the limited competences of the 
EU as well as a number of other relevant topics, including the institutional role and the 
judicial style of the ECJ and the limited scope of application of EU fundamental rights. 
 Th irdly, this study aims to contribute to the critical debate regarding the system 
of EU fundamental rights protection. As has been explained to some degree already, 
some scholars suggest that the limited competences of the EU to protect fundamental 
rights could cause gaps in the protection of fundamental rights to arise. Th is study 
aims to bring clarity regarding the types of situations in which it is  not possible to 
recognise positive obligations on the basis of EU law. It will be discussed whether that is 
necessarily problematic, and the resulting fi ndings may provide some  ‘ food for thought ’ 
in relation to the accession of the EU to the Convention. Some scholars expect a further 
development of positive obligations under EU law aft er the accession has taken place. 39 
Th e discussion of the potential scope for a development of positive obligations in EU 
law in this study will shed new light on this discussion. 
 1.3.  METHODS AND APPROACH 
 In answering the main question underlying this study, and the various sub-questions of 
this study, the following methods and approaches are used. 
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 40  Article 6(3) TEU specifi cally mentions the Convention as such as a source of inspiration for the 
development of general principles of EU law. 
 41  Examples thereof include Lawson (1995a and 1995b); Mowbray (2004); Van Kempen (2008); Gerards 
(2011b); and Xenos (2011). 
 1.3.1.  DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS AND 
ITS IMPLICATIONS 
 As an important starting point, further clarity is brought as to what the development 
of a concept of positive obligations to protect fundamental rights really means. Th is 
is necessary to be able to discuss whether, and to what extent, a concept of positive 
obligations could be accepted within the specifi c context of EU law. Th e primary source 
of inspiration for such insights in this research is the case-law of the ECtHR and the 
academic theory which is directly related thereto. Importantly, as explained in section 
1.1, the concepts that have been developed by the ECtHR are considered to form the 
most relevant source of inspiration for the ECJ with regard to the interpretation of 
the fundamental rights that are recognised under EU law. 40 Th ere is a rich source of 
commentary available for studying this concept which has been written in the language 
of the present author ’ s own legal background (Dutch), and there also are numerous 
studies in the English language. 41 Th e case-law of the ECtHR has been extensively 
discussed and can therefore provide useful further insights as to what positive 
obligations actually entail, what important features they have, what criticism they raise 
and also how such criticism can be counteracted. Drawing on these fi ndings, concrete 
recommendations can be directed at the EU Courts (regarding their application of the 
doctrine), as well as to national authorities (regarding the possibility of infl uencing the 
application of the doctrine on the EU level, for example, by formulating preliminary 
questions in court procedures) and to legal practitioners. 
 1.3.2.  IDENTIFYING THE SCOPE AND LIMITS FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER EU LAW 
 As a second step, the scope and the limits of fundamental rights protection in the EU 
are examined, in particular with a view to the development of positive obligations. A 
legal theoretical study is therefore undertaken of the main principles and values that 
are relevant for the functioning of the doctrine of positive obligations in the context 
of the EU legal system. Th e various principles and their potential impact on the 
doctrine of positive obligations have been traced and analysed on the basis of a study 
of legal theoretical writings and on the basis of their application in the case-law of 
the ECJ. Th e main values and principles investigated are the principles of conferral 
of limited powers; the principle of subsidiarity; the principle of proportionality; and 
the protection of fundamental rights. Further research has also been undertaken on 
the specifi c role which the ECJ plays in the fi eld of fundamental rights protection and 
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the specifi c position that it may adopt towards the EU institutions and the member 
states, which, as is oft en noted, is refl ected in the reasoning of its judgments. 42 Th is 
allows a deeper understanding of the underlying principles, values and interests that 
determine the division of competences between the EU level and the national level, and 
the mechanisms determining the relationship between the EU and the Convention. 
Such understanding can help to structure and nuance the current political and media 
debates on  ‘ competence creep ’, especially in the fi eld of fundamental rights protection. 
 1.3.3.  STUDYING SPECIFIC CASE-LAW EXAMPLES 
 To be able to draw further conclusions regarding the extent to which a development of 
positive obligations can take place within the context of EU law, and whether such a 
development would give rise to any confl icts with specifi c EU law principles, the ECJ 
case-law showing relevant examples of positive obligations for the context of EU law 
has been examined. Th ese examples have been selected on the basis of a study of the 
literature, as well as by further studying the judgments of the ECJ and the opinions 
of the Advocates General on fundamental rights matters that were delivered between 
December 2009 and June 2016. Th e diff erent sources of literature for the most part only 
revealed relevant examples of cases dating from the period before the Charter entered 
into force. Th erefore, to supplement this with more recent examples, a further study 
was carried out regarding the case-law of the ECJ and the opinions of the Advocates 
General since December 2009. A further reason for taking December 2009 as a starting 
point for this in-depth study is that this is the date of the entry into force of the Charter 
as a binding document. Since that date, there has been a clear increase in the number of 
cases of the ECJ on fundamental rights, and these cases appear to have been overlooked 
in the literature discussing the development of a concept of positive obligations. 
 Th is case-law analysis provides some further insight into the specifi c kinds of 
positive obligations that could become relevant for the EU, and the specifi c situations 
in which such positive obligations would arise. Such examples include the case of  T.Port 
(also discussed further below) in which Community institutions were put under an 
obligation to take meaures to protect the right to property of traders in their transition 
to the common market; the case of  Chatzi (discussed in section 7.2.2.) in which the 
member states incurred a legislative obligation to protect the right to equal treatment 
with respect to parents of twins and their right to parental leave; and the case of  Abdida 
(discussed in section 11.5.4.) in which the member states incurred an obligation to 
provide for the basic needs of a seriously ill third-country national, as well as interim 
measures while he or she awaits the appeal of a transfer decision. A selection of cases 
are further assessed in light of the conclusions reached in part II to fi nd out whether, 
and at what point, any confl icts with the specifi c principles of EU law take place. 
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 43  Besson has, for example, explained that the EU legislature and the member states may still not be 
suffi  ciently aware of how to apply and explain fundamental rights in relation to their policies and 
actions under EU law, see Besson (2011b), p. 68. 
 44  Besson (2011b), pp. 59 and 68; and Fontanelli (2011), E-26. 
 45  Besson (2011b), p. 59. 
 Within the EU ’ s legal order, the ECJ is just one of the institutions that could further 
defi ne the scope and meaning of fundamental rights, since the EU legislature and 
the executive are also increasingly engaging with fundamental rights protection. A 
diff erent approach might have been to study whether and how the EU institutions, in 
combination with the national legislature, would incorporate the concept of positive 
obligations into the EU legal order, in a similar way to the ECtHR. Th is present study, 
however, focuses on the ECJ and its case-law. Th e ECJ still plays an authoritative role 
in the interpretation of fundamental rights within the EU context. 43 Legal scholarship, 
moreover, expects that the ECJ in particular will deal with the concept of positive 
obligations in the EU context. 44 As will be explained in this study, positive obligations 
may oft en not be defi ned beforehand by legislatures or other public authorities. 45 Th ey 
are, rather, revealed in concrete circumstances and in individual cases brought to 
the courts, showing that certain gaps exist in state policies. Indeed, the defi nition of 
positive obligations by Courts raises the most intricate questions, as the fi rst part of 
this study, in particular chapter four, will reveal. Even though this research is therefore 
not focused on legislation at the EU and at the national level, it should be emphasised 
and recognised that the EU legislature can provide important guidance to the various 
actors involved as to how positive obligations to protect fundamental rights in relevant 
fi elds of interest for EU law can be accommodated and, for example, the limits which 
must be respected. 
 Considering the three steps discussed above, it can be seen that, overall, this study 
takes a predominantly legal positivist approach as to answering the central question. Th is 
is valuable, since so much is as yet unknown about the potential scope for a development 
of positive obligations doctrine under EU law. For that reason, a further normative 
study of the doctrine of positive obligations and the protection of fundamental rights 
within the EU context is not specifi cally called for, nor is it undertaken in this study. 
 1.4.  WORKING DEFINITION OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EU LAW 
 In academic discussions, only a few writers have explained how they would defi ne 
a concept of positive obligations for EU law. Most refer in general to the concept of 
positive obligations as it has been defi ned by the ECtHR or to the tripartite duty to 
respect, protect and fulfi l human rights as it has been developed in international human 
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 46  Ahmed  & Butler rather defi ne the concept of positive obligation on the basis of the tripartite typology 
of  ‘ respect, protect, and fulfi l ’ , which is more commonly used in international human rights law, see 
Ahmed  & Butler (2006), p. 796; and section 3.3.2. 
 47  See section 3.2.2. 
 48  ECJ 26 November 1996, C-68/95,  T. Port . 
 49  Cf. Weiler  & Fries (1999), p. 147; De Witte (1999), p. 882; and Ahmed  & Butler (2006), p. 795. 
 50  ECJ 26 November 1996, C-68/95,  T. Port , para. 38. 
rights law. 46 Th is study, as discussed earlier, also takes inspiration from the case-law 
of the ECtHR on the development of positive obligations, including its defi nition. As 
explained further in chapter 3, the basic defi nition provided by the ECtHR is that of an 
obligation for states to take active measures to protect fundamental rights. 47 
 Th ere is more, however, to defi ning positive obligations within the context of EU law. 
Th is is because of the specifi c role played by provisions of EU primary or secondary 
EU law which must also be taken into account. Th ese provisions play an important role 
because they bring situations within the scope of application of EU fundamental rights. 
Provisions of secondary EU law may already provide (quite clearly) the conditions 
and the actions that must be undertaken by the EU institutions or the member states. 
However, if such conditions and detail are missing, and the actions which need to be 
taken by the EU institutions or the member states are mostly defi ned by provisions of 
fundamental rights and the interpretation given thereof by courts, it can be concluded 
that an obligation to take active measures is indeed established on the basis of provisions 
of fundamental rights. Th is is when positive obligations are created under EU law 
according to the meaning given to this concept in this study. 
 Th us a positive obligation within the context of EU law is defi ned as  ‘ An obligation to 
take active measures which is based on the protection of fundamental rights and which 
is not already specifi ed by EU (secondary or primary) law. ’ 
 To explain the choice for this particular defi nition, a closer look can be taken at a 
specifi c example, that is, the case of  T. Port . 48 Th is case has frequently been cited as 
a prime example of where the ECJ has recognised in a clear manner the existence of a 
positive obligation for the Community institutions. 49 In that judgment, the ECJ held 
that: 
 Th e Community Institutions are required to act in particular when the transition to the 
common organization of the market infringes certain traders ’ fundamental rights protected by 
Community law, such as the right to property and the right to pursue a professional or trade 
activity. 50 
 Here, the ECJ clearly stated that the EU institutions are under an obligation to take 
active measures to protect the fundamental rights of traders. Th is positive obligation 
was formulated by the ECJ in response to a case brought by Port, which was a German 
trading company which suff ered adverse eff ects from a quota system which was 
established under a Community Regulation for the import of bananas. In accordance 
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 51  According to Ahmed  & Butler, the case of  T. Port does not illustrate a  ‘ true example ’ of a positive 
obligation. It only concerns a  ‘ corrective ’ measure which would be taken to repair the damages 
suff ered by the violation of a certain fundamental right, see Ahmed  & Butler (2006), pp. 794 – 795. 
Th is distinction between negative and positive obligations is further discussed in in relation to the 
case-law of the ECtHR in section 3.2.3. and in relation to the case-law of the ECJ in section 11.2. 
 52  Article 30 of Regulation No. 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the common organisation of the market 
in bananas [1993] OJ L47/1. 
 53  ECJ 27 June 2006, C-540/03,  Parliament v. Council . 
 54  See Articles 4(1), 4(6) and Article 8 of Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to 
family reunifi cation [2003] OJ L251/12. 
with that Regulation, Port had obtained licences for the import of a certain quantity 
of bananas which was based on its sales numbers in a certain reference year. Th at 
particular year, Port ’ s sales were particularly low due to a breach of contract by one 
of its suppliers. Th e licences subsequently allocated to Port were insuffi  cient for the 
company to meet its previously contracted fi nancial obligations. Port complained about 
irreparable infringements of its property rights before the national courts under these 
circumstances. Th e national court referred questions to the ECJ, which, among others, 
addressed the failure of the European Commission to take measures. Th e European 
Commission had been given the power under the Regulation to take measures  ‘ to assist 
the transition from arrangements existing before the entry into force of this Regulation 
to those laid down by this Regulation, and in particular to overcome diffi  culties of 
a sensitive nature ’. In some respect, therefore, the measures which the Community 
institutions were required to take on the basis of the judgment of the ECJ were related 
to a positive act that was already defi ned in secondary Community law. 51 At the same 
time, the provision of secondary EU law had granted a discretionary power for the 
Commission to take action in relation to transitional arrangements that needed to be 
made. 52 Th e European Commission was under no obligation under the Regulation 
to take such measures, nor was it required by the Regulation actively to ensure the 
protection of fundamental rights. It may therefore be argued that the Commission 
incurred the obligation to exercise its power to protect the fundamental rights of 
traders only on the basis of the interpretation of the specifi c provision that was given by 
the ECJ in the case of  T. Port. 
 To show the diff erence, the example of a positive obligation that follows directly 
from the provisions of secondary EU law can be given. In its judgment in the case of 
 Parliament v. Council the ECJ held that this situation arose. 53 Th ere, it had to assess the 
compatibility of certain provisions of Directive 2003/86 on family reunifi cation in light 
of fundamental rights. Under this Directive, member states were allowed to restrict 
the right to family reunifi cation in respect of children over the age of 12 or, in certain 
circumstances, the age of 15. 54 Th e member states could also make use of waiting 
lists. In interpreting the relevant provisions, the ECJ took into account the positive 
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 55  ECJ 27 June 2006, C-540/03,  Parliament v. Council , paras 52 – 54. Th e ECJ specifi cally refers to the 
positive obligations in the cases of ECtHR 21 December 2001, no. 31465/96,  Sen v. the Netherlands , 
para. 31; ECtHR 19 February 1996, no. 23218/94,  G ü l v. Switzerland , para. 38; and ECtHR 28 
November 1996, no. 21702/93,  Ahmut v. the Netherlands , para. 67. In the case of  Parliament v. Council , 
the ECJ may have been inspired by arguments brought forward by the European Parliament and the 
discussion thereof by Advocate General Kokott in her Opinion to the case, see Opinion of AG Kokott 
in C-540/03, paras 64 – 71. 
 56  ECJ 27 June 2006, C-540/03,  Parliament v. Council , para. 60. 
 57  In this context, in particular, it is diffi  cult to distinguish between positive obligations and negative 
obligations, see e.g. Lawson (1995a), p. 558. Cf. ECtHR 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/80 to 9474/81, 
 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom ; and ECtHR 11 July 2000, no. 29192/95, 
 Ciliz v. the Netherlands paras 61 – 62. For further examples, see Xenos (2012), p. 69. 
 58  See sections 3.2.2., 3.2.3., and 11.2. where it is explained how the distinction between positive and 
negative obligations can be made. See further sections 3.3. and 11.4. for the existence of diff erent types 
of positive obligations. 
obligations that havebeen defi ned by the ECtHR under Article 8 ECHR requiring states 
to let persons enter into and reside on their territory. 55 It held that: 
 Article 4(1) of the Directive imposes precise positive obligations, with corresponding clearly 
defi ned individual rights, on the Member States, since it requires them, in the cases determined 
by the Directive, to authorise family reunifi cation of certain members of the sponsor ’ s family, 
without being left  a margin of appreciation. 56 
 Th us, by providing the conditions under which member states were required to grant 
family reunifi cation, the Directive itself laid down a positive obligation on the member 
states. 57 Th e ECJ therefore did not need to defi ne further the actions that would have to 
be undertaken by the member states. 
 Importantly, the defi nition provided above is only a working defi nition, which is in 
need of refi nement. In particular, in defi ning positive obligations it is important to take 
account of the diff erent types of positive obligations that exist, as well as the distinction 
that can be made between negative and positive obligations. Th ese issues are discussed 
in chapters 3 and 11. 58 
 1.5.  OUTLINE OF THIS STUDY 
 Th is study has been structured as set out below. 
 1.5.1.  PART I: THE CONCEPT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS WITHIN 
THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 Th e fi rst part of this study explains how the ECtHR has developed positive obligations 
and what criticism the development of this concept has raised. First, chapter 2 gives 
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a brief background sketch of some important elements of the legal system of the 
Convention. Chapter 3 explains how the ECtHR has developed positive obligations in 
its case-law, including a defi nition of the concept of positive obligations, as well as the 
diff erent types of positive obligations that can be distinguished. Chapter 4 discusses 
in more detail the various problematic features which are related to a development of 
positive obligations by the ECtHR. Chapter 5 collects the main conclusions of part I. 
 1.5.2.  PART II: THE SCOPE FOR A DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EU LAW  – AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIFIC PARAMETERS OF THE EU LEGAL 
ORDER AND THE EU SYSTEM OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 
 Th e second part of this study turns towards the system of fundamental rights protection 
of the EU. Chapter 6 discusses a number of general features of this system, including the 
rationale of fundamental rights protection within the context of the EU system, some 
general and important provisions of the Charter, and the particular interrelationship 
between EU law and the Convention. Chapters 7 to 9 address in more detail the 
parameters that are of particular relevance to determine the potential and the limits of 
a development of positive obligations by the ECJ. Chapter 7 discusses the institutional 
position and the judicial style of the ECJ. Chapter 8 looks into the complicated issue of 
the limited competences of the EU to protect fundamental rights. Chapter 9 addresses 
the limited scope of application of fundamental rights under EU and Chapter 10 
presents the main conclusions of the second part of this study. 
 1.5.3.  PART III: SYNTHESIS 
 Th e third and fi nal part of this study brings together the fi ndings and the conclusions 
of the two preceeding parts. Chapter 11 provides an overview of the various kinds of 
positive obligations that can be found in the case-law of the ECJ and evaluates how the 
Court has developed such obligations in its case-law on the basis of the conclusions 
reached in parts I and II. Finally, chapter 12 sets out the fi nal conclusions of this study 
as well the recommendations for how the development of positive obligations by the 
ECJ could take place. 
 
 PART I 
 THE CONCEPT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
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 1  See e.g. ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marck v. Belgium , para. 31. 
 2  On the Convention system generally, see e.g. Harris, O ’ Boyle, Bates  & Warbrick (2014); Van Dijk  & 
Arai-Takahanshi (2006); and Gerards (2011a). 
 CHAPTER 2 
 THE SYSTEM OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
PROTECTION UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 2.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 In order to understand the meaning of the recognition of positive obligations under 
the Convention, it is fi rst important to take into account the particularities of the 
Convention system. Th is is because a positive obligation may bear diff erent meanings 
for each court or body and legal system in which it is applied. Th e ECtHR, in particular, 
has derived positive obligations from a catalogue of mainly civil and political rights 
under the Convention. Th ese rather negatively formulated rights are understood by the 
ECtHR, principally, as obligations for states to refrain from taking action. 1 How has this 
system thus allowed for the recognition of positive obligations, which demand an active 
interference by states ? 
 Th is chapter provides a further background to the Convention system, which, as 
such, will be helpful for those looking for some general context of the Convention. 
It is also of interest for the analysis of the development of positive obligations within 
this system in the following chapters. 2 Specifi c topics that are dealt with in this chapter 
are the background and purpose of the Convention (section 2.2.); its enforcement 
mechanisms (section 2.3.); the subsidiarity principle (section 2.4.); the role of the 
ECtHR (section 2.5.); the tools of interpretation of the ECtHR (section 6.); the eff ects 
of the Convention in the national legal order (section 2.7.); and the horizontal eff ect 
of Convention provisions (section 2.8.). Th e discussion of these topics is followed by a 
brief conclusion (section 2.9.). 
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 3  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome, 
4 November 1950, ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221 (as amended by Protocols No. 11 and No. 14). Th e aims of 
the Council are set out in the preamble and Article 1 of the Statute of the Council of Europe 1949, 
ETS 1; 87 UNTS 103. 
 4  For an historical overview of the establishment and development of the European Economic 
Community, see Urwin (1995). 
 5  Bates (2010), pp. 46 – 47. 
 6  Bates (2010), p. 22. At present, there are 47 states parties to the Convention. Th e ratifi cation of the 
Convention by these Eastern European States constitutes an important step for those states to be able 
to join the European Economic Community, see Bates (2010), p. 451. 
 7  Most of the complaints are concerned with a lack of respect for the rule of law, the right to liberty and 
security, and the right to a fair trial, see Bates (2010), p. 483. For a statistical overview of the types of 
violations see Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2015, p. 193, available 
online at  < www.echr.coe.int > . 
 8  Bates (2010), p. 5; and Harris, O ’ Boyle, Bates  & Warbrick (2014), p. 4. 
 9  On the eff ects of the Convention and the judgments of the ECtHR on the national legal order, see 
Gerards  & Fleuren (2013). 
 2.2.  BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 Th e Convention was adopted in 1950. It was draft ed within the Council of Europe, an 
international organisation that was established to achieve peace and unity in Europe 
aft er the Second World War. 3 At around the same time the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, and later the European 
Economic Community, were established. Th ese predecessors of the current EU 
essentially had the same ideal as the Council of Europe; however, they have mainly 
sought an economic form of cooperation between states. 4 Th e Convention was, 
instead, oriented towards the protection of human rights. Its main aim was to prevent 
the atrocities committed during World War Two from reoccurring and to protect the 
democratic ideals of Western Europe especially at the time when communist regimes 
were in place in the Eastern part of Europe. 5 Initially, only 10, Western European, states 
ratifi ed the Convention, but over time membership has grown. Th ere was a particularly 
sharp increase in the number of ratifying states in the 1990s aft er the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the dissolution of the Yugoslav Republic. 6 Th e geographical expansion of 
membership to the Convention to Eastern Europe, which since 1998 also includes 
Russia, has generally had an eff ect both on the workload of the ECtHR, as well as on 
the types of fundamental rights issues with which the ECtHR is now confronted. 7 Th e 
Convention itself has further evolved into, what is called by some, a  ‘ European Bill 
of Human Rights ’ with a very important role played by the ECtHR. 8 Th e Convention 
provides an important (minimum) standard for the protection of fundamental rights 
for all of the European states. 9 Large numbers of complaints are still, and especially, 
brought by individuals regarding violations of fundamental rights by all of the states 
parties. 
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 10  Th e preamble of the Convention also states that the states parties are resolved to  ‘ take the fi rst steps for 
the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration ’ . For this reason, 
the Convention is considered more eff ective in comparison to the UDHR, see Bates (2010), p. 110. 
 11  Bates (2010), pp. 63 – 68. 
 12  Th ere is now also a collective complaints procedure, which can be used to enforce the rights laid 
down in the European Social Charter. Th e European Committee on Social Rights has delivered a few 
infl uential (although not binding) judgments, for example, on the conditions for the reception of 
illegally staying migrants, see ECSR 14 November 2014, no. 90/2103,  Conference of European Churches 
v. the Netherlands . 
 13  See further section 6.10., explaining that a particular distinction can apply between rights and 
principles and their justiciability, which could particularly aff ect the social and economic rights under 
the Charter. 
 14  Protocols nos. 1, 4 and 12. Th ese protocols have been ratifi ed by most, but not all, of the states parties. 
 15  See further Leijten (2015). 
 16  Articles 46(1) and 32 ECHR. 
 17  Articles 33 and 34 ECHR. Protocol No. 11 of 1998 has made the right to individual application and 
the jurisdiction of the Court compulsory for all states parties. 
 Substantively, the Convention draws from the rights laid down in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights which was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. 10 
Th e Convention contains a range of civil and political rights, and a few more socially 
fl avoured rights, such as the right to private and family life and the right to freedom 
of association. Most social rights have, however, been left  out of the Convention. 
It was found problematic at the time to include social and economic rights as they 
were not considered to form clear enforceable rights. It was also held that such rights 
were already recognised and accommodated in the Western European democracies. 11 
Since then, specifi c fundamental rights instruments have been adopted, such as the 
European Social Charter which provides guarantees of social and economic rights. 
However, it has a diff erent and less forceful enforcement mechanism. 12 More recently, 
social and economic rights can also be found in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU. 13 Also, some concessions have been made to the substantive guarantees in the 
Convention by the addition of multiple Protocols to the Convention. Th erefore, the 
right to protection of property, the right to education, the right to equality between 
spouses, and a self-standing right to non-discrimination have been included. 14 Further, 
the ECtHR has played an important role in developing certain social and economic 
components in its case-law on the protection of the civil and political rights laid down 
in the Convention. 15 
 2.3.  ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
 In comparison to most other international human rights treaties, the Convention 
stands out for its enforcement mechanisms. Individuals can complain directly before 
the ECtHR. Th e judgments of the ECtHR are binding for the parties to the case and 
they can become fi nal. 16 Both individuals and states can bring applications before 
the ECtHR regarding violations by one of the states parties to the Convention. 17 
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 18  Th e annual report of 2015 of the European Court of Human Rights reveals that there was a small 
number of inter-state applications pending in 2015. Th e annual report is available on  < http://www.
echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2015_ENG.pdf > . 
 19  ECtHR 4 February 2005, nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99,  Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey , para. 122. 
 20  Current numbers can be found in the Facts and Figures which are available on  < http://www.echr.coe.
int > . 
 21  Th e ECtHR has described the principle of subsidiarity as  ‘ primordial ’ to the system of protection of 
the Convention, see ECtHR 1 March 2010, nos. 46113/99 to 21819/04 (adm. dec.),  Demopoulos and 
others v. Turkey , para. 69. See further Villiger (2007), pp. 623 – 637. Within the EU context, there is a 
somewhat diff erent meaning that can be ascribed to the principle of subsidiarity, as it is also employed 
specifi cally to govern the division of powers between the EU and the member states, see section 8.4.3. 
 22  Protocol No. 15 was adopted in 2013 as a response to reforms concluded to in the Brighton Declaration 
of 2002. At the time of writing (February 2016), Protocol No. 15 is still open for signature and 
ratifi cation by the states parties, see  < http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/
treaty/213/signatures > . 
In practice, however, very few inter-state applications are actually made. 18 Th e 
Convention is usually enforced through the delivery of judgments by the ECtHR in 
individual cases. Th e ECtHR itself has also recognised the signifi cance of such individual 
applications by stating that  ‘ the Convention right to individual application … has over 
the years become of high importance and is now a key component of the machinery 
for protecting the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention ’. 19 However, the 
number of individual applications being made has led to an overwhelming case load 
for the ECtHR. 20 Any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals, 
irrespective of nationality may bring a claim before the ECtHR alleging the breach of 
one or more Convention rights against one of the states parties. Important admissibility 
conditions are the exhaustion of domestic remedies and certain time limits which must 
have been met (Articles 34 and 35 ECHR). 
 Th e execution of the judgments of the ECtHR is further supervised by the Committee 
of Ministers (Article 46(2) ECHR), which is composed of representatives of the states 
parties ’ governments. Th e Convention also provides for a system of reports on states ’ 
compliance (Article 52 ECHR), but this mechanism is seldom used. 
 2.4.  SUBSIDIARY SYSTEM OF PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 Th e principle of subsidiarity is an important principle underlying the Convention 
system as such, and it is also key to understanding the role of the ECtHR and some 
of the interpretative principles which it uses (see sections 2.5. and 2.6. below). 21 Th e 
principle of subsidiarity is specifi cally mentioned in Article 1 of Protocol No. 15, but 
this Protocol has not yet entered into force. 22 Th e subsidiarity principle has been held 
to follow generally from Article 1 ECHR which encapsulates the basic idea that states 
are primarily responsible for securing the rights and freedoms of the Convention to 
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principle of subsidiarity is generally found in Articles 1, 13 and 35(1) ECHR. 
 24  See ECtHR 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62 to 2126/64,  Belgian Linguistic case , para. 10  in fi ne . 
 25  Th e ECtHR interprets a range of terms in the Convention autonomously. Th is applies to the terms 
 ‘ criminal charge ’ within the meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR, and  ‘ home ’ within the meaning of Article 
8(1) ECHR, see ECtHR 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71 to 5370/72,  Engel and others v. the Netherlands , 
paras 81 – 82; and ECtHR 18 November 2004, no. 58255/00,  Propokovich v. Russia , para. 36. Although 
the meaning of a term in the Convention is not necessarily identical to the meaning of the term at 
national level, the Court does rely and draw inspiration from national meanings for its autonomous 
interpretations. 
 26  Villiger (2007), pp. 634 ff . 
 27  ECtHR 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62 to 2126/64,  Belgian Linguistic case , para. 10  in fi ne . 
 28  Villiger (2007), p. 634. 
 29  Villiger (2007), p. 629. See further section 2.6.3. 
 30  Cf. ECtHR 15 October 2009, no. 17056/06,  Micallef v. Malta , para. 60. 
everyone within their jurisdiction. 23 Th us, in this respect, the Strasbourg system 
of supervision is subsidiary to the national system. Th e ECtHR may intervene only 
if national authorities have failed to fulfi l their obligations under the Convention. 24 
Moreover, the Convention intends to provide only a minimum standard of fundamental 
rights for Europe. 25 
 Th e subsidiary character of the Convention system has several important 
implications. 26 First, states should be off ered the opportunity to redress alleged 
infringements of Convention rights before the ECtHR becomes involved. Secondly, 
states are generally considered to be better placed to assess the factual and legal 
circumstances of a particular case than the ECtHR, and so the ECtHR allows states to 
decide which measures they consider appropriate for remedying fundamental rights 
violations. Th irdly, while it is the ECtHR ’ s task carefully to review states ’ fulfi lment 
of their obligations under the Convention, it must also pay attention to the national 
identities and the diversity of the states parties. It must, aft er all, deal with 47 states 
which have a cultural, historical and moral diversity. 27 
 In eff ect, the principle of subsidiarity thus governs the division of tasks between the 
national authorities and the ECtHR. 28 Th e ECtHR only deals with individual complaints 
on the condition that all national remedies have been exhausted (Article 35(1) ECHR), 
and states must make sure that remedies are available for individuals at the national 
level if they experience a violation of fundamental rights (Article 13 ECHR). 
 In a substantive sense, subsidiarity also has a role to play. Subsidiarity is apparent 
from the restraint that is adopted by the ECtHR in the interpretation and application 
of the Convention. Th e margin of appreciation doctrine, which defi nes the intensity of 
the review by the ECtHR of national decisions and measures, is a particular expression 
of such a deferential approach. 29 Further, the Convention allows for a higher level 
of protection of fundamental rights at the national level (Article 53 ECHR), but 
this provision is rarely applied by the ECtHR. 30 Th e ECtHR has developed several 
techniques in its case-law that aim to ensure respect for its subsidiary position in its 
review of the protection of fundamental rights. It has, for example, developed the 
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 32  ECtHR 22 January 2008, no. 43546/02,  E.B. v. France , para. 49. 
 33  Dubout (2007); and Brems  & Lavrysen (2013). See further section 3.3.1. Interestingly, a procedural 
type of review has also been recognised within some judgments of the ECJ on fundamental rights, see 
Lenaerts (2012b) and section 7.5.2. 
 34  See e.g. ECtHR 27 September 1995, no. 18984/91,  McCann and others v. the United Kingdom , para. 
153. Cf. Tulkens  & Van Drooghenbroeck (2012), Gerards (2012a), pp. 187 – 189; and Xenos (2012), 
pp. 65 – 69. Th e ECtHR does not consistently refer, however, to those procedural violations when 
examining a state ’ s positive obligations, see Van de Westelaken (2010), pp. 147 – 148. 
 35  Dubout (2007), p. 402. 
 36  See also ECtHR 13 August 1981, nos. 7601/76 and 7806/77,  Young, James and Webster v. the United 
Kingdom , para. 53. 
so-called  ‘ in for a penny, in for a pound ’ approach, in which it aims to exercise judicial 
review of nationally protected fundamental rights. 31 Th is implies a review by the ECtHR 
regarding whether certain fundamental rights which are recognised at the national 
level but not at the Convention level are, nonetheless, protected in conformity with the 
requirements of the Convention. For example, the ECtHR has examined whether the 
right to adoption, which is not protected by the Convention as such, was at least applied 
by public authorities to individuals in a non-discriminatory manner. 32 Th is approach 
ultimately seeks to secure that fundamental rights are protected at the national level 
more eff ectively. 
 Another specifi c way in which the ECtHR aims to bridge the concerns of a subsidiary 
and ineff ective review is by conducting a procedural type of review. 33 In this approach, 
the ECtHR has regard to the quality of the decision-making process and to the 
existence of procedural safeguards in order to fi nd out whether suffi  cient protection of 
fundamental rights has (already) been provided at the national level. Th ere are diff erent 
variations of such procedural review. One variation could be that if the ECtHR is 
indeed satisfi ed with the quality of the  ‘ process ’ at the national level, the ECtHR will 
not look in more detail at whether the substantive standards of the Convention have 
also been complied with. 34 Th e benefi t of the approach is that by shift ing the focus of 
fundamental rights protection to the national level, and by strengthening the available 
national administrative frameworks, individuals gain better opportunities to complain 
of fundamental rights violations at national level. It further increases the objectivity of 
the Court ’ s judgments, because it does not need to substitute the assessment that has 
already been made by the national court by its own assessment on the merits. 35 
 2.5.  THE ROLE OF THE ECtHR 
 As has been explained already, the delivery of judgments by the ECtHR is of 
considerable importance for the enforcement of the guarantees laid down in the 
Convention. Th e ECtHR essentially reviews whether states parties have observed their 
engagements under the Convention in individual applications (Article 19 ECHR) in 
light of its subsidiary and supervisory role. 36 Th e ECtHR thereby interprets and applies 
Intersentia 25
Chapter 2. Th e System of Fundamental Rights Protection Under the 
European Convention on Human Rights
 37  Prior to 1998, the European Commission of Human Rights provided interpretations of the Convention 
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 38  See e.g. ECtHR 24 November 1994,  Kemmache v. France (No. 3) , no. 17621/91 para. 44. 
 39  See e.g. ECtHR 24 July 2008, no. 36376/04,  Kononov v. Latvia , para. 108. 
 40  On the relation between the Convention, the judgments of the ECtHR and national law, see section 
3.2.7. 
 41  Th e Court has held that  ‘ Th e Court ’ s judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought 
before the Court but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the 
Convention ’ and  ‘ Although the primary purpose of the Convention system is to provide individual 
relief, its mission is also to determine issues on public policy-grounds in the common interest, 
thereby raising the general standards of protection of human rights and extending human rights 
jurisprudence throughout the community of Convention States ’ . See respectively ECtHR, 18 January 
1978, no. 5310/71,  Ireland v. the United Kingdom , para. 154; and ECtHR, 24 July 2003, no. 40016/98, 
 Karner v. Austria , para. 26. 
 42  Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, inserted on 21 February 2011. Th e Court delivered its fi rst pilot 
judgment in ECtHR 28 September 2005, no. 31443/96,  Broniowski v. Poland . 
 43  Other reforms introduced to reduce the workload of the ECtHR include the possibility of single 
judges making decisions on the admissibility of applications (Article 27 ECHR). 
 44  Cf. e.g. Alkema (2000), pp. 41 – 63; and Wildhaber (2002), pp. 161 – 165. 
the Convention (Article 32 ECHR). 37 Th e ECtHR is not a court of fourth instance in 
relation to the national courts, as it has explicitly stated. 38 Th e ECtHR also does not 
deal with errors of facts or law committed by national courts, unless it appears that the 
assessment made by the national courts is fl agrantly and manifestly arbitrary. 39 
 Th e interpretations which are provided by the ECtHR of the Convention  de facto 
have an impact that goes beyond the individual cases to which the judgment formally 
relates. 40 Th e ECtHR delivers its judgments in a way that allows its interpretation of the 
Convention rights to be applied more generally. Th e interpretations given by the ECtHR 
on the rights laid down in the Convention have acquired a certain authoritative force. 
States have accepted the  res interpretata of the judgments of the Convention even in 
cases which have been brought by individuals against one of the other states parties. 41 
In particular, the Grand Chamber develops further authoritative interpretations of the 
Convention in the cases that are brought before it. Th e Grand Chamber is competent to 
deal with serious questions aff ecting the interpretation or application of the Convention 
(Articles 30 and 43 ECHR). In addition, the introduction of pilot judgment has allowed 
the ECtHR to develop the interpretation of the Convention in a more general way. Pilot 
judgments are delivered in so-called  ‘ clone cases ’, where several cases in combination 
reveal a systemic problem with the compliance by one of the states parties with the 
guarantees of the Convention. 42 
 Th e question is sometimes raised whether the ECtHR should transform into a 
constitutional court, which should also be considered against the background of its 
high workload. 43 Th is would mean that the ECtHR would focus on major fundamental 
rights problems in Europe rather than on individual complaints. Th e constitutional 
nature of the Convention has for many years been the subject of extensive academic 
debate, where it is as much criticised as it is welcomed. 44 Presently, the ECtHR is 
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European public order ’ , see ECtHR 23 March 1995, no. 15318/89,  Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary 
objections), para. 75; and ECtHR 4 March 1991, nos. 15299/89 to 15318/89 (adm. dec.),  Chrysostomos, 
Papachrysostomou and Loizidou v. Turkey , para. 22. See further Frowein (1990). 
 46  See section 2.4. 
 47  Gerards (2011b), pp. 201 – 202. 
 48  Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). Th e ECtHR does not oft en 
refer to provisions of the Convention. See e.g. ECtHR 21 February 1975, no. 4451/70,  Golder v. the 
United Kingdom , para. 29. 
 49  Br ö lmann (2005), pp. 383 – 387. 
 50  ECtHR 27 June 1968, no. 2122/64,  Wemhoff  v. Germany , para. 8. 
 51  Article 31(1) and (2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties give weight to the object 
and purpose of a treaty for the interpretation of the treaty ’ s provisions. Th e ECtHR applied these 
provisions in the  Golder case to discover whether a right of access to court was indeed guaranteed by 
Article 6(1) ECHR, see ECtHR 21 February 1975, no. 4451/70,  Golder v. the United Kingdom , paras 
24 – 36. 
 52  ECtHR 7 July 1989, no. 14038/88,  Soering v. the United Kingdom , para. 87; and ECtHR 7 December 
1976, nos. 5095/71 to 5926/71,  Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v. Denmark , para. 53. 
described as a quasi-constitutional court, because it is generally considered to provide 
the fi nal interpretation of fundamental rights within Europe. 45 
 While the ECtHR may thus play quite an active role in the protection of fundamental 
rights, it is also aware of its subsidiary function, as has been discussed above. 46 In 
general, the ECtHR therefore remains careful in pronouncing on decisions which are 
politically sensitive for the states parties. 47 
 2.6.  TOOLS OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 As any international treaty, the Convention is interpreted according to the rules on 
interpretation of Treaties laid down in the Vienna Convention, which the ECtHR also 
considers itself bound by. 48 Th e ECtHR has, however, also described the Convention as a 
 ‘ law-making treaty ’, which would make it distinct from other international treaties that 
merely create contractual obligations. 49 Th e ECtHR thus approaches the Convention as 
being of a special kind in the area of international law. By reason of the special nature 
of the Convention, the ECtHR has held that  ‘ it is … necessary to seek the interpretation 
that is most appropriate in order to realise the aim and achieve the objective of the 
treaty, not that which would restrict to the greatest possible degree the obligations 
undertaken by the Parties. ’ 50 
 Given the special  ‘ law-making character ’ of the Convention, the  ‘ object and purpose ’ 
of the Convention play a crucial role in the interpretation of the rights set forth in 
the Convention. 51 As explained earlier, the aims of the Convention are to ensure the 
 ‘ protection of individual human beings ’ and to  ‘ maintain and promote the ideals and 
values of a democratic society ’. 52 Th e ECtHR has explained that these objects and 
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contain, see Gerards (2011b), p. 69. 
 56  See Senden (2011), pp. 46 and 69. A distinction can be made between interpretative principles 
and interpretation methods (e.g. textual interpretation), see Senden (2011), pp. 44 – 47. It has been 
questioned whether the Convention actually holds a special character and whether its interpretation 
methods can really be considered unique in comparison to other international legal systems, see e.g. 
Christoff ersen (2009). 
 57  See e.g. ECtHR 4 February 2005, nos. 46827/99 to 46951/99,  Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey , para. 
101; and Gerards (2011b), p. 31. 
purposes justify certain specifi c methods for the interpretation of the Convention. 53 
Th e ECtHR strongly focuses on a teleological interpretation of the Convention. Other 
methods of interpretation are less important for the case-law of the ECtHR, in particular 
the historical method of interpretation. 54 Th is can be explained by the fact that the text 
of the Convention and the  travaux pr é paratoires date back more than 60 years. 55 States 
parties in Europe at that time faced rather diff erent fundamental rights ’ challenges as 
compared to those seen now. Also, over the years many new states, including Eastern 
European states, which did not participate in the draft ing process have become parties 
to the Convention. 
 Th e principle of eff ectiveness and the principle of evolutive or dynamic interpretation 
both play important roles in the interpretation of the Convention. Th ese principles 
help the ECtHR to realise the object and purpose of the Convention, and they can 
be viewed as interpretative principles which follow from the special character of the 
Convention. 56 Another important tool of interpretation which is specifi cally used by 
the ECtHR is the  ‘ margin of appreciation ’ doctrine. Th is doctrine plays an important 
role in the judgments of the ECtHR. It gives clear expression of the subsidiary nature 
of the Convention. In view of their importance, these three tools of interpretation are 
briefl y explained below. 
 2.6.1.  THE PRINCIPLE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
 Th e Convention provisions are, generally, to be interpreted and applied in line with the 
principle of eff ectiveness. 57 Th e ECtHR has oft en held that  ‘ Th e Convention is intended 
to guarantee not rights that are theoretical and illusory but rights that are practical 
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 61  ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. Ireland . 
 62  ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. Ireland , para. 24. 
 63  ECtHR 7 July 1989, no. 14038/88,  Soering v. the United Kingdom . 
 64  ECtHR 7 July 1989, no. 14038/88,  Soering v. the United Kingdom , para. 87. Factors that  inter alia were 
taken into account by the Court were the conditions of the detention (being on death row) and the 
personal circumstances of the applicant (the young age and the psychiatric conditions in which the 
crimes were committed), see para. 111 of the judgment. 
 65  Harris, O ’ Boyle, Bates  & Warbrick (2014), p. 18. 
and eff ective ’. 58 According to the ECtHR, the eff ective interpretation of fundamental 
rights forms an objective of the Convention. 59 To be able to guarantee  ‘ practical and 
eff ective rights ’ means that the Convention cannot remain theoretical and illusory. 60 
States must ensure that individuals can enjoy fundamental rights in the reality of 
everyday life. An example of this approach is the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of 
 Airey v. Ireland . 61 In this case, Mrs Airey wanted to divorce from her violent husband, 
but the national procedure she needed to follow to obtain a divorce was complex and 
held before a specialised court. Th e assistance of a solicitor proved indispensable to 
follow such a procedure. Mrs Airey could not aff ord to hire a solicitor, and so access to 
court was not realistically available to her. Before the ECtHR, she complained that her 
right of access to court (Article 6(1) ECHR) was violated. Th e ECtHR decided that the 
right of access to court was not eff ectively protected in this case, and moreover, that in 
such circumstances the state may need to provide for legal aid. Th is led to a positive 
obligation that needed to be fulfi lled by the states parties. 62 
 To ensure the eff ectiveness of Convention rights may further imply that states are 
held responsible for prospective or potential breaches of the Convention. Th is is shown 
by the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of  Soering v. the United Kingdom . 63 Th is case 
was about a young German national who was detained in a prison in England. He was 
waiting to be extradited to the United States where he would be faced with charges 
of murder, and where he might incur the death penalty. Although it was not certain 
that the death penalty would actually be imposed in his case, the ECtHR held that 
the prohibition of torture (Article 3 ECHR) would be not be protected in an eff ective 
manner if the applicant were to be extradited to the United States. Th ere was a real risk 
of ill-treatment, to which the United Kingdom needed to pay attention. 64 Th e ECtHR 
thus established that a violation had taken place even though the actual ill-treatment 
had not taken place. 
 Applying the principle of eff ectiveness to fundamental rights protection might 
also mean that the territorial reach of the jurisdiction of the ECtHR is extended, as 
the judgment in  Soering v. the United Kingdom shows. 65 More generally, the scope of 
Convention rights and obligations has been widened considerably as a result of the 
Court ’ s interpretation of fundamental rights based on the principle of eff ectiveness. An 
eff ective interpretation implies that the permissible limitations of the Convention rights 
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 73  Gerards (2009), p. 17. 
are interpreted in a narrow sense by the ECtHR. 66 Lastly, the ECtHR has also decided to 
interpret the notion of a  ‘ victim ’ within the meaning of the right to individual petition 
(Article 34 ECHR) on the basis of the principle of eff ectiveness, which means that a 
wider array of claims can be lodged before the ECtHR. 67 
 2.6.2.  THE PRINCIPLE OF DYNAMIC OR EVOLUTIVE 
INTERPRETATION 
 Th e ECtHR has rather famously held:  ‘ Th e Convention is a living instrument which  … 
must be interpreted in light of present-day conditions. ’ 68 With this statement, the 
ECtHR announced that it will apply a dynamic or evolutive interpretation to the rights 
of the Convention in its judgments. 69 Th e ECtHR thereby adopts a fl exible approach 
to the interpretation of fundamental rights. 70 It takes into account that societies and 
their standards of living evolve and that therefore fundamental rights can, over time, 
acquire new meanings. Th us, the ECtHR does not strictly hold to the interpretation 
of the Convention that was prevalent at the time when it was adopted, but adapts the 
interpretation of Convention rights in accordance with the contemporary standards 
of living and thinking in the Council of Europe. Th e ECtHR has regard to the 
developments of certain areas of law, including changes in public opinion, in relation to 
the interpretation of the applicable Convention rights. 71 Th e penal policies and family 
laws of the states parties have, for example, developed signifi cantly over time. 72 Seeing 
that such an evolution can take place, the ECtHR may therefore also, over time, deliver 
diff erent judgments on the same issues. 
 Th e ECtHR will only accept a diff erent interpretation of the fundamental rights of 
the Convention due to the changing standards of the states parties in a gradual manner. 
Th e ECtHR makes use of the consensus method to determine whether a certain 
interpretation can be accepted. 73 Th is method of comparative interpretation means that 
the ECtHR has regard to the prevalent standards that are recognised by national and 
international laws, taking account of interpretations as well as practices. Th e ECtHR 
looks at the extent to which a certain interpretation of a fundamental right is accepted 
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in the states parties, and it requires a certain level of uniformity. It generally needs to 
be satisfi ed that, at least, the majority of states parties appreciate the same standard. 
Preferably, this should be a great majority of the states. 74 
 2.6.3.  THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE 
 Th e ECtHR may decide to grant a margin of discretion to the national authorities in 
the fulfi lment of their obligations under the Convention, which is better known as a 
margin of appreciation. 75 Th e margin of appreciation doctrine is expressly inspired by 
the subsidiary nature of the Convention system. 76 National authorities are generally 
considered to be better placed than the ECtHR to implement Convention law, and 
to strike a fair balance between all the interests involved. Th e  ‘ room for manoeuvre ’ 
that is allowed in the protection of the Convention rights is, however, subject to the 
supervision of the ECtHR. 
 Th e margin of appreciation doctrine is used by the ECtHR when it examines 
the proportionality and the reasonableness of interferences of states parties with 
Convention rights. Th e doctrine is therefore relevant especially to those rights which 
have limitation clauses, which most notably concerns Articles 8 to 11 ECHR. Th ese 
provisions allow states parties to restrict Convention rights as long as a restriction 
strikes a fair balance of interests and meets a number of other requirements. 77 Th e 
application of the margin of appreciation doctrine by the ECtHR may mean that it 
adjusts the intensity of its assessment. Generally, the ECtHR will limit its examination to 
whether national authorities have made a careful assessment of all facts and interests at 
stake. Th e ECtHR could decide to assess only whether adequate procedural safeguards 
were available at national level, or whether the balance of interests that was struck by 
the national authorities was not manifestly without reasonableness or proportionality. 78 
Th us, so-called non-derogable rights, such as Article 2 ECHR on the right to life and 
Article 3 ECHR on the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, in principle 
do not leave room for a similar deferential assessment. 
 Th e ECtHR can accord a wide, a narrow, or a  certain margin to states depending 
on the specifi c context of the case. Considerable deference is generally applied by the 
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Article 13 nor the Convention in general lays down for the Contracting States any given manner 
for ensuring within their internal law the eff ective implementation of any of the provisions in the 
Convention ’ , see ECtHR 6 February 1976,  Swedish Engine Driver ’ s Union v. Sweden , no. 5614/72, para. 
50. 
 84  Leach (2005), p. 150. 
ECtHR if a case concerns the economic and social policies of a state. 79 At the same 
time, generalisations on the scope of the margin of appreciation are hard to make. 
Th ere are many factors which the ECtHR takes into account, such as the nature of the 
right, the importance of the right for the individual, the nature of the interference, the 
object pursued by the interference, and the consensus in Europe on the issues at stake. 80 
Arguably, with so many factors to take into account, and due to the lack of clarity as 
to the relations between these factors, the application of the doctrine by the ECtHR is 
rather unpredictable. 81 
 Th e margin of appreciation doctrine is also of special interest in relation to the 
formulation and development of positive obligations by the ECtHR. It is particularly 
relevant when the ECtHR deals with infringements of fundamental rights that have 
been caused by private parties. It can be expected that the margin of appreciation in this 
fi eld is generally wide, although there is also room for exceptions. 82 
 2.7.  THE EFFECTS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
 Because of the subsidiary nature of the Convention system, the Convention needs to 
rely on the national authorities for eff ectuating the rights and freedoms it sets forth. 
In this regard, the responsibility of the states parties is paralleled with a high level of 
autonomy. States may, in principle, decide for themselves how they wish to give eff ect 
to the Convention. 83 Th ey need to make sure that Convention rights are guaranteed to 
the individuals within their jurisdiction (Article 1 ECHR) and provide individuals with 
eff ective remedies before their national courts in the event of a violation of Convention 
rights (Article 13 ECHR). On the basis of these obligations, the eff ects of the Convention 
on the national legal orders would seem to be limited. 84 
 Yet, all of the state parties have chosen to incorporate the Convention in some 
way or another in their domestic legal systems, meaning that individuals can rely on 
Convention provisions  – or at least the rights protected by the Convention  – before the 
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 85  Th e United Kingdom, with its dualist system, for example, has made provision for the incorporation of 
the Convention in the Human Rights Act 1998, which implies that individuals must have recourse to 
the Human Rights Act to receive the protection that is off ered by the Convention. In the Netherlands, 
the Convention is implemented according to a monist tradition. 
 86  Th e ECtHR considers incorporation as a  ‘ particularly faithful refl ection ’ of the intention to secure the 
Convention rights in the national legal order, see ECtHR 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71,  Ireland v. the 
United Kingdom , para. 239; and Bates (2010), p. 159. 
 87  It has to do with the choices that have been made at national level with regard to the reception of 
international law. Th e direct eff ect of the Convention is also dependent on the self-executing character 
of a specifi c right, meaning that it must be precise and clear. See Gerards  & Fleuren (2013), p. 49. 
 88  Polakiewicz (2010), pp. 50 – 52. See more generally Barkhuysen  & Van Emmerik (2005), Keller  & Sweet 
(2008); and Martinico  & Pollicino (2010). 
 89  Article 41 ECHR states that just satisfaction is awarded if the Court deems it necessary. Also, the 
dictum reveals the distribution of votes of the judges. 
 90  ECtHR 26 July 2011, no. 41416/08,  M. and others v. Bulgaria , para. 136. 
 91  Resolution 1226/2000, Execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Parliamentary 
Assembly (30th Sitting), Council of Europe, point 3. 
 92  Th e Court may, nevertheless, deviate from earlier interpretations if there is a good reason to do so, for 
example, if fundamental rights standards have evolved, see e.g. ECtHR 18 January 2001, no. 24882/94, 
 Beard v. the United Kingdom , para. 81. 
 93  Resolution 1226/2000, Execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Parliamentary 
Assembly (30th Sitting), Council of Europe, point 3. Th is implies that the ECtHR ’ s interpretations 
must, generally, be followed and therefore generally produce an orientation eff ect for the Court as well 
as for the domestic authorities, see Ress (2005), p. 374. 
 94  ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium , para. 58. 
national courts. 85 States are not legally obliged to do so. 86 Th e ways in which Convention 
rights can be enforced and protected through and by the national courts, legislature 
and executive may diff er between the states parties. 87 Nonetheless, academic research 
has shown that, over the past years, the Convention has increasingly been relied on in 
national courts throughout Europe. 88 
 States parties are further legally bound to abide by the judgments of the ECtHR 
(Article 46(1) ECHR). Th e obligations of the states in individual judgments are generally 
confi ned to what is stated in the  dictum , that is, the operative part of the judgment. 
In the  dictum , the ECtHR formally concludes the judgment with its fi ndings on the 
admissibility and the merits of the case, and, eventually, awarding just satisfaction. 89 
Th e binding eff ect of the judgment applies to all organs of the state, including the 
legislature. 90 Decisions of the ECtHR made in specifi c judgments are restricted to the 
states that were party to it, which excludes a general  erga omnes eff ect. 91 Th e ECtHR 
considers, however, that its judgments establish precedents, which it considers to be 
in the interest of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law. 92 An  erga 
omnes eff ect is therefore  de facto present when it comes to interpretations given by the 
ECtHR on the terms of the Convention. Th is is oft en called the  ‘ interpretative force ’ 
or  res interpretata of its judgments. 93 It means that states are expected to follow the 
interpretation of fundamental rights that has been provided by the ECtHR in cases to 
which they were not a party. 
 Th e judgments of the ECtHR are declaratory, which implies that the ECtHR decides 
in its judgments whether a state has violated the Convention or not. 94 Th e ECtHR 
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cannot order a state to make use of particular means to remedy the violation, nor can it 
nullify the decision taken by the national authorities. States are generally free to choose 
the (individual or general) means by which they wish to execute the judgments of the 
ECtHR, as long as their action is in compliance with the Court ’ s conclusion set out in 
the judgment. 95 
 Sometimes, the ECtHR provides indications of which general or individual measures 
must be taken by states to execute particular judgments. 96 General measures may, in 
particular, be called for when there is a structural problem at the national level that 
underlies the violation. 97 Examples of individual measures recommended by the ECtHR 
include the immediate release of a prisoner who was held in detention unlawfully; 
the return of land to an applicant following unlawful expropriation; and the retrial 
of an applicant whose case had not been dealt with by an independent and impartial 
tribunal. 98 Th e ECtHR explained that it indicated such measures in the relevant 
judgments, because there was in reality no choice left  to the states in the execution of 
the judgment; there was an urgent need for the measures to be taken; and that resort to 
national remedies would needlessly prolong procedures for the applicant. 99 Th e Court ’ s 
pilot judgments also off er a suitable framework within which the ECtHR is able to 
prescribe such general measures. 100 Th e Committee of Ministers supervises whether 
states have taken general and/or individual measures to execute particular judgments 
of the ECtHR. 
 Although the ECtHR has always stressed that it is not its task to review the national 
legislation of states parties in light of the Convention  in abstracto , in relation to the 
general obligation of Article 1 ECHR it expects states parties to undertake to ensure the 
compatibility of their national legislation with the Convention requirements, especially 
 95  See e.g. ECtHR 26 June 2012, no. 26828/06,  Kuri ć and others v. Slovenia , para. 406; ECtHR 13 July 
2000, nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98,  Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy , para. 249; and ECtHR 10 January 
2012,  Ananyev and others v. Russia , nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, para. 180. Th e discretion allowed to 
states in the execution of the Court ’ s judgment follows from Article 1 ECHR, see ECtHR 23 January 
2001, no. 28342/95,  Brum ă rescu v. Romania (Article 41) , para. 20. Th e competences of the Court can 
be contrasted with those of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which has the explicit power, 
under Article 63(1) of the American Convention of Human Rights to rule that the  ‘ consequences of 
the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied … ’ . 
 96  Sutton (2010), pp. 56 – 59. Th e Court incidentally held that  ‘ States that are parties to a case are  in 
principle [emphasis added] free to choose the means whereby they will comply with a judgment ’ , see 
ECtHR 31 October 1995, no. 14556/89,  Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece (Article 50), para. 34. 
 97  See e.g. ECtHR 3 November 2011, no. 12793/03,  Balitskiy v. Ukraine , para. 54. 
 98  See respectively ECtHR 8 April 2004, no. 71503/01,  Assanidze v. Georgia, point 14 of the dictum; 
ECtHR 31 October 1995, no. 14556/89,  Papamichopoulos v. Greece (Article 50), para. 38; and ECtHR 
30 October 2003, no. 32984/96,  Alfatli and others v. Turkey (as regards the applicant Mahmut Memduh 
Uyan), para. 52. 
 99  Cf. ECtHR 8 April 2004, no. 71503/01,  Assanidze v. Georgia, par 202; ECtHR 17 September 2009, 
no. 10249/03, Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2) para. 154; ECtHR 31 October 1995, no. 14556/89, 
 Papamichalopoulos and others v. Greece (Article 50), para. 40; and ECtHR 9 October 2007, no. 
14484/04,  Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey , para. 84. 
 100  Th e Committee of Ministers has explicitly invited the Court to do so, see Committee of Ministers, 
Resolution RES(2004)3, 12 May 2004, 114th session; and Resolution RES(2004)6, 12 May 2004, 114th 
session. See further Ress (2005), pp. 379 – 380; and Gerards (2012c), pp. 381 – 384. 
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if their legislative actions clearly interfere with Convention rights. 101 Bringing national 
legislation in conformity with the Convention is to be considered in the interest of 
preventing further violations for the individual ’ s case, as well as preventing future 
violations for other individuals. 102 
 Th erefore, in this respect, it can already be expected that states will undertake certain 
active measures to ensure compliance with the Convention and with the judgments of 
the ECtHR. 103 Generally, states are, however, given some discretion to make their own 
choices as to how to comply with the Convention and the judgments of the ECtHR. 
 2.8.  HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF CONVENTION PROVISIONS 
 Th e direct horizontal eff ect of fundamental rights, which would mean that these rights 
are directly applied in the relations between private parties, is excluded under the 
Convention. Individuals can only invoke the Convention provisions before the ECtHR 
in respect of the actions or omissions of states parties. Th is follows from the (restrictions 
to the) right to individual petition as laid down in the Convention (Article 34 ECHR). 
However, the ECtHR has, to a certain extent, allowed for the indirect horizontal eff ect 
of the Convention rights. It has held states parties responsible for private infringements 
and it has also accepted the indirect horizontal eff ect by accepting that states have a 
positive obligation to prevent the fundamental rights of individuals  vis- à -vis other 
individuals. 104 As an example, in the case of  Moreno G ó mez , the ECtHR held that the 
Spanish state was responsible for a violation of the right to private life of an individual 
living in the vicinity of bars, restaurants and night clubs in the city centre of Valencia 
that created disturbances, such as noise nuisance. 105 
 Indirect horizontal eff ect of the Convention rights is thus oft en established by the 
ECtHR by attributing responsibility for infringements to states parties (Article 1 
ECHR) 106 or through the imposition of positive obligations. 107 States can be called upon 
to prevent, remedy or sanction individual ’ s actions in order to protect the fundamental 
 101  See ECtHR 27 September 1995, no. 18984/91,  McCann and others v. the United Kingdom , para. 153. 
Th e Court has examined the compatibility of certain national legal provisions in abstract as to their 
compliance with the Convention. See e.g. ECtHR 29 April 1988, no. 10328/83,  Belilos v. Switzerland 
(concerning a reservation made by a state party to Article 6 ECHR); ECtHR 6 September 1978, 
no. 5029/71,  Klass and others v. Germany , para. 33 (concerning a law that allows restrictions of the 
confi dentiality of mail, post and telecommunications); and ECtHR 25 February 1982, nos. 7511/76 to 
7743/76,  Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom , para. 26 (concerning a law allowing corporal 
punishment in schools). 
 102  See ECtHR 17 February 2004, no. 39748/98,  Maestri v. Italy , para. 47. 
 103  Th is is also further examined in relation to the positive obligations which states incur under the 
Convention in section 4.4.1. 
 104  See generally Gerards (2011b), pp. 263 ff . 
 105  ECtHR 16 November 2004, no. 4143/02,  G ó mez v. Spain . 
 106  Cf. also ECtHR 13 July 2004, no. 69498/01,  Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra . 
 107  See e.g. ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80,  X and Y v. the Netherlands . 
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rights of the Convention. 108 It is not clear, however, at what point states will be held 
liable more generally for omissions in the private sphere. 109 Th is is also discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4 in relation to the doctrine of positive obligations. 
 2.9.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Th e civil and political rights under the Convention have been enforced successfully 
within the states parties, which has depended on the existence of the right of individuals 
to lodge complaints before the ECtHR. Th is chapter has explained that the ECtHR 
delivers judgments which provide individual justice, and which also develop the 
standards set by the Convention more generally. Th e Convention provides an important 
minimum standard of fundamental rights protection for its states parties, and as a result, 
has had eff ects on the laws of states parties and their fundamental rights obligations, 
even though the Convention has, formally, only limited legal eff ect. In its interpretation 
of the Convention, the ECtHR has regard to the object and purpose of the Convention, 
that is, to achieve individual justice, and it has developed several tools of interpretation 
which are specifi c for the Convention. By interpreting the Convention rights eff ectively 
and dynamically, states parties ’ obligations have been extended considerably and have 
come to cover obligations to regulate private relations. At the same time, the ECtHR 
also aims to respect certain important limits such as those constituted by the subsidiary 
character of the system of the Convention, which is expressed fi rst and foremost in its 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation. 
 
 108  See generally Gerards (2011b), pp. 264 – 280. 
 109  Harris, O ’ Boyle, Bates  & Warbrick (2014), p. 24. 
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 CHAPTER 3 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 3.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Th is chapter aims to defi ne the meaning of the concept of positive obligations and 
its implications for the Convention system. A clear basis of the concept of positive 
obligations is needed so that it can be applied and further examined within the specifi c 
context of EU law (see part II). Scholars such as Mowbray, Xenos and, most recently, 
Lavrysen have undertaken important studies on the development of positive obligations 
by the ECtHR, which will be relied on in this chapter. 1 Th ese studies also show that there 
continues to be discussion on some aspects of the development of positive obligations 
by the ECtHR. Th erefore, a further study of the case-law of the ECtHR itself is also 
undertaken here in order to discover how the ECtHR specifi cally understands and 
defi nes the concept of positive obligations. 2 
 Th is chapter begins by describing how the ECtHR introduced the concept of positive 
obligations in its case-law (section 3.2.1.). It then looks at how the ECtHR defi nes 
positive obligations (section 3.2.2.); how the distinction between positive and negative 
obligations is made (section 3.2.3.); the general rationale expressed for recognising 
positive obligations (section 3.2.4.); which explicit legal bases are used (section 3.2.5.); 
and the methodology applied by the ECtHR in order to determine the existence of 
positive obligations under the Convention (section 3.2.6.). Th e fi rst part of this analysis 
is followed by an overview of several typologies of positive obligations that can be made 
(section 3.3.), and a discussion of the implications of the recognition of the diff erent 
kinds of positive obligations, both for states and for individuals (section 3.4.). Th ereaft er, 
important limitations on the scope of positive obligations that can be found in the 
case-law of the ECtHR are highlighted (section 3.5.). A few main observations on the 
concept of positive obligations are brought together in the conclusions (section 3.6.). 
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 3.2.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS BY 
THE ECtHR 
 3.2.1.  THE BELGIAN LINGUISTIC CASE: INTRODUCING POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS 
 Th e ECtHR introduced the concept of positive obligations for the fi rst time in the 
 Belgian Linguistic case in 1968, which was only its sixth judgment. 3 In this judgment, 
the ECtHR provided important reasoning on how the concept of positive obligations 
was to be understood within the context of the Convention, and it is therefore dealt 
with here in detail. 
 Th is case was about the eff ects of the Belgian linguistic laws on children attending 
schools in certain regions of Belgium. Th ese linguistic laws divided the Belgian territory 
into linguistic regions and established that public schools would teach either in Flemish 
or in French. Some children who were raised to speak French by their parents lived in 
regions where all of the nearby schools were obliged to teach in Flemish. A group of these 
children ’ s parents decided to lodge a complaint before the ECtHR against the Belgian 
government, alleging that the right to education (Article 2 of the First Protocol) and 
their right not to be discriminated in the enjoyment of their family life (Articles 8 and 
14 ECHR) was breached. Th e Belgian government, however, argued that it could not be 
held responsible for either of these violations. 4 It had already complied with what was 
(literally) required of it under the Convention. It did not as such and deliberately hinder 
the applicants ’ children ’ s access to educational institutions. Th e Belgium government 
also argued that such matters of national languages, education and subsidisation of 
public facilities were to be dealt with internally by the Belgian legislature, not by the 
ECtHR which was a supranational court. Th ere was therefore no infringement, because 
the issue wholly fell outside of the scope of the Convention. 
 Th e ECtHR did not agree with the Belgian government. As to the alleged violation of 
the right to education in this case, the ECtHR held that: 
 Th e negative formulation [no person shall be denied the right to education] indicates, as is 
confi rmed by the  ‘ preparatory work ’ …, that the Contracting Parties do not recognise such a 
right to education as would require them at their own expense, or to subsidise, education of 
any particular type or at any particular level. However, it cannot be concluded from this that 
the State has no positive obligation to ensure respect for such a right as is protected by Article 2 
of the Protocol. As a  ‘ right ’ does exist, it is secured, by virtue of Article 1 of the Convention, 
to everyone within the jurisdiction of a Contracting State. 
 To determine the scope of the  ‘ right to education ’, within the meaning of the fi rst sentence 
of Article 2 of the Protocol, the Court must bear in mind the aim of this provision. It notes 
in this context that all member states of the Council of Europe possessed, at the time of 
 3  ECtHR 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62 to 2126/64,  Belgian Linguistic case , para. 3. 
 4  ECtHR 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62 to 2126/64,  Belgian Linguistic case , Part A of the judgment. 
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 6  ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium ; ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. 
Ireland; ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80,  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands. For an interesting insight 
into the historical background of the  Belgian Linguistic case , see Bates (2010), p. 237. 
 7  ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium . 
the opening of the Protocol to their signature, and still do possess, a general and offi  cial 
educational system. Th ere neither was, nor is now, therefore, any question of requiring 
each State to establish such a system, but merely of guaranteeing to persons subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties the right, in principle to avail themselves of the means 
of instructions existing at a given time. 
 Th e Convention lays down no specifi c obligations concerning the extent of these means and 
the manner of their organisation or subsidisation. … However the right to education would 
be meaningless if it did not imply in favour of its benefi ciaries, the right to be educated in the 
national language or in one of the national languages, as the case may be. 5 
 Th e ECtHR thus recognised, despite the fact that the Convention itself does not specify 
particular obligations that must be fulfi lled by states parties, nor textually enunciates 
an active approach towards protecting fundamental rights, that positive obligations can 
be imposed on the states parties. Th is interpretation by the ECtHR of the Convention 
rights requires the states to move beyond a formal and textual reading of the rights of the 
Convention. Fundamental rights protection would, in the view of the ECtHR, become 
meaningless for certain groups of individuals if the obligations for the states parties 
were reduced to what is stated in the exact words of the Convention. Th e children of the 
applicants, for example, would not be able to enjoy the right to education meaningfully 
if education was not accessible in one of the national languages. 
 In the  Belgian Linguistic case, the ECtHR ultimately did not specify the content of any 
particular positive obligation that would have to be fulfi lled under the Convention. In 
fact, most of the complaints of the applicants were dismissed. Nonetheless, the  Belgian 
Linguistic case paved the way for the further development of positive obligations by 
the ECtHR in the subsequent cases of  Marckx v. Belgium ,  Airey v. Ireland and  X.  & 
Y. v. the Netherlands . 6 In these cases the ECtHR actually did impose  ‘ novel ’ positive 
obligations on the states parties and these cases are much more well known. Th ey show 
a range of the diff erent kinds of situations that can give rise to positive actions for states. 
Th ese cases help to clarify what positive obligations may entail under the Convention, 
and they are therefore briefl y discussed here and in the following subsections to show 
how the ECtHR defi nes positive obligations, the rationale that guides the development 
of positive obligations in such cases, as well as the legal bases and methods used to 
determine the content and scope of positive obligations. 
 First, the case of  Marckx v. Belgium was about an unmarried mother whose family 
ties with her daughter were not automatically legally recognised by Belgian laws 
because the birth of the child had taken place outside of marriage. 7 Both the mother 
and daughter complained before the ECtHR about a violation of their right to family 
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 8  ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium , para. 31. 
 9  ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. Ireland . 
 10  ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. Ireland , para. 26. 
life under Article 8 ECHR. Th e ECtHR came to the conclusion that Belgium had failed 
to fulfi l its positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR, as it held that: 
 when the State determines in its domestic legal system the regime applicable to certain family 
ties such as those between an unmarried mother and her child, it must act in a manner 
calculated to allow those concerned to lead a normal family life. As envisaged by Article 8, 
respect for family life implies in particular, in the Court ’ s view, the existence in domestic law of 
legal safeguards that render possible as from the moment of birth, the child ’ s integration in his 
family life. In this connection, the State has a choice of various means  … 8 
 Secondly in the case of  Airey v. Ireland , which was briefl y addressed in chapter 2, the 
ECtHR established a positive obligation in connection to the right to a fair trial laid 
down in Article 6 ECHR. In this case, the applicant, Mrs Airey, sought a divorce from 
her violent husband, but was unable to start the requisite court proceedings, because she 
could not aff ord a solicitor. 9 She found that her right of access to a court under Article 
6 ECHR had been eff ectively denied by the Irish government. Th e Irish government 
argued before the ECtHR that it did not, as such, prevent access to the applicant in this 
case and that, moreover, free legal aid was not provided for under Article 6(1) ECHR. 
Th is provision only specifi cally requires states to make legal aid available in criminal 
cases, and not expressly in civil cases. Th e ECtHR determined nonetheless that: 
 Article 6 para. 1 may sometimes compel the State to provide for the assistance of a lawyer when 
such assistance proves indispensable for an eff ective right of access to court either because legal 
representation is compulsory, as is done by the domestic law of certain Contracting States for 
various types of litigation, or by reason of the complexity of the procedure or of the case. 10 
 As a third example, the case of  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands provides a helpful illustration 
of how the ECtHR has recognised a positive obligation under the Convention. Th is 
case was about a father who complained about the situation of his daughter who was 
mentally handicapped and lived in a privately run home for mentally handicapped 
children, where she had been sexually assaulted. Th e perpetrator of this crime could 
not be prosecuted because, under the Dutch laws of that time, victims needed to lodge 
complaints personally. His daughter could not, however, physically sign the complaint 
due to her condition. Th e father therefore complained of a violation of the right to private 
and family life under Article 8 ECHR, for which the Netherlands was responsible. In its 
judgment, the ECtHR agreed that: 
 the protection aff orded by the civil law in the case of wrongdoing of the kind infl icted on Miss Y 
is insuffi  cient. Th is is a case where fundamental values and essential aspects of private life are at 
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 11  ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80,  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands , para. 27. 
 12  Th e various points of criticism are further discussed in chapter 4. 
 13  See respectively Akandji-Komb é (2007), p. 7; the dissenting opinion of Judge Martens to ECtHR 19 
February 1996, no. 232184/96,  G ü l v. Switzerland ; and Mowbray (2004), p. 2. 
 14  ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium , para. 31. 
 15  ECtHR 21 June 1988, no. 10126/82,  Plattform  “ Ä rtze f ü r das Leben ” v. Austria , para. 31. 
 16  ECtHR 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/80 to 9474/81,  Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United 
Kingdom , para. 67. 
 17  ECtHR 27 September 1990, no. 10843/84,  Cossey v. the United Kingdom ), para. 37. 
stake. Eff ective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by criminal 
law provisions. 11 
 Th us, the Dutch government had failed to provide suffi  cient protection for the right of 
the applicant under Article 8 ECHR in this case and incurred a positive obligation in 
the area of criminal law provisions. 
 All these three cases are considered to form landmark judgments of the ECtHR in 
developing positive obligations in its case-law. Th ey have received much attention (and 
criticism) and have led to an intense debate as to how far the ECtHR ’ s conception of 
positive obligations actually reaches. 12 
 3.2.2.  DEFINING THE CONCEPT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 Th e ECtHR, in general, explains in the cases mentioned above that a positive obligation 
entails that states must  ‘ do something ’,  ‘ take action ’ or  ‘ undertake affi  rmative action ’. 13 
It therefore does not provide a very particular defi nition of the concept of positive 
obligations in its case-law. Th e ECtHR holds, for example in relation to Article 8 ECHR, 
that: 
 the object of the Article is  ‘ essentially ’ that of protecting the individual against arbitrary 
interference by the public authorities … Nevertheless it does not merely compel the State to 
abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there may 
be positive obligations inherent in an eff ective  ‘ respect ’ for family life. 14 
 Th e ECtHR has further declined to develop a general theory on how the concept of 
positive obligations must be defi ned under the Convention. 15 It has held that  ‘ as far as 
those positive obligations are concerned, the notion of  “ respect ” is not clear-cut ’, 16 and 
that  ‘ having regard to the diversity of practices followed and the situations obtaining 
in the Contracting States, the notion ’ s requirement will vary considerably from case to 
case ’. 17 
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 18  ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium , para. 31. 
 19  ECtHR 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62 to 2126/64,  Belgian Linguistic case , para. 7 in fi ne. 
 20  See Connelly (1986), pp. 571 – 572; Harris, O ’ Boyle, Bates  & Warbrick (2014), p. 21; and Bates (2010), 
pp. 64 – 68. 
 21  See Articles 2(1), 3, 4(2), 5(1), 7(1 – 2) ECHR. A negative approach to fundamental rights protection 
also follows from the second paragraph of Articles 8, 10 and 11 ECHR which allow interferences as 
exceptions if certain criteria are met. 
 22  See generally Gerards  & Senden (2009). Cf. Connelly (1986), pp. 571 – 572; and Gerards (2011b), 
p. 233. In comparison, the provisions guaranteeing civil and political rights laid down in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights are formulated in a much more neutral and less negative way. 
 23  Cf. Xenos (2012), p. 2. 
 3.2.3.  THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS 
 Importantly, the ECtHR organises a dichotomy of Convention obligations. It explains 
that the Convention either gives rise to negative obligations, which are viewed as the 
traditional and essential obligations in the protection of fundamental rights, or to 
positive obligations which are viewed as an addition to negative obligations, but which 
are also  ‘ inherent ’ to the rights of the Convention. 18 Th is dichotomy between positive 
and negative obligations helps to further defi ne the concept of positive obligations 
under the Convention more clearly. Th ere are three diff erent features which are further 
explored here. Th ese features can be derived from the case-law of the ECtHR and are 
also oft en discussed in the literature. 
 3.2.3.1.  Traditional versus Implied Obligations 
 Negative obligations logically follow from the text of the Convention. Th e ECtHR 
has therefore explained in its case-law that negative obligations form the traditional 
obligations under the Convention. 19 Th e Convention enunciates a traditional liberal 
view on the protection of fundamental rights, which applies in particular to the type 
of rights that the Convention protects, that is, (mostly) civil and political rights. 20 Th e 
rights laid down in the Convention are interspersed with negative formulations, such 
as  ‘ no one shall be deprived of  … ’,  ‘ no one shall be subjected to  … ’ and  ‘ no one shall be 
required to … ’ . 21 Th e existence and defi nition of negative obligations further logically 
follow from the structure of the Convention provisions. 22 Most of the Convention 
provisions contain a clause or separate paragraph that exceptionally allow for acts 
of interference by public authorities, such as Articles 8 to 11 ECHR. Th ese sections 
stipulate certain requirements which must be met for interferences to be objectively 
justifi ed. Th e interference must be  ‘ in accordance with the law ’, pursue a  ‘ legitimate 
interest ’ and be  ‘ necessary in a democratic society ’. Th is implies that state action in the 
fi eld of fundamental rights protection provides the exception rather than the rule. 23 
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 24  Cf. ECtHR 2 March 1987, no. 9267/81,  Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v. Belgium , where the Court held 
in para. 50:  ‘ … the fact that the primary obligation in the fi eld concerned [Article 3 of Protocol No. 1] 
is not one of abstention or non-interference, as with the majority of the civil and political rights, but 
one of adoption by the State of positive measures to  “ hold ” democratic elections ’ . 
 25  See e.g. ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium , para. 31. 
 26  Cf. the reasoning of the Court with regard to Article 6 ECHR in ECtHR 21 February 1975, no. 4451/70, 
 Golder v. the United Kingdom , paras 25 and 36. 
 27  ECtHR 23 July, nos. 1474/62 to 2126/64,  Belgian Linguistic case , para. 5  in fi ne . 
 28  Cf. ECtHR 6 October 2005, no. 74025/01,  Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2), where the Court held 
in para. 57:  ‘ Indeed it was considered that the unique phrasing [of Article 3 of the First Protocol] was 
intended to give greater solemnity to the Contracting States ’ commitment and to emphasise that this 
was an area where they were required to take positive measures as opposed to merely refraining from 
interference … ’ 
 29  Cf. Dr ö ge (2003), pp. 7 – 8. 
 30  Bates (2010), p. 104. 
 31  Van Dijk (1998), pp. 17 – 18; Harris, O ’ Boyle, Bates  & Warbrick (2014), p. 22; and Mowbray (2004), 
p. 226. Cf. Fredman (2008), p. 70. Fredman explains that positive obligations are frequently, but 
incorrectly, characterised as indeterminate, programmatic and resource intensive, and negative 
obligations as determinate, immediately realisable and resource free. 
States are thus required, foremost, to abstain from intruding in the lives of individuals 
under the Convention. 24 
 Th e ECtHR has held on several occasions that positive obligations arise only in 
addition to the negative obligations. 25 Some Convention provisions do, however, lay 
down fairly specifi c positive obligations for states parties. Article 2(1) ECHR, for example, 
requires the right to life to be protected  by law . Article 6 ECHR also comprises a list of 
several specifi c actions which must be undertaken by the state to guarantee the right to 
a fair trial. It specifi es, for example, that legal aid and interpreters must be provided in 
relation to criminal cases. Article 6 ECHR as a whole, moreover, requires the existence 
of a fully-fl edged judicial system which allows the public to attend. 26 Likewise, the right 
to education laid down in Article 2 of the First Protocol to the Convention presupposes 
the existence of educational facilities. 27 Th e right to free elections laid down in Article 3 
of the same Protocol also very logically gives rise to particular legal and practical 
actions by the state in order to realise elections. 28 Lastly, the right to marry, laid down 
in Article 12 ECHR, would be made redundant if states parties did not provide the legal 
possibility to enter into marriage. Th us, there are various provisions of the Convention 
which demonstrate that states must, to a certain extent, undertake certain actions to 
protect fundamental rights. 29 Th e stated examples of explicit positive obligations, such 
as the provision of a judicial system, evidently fl ow directly from the provisions of the 
Convention, and these could readily be foreseen by states parties when they signed 
the Convention, as opposed to implied positive obligations. 30 Th e content of implied 
positive obligations, such as those that were defi ned in the cases of  Marckx v. Belgium , 
 Airey v. Ireland , and  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands does not logically follow from the 
Convention itself, but has been defi ned by the ECtHR. 31 Th e specifi c actions which 
were required in those cases, such as that family ties need to be recognised (in the case 
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 32  It has been argued that positive obligations result in an extensive reading of the Convention, see Van 
Dijk (1998), p. 18; and Russell (2010), p. 283. Cf. also ECtHR 21 February 1975, no. 4451/70,  Golder 
v. the United Kingdom , para. 36. Th e Court held that  ‘ it follows that the right of access constitutes an 
element which is inherent in the right stated by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6 – 1). Th is is not an extensive 
interpretation forcing new obligations on the Contracting States: it is based on the very terms of the 
fi rst sentence of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6 – 1) read in its context and having regard to the object and 
purpose of the Convention, a law-making treaty … ’ . By contrast, implied positive obligations can be 
regarded as an extensive interpretation of Convention rights. 
 33  Th us far, positive obligations have been determined by the ECtHR in relation to Articles 2, 3, 4, 5, 
6, 8 – 11, 13 and 14 ECHR specifi cally. Yet, it is imagined that positive obligations arise under any of 
the Convention ’ s fundamental rights, see Van Dijk (1998), p. 26. For a provision-based overview of 
the Court ’ s development of positive obligations, see Mowbray (2004); and Harris, O ’ Boyle, Bates  & 
Warbrick (2014). 
 34  Cf. Lavrysen (2016), p. 10. 
 35  Vande Lanotte  & Haeck (2005), p. 99. 
 36  Th e ECtHR more recently emphasised the vulnerability of children in such cases, see ECtHR 12 
December 2013, no. 5786/08,  S ö derman v. Sweden , para. 81. 
of children born out of wedlock), are not expressly or directly indicated by the relevant 
provision under the Convention. 32 Such positive obligations only become evident in 
the specifi c circumstances of the cases brought before the ECtHR. Th e case-law of the 
ECtHR shows that positive obligations can, in principle, be formulated in relation to all 
of the Convention rights. 33 
 3.2.3.2.  State Action versus State Omission 
 Since positive obligations require states to take action, they, in some way, relate to the 
omissions of states. By contrast, negative obligations, which require states to abstain 
from interfering, relate to the (positive) acts of states. 34 Positive obligations have thus 
sometimes been characterised as  ‘ sanctions to the inaction of states ’. 35 In the case of 
 Marckx v. Belgium , it can, for example, be said that the state omitted to provide for legal 
safeguards specifi cally to ensure the protection of the rights to privacy and family life to 
children born out of wedlock. In the case of  Airey v. Ireland , the state omitted to provide 
for (practical and legal) arrangements to ensure that individuals who lacked fi nancial 
resources were able to start court proceedings and actually obtain a divorce. In the third 
case,  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands , the state failed to provide for criminal law provisions 
which would ensure the protection of the right to privacy of one vulnerable individual 
from another individual. 36 
 It can, however, be diffi  cult to determine whether a violation of the Convention results 
from the positive acts of a state or from states ’ omissions. It has oft en been noted that the 
ECtHR could have approached certain cases on positive obligations as matters involving 
a negative obligation for the state. In the case of  Marckx v. Belgium , for example, the 
ECtHR could have held that the state had failed to fulfi l its negative obligation under 
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 37  Cf. Xenos (2012), p. 22. Xenos reads the respective judgments diff erently, as he explains that the Court 
imposed positive obligations on the states parties in those judgments, because they all concerned 
obligations to protect fundamental rights from acts of private parties, instead of acts of state agents. 
 38  Cf. Lavrysen (2016), pp. 237 – 277. 
 39  Cf. Xenos (2012), p. 60. 
 40  ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. Ireland , para. 25. Cf. ECtHR 10 March 1972, nos. 2832/66 
to 2899/66,  De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp ( ‘ Vagrancy ’ ) v. Belgium (Article 50), para. 22. 
 41  Cf. ECtHR 8 July 2003, no. 36022/97,  Hatton and others v. the United Kingdom , para. 119; and Klatt 
(2011), p. 695. 
 42  Lavrysen (2016), p. 72. Th e diff erent types of positive obligations are discussed in section 3.3. 
 43  See in particular section 3.4. 
the Convention because the application of its marital laws had adversely aff ected the 
enjoyment of a particular individual ’ s rights under the Convention. 37 
 Lavrysen has also explained that, in establishing positive obligations under the 
Convention, the ECtHR takes into account the existing structures that could ensure 
the protection of fundamental rights in the states parties. If the required protection 
would imply that the states parties would have to modify their existing structures, such 
as in cases on the recognition of gender transformation and adoption, then the ECtHR 
can decide to impose a  ‘ positive obligation ’ on the state. 38 Th us in cases on positive 
obligations, states may have taken certain positive acts already. According to the ECtHR 
a clear distinction between positive and negative obligations does not always need to be 
made. 39 It has held that: 
 [Th e] … fulfi lment of a duty under the Convention on occasion necessitates some positive 
action on the part of the State; in such circumstances, the State cannot simply remain passive 
and  ‘ there is … no room to distinguish between acts and omissions. ’ 40 
 Perhaps for that reason, the ECtHR has indeed not attempted to clarify how the 
distinction between positive and negative obligations can be made. 41 Th e distinction 
between positive and negative obligations is not always easy to make because there are 
state acts as well as state omissions involved in fundamental rights cases, as explained 
above. Fundamental rights violations can thus result from a complex set of causes. 
Positive obligations can relate to interferences with fundamental rights that are caused 
by private parties, as well as interferences that are caused by the state itself. 42 
 For the purpose of this research, it is of importance to be able to distinguish, broadly, 
between the two concepts of  ‘ positive ’ and  ‘ negative ’ obligations. Th e point is that when 
positive obligations are imposed, they essentially require some action to be taken to 
secure the rights of certain individuals which have not yet received suffi  cient attention 
in the policies of the state. A state may have failed to ensure the protection of especially 
vulnerable persons, for example, in relation to the positive acts which it has already 
undertaken. Th e establishment of such positive obligations on the basis of fundamental 
rights provisions can still have important consequences, as explained further below. 43 
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 44  Klatt (2011), pp. 695 – 696. 
 45  Cf. Nieuwenhuis (2011), p. 189; and Van Dijk (1998), p. 22. Th e Court has held that  ‘ While it is the duty 
of Contracting States to take reasonable and appropriate measures to enable lawful demonstrations 
to proceed peacefully, they cannot guarantee this absolutely and they have a wide discretion in the 
choice of the means to be used … In this area the obligation they enter into under Article 11 of 
the Convention is an obligation as to measures to be taken and not as to results to be achieved ’ , see 
ECtHR, 21 June 1988, no. 10126/82,  Plattform  “ Ä rtze f ü r das Leben ” v. Austria , para. 34. 
 46  According to Klatt, providing justifi cation for positive obligations is considered to form one of the 
main problems of the recognition of positive obligations by the Court, see Klatt (2011), p. 693. 
 47  See also section 2.6.1. 
 3.2.3.3.  Conjunctive versus Alternative Structure 
 Th e last defi ning feature of positive obligations versus negative obligations can be rather 
briefl y explained. It has been held, for example by Klatt, that negative obligations have 
a  ‘ conjunctive structure ’, whereas positive obligations have an  ‘ alternative structure ’. 44 
Th is means that in the case of negative obligations, the fulfi lment of the requirement is 
straightforward: negative obligations do not really leave any choice as to how they must 
be fulfi lled. States must simply refrain from interfering. Any type of action is forbidden. 
Positive obligations, however, generally leave open a range of measures that can be 
taken by states, as has also been recognised by the ECtHR. 45 A positive obligation 
generally implies that national authorities are left  a choice as to the precise fulfi lment 
of that positive obligation in the national legal order. Not all of these actions need to be 
taken by the state. 
 Although, as has been explained, it can thus be quite diffi  cult to make a distinction 
between positive and negative obligations in all cases, the three defi ning features 
of positive and negative obligations mentioned are used as a basis for making the 
distinction throughout this study. It is therefore generally held that positive obligations 
(i) do not follow (directly) from provisions on fundamental rights and their structure, 
but need to be implied in individual cases; (ii) require states to take active measures; 
and (iii) generally leave a choice as to which measures need to be taken by the state. 
 3.2.4.  RATIONALES FOR RECOGNISING POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 In most cases, the ECtHR does not indicate a very clear and explicit legal basis for the 
recognition of positive obligations (see section 3.2.5.). Instead, it generally refers to 
the need to guarantee an eff ective protection of fundamental rights as the underlying 
ground or justifi cation. 46 Th e ECtHR oft en explains that the eff ective protection of 
fundamental rights  – which is necessitated by the object and purpose of the Convention  – 
requires states to take action instead of refraining from taking action. Convention 
rights must be enjoyed in a meaningful way and their interpretation must be  ‘ practical 
and eff ective ’, not  ‘ theoretical and illusory ’. 47 In the case of  Airey v. Ireland , for example, 
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 48  ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. Ireland , paras 24 – 25. 
 49  Cf. Xenos (2012), pp. 142 – 143. 
 50  Cf. Dr ö ge (2003), p. 386; and Van de Westelaken (2010), p. 138. 
 51  See e.g. ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80,  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands , para. 23; Cf. ECtHR 
21 June 1988, no. 10126/82,  Plattform  “ Ä rtze f ü r das Leben ” v. Austria , para. 32; ECtHR 25 April 1996, 
no. 15573/89,  Gustafsson v. Sweden , para. 45; and ECtHR 13 July 2004, no. 69498/01,  Pla and 
Puncernau v. Andorra . Some scholars consider that this formed the initial reason why the Court 
developed a concept of positive obligations in its case-law, see Xenos (2012), p. 19. 
 52  See further section 2.7. 
 53  Cf. Xenos (2012), p. 4. 
the ECtHR took into account the high court fees that were charged as well as the 
particularly complex court procedures, concluding that: 
 the Court considers it most improbable that a person in Mrs. Airey ’ s position can eff ectively 
present his or her case. … hindrance in fact can contravene the Convention just like a legal 
impediment … fulfi lment of a duty under the Convention on occasion necessitates some 
positive action on the part of the State … 48 
 While access to court was formally made available in Ireland, the judicial system in 
Ireland was arranged in a way which made it almost impossible for certain individuals 
to access the judicial system in practice. Th e ECtHR accepts that interferences can be 
caused  – directly or indirectly  – by legislative, administrative or judicial acts of state 
agents, by acts of private parties, and by the vulnerabilities of particular individuals. 49 It 
has been argued that the ECtHR has thereby accepted a multidimensional perspective 
to fundamental rights protection. 50 Th is means that it holds states responsible for 
interferences with fundamental rights which go far beyond violations that are caused by 
their own acts. Th e attribution to states parties of violations caused by private parties, 
thus the horizontal violations, has signifi cantly increased the range of circumstances 
in which states have incurred responsibility. 51 Having to fulfi l the positive obligations 
that have been defi ned by the ECtHR in its case-law means that states must bring their 
national legislation into conformity with Convention rights, and that they must also 
undertake other forms of regulatory activities to be able to comply with the Convention, 
even though in respect of individual judgments the ECtHR cannot, in principle, impose 
particular legislative obligations on states. 52 
 Th e approach of the ECtHR with regard to the development of positive obligations 
evidently requires justifi cation as to why (and to what extent) states parties can be 
held responsible for fulfi lling such wide-ranging fundamental rights and obligations. 
On occasion, in relation to the specifi c circumstances of a case brought before it, the 
ECtHR has expressed some thoughts on how the attribution of the infringements of 
fundamental rights in a broad array of circumstances can be justifi ed. Th is can be of 
interest more generally. 53 In its very fi rst judgment on positive obligations, the  Belgian 
Linguistic case, the ECtHR held: 
 Th e Court considers that the general aim set for themselves by the Contracting Parties through 
the medium of the European Convention on Human Rights, was to provide eff ective protection 
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 54  ECtHR 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62 to 2126/64,  Belgian Linguistic case , para. 5  in fi ne . 
 55  Cf. Xenos (2012), p. 143. 
 56  As explained by Sen, there is a certain asymmetry of power, e.g. between a mother and a child, or a 
state and its citizens, which implies that there is responsibility for the one in power to create more 
justice, see Sen (2010), p. 205. Cf. further Xenos (2012), pp. 2 and 142 – 143; and Bates (2010), p. 236. 
 57  Cf. ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. Ireland , para. 23; ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74, 
 Marckx v. Belgium , para. 31; and ECtHR 22 June 2004, no. 31443/96,  Broniowski v. Poland , at para. 
184. 
 58  ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium , para. 31. 
 59  ECtHR 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62 to 2126/64,  Belgian Linguistic case , para. 9. 
of fundamental human rights, and this, without doubt not only because of the historical 
context in which the Convention was concluded, but also because of the social and technical 
developments in our age which off er to States considerable opportunities for regulating the 
exercise of these rights. 54 
 Th e ECtHR thus takes into account the fact that states (nowadays) have the power 
to infl uence the enjoyment of fundamental rights protection, and that it is therefore 
reasonable to require states to use their infl uence since individuals do not have the 
ability to counteract fundamental right violations which they may experience, whether 
in relations with other individuals or as they arise from their own vulnerability. 55 Th is 
rationale has also been described as  ‘ the obligation of eff ective power ’. 56 
 In relation to this, the ECtHR has on various occasions also explained that the 
responsibility for fundamental rights violations of states results from the fact that they 
have (already) decided to undertake regulatory activities to control certain aff airs and 
thus also to ensure fundamental rights protection in that area. States must then make 
sure that their legislation respects  everyone ’ s fundamental rights. 57 In the case of  Marckx 
v. Belgium , the ECtHR specifi cally explained that: 
 when the State determines in its domestic legal system the regime applicable to certain family ties 
such as those between an unmarried mother and her child, it must act in a manner calculated to 
allow those concerned to lead a normal family life. As envisaged by Article 8, respect for family 
life implies in particular, in the Court ’ s view, the existence in domestic law of legal safeguards 
that render possible as from the moment of birth the child ’ s integration in his family. 58 
 Th e same rationale is noticeable in the  Belgian Linguistic case (although the ECtHR 
refrained from imposing any particular positive obligation). Th e ECtHR explained 
in its judgment on this case that the (active) protection of the right to education 
imposes an obligation for states to organise their educational system in accordance 
with fundamental rights. 59 Th is may involve, as the circumstances of that case show, 
organisational and fi nancial obligations. Th e ECtHR thus fi nds that such positive 
obligations do not upset the choices made in such national sovereign aff airs, as the 
states had already set up particular offi  cial systems of education when they signed the 
Convention upon which fundamental rights protection is built. Th is is also how the 
ECtHR has explained that the states parties needed to adopt criminal law provisions 
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 60  ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80,  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands , para. 27. 
 61  In the case of  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands , the ECtHR held that  ‘ Th is is a case where fundamental 
values and essential aspects of private life are at stake. Eff ective deterrence is indispensable in this area 
and it can be achieved only by criminal-law provisions … Th e only gap, so far as the Commission and 
the Court have been made aware, is as regards persons in the situation of Miss Y; in such cases, this 
system meets a procedural obstacle which the Netherlands legislature had apparently not foreseen ’ , see 
ECtHR  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands , para. 27. 
 62  See section 2.4. 
 63  ECtHR 16 November 2004, no. 4143/02,  Moreno G ó mez v. Spain , para. 61. For similar considerations, 
see ECtHR 13 August 1981, no. 7601/73 and 7806/77,  Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom , 
where the Court held in para. 49:  ‘ … hence, if a violation of one of those rights and freedoms is the 
result of non-observance of that obligation in the enactment of domestic legislation, the responsibility 
of the State for that violation is engaged. Although the proximate cause of the events giving rise to this 
case was the 1975 agreement between British Rail and the railway unions, it was the domestic law in 
force at the relevant time that made lawful the treatment of which the applicants complained. ’ See also 
ECtHR 28 June 2001, no. 24699/94,  VgT Verein Gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland , para. 47. 
to ensure in the case of  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands that the private life of the applicant 
could eff ectively be protected. 60 Th e ECtHR explicitly said that  ‘ indeed it is by such 
provisions that the matter is normally regulated. Moreover, …, this is in fact an area 
in which the Netherlands has generally opted for a system of protection based on the 
criminal law. ’ 
 Th us if states are engaged in a certain area they must ensure the  ‘ all-inclusiveness ’ of 
their national laws and they can be required to remedy certain  ‘ gaps ’ in their legislation 
in order to protect the rights of certain individuals. 61 It may be said that the same 
rationale applies here as in the application of the  ‘ in for a penny  – in for a pound ’ 
approach that was discussed in chapter 2. 62 States parties need to make sure that they 
confer fundamental rights protection under their national laws in conformity with the 
requirements of the Convention, and thus in a non-discriminatory way. 
 Lastly, the ECtHR has also justifi ed the recognition of positive obligations in its case-
law by pointing out that states are to be considered responsible for the fundamental 
rights violations of certain private parties, if they have adopted acts that could explicitly 
condone, legalise or otherwise approve the behaviour of such private parties. For 
example, in the case of  Moreno G ó mez v. Spain , the ECtHR concluded that the state 
could be held responsible for the violation of the right to privacy of Ms Moreno, who 
experienced considerable noise nuisance and suff ered from sleep disturbance from the 
activities of the many bars, restaurants and night clubs in the city centre of Valencia. 
Th e ECtHR reasoned that: 
 Although the Valencian City Council has used its powers in this sphere to adopt measures (such 
as the bylaw concerning noise and vibrations) which should in principle have been adequate 
to secure respect for the guaranteed rights, it tolerated, and thus contributed to, the repeated 
fl outing of the rules which it itself has established during the period concerned. 63 
 Th e ECtHR potentially applies such considerations in other circumstances where 
states have granted licences to certain undertakings whose activities may aff ect the 
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 64  ECtHR 9 December 1994, no. 16798/90,  L ó pez Ostra v. Spain . Cf. ECtHR 9 June 2005, no. 55723/00, 
 Fadeyeva v. Russia , paras 89 – 93. 
 65  See Xenos (2012), p. 21, who explains that the use of the terms  ‘ everyone has the right to … ’ , or  ‘ no 
person shall be … ’ , also form general reference points for the active protection of fundamental rights. 
 66  See ECtHR 25 February 1985, nos. 7511/76 and 7743/76,  Campbell and Cosans v. the United Kingdom , 
para. 37. Th e ECtHR has also applied this reasoning in relation to Article 9 ECHR, despite the fact that 
 ‘ respect for ’ is not included in that provision as such, see ECtHR 20 September 1994, no. 13470/84, 
 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria , para. 47. 
 67  See ECtHR 9 June 1998, no. 23413/94,  L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom , para. 36. Cf. Lavrysen (2016), 
p. 93. In relation to the other Convention rights which, under the second paragraph, require 
restrictions to be provided for by law, the ECtHR regards the legislative obligations fl owing therefrom 
as  ‘ negative obligations ’ as opposed to  ‘ positive obligations ’ . See further Xenos (2012), p. 26; Akandji-
Kombe (2007), p. 7; and Van Dijk (1998), p. 26. 
enjoyment of fundamental rights of individuals living nearby. If such undertakings 
infringe fundamental rights in a serious way, states may be said to have knowingly 
tolerated such behaviour and therefore can incur positive obligations based on their 
responsibilities under the Convention. 64 
 In conclusion, while the ECtHR generally recognises positive obligations in a wide 
range of circumstances mainly by expressing the rationale of the eff ective protection 
of fundamental rights, it may also, in specifi c circumstances, take into account other 
considerations for attributing state responsibility, such as that states have the eff ective 
power to be able to make a diff erence in the lives of individuals. Th e ECtHR may have 
regard to the existing legal framework of the state which already provides a certain level 
of protection, in order to be able to impose positive obligations by reason of the  ‘ all-
inclusiveness ’ of the national regulatory system, and to require states to remedy certain 
gaps in their legal systems. Lastly, the ECtHR may take into account that states have 
already legalised certain behaviour or, instead, decided to take action to control other 
kinds of unwanted behaviour (such as noise nuisance). 
 3.2.5.  EXPLICIT LEGAL BASES 
 As such, the principle of eff ective protection of fundamental rights is thus used by 
the ECtHR as a ground to justify the recognition of positive obligations under the 
Convention. Th e ECtHR has also pointed out that there is a further basis to be found for 
legitimising the existence of positive obligations in the specifi c text of the Convention. 65 
Th e ECtHR has explained, for example, that the term  ‘ respect for ’ in Article 8 ECHR 
was deliberately chosen by the draft ers of the Convention instead of terms such as 
 ‘ acknowledge ’ or  ‘ take into account ’. Th is would imply, according to the ECtHR, that 
positive obligations can be found in relation to this provision. 66 Th e ECtHR has also 
held in relation to Article 2 ECHR which requires the right to life to be protected by 
law, that it contains a basis for states to put in place an administrative and legislative 
framework. 67 
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 70  See ECtHR 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71,  Ireland v. the United Kingdom , para. 239. 
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 72  See ECtHR 13 August 1981, nos. 7601/76 to 7806/77,  Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom , 
para. 49. 
 73  See ECtHR 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71,  Ireland v. the United Kingdom , para. 239. 
 74  Cf. Barkhuysen (2004), p. 32. 
 75  ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96,  Kudla v. Poland , para. 152. However, as the ECtHR held, 
 ‘ Article 13 ECHR does not go so far as guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State ’ s laws as such 
to be challenged before a national authority on the ground of being contrary to the Convention or to 
equivalent domestic legal norms ’ , see ECtHR 21 February 1986, no. 8793/79,  James and others v. the 
United Kingdom , para. 85. 
 76  See e.g. ECtHR 6 September 1978, no. 5029/71,  Klass and others v. Germany , para. 64; and more 
recently, ECtHR 4 July 2013, no. 21788/06,  Balakin v. Russia , para. 33, where the ECtHR concluded 
that Article 13 ECHR was not applicable in relation to domestic procedures to obtain social housing, 
as it did not constitute an arguable claim of a violation of a substantive Convention right. 
 77  ECtHR 26 October 2000, no. 30210/96,  Kudla v. Poland , para. 154. 
 More generally, the ECtHR has indicated Articles 1 and 13 ECHR as the basis for 
the recognition of positive obligations. 68 Article 1 ECHR requires the states parties 
to  ‘ secure ’ the fundamental rights of the Convention. Th is general obligation must 
always be read in conjunction with a specifi c Convention right and cannot lead to a 
self-standing violation of the Convention. 69 Th e ECtHR has clarifi ed that Article 1 
ECHR establishes a binding obligation for states to  always secure fundamental rights. 70 
Article 1 ECHR engages the responsibility of states for compliance with the Convention 
within their territory generally. 71 Violations that result from national legislation, 
administrative acts or other forms of state action are therefore attributed to the states 
parties. 72 In combination with Article 14 ECHR, the ECtHR has also held that Article 
1 ECHR implies a general obligation for states parties to prevent or remedy breaches of 
the Convention rights at national levels. 73 Th e obligation under Article 1 ECHR is held 
to be one of result. 74 
 Article 13 ECHR entails an obligation for the states parties to provide for eff ective 
remedies at national level. Article 13 ECHR is, in a way, closely connected to the 
realisation of the general obligation of Article 1 ECHR. By requiring the states parties to 
provide remedies at national level for individuals whose Convention rights are violated, 
the provision aims to secure, procedurally, that the Convention rights are eff ectively 
protected at national level. 75 Article 13 ECHR also has an accessory character: according 
to the Court ’ s case-law, Article 13 ECHR can only be invoked by individuals if there is an 
 ‘ arguable claim ’ of a violation of the (rights under the) Convention. 76 Article 13 ECHR 
allows the states parties discretion in choosing the manner of fulfi lling this procedural 
obligation of the Convention. 77 Th e ECtHR, however, rarely applies the term positive 
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obligations when imposing procedural obligations on the states parties on the basis 
of Article 13 ECHR, even though the actual requirements developed under Article 13 
ECHR are very similar to the requirements which are developed by the ECtHR when it 
develops positive obligations on the basis of other provisions of the Convention. 78 Th is 
could be explained by the fact that Article 13 ECHR recognises in a more explicit way 
that active requirements need to be taken  – that is, by providing remedies  – and positive 
obligations follow more implicitly from other provisions of the Convention. 79 
 3.2.6.  METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF 
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 Th e Convention provisions itself have been draft ed with a view to states ’ negative 
obligations which does not give much structure for defi ning states ’ positive obligations. 
Th e criteria which have been laid down in the Convention provisions, in particular 
where it concerns  ‘ interferences ’ are, in the Court ’ s perspective, not fully applicable to 
positive obligations. 80 Th erefore, in determining the existence of positive obligations, 
the ECtHR has clarifi ed that it applies a fair balance test. 81 Th e application of the fair 
balance test in cases of positive obligations has been explained by the ECtHR in its 
judgment in  Rees v. the United Kingdom as follows: 
 In determining whether or not a positive obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair 
balance that has to be struck between the general interests of the community and the interests 
of the individual, the search for which balance is inherent in the whole of the Convention … 
In striking this balance the aims mentioned in the second paragraph of Article 8 may be of a 
certain relevance, although this provision refers in terms only to  ‘ interferences ’ with the right 
protected by the fi rst paragraph  – in other words is concerned with the negative obligations 
fl owing therefrom … 82 
 To some extent, the fair balance test is thus similar to the test that must be carried out 
according to the terms of the provisions of Convention rights that specifi cally allow 
for restrictions to be made (such as Article 8(2) ECHR). In the Court ’ s view, the terms 
 ‘ pursues a legitimate interest ’ and  ‘ the interests of a democratic society ’ might be of 
relevance. It is not so logical to apply the term  ‘ prescribed by law ’ in cases on positive 
obligations, considering that a legislative framework is usually absent in circumstances 
that give rise to a positive obligation on the part of the state. 83 Th us, (only) some 
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elements related to the test of balancing can be used in regard to negative as well as 
positive obligations. 
 Th e fair balance test in cases on positive obligations implies a merging of the two 
stages of review. Th e fair balance test determines both whether a right exists  – thus 
whether an individual ’ s claim falls within the scope of a Convention right  – and whether 
it has been legitimately compromised by the state  – thus whether an infringement can 
be objectively justifi ed. 84 Th ose two stages are generally kept separate in respect to 
negative obligations. Th is implies that the Court ’ s assessment for determining whether 
a state has fulfi lled its positive obligations is less structured as compared to negative 
obligations. 85 
 In most cases, the ECtHR carries out the fair balance test by determining fi rst which 
interests are involved, that is, the interests of the individual and the general interests 
of the community, and subsequently whether the state has carried out a reasonable 
assessment in balancing those interests. 86 Th e ECtHR will look at the national 
administrative and legislative frameworks as a benchmark for fi nding which interests 
need to be taken into account and whether the public authorities have struck a fair 
balance of those interests. 87 
 On occasion, the Court applies the fair balance test in a diff erent way, by fi rst defi ning 
which particular positive action arises on the basis of a specifi c Convention right and 
then by examining whether the state has fulfi lled that particular positive obligation, or 
whether the failure to fulfi l that obligation can be objectively justifi ed according to the 
criteria for justifying interferences of fundamental rights. 88 Th is assessment is evidently 
more structured as compared to the assessment discussed above and it also provides 
much more clarity over the content of the positive obligations which can follow from 
the Convention provisions. However, the ECtHR only rarely applies this approach. 
 In several cases it has appeared that the ECtHR may also apply a  ‘ knowledge ’ test 
to determine whether the state incurs positive obligations. In the case of  Osman in 
particular, the ECtHR has explained that it will examine whether  ‘ the authorities knew 
or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the 
life of an identifi ed individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party ’. 89 
Th e criterion of knowledge is particularly relevant in relation to positive obligations 
which are concerned with violations of fundamental rights between private parties. 
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 96  In relation to the determination of states ’ positive obligations, the ECtHR has, however, 
clearly expressed several limitations that must be taken into account, as discussed further below, see 
section 3.5. 
Th is criterion has been applied by the ECtHR in relation to matters such as child abuse 
and in cases concerning industrial dangerous activities. 90 
 States parties may be allowed a margin of appreciation in complying with the positive 
obligations under the Convention. 91 Th e margin of appreciation is generally wide when 
the active protection of Convention rights gives room for alternative measures to be 
taken and when there is little consensus in the states parties as regards the positive 
action that follows from Convention provisions, especially if the case at hand involves 
social or economic rights. 92 Th e width of the margin of appreciation is, however, 
determined under similar conditions as would be the case for negative obligations. 93 
Th ere appears to be no signifi cant diff erence in its application, although this has been 
subject of debate. 94 
 While the ECtHR has thus devised a separate test for determining the existence of 
positive obligations, the ECtHR has also clarifi ed that: 
 Whether [a] case is analysed in terms of a positive duty on the State to take reasonable and 
appropriate measures to secure the applicant ’ s rights under paragraph 1 of Article 8 or in terms 
of an  ‘ interference by a public authority ’ to be justifi ed in accordance with paragraph 2, the 
applicable principles are broadly similar. 95 
 By trivialising the distinction between negative and positive obligations, the Court seems 
to have wanted to make clear that states do not need to identify whether fundamental 
rights violations result from acts or omissions; instead, states must focus on providing 
eff ective protection of individuals ’ rights. 96 
 3.3.  TYPOLOGIES OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 Th e discussion above has concluded that the ECtHR applies quite a broad defi nition of 
positive obligations. Th e concept of positive obligations therefore in fact comprises a 
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multitude of diff erent types of actions that can be taken by the state and such obligations 
may arise in very diff erent circumstances. Th is section aims to provide insight into 
the existence of the diff erent types of positive obligations which can arise from the 
Convention. 97 It discusses the (basic) typology of positive obligations that can be found 
in the case-law of the ECtHR, as well as various other typologies that have been put 
forward in the literature. 
 3.3.1.  TYPOLOGY DEVELOPED BY THE ECtHR 
 Th e judgments of the ECtHR do not provide much systematisation for the positive 
obligations which it has developed. Th e ECtHR has generally developed positive 
obligations on a case-by-case basis and always in relation to specifi c Convention rights. 98 
Th e ECtHR makes a distinction only between substantive, or material, and procedural 
positive obligations in its judgments. 99 Th e same distinction can be found concerning 
negative obligations in the case-law of the ECtHR. 100 In making the distinction, what 
matters is the content of the required action. 101 Th e substantive positive obligations, 
especially, show a great variety of measures that must be taken by states under the 
Convention, and are heavily case-based. 102 States have, for example, incurred positive 
obligations to ensure that lawful demonstrations proceed peacefully; to provide for 
conditions of detention that respect human dignity; to enable the legal recognition of the 
sexual identity of transsexuals; and to protect the Gypsy way of life. 103 Such obligations 
typically impose social and economic demands on states parties and have eff ects on the 
relations between individuals. 104 States parties could discharge the substantive positive 
obligations by taking action at the legislative, the judicial or the administrative level. 105 
 Procedural positive obligations are concerned with the organisational dimension of 
fundamental rights protection. Th e Convention itself provides for explicit procedural 
positive obligations in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, as these provisions require states to 
have various kinds of procedural safeguards in place. 106 Th e ECtHR has developed 
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further  ‘ implied ’ procedural positive obligations, particularly in relation to Articles 2 
and 3 ECHR. Th e ECtHR has held that eff ective investigation must be undertaken into 
suspicious deaths and into complaints about inhuman or degrading treatment. 107 Th e 
ECtHR has also established that there is an obligation on states to undertake eff ective 
investigations on the basis of Article 2 ECHR, which it has even qualifi ed as a separate 
and autonomous duty under the Convention. 108 Procedural obligations can further be 
found in respect to almost all other substantive rights of the Convention, although the 
ECtHR may not always defi ne the procedural obligations as such in terms of positive 
obligations. 109 Clear examples of procedural obligations can be found, however, in the 
case-law of the ECtHR on adoption and custody cases. In such cases, the ECtHR has 
required there to be procedures in place to allow the persons involved to participate 
in the decision-making process and to have access to remedies, to ensure the eff ective 
protection of the right to private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. 110 
 Th ere are judgments to be found in which the ECtHR imposes both substantive 
and procedural positive obligations on the states parties, and where the interaction 
between the two types of obligations is noticeable. On some occasions, the ECtHR 
examined fi rst whether a state party had complied with a substantive obligation, and 
then whether the national legal and administrative framework had provided for the 
requisite procedural safeguards to protect Convention rights. 111 In more recent years, 
the ECtHR has increasingly focused on whether states parties have fulfi lled certain 
positive procedural obligations under the Convention, which can be regarded as the 
way in which it aims to respect the subsidiary nature of the Convention system, as 
discussed in chapter 2. 112 Th is tendency has also been depicted as the  ‘ proceduralisation 
movement ’ of the ECtHR, in which the ECtHR has shown to pay special attention to the 
quality of the administrative, judicial or even legislative procedures which are relevant 
to the specifi c circumstances in which the alleged interference with a fundamental right 
has taken place. 113 
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 3.3.2.  TYPOLOGIES DEVELOPED IN ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
 Th ere are many diff erent typologies of positive obligations which provide useful insight 
into the types of implementing measures which states could take to fulfi l the positive 
obligations under the Convention, as well as what diff erent relations these positive 
obligation can apply to. 
 First, the types of measures which states could take to implement the positive 
obligations under the Convention could be considered. Xenos, in particular, has 
concentrated on this, and distinguishes between positive obligations to legislate, positive 
obligations to provide for an administrative framework, and positive obligations to take 
practical measures to protect fundamental rights. 114 Th e ECtHR itself has also clarifi ed 
on diff erent occasions that fundamental rights require, by their very nature, that there 
must be a legislative and administrative framework to protect fundamental rights or 
that amendments must be made thereto. 115 
 Secondly, to be able to classify further the positive obligations which can be found 
in the case-law of the ECtHR, it may be useful to look at the classic typology of the 
duties to respect, protect and fulfi l. 116 Th is tripartite typology was originally developed 
in relation to the protection of social, economic and cultural rights, although it can also 
be applied to the protection of civil and political rights. 117 Th e duty to respect entails 
a duty to refrain from interfering in the exercise of fundamental rights by individuals. 
Th e duty to protect constitutes a duty to prevent human rights violations caused by 
private parties. Th e duty to fulfi l is a duty for states to take complementary legal, 
administrative and other kinds of measures in order to guarantee the enjoyment of 
fundamental rights. 118 All three duties are considered to be inherent to all fundamental 
rights, and are necessary to fully realise fundamental rights. 119 It is oft en suggested that  – 
compared to the negative/positive dichotomy which is applied by the ECtHR  – this 
typology manifests more clearly the indivisible nature of fundamental rights and the 
multiple types of obligations that can be imposed on states. 120 
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 Related to this typology is one which distinguishes between positive obligations of 
a horizontal nature and positive obligations of a vertical nature. 121 Horizontal positive 
obligations relate to the protection of fundamental rights in the relations between 
individuals, whereas vertical positive obligations relate to the relations between the 
state and an individual. 122 Dr ö ge has also further distinguished between the horizontal 
positive obligations which have a social dimension. 123 Such positive obligations are 
concerned with the realisation of the eff ective enjoyment of fundamental rights in 
social reality. Where positive obligations with a social dimension are encountered, 
the fundamental rights violations are not caused directly by any act of a state agent, 
nor by acts of other private parties, but rather arise from the situation  ‘ on the ground ’. 
Also, Xenos seems to consider that there is such a positive obligation with a social 
dimension to be found in the case-law of the ECtHR. According to Xenos there are 
positive obligations which arise in the absence of state interference, and relate to the 
vulnerability of specifi c groups of individuals, such as immigrants or the elderly. 124 
 It can be very diffi  cult to distinguish clearly between these vertical, horizontal and 
social types of positive obligations in practice. Scholars themselves may even come to 
diff erent conclusions over what type of positive obligations were defi ned by the ECtHR 
in specifi c cases. 125 Also, the tripartite typology of positive obligations discussed 
earlier is very diffi  cult to trace on the basis of the case-law of the ECtHR on positive 
obligations. 126 Th e diff erences between these typologies may in fact relate to the objective 
of the analysis that was undertaken when they were developed. 127 Th ese typologies may, 
however, more generally show the types of relations to which positive obligations may 
apply (to state-individual, to two individuals, or to the societal relations of individuals). 
It is therefore also useful to examine the types of positive obligations which may be 
found in the case-law of the ECJ, which will be discussed further in parts II and III. 128 
 Lastly, an interesting typology has been developed by Van Kempen. 129 Th is typology 
focuses on the degree to which the positive obligations of the ECtHR follow from 
the negative obligation that can legitimately be derived from the provisions of the 
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Convention. Van Kempen analysed the Court ’ s development of positive obligations, 
particularly in the fi eld of criminal law. He put forward six types of positive obligations 
that can be arranged on a scale that is based on a negative concept of freedom. Th e 
negative concept of freedom, according to Van Kempen, is essential to the guarantees 
which are provided by fundamental rights. On one end of the scale, one can fi nd the 
so-called  dependent type of positive obligations. Th is positive obligation is imposed 
on states when they breach the negative obligation not to interfere in the lives of 
individuals. For example, when states restrict the liberty of a detainee, they must take 
action to guarantee the basic facilities to protect the health and safety of detainees. 
Such obligations logically follow from the negative obligations that can be found in 
fundamental rights provisions. Next on the scale, there are positive obligations which 
are  supportive to negative obligations, that is, obligations which must, in particular, be 
fulfi lled by the addressees of fundamental rights provisions. Van Kempen indicates the 
positive obligation for suitable training to be provided for police offi  cers in order to 
prevent torture, inhuman or degrading treatment as an example. Further along the scale 
one can fi nd positive obligations that are  intrinsic to particular fundamental rights, such 
as the right to free elections and the right to education, which logically require the state 
to set up certain institutions and take organisational measures. At the opposite side of 
dependent positive obligations, Van Kempen positions the so-called  autonomous or 
 repressive positive obligations. He considers this type of positive obligation to be the most 
detached and distant from the fundamental right to which the obligation is related (and 
therefore the most problematic). Examples of such positive obligations are obligations 
to prevent human traffi  cking and terrorist activities. Autonomous or repressive positive 
obligations require the most extensive interpretation of the Convention provisions. 130 
Th is typology can, in particular, be useful when looking at the legitimacy of deriving 
certain positive obligation from fundamental rights. 
 Clearly, there are many diff erent typologies of positive obligations to be made, and 
this section has not discussed all of them. Th e typologies that have been discussed 
here are those which will fi rstly be used in chapter 4 to examinine various problematic 
features of the development of (some) positive obligations. Secondly, these typologies 
will be especially relevant when discussing the concept of positive obligations in the 
following parts of this study on the EU context. Th e diff erent typologies are applied in 
order to be able to characterise the types of positive obligations which may be found in 
the case-law of the ECJ, and also to discuss their problematic aspects. 131 
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 3.4.  IMPLICATIONS OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF CONVENTION RIGHTS 
 Th e recognition of positive obligations has signifi cantly infl uenced the system of 
fundamental rights protection of the states parties to the Convention and it has greatly 
increased the opportunities of those seeking protection of fundamental rights. 132 
Th is section pays some further attention in explaining how the acceptance of positive 
obligation has aff ected the scope of Convention rights and obligations. It draws on 
some of the general issues discussed in the previous sections. First, the implications 
are examined from the viewpoint of the states parties and then from the viewpoint of 
individuals. Th is mainly analytical section may disclose some of the various problematic 
features of the development of the concept of positive obligations, however, a more 
in-depth critical appraisal is undertaken in chapter 4. 
 3.4.1.  THE POSITION OF STATES PARTIES 
 First, one important implication of the development of positive obligations is that, 
although the ECtHR establishes positive obligations in individual judgments, they 
have clear implications for all states parties of the Convention. Th e states parties can 
already incur obligations to amend legislation or administrative structures as part of 
the requirement to take individual and general measures under Article 46(1) ECHR. 133 
Th e main diff erence, however, is that the individual and general measures prescribed 
under Article 46 ECHR are only imposed on one particular state, that is, the respondent 
state to a certain case, and they directly follow from the dictum of a judgment which 
that particular state must abide by. In contrast, positive obligations are developed by the 
ECtHR as obligations which are inherent to Convention rights  – they are  ‘ clarifi cations ’ 
of the terms and notions of the Convention given by means of interpretation. 134 Since 
these interpretations can be considered to form part and parcel of the text of the 
Convention, and thereby of the obligations undertaken by the signatory states, positive 
obligations  de facto have  erga omnes eff ect. Th e reach of positive obligations is therefore 
generally much broader than general and individual measures imposed under Article 
46 ECHR. 
 Secondly, the Court ’ s recognition of positive obligations as part of the states ’ 
obligations under the Convention has had a signifi cant eff ect on the role that is played 
by states parties under the Convention. Th e state obtains a rather diff erent role than is 
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given by its negative obligations to respect fundamental rights. Th e state is no longer, 
possibly, the  ‘ violator ’ of fundamental rights (negative obligations), but becomes the 
 ‘ protector ’ of fundamental rights due to the acceptance of positive obligations under 
the Convention. 135 In other words, states have become  ‘ duty-bearers ’ under the 
Convention. 136 States bear duties to protect individuals from violations infl icted by 
state agents, but also from violations caused by private parties or which result from the 
vulnerabilities of particular groups of individuals. To perform their role as protectors of 
fundamental right, states must have regard to the requirements of fundamental rights 
protection prior to all the acts of state agents. 137 States must therefore take responsibility 
in all situations in which human rights issues can be reasonably be considered to 
play a role and they must design proactive, preventive, compensatory or remedial 
measures accordingly. 138 Th e recognition of positive obligations under the Convention 
thus implies a departure from a more formal understanding of the protection of the 
fundamental rights under the Convention. 
 Th irdly, the incorporation of positive obligations into the Convention has extended 
the fundamental rights obligations of the states parties beyond the  ‘ sphere of rights ’ 
that they knowingly and willingly contracted to respect under the Convention. Positive 
obligations under the Convention may also imply obligations that lie in the fi eld of 
social and economic rights. Th e ECtHR has clearly recognised this by stating that: 
 the mere fact that an interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere of social 
and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against such an interpretation; there is no 
water-tight division separating that sphere from the sphere covered by the fi eld covered by the 
Convention. 139 
 Th e ECtHR thus does not limit itself to the exact codifi cation of fundamental rights in 
the Convention, as this does not seem to leave room for implied positive obligations in 
general and social and economic obligations in particular. Th e ECtHR also continues 
to develop substantially new positive obligations in its case-law. Some recent examples 
of positive obligations that have been recognised include obligations to take measures 
to protect the environment and to take action against human traffi  cking. 140 States may 
have little certainty as regards the positive obligations they incur under the Convention, 
and they clearly need to keep track of the case-law of the ECtHR to understand what 
obligations they must abide by in relation to the Convention. 
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 Incorporating positive obligations into the Convention thus has signifi cant 
implications for the states ’ role in protection of fundamental rights. Th eir role has been 
expanded and transformed in relation to the protection of fundamental rights. In terms 
of the obligations they incur, those cannot easily be circumscribed, and they may also 
evolve due to developments in the case-law of the ECtHR. 
 3.4.2.  THE POSITION OF INDIVIDUALS 
 Individuals play an important role in the development of positive obligations by the 
ECtHR, since the existence of particular fundamental rights violations requiring positive 
action becomes apparent in judgments in cases brought by individual applicants, on a 
case-by-case basis. 
 Th e development of positive obligations by the ECtHR can be seen as an improvement 
of the legal position of individuals. Where the state incurs a positive obligation to 
protect fundamental rights, the individual obtains a right to positive action by the 
state. 141 Positive obligations for states thus oft en imply positive, enforceable rights for 
individuals. Traditionally, where negative obligations are concerned, individuals are 
entitled to be protected from interferences by state agents. Th e recognition of positive 
obligations may imply much stronger guarantees, as the individual is entitled to an 
active response by the states parties in terms of legislative, administrative or practical 
measures. 142 Th e recognition of positive obligations therefore empowers the individual 
 vis- à -vis states parties. Th e empowerment of individuals is sometimes considered to be 
the most powerful argument to justify the development of positive obligations by the 
judiciary in general. 143 
 At the same time, it has been argued that the recognition of positive obligations 
can also have a detrimental impact on the legal status of individuals. Th e right to 
positive action by the state for one individual may imply that another individual ’ s 
rights are restricted. Th is concern is especially relevant in relation to the development 
of horizontal types of positive obligations. For example, in the case of  X. and Y. v. the 
Netherlands , the ECtHR imposed a requirement on the state to protect the right to 
family life of a young individual who had been sexually assaulted. 144 Th e state needed 
to adopt criminal measures against the perpetrator, according to the ECtHR, which 
evidently had a detrimental eff ect on the rights of that second individual. Also, in the 
case of  Von Hannover , the ECtHR imposed a positive obligation on the national court 
to protect the right to privacy of a well-known individual whose pictures had been 
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published in newspapers without consent. 145 Th e fulfi lment of this positive obligation, 
on the other side, restricted the right of the media to freedom of expression. 
 By recognising positive obligations in individual judgments, the ECtHR has further 
allowed the individual to set the state apparatus of all of the contracting parties in 
motion to implement the interpretation given to the Convention rights. Th e individual 
is not empowered, as such, to lay claim to any particular kind of action by the public 
authorities  – due to the alternative structure of positive obligations. 146 Still, the judicial 
actions taken by the individual give rise to public debate and fundamental rights 
protection is put on the (political) agenda, although the ECtHR can leave room for public 
debate as to how particular positive obligations must be fulfi lled. Positive obligations 
create an opportunity for individuals to participate in the democratic process and 
contribute to a deliberative democracy, where the state accounts for its actions and 
omissions through the adjudicative forum, and eventually, realises active protection 
of fundamental rights. 147 Th rough democratic procedures, individuals have the ability 
to infl uence state politics and thus decisions on how to fulfi l positive obligations. Th e 
supervisory mechanism created by the Convention and the recognition of positive 
obligations therefore enables the individual to bring fundamental rights violations to 
the attention of states, even if they may otherwise be ignored by majoritarian politics. 148 
As a result, positive obligations do not only result in stronger protection of rights and 
direct empowerment of the individual, but also in enhanced participation in national 
democratic decision-making. 
 3.5.  LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS 
 As has become clear from the discussion so far, there is a broad range of circumstances 
in which states can incur positive obligations, and a broad range of types of measures 
which states can be expected to take. In theory it seems that an endless range of 
positive obligations is conceivable. As has been explained, the principle of eff ectiveness 
generally guides the ECtHR ’ s examination of the content of positive obligations under 
the ECtHR. 149 What the eff ective protection of fundamental rights requires can be 
examined only in very concrete situations. It will also depend on the particular type 
of Convention right that is involved, on the specifi c circumstances of the case and 
the diff erent interests which are at stake, and sometimes even on the identity of the 
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respondent state. 150 Th e principle of eff ectiveness is thus very open-ended. Th e scope 
of states ’ positive obligations may even change over time, because the ECtHR considers 
that the Convention must be interpreted as a  ‘ living instrument ’. 151 Xenos, for example, 
has therefore concluded that  ‘ the problem with positive obligations is that their scope 
appears to be open-ended ’. 152 
 It can thus be very diffi  cult to defi ne the states ’ positive obligations in relation to 
the protection of fundamental rights. Th e ECtHR has, however, also made clear on 
occasions that there are some limitations which apply in this context. Th e ECtHR 
has generally held that, in comparison to negative obligations, the scope of positive 
obligations is  inherently limited. 153 It also considers that positive obligations arise (only) 
in addition to negative obligations. 154 With respect to the protection of fundamental 
rights in horizontal relations, in which positive obligations are of concern, the ECtHR 
has moreover clarifi ed that  ‘ the Court is not in theory required to settle disputes of a 
purely private nature ’. 155 
 Other, more specifi c, limitations on the scope of positive obligations can also be 
found in the case-law of the ECtHR. Th e ECtHR requires the existence of knowledge, 
a direct and immediate link, and no impossible or disproportionate burdens to be 
able to accept (some) positive obligations. 156 Th ese limitations have been developed 
especially in relation to provisions that are very indeterminate in nature, such as Article 
8 ECHR, and Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, which have given rise to very detailed positive 
obligations under the Convention. 157 Th ese limitations will be discussed in more detail 
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in the following section in order to clarify how they are applied. In addition to this, it 
can be said that there also are some further limitations which apply generally to the 
scope of Convention rights, which are therefore also relevant for the scope of positive 
obligations. Th e wording of the Convention provisions and the comparative approach 
are considered most important in this regard. 158 Th ose limitations are derived mostly 
from interpretative principles, thus, they determine what kind of fundamental rights 
issues can reasonably be brought within the scope of the Convention rights. 
 3.5.1.  KNOWLEDGE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
 Th e existence of knowledge by a state is an important condition limiting the scope 
of states ’ positive obligations. 159 It determines whether a particular action can be 
reasonably expected of a state in relation to situations where violations are committed 
by private parties. If it cannot be established that the state knew or ought to have known 
of fundamental rights violations committed by such actors, the state does not incur 
any positive obligations. 160 Th e ECtHR held so, very clearly, in the case of  Osman v. the 
United Kingdom , which was about the protection of the right to life: 
 it must be established to its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to have known at 
the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identifi ed individual 
or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take measures 
within the scope of their powers which, judges reasonably, might have been expected to take 
that risk. 161 
 Th ere are various ways in which the ECtHR has established that the state has or could 
have knowledge of fundamental rights violations. Xenos has explained that knowledge 
can be established, inter alia, by the presence of reports on particular fundamental 
rights violations, by complaints which are lodged by individuals at the offi  ces of 
public authorities, and by repetition of certain incidents in the past. 162 In some cases 
it can be seen that the state has knowledge from specifi c circumstances where certain 
(vulnerable) individuals were involved. For example, if state authorities are aware of 
domestic violence that has taken place against a certain individual (in the past), it can 
be required to perform positive obligations to protect that individual in the future as 
well. In other cases, the ECtHR imposes positive obligations on the state on the basis of 
the knowledge which they could more generally be considered to have because of the 
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violations that take place in a particular area. 163 In its judgment in the case of  O ’ Keeff e 
v. Ireland , for example, the ECtHR decided that the state ought to have known about the 
risk of sexual abuse for children in public educational systems. 164 
 Th e element of knowledge is also especially relevant to determine whether the 
state can be held responsible for violations of Articles 2 and 8 ECHR in relation to 
certain dangerous industries or circumstances. In  Ö neryildiz v. Turkey , the ECtHR has 
explained that the positive obligation to take appropriate safeguards to protect the right 
to life applies  ‘ a fortiori … in the case of industrial activities, which by their very nature 
are dangerous, such as the operation of waste-collection sites ’. 165 Th e ECtHR concluded 
in this case that at diff erent levels the authorities knew or ought to have known that 
there was a real and immediate risk for the people living near the site of such industry, 
which implied that the state had a positive obligations to take preventive measures. 166 
Th e ECtHR derived this from the fact that there were administrative and municipal 
departments responsible for supervising and managing the specifi c industry, as well 
as specifi c regulations on the matter, and from the existence of reports which revealed 
the risks related to the specifi c industry. Th e Court ’ s more recent judgment in the case 
of  Cavit Tinarlioglu v. Turkey provides a helpful overview of the positive obligations 
that have been established by the ECtHR in similar circumstances. Th is judgment 
reveals that states can be held responsible for violations in relation to child abuse in 
school systems; for large numbers of stray dogs causing nuisance in city centres; and 
for the health risks posed by professional diving and by the release of asbestos into the 
environment. 167 
 Th e element of knowledge is thus important to establish when states can be held 
responsible for fundamental rights violations between private individuals. In some 
cases knowledge is generally accepted by the ECtHR, while in other cases there is much 
more specifi c material available for it. Th e existence of the element of knowledge is not 
explicitly discussed by the ECtHR in all cases; however, it is still oft en, as Xenos has 
explained, implicit in the judgments of the ECtHR on positive obligations. 168 
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 3.5.2.  DIRECT AND IMMEDIATE LINK/MINIMUM LEVEL OF 
SEVERITY 
 On several occasions, the ECtHR has decided that particular claims were inadmissible 
and did not fall within the scope of Convention rights, because there was no  direct 
and immediate link between the measure that was sought by the individual and the 
Convention right which was claimed. Th e ECtHR established this particular limit in 
its judgment in the case of  Botta v. Italy , which was about a physically disabled man 
who complained that he could not access the beach at a holiday resort in Italy due to 
his condition. 169 He asked for special facilities, such as access ramps, lavatories and 
washing rooms to be installed by the Italian authorities. Th e Court responded to those 
claims as follows: 
 the right to gain access to the beach and the sea at a place distant from his normal place or 
residence during his holidays, concerns interpersonal relations of such broad and indeterminate 
scope that there can be no conceivable direct link between the measures the State was urged 
to take in order to make good the omissions of the private bathing establishments and the 
applicant ’ s private life. 170 
 Although this was the fi rst time the ECtHR explained this general limit in a judgment, 
it held that the requirement of a direct and immediate link had already existed in its 
earlier case-law. It thereby referred to the cases of  Airey v. Ireland , and  X.  & Y. v. the 
Netherlands , which appeared to demonstrate the existence of a direct and immediate 
link. 171 In the case of  Airey v. Ireland , for example, it was clear that the required action 
by the state  – the granting of legal aid  – was immediately and directly relevant to secure 
the protection of the fundamental rights of Ms. Airey, who sought to apply for a divorce, 
but was not able to start the very costly court proceedings. 
 In the case of  Botta v. Italy , the Court also made mention of its earlier judgments in 
the cases of  L ó pez Ostra v. Spain , and  Guerra and others v. Italy . 172 In both rulings, the 
Court applied the principle of a minimum level of severity as a limitation to the scope 
of positive obligations. In these cases the Court was respectively asked to determine 
whether the right to private life (Article 8 ECHR) gave rise to active protection by states 
parties in order to protect the individuals from nuisance caused by environmental 
pollution and from a potentially dangerous situation as a result of the activities of a 
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chemical industry. 173 Th e Court held with regard to both cases that there must be a 
minimum level of severity for a claim to fall within the scope of Convention rights. 
Th e requirement of a minimum level of severity as such constitutes a requirement that 
was originally developed by the ECtHR to determine whether treatment constitutes 
ill-treatment within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR. 174 In the context of positive 
obligations, the requirement of a minimum level of severity has been developed by 
the ECtHR in order to narrow down the scope of protection for environmental claims 
on the basis of Article 8 ECHR, arguably so as to avoid a fl ood of claims in the area of 
environmental protection. 175 A minimum level of severity constitutes a high threshold 
for claims to fall within the scope of Article 8 ECHR. By using this requirement, the 
ECtHR in particular aims to make clear that not every instance of inconvenience in life 
gives rise to a well-founded claim of action under the Convention. 
 3.5.3.  NO IMPOSSIBLE OR DISPROPORTIONATE BURDENS 
 Th e ECtHR has also recognised that there is a limit to what states parties may be 
required to do under the Convention to actively protect an individual ’ s fundamental 
rights in terms of fi nances and organisation. In cases involving social and economic 
obligations, in particular, the Court has expressed that the particular measures which 
were claimed by the applicant could not impose an impossible or disproportionate 
burden on states parties. 176 Th e measures which are claimed by individuals under the 
Convention must be considered reasonable. Th erefore, the Court has held, for example 
in cases where an applicant sought medical care or housing and special living facilities, 
that it must not cause an impossible or disproportionate burden for states to protect an 
individual ’ s rights in those circumstances. 177 Th is limitation is also relevant in relation 
to positive obligations arising from the right to life and the prohibition of torture and 
other inhuman and degrading treatment under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. Th e ECtHR 
has established that states have duties to investigate killings and other crimes, such as 
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domestic violence. Th ose duties are limited, as the ECtHR explained in its judgment 
in the case of  Osman v. the United Kingdom , where the applicant alleged a failure on 
the part of the authorities to protect the right to life of her son and husband, who were 
respectively wounded and killed in the same incident. 178 Th e ECtHR considered that: 
 Bearing in mind the diffi  culties in policing societies, the unpredictability of human conduct 
and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, the scope 
of positive obligations must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an impossible or 
disproportionate burden on the authorities. Not every claimed risk to life, therefore, can entail 
for the authorities a Convention requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk 
from materialising. 179 
 Positive obligations must therefore not impose an impossible or disproportionate 
burden on states in cases that (directly) involve state agents, and also in cases that 
concern violations which are committed by private parties. 
 Th e ECtHR oft en looks at whether states have discharged their positive obligations 
under the Convention on the basis of the existence of a legal and administrative 
framework, and it stresses the importance of the actual implementation of such 
measures. 180 It does so rather than specifying which specifi c or practical measures 
would have to be taken by the state. It has taken this approach both in respect of 
Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, and in respect of Article 8 ECHR. 181 Th e requirement to have a 
regulatory framework in place is considered by Xenos to be of fundamental importance. 
According to Xenos, this even concerns the  ‘ core content of positive obligations arising 
under paragraph 1 of Convention rights ’. 182 
 3.6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Th e ECtHR has introduced positive obligations to ensure that Convention rights are 
eff ectively protected. Th e concept of positive obligations implies that an active approach 
must be undertaken by states parties to fulfi l the obligations of the Convention. Within 
the context of the Convention, the recognition of the concept of positive obligations has 
been considered both important and novel, especially because the Convention originally 
provided guarantees for the non-interference of states in the lives of individuals, which 
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 179  ECtHR 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94,  Osman v. the United Kingdom , para. 116. 
 180  See further Lavrysen (2016), pp. 103 – 109; and cf. ECtHR, 16 November 2011, no. 4143/02,  Moreno 
Gomez v. Spain , para. 61. 
 181  See e.g. ECtHR 17 January 2001, no. 32967/96,  Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy , para. 49; ECtHR 18 January 
2001, no. 27238/95,  Chapman v. the United Kingdom , para. 92; and ECtHR 16 July 2014, no. 37359/09, 
 H ä m ä l ä inen v. Finland , para. 63. 
 182  Xenos (2012), p. 107. 
Intersentia70
Th e Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU
clearly appears from the text of the Convention. According to the ECtHR, positive 
obligations are nonetheless inherent to the rights laid down in the Convention. 
 Th e ECtHR has adopted a broad approach to defi ning violations in terms of positive 
obligations, including situations where states have already taken certain positive 
acts. It can be diffi  cult therefore, to clearly distinguish between positive and negative 
obligations, taking into account that state interfere in an increasing number of areas. 
Positive obligations can (still) essentially be defi ned by contrasting them to negative 
obligations. Contrary to negative obligations, positive obligations (i) do not directly 
follow from the text of fundamental rights provisions; (ii) they relate to state omissions 
rather than state acts, and (iii) they have an alternative structure, leaving states diff erent 
choices to fulfi l these obligations. 
 Th e development of positive obligations in the case-law of the Court has resulted in 
the recognition of diff erent types of positive obligations. Th e Court itself has made a 
general distinction between substantive and procedural positive obligations. A further 
distinction is oft en made between vertical positive obligations, which relate to states ’ 
obligations in their relation with individuals; horizontal positive obligations, which 
relate to states ’ obligations in horizontal relations; and social positive obligations, 
which relate more broadly to the societal conditions in which fundamental rights 
violations may take place. Also of importance from an implementation perspective 
is the typology of measures that must be taken to fulfi l positive obligations, namely 
legislative, administrative and practical measures. Lastly, a critical typology has been 
developed which recognises the extent to which positive obligations are connected to 
the negative concept of freedom within fundamental rights. According to this typology 
positive obligations range from being closely related to the fundamental right to being 
completely self-standing. 
 By imposing positive obligations on states parties, the ECtHR has expanded 
the responsibility of states for violations of fundamental rights, as this goes beyond 
responsibility for interferences caused directly by its agents, and even includes 
responsibility for violations caused by private parties or breaches caused by the 
particular vulnerabilities of individuals. Th e Court has not set out clearly how and 
to exactly what extent obligations to prevent violations can be imposed on the states 
parties. Th e main rationale for the recognition of positive obligations seems to be that 
states have an obligation to ensure eff ective protection of the Convention rights. 
 Positive obligations are discovered by balancing individual and general interests. 
Th is approach aims to defi ne eff ective protection of an individual ’ s fundamental rights, 
rather than to determine at which point states ’ responsibility arises. On diff erent 
occasions, the ECtHR has set out certain limitations which further help to defi ne the 
scope of positive obligations more clearly, which include the existence of knowledge, the 
requirement of a direct and immediate link, and that no impossible or disproportionate 
burden may arise for the states parties. 
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 1  See Mowbray (2004), pp. 229 – 231. 
 2  See further Lawson (1995a); Lawson (1995b); Van Dijk (1998); Dr ö ge (2003); and Van Kempen (2008). 
See the dissenting opinion of Judge Terje Wold to ECtHR 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62 to 2126/64, 
 Belgian Linguistic case ; the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Matscher and the partly dissenting 
opinion of Judge Pinheiro Farinha, both to ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium ; and 
the dissenting opinions of Judge O ’ Donoghue and Judge Th  ó r Vilhj á lmsson, both to ECtHR 9 October 
1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. Ireland . 
 CHAPTER 4 
 A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
 4.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Th e concept of positive obligations has become a familiar concept in the case-law of 
the ECtHR. In its judgments the ECtHR reconfi rms and refi nes particular positive 
obligations which it has established in the past and also continues to develop new 
obligations. 1 Nevertheless, the concept of positive obligations and the Court ’ s case-law 
on positive obligations have remained controversial. Various points of criticism have 
been expressed by scholars, as well as by judges of the ECtHR. 2 Th is chapter discusses 
that there is a certain amount of controversy over the very idea of inferring positive 
obligations from fundamental rights (section 4.2.). Th e Convention in particular is 
considered to leave no room for the implication of such obligations. Further, there are 
some who are critical of the far-reaching eff ects that positive obligations impose on 
relations between individuals (section 4.3.). Others fi nd that the ECtHR, by determining 
the content of positive obligations, has entered the forbidden fi eld of political decision-
making, or that it has unduly created socio-economic obligations which had been 
deliberately excluded from the scope of the Convention by its draft ers (section 4.4.). 
Also, the supranational position of the ECtHR is considered to be problematic in that 
respect (section 4.5.). Th e positive obligations doctrine continues to be considered 
unpredictable and incoherent and it has been criticised for its lack of well-defi ned 
limits (section 4.6.). Lastly, the methodological choices which the ECtHR has made 
in the development and application of positive obligations have met with considerable 
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disapproval (section 4.7.). 3 Th ese critiques of the positive obligations doctrine need to 
be discussed, as they would need to be evaluated and taken into account if the ECJ were 
to incorporate and develop a doctrine of positive obligations on its own. Th is chapter 
also considers, throughout the diff erent sections, how such criticism can be dealt with. 
Th e main points of attention for developing a doctrine of positive obligations are 
brought together in the conclusions (section 4.8.). 
 4.2.  ARE POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS  INHERENT IN 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION ? 
 Th ere are three types of criticism which have been expressed with respect to the Court ’ s 
view that positive obligations are inherent to fundamental rights. Criticism has come 
from an originalist perspective, from a contemporary debate about the nature of 
fundamental rights, and out of concern regarding human rights infl ation. Th ese three 
points are consecutively discussed. 
 4.2.1.  CRITICISM BASED ON ORIGINALISM 
 Th e development of positive obligations by the ECtHR can be viewed critically from an 
 ‘ originalist ’ perspective. Originalism requires the law to be interpreted as it was originally 
written. 4 Th e Convention provisions are textually negatively phrased, and the declaration 
of intentions of the draft ers of the Convention are considered to disclose a limited scope 
for the Convention. 5 It could therefore be argued that, originally, the Convention did 
not provide room for positive obligations, and that the few existing explicit positive 
obligations must be regarded as exceptions. Of the (former) judges of the ECtHR, Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice is most renowned for taking an originalist view with regard to the 
interpretation of the Convention. He expressed his views when serving at the ECtHR in 
the 1970s, which is precisely the period in time when the Court started to develop its 
positive obligations doctrine that provision. 6 In his dissenting opinion to the judgment 
of the ECtHR in the case of  Marckx v. Belgium , Judge Fitzmaurice held that the Court had 
over-extended the scope of Article 8 ECHR by recognising a positive obligation under 
that provision. Th e object of the Convention was to provide protection for the individual 
 3  Such critiques have also been summarised by Klatt, see Klatt (2011), p. 694; and Klatt (2015), 
pp. 355 – 357. 
 4  Originalism perspectives have also been expressed in relation to the EU Charter, see Brittain (2015). 
 5  For an elaborate discussion of the draft ing of the Convention, see Bates (2010), pp. 51 – 75 and 
pp. 80 – 94. 
 6  Dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice to ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx 
v. Belgium ; and dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice to ECtHR 25 March 1978, 
no. 5856/72,  Tyrer v. the United Kingdom . 
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from  ‘ the whole gamut of fascist and communist inquisitorial practices ’ that was feared 
for in Europe since the two world wars. 7 Th e national regulation of family relationships 
had nothing to do with what the Convention was all about, and thus, according to Judge 
Fitzmaurice, the Court had illegitimately interpreted the Convention. It had been overly 
eager to produce a specifi c result, and had thereby abused its power in defi ning positive 
obligations in the case of  Marckx v. Belgium . 
 Within the ECtHR, Judge Fitzmaurice found little support for these restrictive 
views. Th e majority of the Court ’ s judges have, more generally, chosen to interpret 
the Convention as a living instead of a static instrument. 8 As a consequence, the 
Convention has been given a wider scope and interpretations have been chosen that 
clearly can go beyond a strictly textual and historical interpretation of the Convention. 9 
Th is has been viewed critically by scholars, although they also recognise that the text 
of the Convention was draft ed quite some time ago and does not necessarily refl ect 
the current fundamental rights standards of the states parties. Some of the positive 
obligations which have been recognised by the ECtHR have therefore been added to 
the Convention by the ECtHR, whereas other positive obligations have as such (always) 
been rather more implicit in the Convention itself. 10 
 Overall, it is important that when the ECtHR develops positive obligations in its 
case-law, that it has regard to the current fundamental rights standards of the states 
parties and/or that it explains that certain positive obligations fl ow more implicitly 
from the Convention provisions, so that it can ensure respect for the position of the 
states parties. 
 4.2.2.  CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ON THE NATURE OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 Th e idea that positive obligations are as such  inherent to fundamental rights remains 
contested. Some scholars argue that positive obligations are simply not part of the 
nature of fundamental rights, at least not when it comes to classic fundamental rights, 
that is, civil and political rights. 11 Th ey argue that such classic fundamental rights are 
intended to guarantee the protection of an individual ’ s freedom against intrusion and 
coercion by the state. 12 States are thus primarily required to abstain from taking action 
to realise fundamental rights protection. Finding a justifi cation for states ’ practices of 
taking active measures on the basis of fundamental rights would run counter to the core 
value of freedom which fundamental rights ultimately aim to protect. Th e development 
 7  Dissenting opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice to ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. 
Belgium , para. 7. 
 8  See section 2.6.2. 
 9  Bates (2010), p. 364. See further section 2.6. 
 10  Harris, O ’ Boyle, Bates  & Warbrick (2014), p. 9. 
 11  Klatt considers that this constitutes the  ‘ justifi cation problem ’ , see Klatt (2015), p. 955. 
 12  See generally Van Kempen (2008). 
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of positive obligations in relation to social, cultural and economic rights is, in this 
regard, approached diff erently. Th e realisation of those rights depends more obviously 
on active assistance by the state. Social, cultural and economic rights have even been 
characterised by some as second-generation rights. 13 Th e protection of such rights is 
considered less pressing than the protection of civil and political rights. 14 Th e Court 
has decided, nonetheless, to develop various social and economic positive obligations 
in relation to civil and political rights, and it does not draw a strict line between the two 
categories of rights. 15 
 Starting from a primarily negative concept of freedom, scholars such as Van 
Kempen are very critical of the Court ’ s development of positive obligations. 16 By 
accepting positive obligations, fundamental rights are, in a sense, used as a ground 
for legitimising states ’ practices of interfering in the lives of individuals. Van Kempen 
fi nds that the ECtHR does not pay due respect to the core value of freedom, that 
fundamental rights essentially seek to protect, and that it undermines the main 
rationale for guaranteeing an individual ’ s fundamental rights. 17 An autonomous type of 
positive obligation is therefore objectionable, because it is far removed from a negative 
concept of freedom. 18 Some types of positive obligations can, however, be legitimately 
imposed on states according to Van Kempen, which is the case if they are inextricably 
linked to the fulfi lment of the negative obligations of a state. Van Kempen fi nds that 
positive obligations can only be legitimately derived from fundamental rights if they are 
intended to guarantee the negative freedom of individuals. For example, if states detain 
prisoners, they have interfered with the right to liberty, even though such interferences 
may be justifi ed and legitimate. For the very reason of having breached the negative 
obligation not to interfere in the liberty of individuals, states must take certain positive 
action, that is, provide basic living conditions for prisoners on the basis of fundamental 
rights. Positive obligations are in this view closely connected to the states ’ negative 
obligations as well as to negative freedom. 19 Van Kempen accepts that many other 
types of positive action can be considered generally desirable and in the interest of 
the fundamental rights of an individual or a group of individuals, but such actions 
really stem from values and interests which are not codifi ed in a particular fundamental 
rights norm, and they therefore cannot be derived from the provision itself. 20 
 13  Th e term  ‘ second-generation rights ’ was introduced by Vasak, see Vasak (1977). 
 14  See e.g. Van Kempen (2008), p. 13. Cf. Fredman (2008), p. 66. 
 15  ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73,  Airey v. Ireland , para. 26. 
 16  See Van Kempen (2008). 
 17  Van Kempen ’ s ideas on the doctrine of positive obligations are developed particularly in relation to 
the sometimes far-reaching case-law of the ECtHR in the fi eld of criminal law. Especially in this area 
of law, maintaining a negative conception of freedom is of importance. 
 18  See section 3.3.2. 
 19  Van Kempen (2008), p. 14. 
 20  Van Kempen has suggested that therefore a diff erent assessment can be undertaken in this respect, 
see section 4.7.2. 
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 Evidently, the ECtHR has taken a diff erent perspective on the kind of obligations 
that states must inherently guarantee under the Convention. Th e Court agrees that 
Convention rights essentially give rise to obligations for states to refrain from interfering 
(negative obligations). 21 Th e Court has developed a broad range of positive obligations, 
and does not appear to be particularly concerned about whether such obligations are 
derived from a negative or a positive notion of freedom. It has accepted states ’ obligations 
to protect individuals from interferences by other individuals, and obligations to assist 
those individuals which have particular vulnerable characteristics. 22 Th e ECtHR thus 
demonstrates a much broader and less negative conception of freedom than is held by 
Van Kempen. Th e development of the Court ’ s concept of fundamental rights and positive 
obligations may have been inspired by the work of scholars such as Sen and Nussbaum. 23 
Th ese scholars have developed important ideas regarding the concept of freedom which 
fundamental rights seek to protect, which basically start from the perceived need to 
realise a situation where an individual is free (from obstacles) to choose the life he 
or she wants to live. Poverty, poor health or social inequalities must be considered to 
constrain the exercise of fundamental rights, just as much as hindrances or obstacles 
that are knowingly laid down by states. 24 Th is approach to freedom recognises that 
the protection of social, cultural and economic rights is as important as the protection 
of civil and political rights. Th e boundaries between those categories of rights cannot 
and should not be sharply drawn. Th ey accept that states undertake various social and 
welfare functions in contemporary societies and that states can play an important role 
in infl uencing the enjoyment of the fundamental rights of individuals. 25 States become 
more and more involved in regulating private life, and as a result the public/private 
divide has become blurred. Th e distinction between negative and positive obligations 
therefore simply cannot be easily drawn. 
 Th is more  ‘ positive ’ approach to fundamental rights and the concept of freedom 
arguably justifi es a wider interpretation given to the rights laid down in the 
Convention. It implies that fundamental rights can be treated as values that are to be 
taken into account by all acts of states, including the legislature, the executive and the 
administrative apparatus. 26 From this perspective it could be accepted that positive 
obligations inherently follow from the Convention. It could therefore be regarded 
as problematic that the ECtHR applies a separate fair balance test to determine the 
existence of positive obligations. By doing so, the ECtHR undermines its own viewpoint 
that positive obligations are  – just like negative obligations  – inherent to fundamental 
 21  See e.g. ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium , para. 31; ECtHR 11 January 2006, nos. 
52562/99 and 52620/99,  S ø rensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark , para. 57; and ECtHR 16 March 2000, 
no. 23144/93,  Ö zg ü r G ü ndem v. Turkey , para. 42. 
 22  See Xenos (2012), pp. 142 – 146; and Dr ö ge (2003), p. 179. 
 23  Sen (1999); and Nussbaum (2006). See further Dr ö ge (2003), pp. 187 – 223; Xenos (2012), pp. 19 – 20; 
and Fredman (2008), p. 1. 
 24  Cf. Fredman (2008), p. 11. 
 25  See Connelly (1986), pp. 574 – 575; Xenos (2012), p. 21; and Mowbray (2004), p. 5. 
 26  Cf. Xenos (2012), p. 72. 
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rights. 27 At the same time, the ECtHR thus recognises that positive obligations diff er 
from negative obligations and that diff erent principles need to be taken into account 
in their examination. Th e diff erent characteristics attributed to positive obligations, 
versus those of negative obligations can explain why the ECtHR applies a separate test 
for establishing positive obligations. 28 Th e ECtHR has also stated that there are certain 
limits which apply to the scope of positive obligations under the Convention. 29 
 Th ere is thus a theoretical debate on the foundations for the development of positive 
obligations. Some who very much adhere to a negative concept of freedom criticise 
the Court for its acceptance of positive obligations, or at least some types thereof. In 
contrast, others embrace a positive concept of freedom and would generally agree with 
the development of positive obligations in relation to the Convention. 30 To the extent 
that positive obligations are indeed far removed from guaranteeing the negative concept 
of freedom, it seems necessary for the ECtHR to take into account the detrimental 
impacts on the interests of other individuals in specifi c cases. In this regard it can be 
useful to take into consideration the particular typology which has been developed by 
Van Kempen, and specifi cally the autonomous or repressive type of positive obligation. 31 
 4.2.3.  THE CONCERN OVER HUMAN RIGHTS INFLATION 
 Apart from more theoretical disputes, there is perhaps a more practical risk that arises 
from accepting a broad conception of freedom and a similarly broad defi nition of 
positive obligations. Th e problem is that it makes it diffi  cult to determine the exact 
scope of fundamental rights. 32 To some extent, the ECtHR itself has intensifi ed this 
problem by holding on to a very wide conception of positive obligations, and by not 
(always) explaining its theory for the development of positive obligations under the 
Convention. 33 Th e ECtHR does not defi ne the scope of positive obligations very well 
in its judgments, nor does it always provide clear limitations to the scope of positive 
obligations. 34 States are made (potentially) responsible for fundamental rights 
violations in a wide array of circumstances, including violations caused by the (in)direct 
 27  Cf. Xenos (2012), p. 119; and Lavrysen (2016), p. 218. 
 28  See sections 3.2.3. and 3.2.6. Some scholars, however, do not consider that a diff erent test needs to be 
applied to positive and negative obligations, see in particular Lavrysen (2016), pp. 277 – 280. 
 29  See section 3.6. 
 30  Within the ECtHR, however, there remain diff erences of opinion with regard to the reach of positive 
obligations, see the dissenting opinion of Judges Zupan č i ć , Gyulumyan, Kalaydjieva, De Gaetano and 
Wojtyzek to ECtHR 28 January 2014, no. 35810/09,  O ’ Keeff e v. Ireland , paras 7 ff . 
 31  See section 3.4. Th is typology is also of interest as it could infl uence the extent to which the ECtHR 
may be required to specify and motivate how the recognition of particular types of positive obligations 
can be justifi ed under the Convention. 
 32  Lawson (1995a), pp. 563 – 564. 
 33  Cf. Xenos (2012), p. 205. 
 34  Xenos (2012), p. 4. 
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involvement of its state agents, and also for violations caused by other individuals, and 
for the particular vulnerabilities of individuals. 35 
 Th e problem of the so-called  ‘ human rights infl ation ’ may therefore arise, which 
means that claims for state action are increasingly being framed in terms of human 
rights, even if the relation of such claims to core fundamental rights issues is not always 
clear. 36 Human rights infl ation is considered problematic for a variety of reasons. 
Among other things, it can blur the scope of human rights and it may aff ect legal 
certainty for claimants seeking judicial protection. Th e ECtHR has therefore been 
urged to provide a clearer justifi cation for the recognition of positive obligations, for 
example by explaining to what extent the positive obligations under the Convention 
relate to the concept of negative obligations. 37 Th e ECtHR has also been urged to defi ne 
the scope of Convention rights more clearly. Th e ECtHR indeed seems to have paid 
greater attention to this point of criticism, which will be further addressed in several of 
the following sections. 
 4.3.  HORIZONTAL POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 Th e ECtHR has developed positive obligations in its case-law which aim to protect the 
fundamental rights of individuals in their relations with other individuals. Actually, 
many of the positive obligations that have been recognised by the Court appear to have a 
certain horizontal dimension. 38 Th is type of positive obligation renders states indirectly 
responsible for fundamental rights violations that are committed by private parties and 
creates, albeit indirectly, a horizontal eff ect of fundamental rights ( Drittwirkung ). 39 
Such eff ects have been considered problematic for various reasons. In the following 
subsections the limited personal scope of fundamental rights and the related problem 
of determining state responsibility for private acts are discussed. 
 4.3.1.  THE LIMITED PERSONAL SCOPE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 Fundamental rights are, in general, addressed to states and not to individuals. 40 For 
that reason, the ECtHR can hear claims brought by individuals against states but not 
 35  See further sections 3.3. and 3.4. 
 36  Cf. Sen (2010), p. 387. Sen argued that a solution for the fear of human rights infl ation can be found 
in providing a public discussion on human rights claims. Th is will attest which claims are genuinely 
about human rights and which are not. 
 37  See Gerards (2012a), pp. 173 – 202; Lavrysen (2013); and Van Kempen (2008), pp. 12 and 73. 
 38  See e.g. ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80,  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands , para. 27. See further Xenos 
(2012), pp. 3, 19 and 39; and section 3.3. 
 39  Th e horizontal scope of EU fundamental righs is specifi cally addressed in section 6.7.2. 
 40  Van Kempen (2008), pp. 12 – 73. 
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against other individuals. 41 Th e Convention does not allow, whether substantively or 
procedurally, for a direct horizontal eff ect of Convention rights. By having accepted 
obligations to protect individuals from interference by other individuals, the ECtHR 
has been criticised for circumventing the limited outlook of the Convention. Moreover, 
there is some fear that the primary vertical eff ect of the Convention rights may be 
diluted as a result of the recognition of these types of positive obligations, as discussed 
in the previous section. 42 By accepting obligations to protect other individuals, the very 
foundation for fundamental rights could be jeopardised, that is, the need to protect the 
freedom of individuals from the power of the state. 43 Th e most problematic sitation 
is where the fundamental rights of other individuals are  ‘ suppressed ’ by accepting 
positive obligations. Fundamental rights considerations may, for example, play a role in 
justifying the adoption of criminal investigation measures, the prosecution of suspects 
and the detainment of convicted criminals in order to prevent terrorism. 44 According 
to Van Kempen, such repressive types of positive obligations should be left  outside the 
scope of protection of fundamental rights guarantees. 45 
 To a certain extent, it must be acknowledged that one of the normal functions of 
states is to provide protection to individuals from harm caused by private parties, 
and to regulate the relations between private parties. 46 It is clear that states must act 
to protect individuals, for example, from interferences in their right to life (murder) 
and their right to property (theft ) which can be eff ected by private parties as well as 
states parties. It can be disputed whether such obligations arise from the protection of 
fundamental rights or whether they arise from the states ’ sovereign responsibility to 
protect individuals from interferences by other individuals. Th e fi rst scenario would 
mean that individuals could indeed claim and enforce a right to positive action by the 
state. Th is point then also essentially relates to the political nature of positive obligations 
which will be discussed elsewhere (see section 4.4.). Yet, it must be recognised by the 
ECtHR that it needs to take into account that the fundamental rights or interests of 
third parties can be aff ected by horizontal types of positive obligations. Th erefore, if 
it imposes such positive obligations on states, it needs to make sure that it does not 
 41  Article 34 ECHR. 
 42  See generally Fredman (2008), pp. 73 – 76. Cf. ECtHR 21 June 1988, no. 10126/82,  Plattform  “ Ä rtze f ü r 
das Leben ” v. Austria . 
 43  Van Kempen (2008), para. 80. 
 44  Here, the right to safety as part of the right to liberty under Article 5 ECHR plays a role. See further 
Van de Westelaken (2010), p. 149. See also the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Wildhaber joined by 
Judges Kovler and Mularoni, all to ECtHR 20 December 2004, no. 50385/99,  Maraktzis v. Greece . 
 45  In this regard, Van Kempen refers to the practice of the Supreme Court of the United States of 
America, which has specifi cally chosen to exclude duties to protect from the ambit of the protection 
that is off ered by its constitution, see e.g. U.S. Supreme Court 27 June 2005,  Castle Rock/Gonzales , 545 
 U.S. 189 (1989). Th e Supreme Court only recognises horizontal positive obligations if the individual 
who seeks protection fi nds itself in a state of dependency  vis- à -vis the state and it is obvious that the 
individual cannot protect itself in such a situation (such as prisoners). See U.S. Supreme Court 6 June 
1994,  Farmer/Brennan , 511  U.S. 825 (1994). 
 46  Cf. De Meyer (1973), p. 273; and Xenos (2012), pp. 29 and 47. 
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run into confl ict over the obligation of states to protect the fundamental rights of all 
individuals under the Convention. 47 
 4.3.2.  THE DETERMINATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
PRIVATE ACTS 
 A problematic aspect to accepting horizontal positive obligations concerns the 
diffi  culty of determining state responsibility for interferences caused by private parties. 
Many violations of fundamental rights may be unknown to states. Purely horizontal 
violations could take place in private households. In some cases, these type of violations 
also cannot be controlled by state agents for other reasons. In contemporary societies, 
states have lost some control in certain areas, for example, by mandating many public 
tasks to private parties. Companies formerly owned by the state have been privatised 
or have become players on the commercial markets. 48 Also certain private parties such 
as multinationals and other powerful companies, such as banks, wield immense power 
that, as has been argued, goes beyond the states ’ control. 49 
 Th e ECtHR holds, logically, that states parties are not relieved of the responsibility 
for guaranteeing fundamental rights protection in the execution of public tasks. 50 Th e 
question remains, however, to what extent states can be held responsible for all actions, 
or rather omissions, in a society in which the public/private divide is increasingly 
blurred. 51 
 Th e case-law of the ECtHR on state responsibility for private acts is still case-based. It 
is not clear for what kind of private interferences and for what reasons states must take 
positive measures to protect individuals from fundamental rights violations caused 
by other individuals. 52 Th e ECtHR, for example, attributed state responsibility for 
fundamental rights violations in the case of  Ö neryildiz v. Turkey where it established 
that the Turkish state had not taken adequate measures to prevent an explosion at a 
rubbish tip, as a consequence of which many lives were lost. 53 Also in the case of  Guerra 
and others v. Italy , the ECtHR held that the state failed to fulfi l its positive obligation 
to provide information to inhabitants who were living near a site where an industry 
that was potentially very dangerous was operating. 54 Th e particular circumstances of 
 47  See the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Wildhaber joined by Judges Kovler and Mularoni, all to 
ECtHR 20 December 2004, no. 50385/99,  Maraktzis v. Greece . 
 48  Fredman (2008), pp. 58 – 61. Cf. e.g. ECtHR 25 March 1993, no. 13134/87,  Costello-Roberts v. the 
United Kingdom . 
 49  Dr ö ge (2003), pp. 1 – 2. 
 50  See ECtHR 25 March 1993, no. 13134/87,  Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom , para. 27, where the 
Court held that  ‘ the State cannot absolve itself from responsibility by delegating its responsibilities to 
private bodies or individuals ’ . 
 51  See further Fredman (2008), pp. 40 – 58. 
 52  Van Kempen (2008), pp. 29 – 30. 
 53  ECtHR 30 November 2004, no. 48939/99,  Ö neryildiz v. Turkey , paras 92 – 94. 
 54  ECtHR 19 February 1998, no. 14967/89,  Guerra and others v. Italy , paras 58 – 60. 
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those cases may have arguably given rise to positive obligations for those states, but the 
judgments do not explain in a more general sense how the scope of state responsibility 
for horizontal fundamental rights violations must be determined in such cases. 
 Th e ECtHR has developed a few limitations to the scope of positive obligations, as 
discussed in  chapter 3 , such as that states must have knowledge of fundamental rights 
violations. 55 Th is helps to bring some clarity over the situations in which states can 
be held responsible for violations of fundamental rights in horizontal situations. Th e 
ECtHR is still developing its case-law on this issue, however. 
 Th e ECtHR has not made clear to what extent it is also relevant to establish a certain 
causal link between state acts and fundamental rights violations. It seems that active 
interference by states in a given area, by adopting regulations or by taking other types 
of measures, is a relevant factor that could be taken into account. For example, the 
case-law of the ECtHR shows that states incur positive obligations for the very fact of 
having issued licences to undertakings that carry out certain harmful activities. 56 In 
that respect the positive obligation follows more logically from the fact of the state itself 
having failed to fulfi l its negative obligation. According to the typology of Van Kempen, 
as discussed, it would then be less problematic to impose such a positive obligation on 
states. 57 Th ere are some examples to be found in the case-law of the ECtHR which reveal 
that the ECtHR indeed takes into account the fact that states have actively intervened 
in certain circumstances, for example by establishing legislation while failing to fully 
respect the situation of certain (vulnerable) individuals in the given circumstances. 58 
More generally, however, the case-law of the ECtHR on this issue is inconsistent. 59 It 
is therefore unclear to what extent the ECtHR also takes into account that a state has 
actively intervened in a certain area. 
 4.4.  THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS 
 While there is now general agreement that fundamental rights protection can give rise 
to (some types of) positive obligations there is still disagreement as to whether the 
judiciary in particular is competent to impose positive obligations on the state. 60 One 
of the strongest critiques against the development of positive obligations is that it is at 
odds with the principle of separation of powers. Of relevance in this context also is the 
supranational position of the ECtHR, which will be discussed later (see section 4.5.). 
 55  See sections 3.2.6. and 3.5. 
 56  Lavrysen (2016), p. 130. 
 57  See sections 3.3.2. and section 4.2.2. 
 58  See sections 3.2.4. See e.g. ECtHR 26 May 1994, no. 16969/90,  Keegan v. Ireland , para. 51. 
 59  See further Lavrysen (2016), pp. 246 – 251. 
 60  Fredman (2008), p. 92. 
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Th e discussion in the following sections thus focuses more generally on the arguments 
against the competence of the judiciary in general to determine positive obligations. 
 4.4.1.  LACK OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
 In principle, it is problematic for the judiciary to determine which actions must be 
undertaken by the state, considering that judges are, aft er all, not democratically 
elected nor politically accountable. 61 Th e judiciary does not have the same capacity 
as the legislature and administrative bodies to consider all of the interests involved 
for determining which actions must be undertaken by the state. Positive obligations 
can generally be fulfi lled by a range of possible actions and thus require political 
deliberation. Moreover, the fulfi lment of certain positive obligations can impose a high 
burden on states resources in terms of fi nances as well as organisation. 62 Such decisions 
imply political choices which are generally not entrusted to the judiciary. 
 From this perspective, it can be maintained that courts should take a restrained 
approach in defi ning positive obligations related to politically sensitive decisions, 
especially those decisions in the fi eld of social and economic policy with fi nancial 
implications. It should, at the least, leave states parties a wide margin of appreciation as 
far as the further realisation of those obligations is concerned. 63 
 Various judgments of the ECtHR on positive obligations have been criticised for this 
reason, especially where the ECtHR failed to provide clear reasoning for the choices it 
made in those judgments. 64 Van Kempen, in particular, is concerned over the practice 
of the ECtHR in which it indicates that states must undertake positive obligations in the 
area of criminal law. 65 Th e ECtHR does not always explain why criminal law measures 
in particular would be necessary to protect fundamental rights. Are there no other 
possibilities available to provide eff ective protection ? Could prevention not have been 
chosen over repression ? 66 Th ese choices, it can be argued, should instead be made only 
aft er deliberation in the political domain. 
 Van Kempen therefore suggests that the ECtHR should adopt a diff erent approach and 
refrain from specifying which positive (legislative) obligations should be undertaken by 
 61  Fredman (2008), pp. 32 ff .; and see ECtHR 21 February 1986, no. 8793/79,  James and others v. the 
United Kingdom , para. 46, where the Court held:  ‘ Th e Court, fi nding it natural that the margin of 
appreciation available to the legislature in implementing social and economic policies should be 
a wide one, will respect the legislature ’ s judgment as to what is  “ in the public interest ” unless that 
judgment be manifestly without reasonable foundation. ’ 
 62  Fredman (2008), pp. 69 ff . 
 63  Cf. Fredman (2008), pp. 95 – 96; and Nieuwenhuis (2011), pp. 191 – 195. 
 64  See Van Kempen (2008), p. 74. 
 65  See Van Kempen (2008), pp. 25 – 56 and 76; and Van de Westelaken (2010), pp. 135 – 152. 
 66  Van Kempen (2008), p. 78. See also the dissenting opinion of Judge Kj ø lbro to ECtHR 20 October 
2015, no. 15529/12,  Bal á zs v. Hungary , where it was held that the ECtHR had interfered too much in 
examining the choice over whether to criminally prosecute an individual involved. 
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the state. 67 Th e Court ’ s recourse to such broad legal bases as Articles 1 and 13 ECHR, 
and the object and purpose of the Convention to provide eff ective fundamental rights 
protection, does not provide suffi  ciently precise legitimation for the far-reaching eff ects 
of positive obligations under the Convention. 68 Th e ECtHR could instead adopt an 
approach in which it fi rst considers whether and/or which positive obligations are 
already recognised at the national level or in administrative structures. If such positive 
obligations can be recognised, the ECtHR can then examine whether the state fulfi ls 
such positive obligations without discriminating (on the basis of Article 14 ECHR 
and Article 1 of the Twelft h Protocol to the Convention). 69 States parties would then 
preserve the prerogative to determine whether and when to have recourse to particular 
methods  – such as criminal law measures  – in order to protect fundamental rights. 70 
 Th is approach thus respects the principle of state sovereignty and the responsibility 
to protect. Th e concerns over the democratic legitimacy of judicial review are generally 
(also in relation to negative obligations) an important aspect to be aware of. 71 In 
developing positive obligations in its case-law, the ECtHR has explained in some cases 
that it looks at the choices that have already been made at national level which could 
secure the protection of certain fundamental rights. For example, in the case of  X. and 
Y. v. the Netherlands, which was about a young and handicapped girl who was not able 
to lodge a complaint about sexual abuse that had taken place, the ECtHR held that: 
 this is in fact an area in which the Netherlands has generally opted for a system of protection 
based on the criminal law. Th e only gap so far, as the Commission and the Court have been 
made aware, is as regards persons in the situation of Miss Y; in such cases, this system meets a 
procedural obstacle which the Netherlands legislature had apparently not foreseen. 72 
 While the ECtHR had established in this case that a positive obligation to take measures 
in the fi eld of criminal law derived from the right to protect private life, the ECtHR also 
explained that there is a certain basis that can be found under national law for taking 
such measures. 
 Furthermore, in the case of  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands , the ECtHR explained 
that  ‘ Eff ective deterrence is indispensable in this area and it can be achieved only by 
criminal-law provisions ’. 73 Th e ECtHR thus clarifi ed its choice for specifi c types of 
measures that need to be taken by states, in this case criminal law, while its choice is 
 67  Van Kempen (2008), pp. 87 and 89 – 94. 
 68  Van Kempen (2008), pp. 68 – 69. 
 69  A similar approach seems to be taken as the  ‘ in for a penny  – in for a pound ’ approach that was 
discussed in section 2.4. 
 70  Th is approach is also visible, to some extent, in the case of  Ç am v. Turkey , where the ECtHR was 
required to examine whether the state had violated the prohibition of discrimination in relation to the 
right to education in a case of a blind girl who was refused entry to a music academy on the basis of 
her sight impairment. See ECtHR 23 February 2006, no. 51500/08,  Ç am v. Turkey , para. 56. 
 71  See in particular Waldron (2006). Cf. Klatt (2015). 
 72  ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80,  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands , para. 27. 
 73  ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80,  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands , para. 27. 
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also further justifi ed by the principle of eff ective protection of fundamental rights. 74 
Providing such more specifi c directions as to the types of measures which can be taken 
will ultimately help states as well as litigants to fi nd an appropriate way of securing 
eff ective fundamental rights protection. Th is approach is also visible in the practice of 
the ECtHR in which it indicates the general and individual measures that states must 
take to abide by its judgments under Article 46(1) ECHR. Th is provision only contains 
a very general obligation for states to comply with the judgments of the ECtHR. 75 
Th e ECtHR, on occasion, also clarifi es which particular individual as well as general 
measures need to be taken by the state in order to ensure that similar violations do not 
take place in the future. 76 
 In relation to its case-law of positive obligations, it would thus generally help if the 
ECtHR were to explain why it chooses specifi c types of measures, in view of the fact 
that courts are frequently not well-placed to take such decisions, and therefore need to 
provide clear justifi cations. 
 4.4.2.  EMPOWERMENT OF INDIVIDUALS 
 Th e ECtHR has accepted in its case-law that individuals are entitled to positive action 
by the state on the basis of its doctrine of positive obligations. Th e development of 
positive obligations by the ECtHR can be defended on the basis of the empowerment of 
individuals, as explained in chapter 3. 77 
 Th ere is some disagreement amongst scholars, however, as to whether the 
establishment of positive obligations by the judiciary can indeed be legitimated on the 
basis of this argument. Some argue that the interest of safeguarding the negative value of 
freedom is more important than empowerment, and this value would be overshadowed 
if it is also accepted that fundamental rights give rise to the need for positive action 
by states. In particular, this could be the case if the recognition of positive obligations 
would lead to interferences with the rights of other individuals. 78 Th e empowerment of 
individuals could be secured diff erently, namely through the accountability of politically 
elected parliament. Other scholars have instead proposed an intermediate approach. 
Th ey believe that in a democracy governed by majoritarian rule, there is a legitimate 
role to be played by the judiciary in developing positive obligations. Th e judiciary has 
 74  See in particular Leach (2006), p. 126. 
 75  Under general international law, this means that states are required to end the violation (obligation of 
cessation), restore the situation as far as possible as it existed before the violation took place ( restitutio 
in integrum ) or, if reparation is not possible, make available appropriate satisfaction, see in particular 
 Chorz ó w Factory (Germany v. Poland) (Indemnity) (Merits) , Permanent Court of International Justice, 
case PCIJ Rep Series A No 17, para. 47. See also Vande Lanotte  & Haeck (2005), p. 704; and Ress 
(2005), p. 371. 
 76  See section 2.7. 
 77  See section 3.4.2. 
 78  See section 3.4.2. 
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an important role to play in protecting the rights of vulnerable individuals who are not 
able to voice their own particular interests under majoritarian rule. Th e recognition of 
positive obligations in judgments relating to individuals could therefore be necessary, 
and the judiciary would need to pay respect to certain constitutionally relevant criteria 
when accepting claims for positive obligations. 79 
 Fredman, for example, argues that the judiciary can perform a corrective role in 
democratic societies when individuals cannot validate their fundamental rights claims 
through the electorate. 80 Judges then are competent to provide input in their judgments 
for a political discussion on the fulfi lment of positive obligations, as long as they do 
not claim the power to have the fi nal say as to which particular positive action must 
be taken. Fredman also fi nds that there are certain standards which must be met 
for the exercise of such power in the judicial process leading up to the defi nition of 
fundamental rights. 81 First, accountability is required, which demands that decision-
makers should justify openly before courts their choice of particular actions. Standards 
of participation must also be met, which means that courts have to provide a forum for 
deliberation on perspectives. Lastly, the principle of equality must be applied, which 
demands that courts must address inequalities in the democratic process. Fredman 
considers the judiciary as a competent institution that can provide an appropriate 
forum for addressing inequalities, especially because judgments on positive obligations 
frequently concern individuals or groups of individuals who are vulnerable and/or face 
social inequalities, such as detainees, disabled persons and asylum seekers, who do not 
have a (majority) voice in the democratic process. 82 
 Th e political character of positive obligations remains a critical factor in the 
development of such obligations by courts. Although it may be legitimated to contribute 
to the development of the fulfi lment of states positive obligations for reasons of 
empowerment of individuals, it must still abide by democratic standards. Criticism can 
be raised, and it is therefore important that the ECtHR pays due respect to these points 
of criticism and sees that the standards developed by Fredman are met. 
 4.5.  THE SUPRANATIONAL POSITION OF THE ECtHR 
 Several critics have stressed that there is further reason for restraint for the development 
of positive obligations by the ECtHR considering its supranational position. 83 Within 
the system of fundamental rights protection of the Council of Europe, the ECtHR must 
be careful to pay due respect to its subsidiary position. 84 Th e ECtHR can be considered 
to be at too great a distance from states to warrant far-reaching interventions in national 
 79  See Xenos (2012), pp. 48 – 49; and Klatt (2015). 
 80  Fredman (2008), pp. 100 ff . See also Xenos (2012); and Van Kempen (2008), pp. 85 – 86. 
 81  Fredman (2008), pp. 103 – 113. 
 82  See further Xenos (2012), chapter 3. 
 83  See Van Kempen (2008), p. 67. 
 84  See section 2.4. 
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law, and it may be insuffi  ciently informed of the facts of the case and of all the interests 
involved in order to be able to carry out a balanced assessment to determine positive 
obligations. 85 According to the critics, therefore, the ECtHR should instead choose 
to leave a margin of discretion to the national authorities to decide which particular 
positive obligations must be fulfi lled. 
 On various occasions the ECtHR has expressed that it is aware of its position and that, 
for that reason, it does not intend to substitute its own assessment on the fulfi lment of 
positive obligations over the balancing of interests which has already been made by the 
public authorities. Th e ECtHR has, for example, held that: 
 Th e balancing of individual interests that may well be contradictory is a diffi  cult matter, and 
Contracting States must have a broad margin of appreciation in this respect, since the national 
authorities are in principle better placed than the European Court to assess whether or not there 
is a  ‘ pressing social need ’ capable of justifying interference with one of the rights guaranteed by 
the Convention. 86 
 Some politically sensitive positive obligations may also lead to high burdens for states, 
both in terms of organisation and fi nance. Th e Court has expressed awareness of this 
consequence, for example, in the case of  Rees v. the United Kingdom , concerning the 
question whether the alteration of sexual identity must legally be recognised by national 
authorities: 
 Th e introduction of such a system [i.e. the alteration of gender in birth registers from a given date] 
has not hitherto been considered necessary in the United Kingdom. It would have important 
administrative consequences and would impose new duties on the rest of the population. 87 
 Because of the political sensitivity of the area in which claimants seek for particular 
actions by the state, the ECtHR has chosen on several occasions not to establish a 
positive obligation on the basis of the Convention at all. 88 Th e ECtHR has, for example, 
held that the Convention does not give rise to a general right to housing, free health 
care, or a clean environment. 89 Th e ECtHR also exercises much restraint regarding 
immigration law in view of the politically sensitive nature of that area. 90 
 85  See Van Kempen (2008), pp. 54 – 55. 
 86  ECtHR 29 April 1994, nos. 25088/94 to 28443/95,  Chassagnou and others v. France , para. 113. 
 87  ECtHR 17 October 1986, no. 9532/81,  Rees v. the United Kingdom , para. 42. 
 88  Cf. ECtHR 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/80 to 9474/81,  Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United 
Kingdom , para. 68, where the Court concluded:  ‘ Th e duty imposed by Article 8 cannot be considered 
as extending to a general obligation on the part of a Contracting State to respect the choice by married 
couples of the country of their matrimonial residence and to accept the non-national spouses for 
settlement in that country. ’ 
 89  See, respectively, ECtHR 18 January 2011, no. 272385/95,  Chapman v. the United Kingdom , para. 99; 
ECtHR 26 May 2011, no. 27617/04,  R. R. V. Poland , para. 198; and ECtHR 8 July 2003, no. 36022/97, 
 Hatton and others v. the United Kingdom , para. 96. 
 90  ECtHR 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/80 to 9474/81,  Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United 
Kingdom , para. 67. 
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 Th e ECtHR thus expresses awareness of the potential implications which the defi nition 
of a positive obligation in an individual ’ s case can have for the particular state party, as 
well as for all of the states parties, arguably, due to its subsidiary position. At the same 
time, this exercise of restraint is in itself criticised. It is sometimes argued that such a 
deferential approach is at odds with the objective of realising the eff ective protection of 
fundamental rights. 91 It has been argued that the ECtHR should adopt a less deferential 
approach as regards fundamental rights violations for which the legislatures and 
judiciaries at national level cannot provide solutions. Th is would mainly apply to those 
issues which all European states deal with in isolation, but to which they do not seem 
to provide appropriate responses, such as the migration, international trade, cross-
border movement of workers and environmental issues. Th ese clearly cross-border 
issues require a concerted response at the regional or international level, and it appears 
especially diffi  cult to conclude agreements between states in the short term, as the 
competences to deal with those issues remain, to a certain degree, at national level. 92 
 Th ere are therefore some diff erent expectations on the role which the ECtHR must 
fulfi l in the development of positive obligations under the Convention. 93 Th e ECtHR 
struggles with this, which it also does in respect of its case-law on negative obligations. 
One particular way of dealing with this criticism seems to be that the ECtHR 
increasingly pays attention to the national procedural framework to ensure an eff ective 
way of reviewing the compliance of states parties with the Convention, while respecting 
its subsidiary position, as further discussed in chapter 2. 94 
 4.6.  LEGAL UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE SCOPE OF 
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 Th e scope of positive obligations can be quite open-ended. 95 Th e ECtHR has declined 
to develop a general theory on how the concept of positive obligations must be defi ned 
within the Convention. Th is is problematic because it frustrates the ability of states 
 91  See Xenos (2012), p. 5. According to Xenos,  ‘ European judges are renowned for their low profi le and 
cautiousness with states ’ sensitivities about the ever-decreasing national sovereignty that unavoidably 
results from the interaction of national legal systems with European human rights law. It is to their 
credit that they have always manage to sense carefully the international climate and the changing 
social dynamics in various corners of Europe before moving to modify steadily an progressively the 
intensity of their review on the state ’ s legal system. Th ere are numerous statements of the Court on 
the state ’ s margin of appreciation and on the optional choice of the national incorporation of the 
Convention, but, in reality, what is observed is a considerable expansion of positive obligations and 
numerous rulings against the states that we present and discuss in the following chapters. ’ 
 92  See Xenos (2012), p. 48. 
 93  See further Xenos (2012), pp. 51 – 53. 
 94  See section 2.4. Interestingly, the ECtHR formulates positive procedural obligations in this context, 
which can itself be criticised. See e.g. ECtHR 27 September 1995, no. 18984/91,  McCann and others v. 
the United Kingdom , para. 153; and cf. Van de Westelaken (2010), pp. 147 – 148. 
 95  See sections 3.2.6. and 3.5.; and cf. Xenos (2012), p. 4. 
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to foresee the obligations they will incur under the Convention, and for individuals 
to foresee which claims will be covered by the Convention. 96 With the lack of clearly 
defi ned limits to the scope of positive obligations, the possibilities for positive 
obligations to arise under the Convention may seem endless. 97 
 Although the lack of specifi city and predictability is problematic, it is diffi  cult to 
blame the ECtHR for this. Fundamental rights generally provide only a very general 
framework, and the course of states ’ actions to protect such rights cannot directly be 
derived from the provisions in which fundamental rights have been laid down. Oft en, 
positive obligations are defi ned by the ECtHR on the basis of the specifi c circumstances 
of a case, which can be very hard for states to foresee. For example, the ECtHR accepted 
in the case of  Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania that the state was under a 
positive obligation to take measures in response to the large number of stray dogs, 
because it needs to protect public health and prevent threats to the physical integrity of 
the population. 98 
 Th e ECtHR can only determine in a very general and broad manner which positive 
obligations arise from the Convention, since it must leave the details and the manner 
of protection to be resolved through political debate. 99 Due to the political nature of 
positive obligations and the supranational position of the ECtHR, it is unavoidable 
that positive obligations can only be developed on a rather broad and vague basis. Th e 
ECtHR has, for example, held that states have a positive obligation under Article 8 ECHR 
 ‘ to facilitate the gypsy way of life ’ in the case of  Chapman v. the United Kingdom . 100 
Th is positive obligation cannot directly create clear enforceable rights for individuals. 
Rather, it creates an indeterminate and open-ended positive obligation for states which 
should be fi lled in by the national authorities which will choose particular policies. 101 
Th is is problematic as states will not be sure of what such an obligation actually entails 
and individuals may not be sure what they are entitled to and whether they will be able 
to start judicial proceedings to enforce compliance with such vague positive obligations. 
 On some occasions, the Court has been clear about which measures states must 
take to fulfi l their positive obligations, for example, by clarifying that states needed to 
amend their criminal law provisions. 102 Inevitably, this raises objections from the point 
of the view of the separation of powers, in particular if it means that the Court delivers 
 ‘ political ’ judgments. On other occasions, the Court has introduced specifi c limits to 
the scope of positive obligations, as set out in chapter 3. 103 Such limitations contribute 
at least somewhat to the task of defi ning the scope of positive obligations under the 
Convention more clearly. 
 96  Cf. Xenos (2012), pp. 4 – 5, pp. 78 and 205. 
 97  Cf. Xenos (2012), p. 91. 
 98  ECtHR 26 July 2011, no. 9718/03,  Georgel and Georgeta Stoicescu v. Romania . 
 99  See sections 4.4. and 4.5. 
 100  ECtHR 18 January 2001, no. 27238/95,  Chapman v. the United Kingdom , para. 96. 
 101  Van Kempen (2008), pp. 28 and 38 – 40. 
 102  See e.g. ECtHR 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80,  X. and Y. v. the Netherlands . 
 103  See section 3.5. 
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 Th e lack of certainty over the scope of positive obligations has led to proposals, 
put forward by diff erent scholars, for the Court to provide a better understanding 
of the concept of positive obligations, to establish better-defi ned limits in individual 
judgments, and to improve the structure of its argumentation (see section 4.7.2.). 104 
Considering the continuous development of positive obligations by the Court and 
their impact on national legislation of states parties, such strategies can generally 
be welcomed, especially since the Court has expressed its intention not to develop a 
theoretical framework regarding its doctrine of positive obligations and the possible 
methods for their implementation. At the same time, they can never fully remedy the 
unpredictability of the case-law of the Court. 
 4.7.  AMBIGUOUS METHODS OF THE ECTHR FOR 
DETERMINING THE EXISTENCE OF POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS 
 4.7.1. CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE FAIR BALANCE TEST 
 Th e Court ’ s approach to determining the existence and fulfi lment of states ’ positive 
obligations has been criticised for its technical fl aws. It has already been mentioned 
that the fair balance approach of the ECtHR lacks clarity and fairness and the use of the 
margin of appreciation doctrine may be incorrect. Also, the usefulness of distinguishing 
between negative and positive obligations and of applying a diff erent approach to 
determine the respective obligations under the Convention has been questioned. 
Th ese three diff erent points of criticism will be discussed, before some suggestions for 
improving the Court ’ s technical approach will be briefl y addressed. 
 4.7.1.1.  Lack of Clarity, Structure and Fairness 
 Th e application of the fair balance test to determine positive obligations has been held 
to lack clarity, because the criteria which are used by the ECtHR are not fi xed and the 
ECtHR does not base its judgments on a uniform approach. 105 Th e ECtHR does not 
consistently examine, with respect to the fulfi lment of positive obligations by states, 
whether a state has a legitimate reason for seeking to escape its positive obligation 
to protect fundamental rights and whether this can be necessary in a democratic 
society. 106 Various judgments of the ECtHR further demonstrate that it does not always 
 104  See Lavrysen (2013); Xenos (2012); and Russell (2010). 
 105  Xenos (2012), p. 61; and Lawson (1995b), p. 728. 
 106  Van Dijk (1998), pp. 25 – 26. See e.g. ECtHR 18 January 2001, no. 24882/94,  Beard v. the United 
Kingdom , para. 107. 
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fully perform a balancing exercise, that it concentrates only on specifi c interests 107 and 
that it simply assumes that particular positive obligations exist. 108 It is simply not clear 
how exactly the test is carried out. 
 Secondly, the fair balance test also has been said to lack structure. Th e test implies 
a merging of two stages, which are generally to be examined separately. 109 Th e ECtHR 
usually merges the questions of what constitutes an interference with a particular 
Convention right, and whether or not this interference can be objectively justifi ed 
by the state, when it determines states ’ positive obligations. Th e precise scope of the 
positive obligations under the Convention is not frequently addressed by the ECtHR 
as a separate issue. Th e Court ’ s judgments generally also do not make clear why and 
when particular claims to positive action will fall within the scope of the Convention. 
Th e Court ’ s approach can cause confusion as to the distribution of the burden of proof 
between the claimant and the state. 110 Th e lack of clarity and structure of the Court ’ s 
approach clearly increases the unpredictability and uncertainty over what positive 
obligations exist under the Convention. 111 
 Th e third problematic aspect of the fair balance test is that it is considered to off er a 
lower level of protection of fundamental rights as compared to the test used to determine 
the fulfi lment of a state ’ s negative obligations  – the assessment of which is regarded by 
some scholars as being much more structured. 112 In the fair balance test, the criteria 
are applied loosely instead of strictly. 113 It has been argued that the ECtHR applies 
the  various proportionality criteria less stringently in case of positive obligations. 114 
Th e lower level of protection is also a result of the Court ’ s merging approach, where the 
ECtHR (incorrectly) applies the criteria for justifying restrictions of fundamental rights 
to determine the scope of states ’ positive obligations, and thus individuals ’ entitlements 
to positive action. Th is is because the ECtHR pays less attention to defi ning what rights 
individuals actually have, and more attention to whether or not it is reasonable to 
impose requirements on states to take certain active measures. 
 Overall, there thus seems to be a less strict and a rather confused approach to 
determine the fulfi lment of states ’ positive obligations, which could aff ect the level of 
protection of an individual ’ s fundamental rights. 115 
 107  See e.g. ECtHR 8 July 2003, no. 36022/97,  Hatton and others v. the United Kingdom . It has been argued 
that the Court overtly focused on economic arguments in the balancing act in this judgment, see 
Xenos (2012), p. 65. Cf. Tulkens  & Drooghenbroeck (2002). 
 108  Van Dijk (1998), p. 24. 
 109  See generally Gerards  & Senden (2009). 
 110  Gerards (2011b), p. 253. 
 111  Xenos (2012), pp. 91 – 97. 
 112  See Lawson (1995b), pp. 731 and 821. 
 113  See Lawson (1995b), p. 728. 
 114  See in particular Lavrysen (2016), pp. 209 – 218. 
 115  Cf. Van de Westelaken (2010), p. 150. 
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 4.7.1.2.  Th e Incorrect Use of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine 
 In examining whether a state has complied with its positive obligations, the ECtHR 
usually has recourse to the margin of appreciation doctrine. 116 In particular, the ECtHR 
does so in cases concerned with the protection of Articles 8 to 11 ECHR. 117 Some 
scholars believe that a wide margin of appreciation must be aff orded to states generally 
when they impose positive obligations. 118 Th ey reason that initially, when states ratifi ed 
the Convention, they had not given their consent to such obligations, which may 
entail fi nancial or organisational burdens on states. 119 For these reasons, states should 
be allowed discretion in determining how they fulfi l positive obligations under the 
Convention. According to other scholars, however, the margin of appreciation should 
not be applied diff erently to positive obligations and to negative obligations, and, in 
fact, it is generally to be just as wide or narrow for both types of obligations. 120 Also, 
it is only in cases on positive obligations that the ECtHR uses the argument that no 
impossible or disproportionate burdens can be placed on states. 121 By not expressing a 
similar limitation in cases on negative obligation, it could seem that a wider margin is 
too easily granted to states in cases on positive obligations. 
 Th e ECtHR has explained that the  ‘ applicable principles ’ to the determination of 
states ’ positive and negative obligations are largely similar. Th is would imply that the 
ECtHR does not aff ord a diff erent margin of appreciation to states in cases concerning 
positive obligations. Recent research, conducted by Lavrysen, suggests that, in practice, 
the ECtHR does adopt a lower intensity in its review of states compliance with their 
positive obligation under the Convention, particularly so in relation to violations of 
Articles 8 to 11 ECHR. 122 It is, however, diffi  cult to discover whether the ECtHR really 
aff ords a wider margin of appreciation in cases of positive obligations than in negative 
obligations. Oft en, such cases can be about matters of socio-economic interests for the 
state or about matters for which there may not yet be suffi  cient consensus between 
states. Th ese factors can infl uence whether the ECtHR will decide to grant a wide 
margin of discretion to the states parties. If the ECtHR indeed aff ords a diff erent margin 
to the states in cases concerning positive obligations, it is important to fi nd out how 
 116  See sections 2.6.3. and 3.2.6. Th e Court seldom holds in general that a wide margin of appreciation 
applies to positive obligations, except for ECtHR 3 February 2009, no. 31276/05,  Women on Waves 
v. Portugal , para. 40, where it held:  ‘ s ’ il est vrai que, dans les deux hypotheses  – obligations positives 
et negatives  – l ’ É tat jouit d ’ une certain marge d ’ appr é ciation … , la Cour estime que cette marge 
d ’ appreciation est plus  é troite s ’ aggisant des obligations negatives d é coulant de la Convention. ’ 
 117  Lavrysen (2016), p. 206. Lavrysen argues that the ECtHR applies a proportionality test which is less 
intense in cases on positive obligations cases than it is in cases on negative obligations, see on this 
point Lavrysen (2016), pp. 209 – 218. 
 118  See e.g. Van Dijk (1998), p. 22. 
 119  Campbell (2006), p. 411; and Van Dijk (1998), p. 22. 
 120  See Gerards (2011b), p. 256; and Lawson (1995b), p. 749. 
 121  Lavrysen (2016), p. 211. 
 122  Lavrysen (2016), p. 214. 
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the ECtHR exactly makes the distinction between positive and negative obligations, as 
discussed in the next subsection. 
 Another point of controversy is whether the ECtHR makes correct use of the margin 
of appreciation doctrine with regard to positive obligations because it merges the two 
stages which normally, in relation to negative obligations, are separated. A margin of 
appreciation should be off ered to states only when determining whether restrictions 
of fundamental rights can be objectively justifi ed, thus in the second stage of the 
review. Since the two stages are merged by the Court when determining the existence 
of positive obligations, the margin of appreciation for states aff ects both the scope of 
Convention rights and the justifi cation of a restriction of Convention rights. 123 Th is is 
considered problematic, since all states parties should give the same meaning to the 
scope of Convention rights. 124 According to some critics, the margin of appreciation 
doctrine was therefore wrongly applied by the Court in various judgments, as it led to 
incorrect determination of the scope of Convention rights. 125 One widely cited example 
of an incorrect use of the margin of appreciation doctrine is the case of  Abdulaziz, 
Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom , where the ECtHR explained that states 
have a wide margin of appreciation in the area of migration law and with regard to their 
obligations under Article 8 ECHR. 126 
 4.7.1.3.  Confused Approaches to Positive and Negative Obligations 127 
 Th e ECtHR ’ s distinction between positive and negative obligations has not always 
been very logical. It has not appeared easy to distinguish between the two, since the 
obligations may seem very much alike. 128 Th e Court has, for example, considered that 
the refusal by public authorities to grant residence permits was a failure to fulfi l the 
negative obligation to respect the right to private and family life, but also a failure to 
 123  Xenos (2012), p. 64. Xenos fi nds that:  ‘ At times, there is confusion with the term  “ margin ” when 
it is used to describe a  “ choice ” of measures to guarantee the active protection of human rights 
under paragraph 1, as opposed to examining the necessity/proportionality of the interference under 
paragraph 2 to which the principle of margin of appreciation is connected. ’ 
 124  Gerards  & Senden (2009), p. 635. 
 125  See e.g. ECtHR 26 May 1994, no. 16969/90,  Keegan v. Ireland , para. 49; ECtHR 17 October 1986, no. 
9532/81,  Rees v. the United Kingdom , para. 37; and ECtHR 8 July 2003, no. 36022/97,  Hatton and others 
v. the United Kingdom , paras 99 – 100. See further Xenos (2012), pp. 93 – 95. 
 126  ECtHR 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/80 to 9474/81,  Abdulaziz, Balkandali and Cabales v. the United 
Kingdom , para. 67. See dissenting opinion of judge Bernhardt to ECtHR 28 May 1985, nos. 9214/80 
to 9474/81,  Abdulaziz, Balkandali and Cabales v. the United Kingdom ; and Van Dijk (1998), p. 25. Cf. 
further the dissenting opinion of judge Martens to ECtHR 27 September 1990,  Cossey v. the United 
Kingdom , no. 10843/84; and cf. Xenos (2012), pp. 93 – 95. 
 127  See Connelly (1986), pp. 570 – 575. Connelly distinguishes between a negative and positive obligations 
approach with regard to the Court ’ s interpretation of Article 8 ECHR. 
 128  Cf. the dissenting opinion of judge Wildhaber to ECtHR 25 November 1994, no. 18131/91,  Stjerna v. 
Finland ; and the dissenting opinion of Judge Martens to ECtHR 19 February 1996, no. 23218/94,  G ü l 
v. Switzerland . See further section 3.2.3. 
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fulfi l the positive obligation to protect this right. Th e Court has further blurred its 
approach with regard to the examination of requests for legal recognition of name and 
sex changes in offi  cial registers in light of Article 8 ECHR. 129 In such cases, it is hard 
to explain why one or the other approach is applied by the ECtHR to examine states ’ 
infringements of fundamental rights. 130 Lavrysen has demonstrated that the ECtHR 
oft en looks at the  ‘ existing status quo ’ in a state ’ s legal and administrative framework to 
examine a case in terms of positive obligations or in terms of negative obligations. 131 
Th is means that, for example, in the case of  Marckx v. Belgium the ECtHR looked at 
whether states needed to take any kind of action on the basis of the legal framework 
that was already in place. 132 Positive acts had already been taken by the state to protect 
the family rights of children, but a certain gap had been left  with regard to children 
born out of wedlock. As has been discussed before, it would then also appear possible 
to examine the case in terms of negative obligations. 133 States may oft en already have 
taken certain positive acts in an area where the omission to protect fundamental rights 
has taken place. Th ere may be a combination of factors, including state actions or 
omissions, which create fundamental rights violations. Th en, it cannot always be clearly 
determined whether a state has directly interfered with a fundamental right  – which 
would most logically impose a negative obligation on the state  – or whether it has failed 
to provide protection of fundamental rights  – which would most logically impose a 
positive obligation. 
 It has sometimes been argued that the ECtHR does not need to distinguish between 
positive and negative obligations, especially if it holds that both types of obligations are 
inherent to the Convention. Th e criteria to be used for examining negative interferences 
can be used to examine the existence of positive obligations too, as explained in the 
following section. 134 Th e Court itself has also recognised at several occasions that the 
approaches are very similar. 135 It is therefore oft en recommended  – in the interest 
of predictability, legal certainty and fairness  – that the approaches for negative and 
positive obligations should be aligned. Some obligations for states parties could also 
be presented by the ECtHR as negative obligations, which has some (minor) positive 
implications. 136 
 129  Cf. the examples provided by Lawson (1995b), pp. 732 – 734. 
 130  Xenos (2012), pp. 69 ff .; and Lawson (1995b), pp. 734 – 737 and 742 – 747. 
 131  See Lavrysen (2016), pp. 251 ff . 
 132  ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. Belgium . 
 133  See section 3.2.3. Diff erent scholars have argued that the ECtHR did not necessarily have to review the 
violation in terms of a positive obligation, see Lawson (1995b), p. 563; Van Dijk (1998), pp. 18 – 19; and 
Xenos (2012), p. 69. 
 134  See e.g. Van Dijk (1998), p. 23; Lavrysen (2013) and Lavrysen (2016). 
 135  ECtHR 26 May 1994, no. 16969/90,  Keegan v. Ireland , para. 49. 
 136  See Van Kempen (2008). Van Kempen develops a typology of positive obligations on the basis of the 
relation between positive obligations and negative obligations. Cf. Van Dijk (1998), pp. 24 – 25. Van 
Dijk argues that the term  ‘ positive obligation ’ must only be used if there is a gap in the law or practices 
of states. Xenos also fi nds that the ECtHR should apply a more narrow defi nition of the term positive 
obligations in its case-law, see Xenos (2012), p. 78. 
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 Th e ECtHR, however, has decided to make a distinction in its case-law between the 
positive and negative obligations which follow from the Convention. Th e ECtHR has 
stressed in some recent cases that it was necessary to examine the specifi c case in terms 
of a positive obligation, and not in terms of a negative obligation. In other cases, the 
ECtHR has instead stressed that it would examine those from the viewpoint of negative 
obligations, such as in cases on immigration and the protection of family rights. 137 It is 
still diffi  cult to fi nd out why the ECtHR makes the distinction in such cases, because it 
does not provide clear explanations for its choices. 138 
 It is not in all areas that the ECtHR clearly expresses when a positive obligation instead 
of a negative obligation arises for states. In its case-law on the protection of Article 8 
ECHR, states can incur legislative obligations, because they need to justify the restrictions 
of the right to private and family life on the basis of legal provisions. 139 However, the 
ECtHR does not use the term positive obligations when it imposes such legislative 
obligations. When examining violations of Article 2 ECHR, the ECtHR expressly looks 
into the  ‘ positive ’ obligation for states to have an adequate legal framework in place. 140 
In both situations, however, the content of the obligation is very similar. 
 While it may not as such be necessary for the ECtHR to always clearly express 
whether it fi nds that certain circumstances give rise to a negative or a positive obligation 
for states, it is important that the conceptual diff erences between the two types of 
obligations are taken into account. As discussed in  chapter 3 , the diff erence is, fi rst, that 
positive obligations do not follow (textually) from fundamental rights, but they have 
to be implied by the ECtHR in its judgments. Secondly, positive obligations essentially 
still require certain actions to be taken by the state on the basis of fundamental rights 
provisions, and this is not the case for negative obligations. Th irdly, positive obligations 
have an alternative structure rather than a conjunctive structure, which means that 
states must generally be left  discretion on how to fulfi l those obligations under the 
Convention. 141 
 137  Cf., on the one hand, the positive obligation approach in ECtHR 3 October 2014, no. 12738/10, 
 Jeunesse v. the Netherlands , para. 105; and ECtHR 16 July 2014, no. 37359/09,  H ä m ä l ä inen v. Finland , 
para. 63; and, on the other hand, the negative obligation approach in ECtHR 18 January 2001, no. 
27238/95,  Chapman v. the United Kingdom , para. 99; and ECtHR 26 April 2016, no. 62649/10,  İ zzetin 
Do ğ an and others v. Turkey , paras 96 – 97. Especially in relation to immigration cases and the right to 
respect for family life, De Vries has explained that  ‘ the ECtHR still appears to be searching for the 
right way to qualify and examine the claims of aliens seeking admission for the purpose of family 
reunifi cation. Th is seems to result from unwillingness on the part of the Court to recognise a right to 
family reunifi cation as part of the right to family life, while at the same time not wanting to entirely 
exclude the possibility that a claim for family reunifi cation could come within the scope of the 
Convention. ’ See De Vries (2011), p. 82. 
 138  See Xenos (2012), p. 69. For an explanation of this diff erence, see De Vries (2011), pp. 79 – 81. 
 139  Lavrysen (2016), p. 93. 
 140  ECtHR 24 March 2011, no. 23458/02,  Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy , para. 209. 
 141  Lavrysen, however, argues that there is no good reason to diff erentiate between negative and positive 
obligations on the basis of the argument that positive obligations would impose higher burdens on 
states ’ resources than in negative obligations cases, and this does not justify the broader margin which 
is granted to states for that reason, see Lavrysen (2016), pp. 208 – 209. 
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 Th e ECtHR may want to demonstrate that it is aware of the implications which such 
positive obligations in its case-law have for states as well as for individuals, rather than 
take for granted that states can be held accountable for all types of fundamental rights 
violations, and individuals can claim their fundamental rights in all types of (private) 
situations. 
 It also seems especially relevant for the ECtHR to hold onto the distinction between 
positive and negative obligations in cases concerning the protection of the right to life 
and the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. Th ese are absolute rights 
which do not allow for any restrictions to be made in case of negative obligations. Th is 
does not hold for the positive obligations that can be developed on the basis of these 
provisions, such as the positive obligations requiring states to undertake investigations 
into suspicious deaths and into complaints about inhuman or degrading treatment. 142 
 4.7.2.  PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE STRUCTURE OF 
THE COURT ’ S APPROACH 
 Taking into account that the principles for examining negative obligations under the 
Convention can also be applied to positive obligations, several scholars have urged 
the Court to pay better attention to the structure of fundamental rights and no longer 
merge the fi rst and the second stage. 143 By doing so, the Court would meet with 
the points of criticism which have been discussed above, such as the lack of clarity, 
certainty and fairness, and it would also conform to the view that positive obligations 
are inherent to fundamental rights. Th is would require the ECtHR to undertake two 
separate examinations. First, it needs to defi ne the  scope of the right ( ‘ defi nitional stage ’ ) 
and, second, it needs to determine the legitimacy of the  justifi cation for restrictions 
of the right ( ‘ justifi cation stage ’ ) and take into consideration a state ’ s margin of 
appreciation. 144 Th is two-stage examination is made obvious by the text of Articles 8 to 
11 ECHR, which expressly allows for restrictions under several conditions. However, 
non-derogable rights, such as those of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, do not expressly allow 
for restrictions to be made. When it concerns positive obligations in relation to these 
provisions, the ECtHR does accept restrictions. 145 Th e division of the examination into 
two stages would make it clear in which cases the ECtHR will accept jurisdiction and 
what obligations result for states. Also, by reviewing the justifi cation of the restriction, 
 142  ECtHR 30 November 2004, no. 48939/99,  Ö neryildiz v. Turkey , para. 96. 
 143  See generally Lavrysen (2013); and see Klatt (2011), pp. 691 – 718; and Gerards  & Senden (2009), 
pp. 619 – 653. Cf. the dissenting opinion of judge Wildhaber to ECtHR 25 November 1994, no. 18131/91, 
 Stjerna v. Finland ; the dissenting opinion of Judge Martens to ECtHR 19 February 1996, no. 23218/94, 
 G ü l v. Switzerland . 
 144  See Gerards  & Senden (2009), pp. 620, and 634 – 636. 
 145  ECtHR 30 November 2004, no. 48939/99,  Ö neryildiz v. Turkey , para. 96. 
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the ECtHR could further clarify that arguments to justify restrictions that need to be 
put forward in cases on positive obligations. 146 
 Currently, the Court pays very little attention to the defi nitional stage and most of its 
attention goes to the justifi cation stage. 147 Exceptionally, the Court has paid attention to 
defi ning the scope of a positive obligation under a particular Convention right before 
examining whether a state ’ s omission could be justifi ed. It has done so mainly in relation 
to states ’ obligations under Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. 148 In its judgment in  Osman v. the 
United Kingdom , for example, it explained elaborately: 
 Th e Court notes that the fi rst sentence of Article 2  § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from 
the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the 
lives of those within its jurisdiction  … It is common ground that the State ’ s obligation in this 
respect extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place eff ective 
criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of off ences against the person backed up 
by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches 
of such provisions. It is thus accepted by those appearing before the Court that Article 2 of 
the Convention may imply in certain well-defi ned circumstances a positive obligation on the 
authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk 
from the criminal acts of another individual. 149 
 Here, the scope of a positive obligation is thus examined before it is made subject to a 
balancing of the interests to protect and to restrict a Convention right. 
 Both Lavrysen and Xenos have worked out in a fair amount of detail how the Court 
should go about the more structured assessment for determining the existence of 
positive obligations, and how to determine the core content of positive obligations. 150 
Th e ECtHR could describe the initial scope of a positive obligation as the  ‘ core ’ 
content of positive obligations  – to distinguish it from the  ‘ defi nitive ’ scope of positive 
obligations. 151 To defi ne the core content of positive obligations, the ECtHR would have 
to determine whether an individual ’ s claim falls within the scope of protection that is 
off ered by the Convention. 152 Aft er defi ning this core content of a positive obligation 
under a particular Convention right, the ECtHR would then proceed to determine 
whether the non-fulfi lment of that obligation by states can be objectively justifi ed, with 
 146  Moreover, the distinction is necessary as the stages require a diff erent method of interpretation, see 
Gerards  & Senden (2009), pp. 620 and 625. Also the distribution of the burden of proof becomes 
obvious, and the reason for protecting the human right is also more apparent, see Lavrysen (2013). 
 147  Xenos (2012), p. 92. 
 148  Gerards (2011b), p. 236. Th is approach is also visible in ECtHR 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74,  Marckx v. 
Belgium , para. 31. See further Xenos (2012), pp. 24 – 26. 
 149  ECtHR 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94,  Osman v. the United Kingdom , para. 115. Cf. also ECtHR 16 
December 2010, no. 25579/05,  A, B and C v. Ireland , para. 245. 
 150  See Xenos (2012), pp. 91 ff .; and Lavrysen (2013). 
 151  Xenos (2012), p. 91; and Lavrysen (2013). 
 152  Some scholars consider that the ECtHR should apply certain thresholds in determing whether a claim 
falls within the scope of protection that is off ered by the Convention, see Gerards (2011b). 
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due respect for a states ’ margin of appreciation. Th e resulting positive obligation, which 
was defi ned in the justifi cation stage, could then be described as a defi nitive positive 
obligation. 
 Undertaking this more structured assessment would help the ECtHR to overcome 
some of the criticism that has been raised to its approach on positive obligations. 
 4.8.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Th e judges of the ECtHR and most scholars by now agree that positive obligations 
are part of the protection of fundamental rights by states. Th is chapter has discussed 
the fact that there still is some disagreement with regard to the development by the 
judiciary of states ’ positive obligations to protect fundamental rights on the basis of 
several features related to this development. Criticism still applies to whether or not 
certain types of positive obligations can indeed be derived from fundamental rights 
provisions, and also to the competences of the judiciary from a constitutional theory 
perspective. Opinions diff er on the nature of fundamental rights more generally, and on 
the legitimate interpretation of the Convention by the ECtHR in particular. Although 
the ECtHR must tread with care in this area, it is also in the interests of predictability 
and certainty that the ECtHR provides greater clarity as regards the scope of positive 
obligations under the Convention. 
 A specifi c point which requires attention in the case-law of the ECtHR is the eff ect 
that the fulfi lment of positive obligations may have on horizontal relations. It is not 
generally accepted that fundamental rights protection gives rise to a  ‘ duty to protect ’ 
individuals from interferences by other individuals. Some scholars also argue that the 
acceptance of such duties goes against the very reason for guaranteeing the fundamental 
rights of an individual, that is, the protection of freedom. Th e ECtHR must, therefore, 
be sure to balance the interest of eff ectively protecting fundamental rights in horizontal 
relations, and the adverse eff ects of such  ‘ duties to protect ’ on the protection of another 
individual ’ s fundamental rights. 
 Another, oft en heard, point of criticism relates to the political character of positive 
obligations. Th e ECtHR should pay attention to the choices than can be made, and 
perhaps already have been made, by legislatures as to how positive obligations to 
protect fundamental rights can be fulfi lled. A legitimate role can, however, be played by 
the ECtHR in determining the existence and the content of states ’ positive obligations 
if it appears that the protection of particular individuals is not respected under the 
majoritarian rule of the legislature. 
 Th e ECtHR is also required to take extra care in the development of positive 
obligations because of its subsidiary position in its relation with the states parties. 
Th is has led to a less precise determination of the positive obligations to be fulfi lled by 
states under the Convention. In some particular areas, the ECtHR could consider being 
less deferential in the development of positive obligations, especially in cross-border 
situations where the states parties individually provide no appropriate solutions for 
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violations of fundamental rights. Further, the Court could increase the eff ectiveness of 
the protection of fundamental rights by states by carrying out an examination of the 
procedural framework of states which must guarantee the protection of Convention 
rights at national level. 
 Lastly, there also remains ample room for the improvement of the technical approach 
of the ECtHR in the determination of states ’ positive obligation. It is generally agreed 
that the ECtHR could improve the structure of its approach and align its method for 
determining the fulfi lment of states positive obligations to the criteria for the assessment 
of the fulfi lment of states ’ negative obligations. Moreover, the ECtHR should oft en 
pay better attention to determining whether an individual ’ s claim to positive action 
amounts falls within the scope of protection of a Convention right, before it proceeds 
to determine whether national authorities have struck a fair balance of the interests 
involved in such circumstances. 
 All of these points of criticism still appear relevant for the ECtHR to take into 
account in its development of positive obligations. Th ey may therefore also be relevant 
for other courts to take into account, if they are confronted with cases where they need 
to determine the existence and content of positive obligations. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 PART I  – CONCLUSIONS 
 5.1.  THE MAIN FEATURES RELATING TO THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
BY THE ECtHR 
 Th is chapter aims to bring together the conclusions of part I of this study, regarding 
the concept of positive obligations within the context of the Convention. Th is chapter 
focuses on some of the topics that will be especially relevant for part II of this study, 
which examines whether a similar development of positive obligations can take place 
within the EU ’ s system of fundamental rights protection. Keeping that objective in 
mind, it is especially important here to formulate some conclusions regarding the 
defi nition of the concept of positive obligations in combination with the distinction 
that applies between positive and negative obligations (section 5.2.), as well as regarding 
the diff erent types of positive obligations that can be identifi ed in the case-law of the 
ECtHR (section 5.3.). Th e rationales used by the ECtHR for accepting the diff erent 
types of positive obligations together with the possible eff ects of positive obligations are 
explained (section 5.4.). Th e main points of criticism related to this development are 
discussed (section 5.5.) and, lastly, some fi nal remarks are provided with respect to the 
analysis presented in part II (section 5.6.). 
 5.2.  THE DEFINITION OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS AND THE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE 
OBLIGATIONS 
 Th e ECtHR broadly defi nes a positive obligation as a requirement for states to take 
active measures to protect fundamental rights. It also has been seen in the preceding 
chapters that the ECtHR oft en applies the term  ‘ positive obligations ’ in its judgments to 
indicate the obligations that states must fulfi l to ensure the protection of a fundamental 
right within the relations between individual parties, and in its own relations with 
individuals. To some extent, it appears to be diffi  cult to arrive at a more clear and helpful 
defi nition of the concept of positive obligations. Th e defi nition necessarily needs to be 
broad to cover the diff erent types of positive obligations which are recognised by the 
ECtHR (see section 5.3.). 
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 Perhaps a fuller understanding of the ECtHR ’ s concept of positive obligations can 
be reached by looking at the distinction that applies between positive and negative 
obligations. Th e ECtHR has held that positive obligations arise in addition to the negative 
obligations that are traditionally to be found in the fundamental rights provisions of 
the Convention. Indeed, the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Convention are 
negatively phrased, and generally do not specify that certain actions need to be taken by 
the states. Even the structure of the Convention provisions is mainly oriented towards 
negative obligations  – that is, most provisions specifi cally address the restrictions 
which can be made on those rights by public authorities. In that respect, positive 
obligations can be regarded as the mirror side of negative obligations  – they simply 
are obligations for the states that are  not negative. Th e ECtHR further has held that 
positive obligations generally leave states a choice as to the measures they have to take 
to fulfi l those obligations, while negative obligations are usually regarded as obligations 
of result  – states should simply refrain from interfering with fundamental rights 
(except when a justifi cation can be given). Th us, by contrasting positive obligations and 
negative obligations, it becomes clear that there are certain diff erences, which may help 
to determine what positive obligations really are. 
 Admittedly, a clear-cut distinction between positive and negative obligations is hard 
to make in practice. Th e ECtHR itself has not always applied a very consistent or logical 
approach in every respect. In the case of  Marckx v. Belgium , for example, the ECtHR 
imposed a positive obligation on the states parties to ensure legal recognition of the 
family rights of children born out of wedlock. In that case, the state had already taken 
certain positive action by establishing a legislative and administrative framework for 
the recognition of family rights. It could, therefore, also have been argued that the 
state violated its negative obligation in respect of children born out of wedlock. It is 
diffi  cult to say in such a case whether it was the state ’ s  failure to act or rather its  actions 
that caused an interference with a fundamental right. In addition, interference with 
fundamental rights can result from a complex set of causes that may involve state acts 
as well as omissions. 
 Such diffi  culties notwithstanding, in part I of this study it has been argued that it is still 
valuable to take the conceptual diff erences between negative and positive obligations 
into account when trying to understand when the ECtHR turns to applying positive 
obligations and how it defi nes the concept. In summary, the conceptual diff erences 
that can be taken into account here are that positive obligations, contrary to negative 
obligations, (i) do not follow (directly) from provisions on fundamental rights and 
their structure, but need to be implied in individual cases; (ii) require states to take 
active measures which can only relate to certain gaps in their policies; (iii) and have an 
 ‘ alternative ’ structure, which means that they leave a choice as to the measures which 
need to be taken by states. 
 In combination, these features already reveal some inherent diffi  culties and specialties 
in recognising positive obligations. In particular, positive obligations cannot always be 
defi ned beforehand on the basis of provisions of fundamental rights. Rather they will 
reveal themselves in concrete circumstances, based on the question of what eff ective 
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protection of a Convention right requires in the particular case on hand. Th is principle 
of eff ectiveness actually is very open-ended and its application can create some legal 
uncertainty. Th is broad approach to recognising positive obligations has given rise to 
various forms of criticism which are discussed further below (see section 5.5.). 
 5.3.  TYPOLOGIES OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 Th e broad defi nition of positive obligations provided for by the ECtHR allows it to cover 
various types of positive obligations. Th e ECtHR itself has only clearly distinguished 
between procedural and substantive positive obligations, but other typologies have been 
developed by scholars. Th ese typologies can provide further insight into the diff erent 
kinds of positive obligations that can arise from the Convention. Th ese typologies also 
may help to reveal some of the eff ects that positive obligations may have, as well as 
the problematic consequences that some positive obligations may have. It is therefore 
useful briefl y to summarise them before discussing the eff ects and criticism of the 
Court ’ s case-law on positive obligations (see sections 5.4. and 5.5.). 
 Looking at the content of the measures needed to fulfi l positive obligations, a 
distinction can be made between positive obligations to legislate, to provide for an 
administrative framework and/or to take practical measures to protect fundamental 
rights. In practice, however, it is diffi  cult to trace this typology in the case-law of the 
ECtHR, as this court generally does not indicate what types of implementing measures 
would required to be taken. Nevertheless, it may be useful in a critical analysis of the 
Court ’ s case-law, as it may help to determine if the Court has overstepped its judicial 
functions in imposing obligations on, for example, a national parliamentary body. 
 Secondly, a typology of vertical and horizontal positive obligations has been 
established. Vertical positive obligations concern the relation between the state and the 
individual, and horizontal positive obligations concern the relations between private 
parties. Horizontal positive obligations may be imposed to ensure that certain private 
parties do not violate the fundamental rights of a third party, which may, for example, 
occur in situations between an employer and an employee. Horizontal positive 
obligations may also be imposed on states to ensure that the fundamental rights of 
individuals are enjoyed in their broader societal relations. Th is then concerns horizontal 
positive obligations with a social dimension. Here, some groups of individuals can be 
especially vulnerable, such as immigrants or the elderly, and the violations are not 
caused deliberately by the state or by other individuals but, rather, they follow from a 
situation  ‘ on the ground ’. Both the vertical and horizontal types of positive obligations 
can be recognised in the case-law of the ECtHR. However, when looking at an ECtHR 
case, scholars may disagree over which of these two types of positive obligations have 
been established. Arguably, this is because it requires something to be said about the 
causes of the infringement (state, individual or social reality). 
 Th e third typology mainly focuses on the degree to which a positive obligation can 
be derived from the negative obligation to protect fundamental rights. On this basis, 
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contains the main principles for the development of positive obligations. 
a distinction can be made between dependent, supportive, intrinsic, autonomous and 
repressive types of positive obligations. Th e fi rst type (dependent obligations) is closest 
to the negative obligation to protect fundamental rights, while the last one (repressive 
obligations) is most detached from it. Th is typology has been developed to determine 
whether a certain positive obligation can legitimately be derived from provisions of 
fundamental rights. Th e autonomous and repressive types of positive obligations, in 
particular, are then held to be problematic. To some degree, this typology may overlap 
with the typology of vertical and horizontal positive obligations. Th e dependent type 
of positive obligation, for example, is imposed on states to ensure that they comply 
with their (negative) obligation not to interfere with an individual ’ s fundamental rights. 
Th erefore, it is mostly concerned with the (vertical) relation between the individual and 
the state, and can usually be classifi ed as a vertical positive obligation. Th e autonomous 
type of positive obligation, by contrast, may not have any relation to the state, but may 
apply in a relation between private parties. Many autonomous positive obligations 
therefore could also be classifi ed as horizontal types of positive obligations, potentially 
with a social dimension. 
 5.4.  RATIONALE AND EFFECTS OF RECOGNISING POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS 
 In developing positive obligations in its case-law, the ECtHR has not been able to rely 
on the text and the structure of the fundamental rights under the Convention, nor on 
the other provisions laid down in the Convention. 1 As a guiding principle to discover, 
as well as justify, the recognition of positive obligations, the ECtHR has mainly had 
resort to the principle of eff ectiveness. On that basis, the judgments of the ECtHR have 
disclosed a wide variety of types of positive obligations, as the previous section has 
shown. However, the ECtHR also has expressed some other rationales in its case-law. 
 An example of such a rationale is that states are considered to have the power  – 
especially nowadays  – to eff ectively infl uence the protection of fundamental rights of 
individuals, also in their private relations, especially when they are vulnerable. It is 
reasonable, therefore, to impose positive obligations on states. Positive obligations thus 
may be imposed because they generally strengthen the rights which individuals may 
enjoy  vis- à -vis the states parties. However, individuals cannot demand a particular 
action which must be taken by the state. 
 Another rationale may be defi ned as the  ‘ responsibility rationale ’. In several cases, 
the ECtHR has expressed interest in whether or not states have already undertaken 
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regulatory activities to control certain aff airs, and thereby left  certain gaps. In the case 
of  Marckx v. Belgium , 2 for example, the ECtHR pointed out that the state had already 
undertaken to legally recognise the family ties of children, but that it had not suffi  ciently 
taken into account the situation of children born out of wedlock, whose family rights 
also needed to be protected. Th e ECtHR considers it to be the state ’ s responsibility to 
fi ll such a gap. 
 One of the main implications of the acceptance of positive obligations, regardless of 
their rationale, has been shown to be an increase in the obligations of states under the 
Convention, as well as the broadening of individuals ’ Convention rights. Th e ECtHR 
has made states responsible for a wide range of infringements of fundamental rights, 
which includes situations where the infringements are caused by private parties rather 
than state agents or bodies. 
 For both states and individuals, the recognition of positive obligations by the ECtHR 
may cause a certain amount of uncertainty. Positive obligations are developed by the 
ECtHR on a case-by-case basis, and they can be formulated either in a rather broad 
and vague manner, or with great precision and very closely geared to the individual 
circumstances of the case. As a result it is oft en not easy to predict what obligations will 
be incurred under the Convention, or what rights individuals could seek protection 
for under the Convention. Th e Court should not necessarily be blamed for this as 
fundamental rights provisions and the concomitant obligations by their nature may be 
very broad. 
 Another important implication of recognising positive obligations is that it 
may change, to some extent, the nature of fundamental rights protection by states. 
Fundamental rights may now provide a ground for state action, whereas, traditionally, 
fundamental rights were considered to provide guarantees  against state interference. 
Th e recognition of positive obligations could therefore also have detrimental eff ects for 
certain individuals. Actively protecting the rights of certain individuals, for example by 
obliging the state to grant children access to information about their biological parents, 
means that the right to private life of another individual, in this example the biological 
parents, may be interfered with. Although this may be considered to be reasonable, it 
clearly opens up new and fundamental questions about where to strike a fair balance 
between right and interests, and about the scope of the positive obligations that can be 
imposed. 
 Overall, these diff erent implications, that is, the expansion of states obligations 
and individual ’ s rights; the legal uncertainty that is caused; and the eff ects on the 
fundamental rights of other individuals, must be taken into account in developing 
(a doctrine of) positive obligations. Although the ECtHR has clearly accepted such 
implications, they may give rise to some criticism of the doctrine. Indeed, when the 
objective is to assess whether positive obligations could be recognised in other contexts 
and by diff erent courts, it is useful to take such criticism into account. Th ese criticisms 
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are explained in the next section together with some ways in which the ECtHR has 
aimed to counter some of these criticisms. 
 5.5.  CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 Th e ECtHR has incurred much criticism over its development of positive obligations, 
which has been discussed extensively in chapter 4. Th e discussion in this section focuses 
on those lines of criticism which are of special importance to other courts that might 
consider developing (a doctrine of) positive obligations. 
 One of the main points of criticism relates to the political character of the imposition 
of positive obligations. 3 Th e defi nition of positive obligations could impose burdens 
on states in terms of fi nancial resources as well as organisation. Such burdens are 
closely related to the kind of policy choices which are normally made by democratically 
elected and politically accountable bodies, rather than by courts. At the same time, 
scholars have rebutted such criticism by arguing that it can be necessary for courts 
to develop positive obligations, in particular to protect the rights of individuals 
whose voices may not have been heard under the majoritarian rule, such as those of 
minority ethnic groups. Arguably, courts could accept positive obligations in those 
circumstances if they meet certain standards, which have to do with the accountability 
of such decisions, the participation of the diff erent parties in the proceedings, and 
the clarity of the inequalities that have appeared in such cases. Nevertheless, in by far 
the majority of cases, courts are expected to exercise a certain restraint in developing 
positive obligations for the reasons already mentioned. Th ey must leave states a certain 
degree of choice as to the measures which they could take to fulfi l positive obligations. 
Th e ECtHR has particularly been advised to ensure respect for the principle of state 
sovereignty in developing positive obligations by examining whether certain positive 
obligations are already recognised by the states parties in their legal and administrative 
structures (the responsibility rationale is discussed in section 5.4.). If the ECtHR fi nds 
that states have already adopted certain legislative provisions and/or administrative 
frameworks which are relevant to protect fundamental rights, but these leave some 
gaps or are applied in a discriminatory manner, the state may reasonably be asked to 
provide solutions. 
 Th e political nature of positive obligations is of continuing concern and thus 
requires the ECtHR to tread carefully and avoid making overly political choices. As a 
supranational court, the ECtHR is in an even more diffi  cult position, because it may not 
be aware of national sensitivities and the specifi c circumstances of a case. While this 
would therefore call for even greater restraint by the ECtHR, there are also scholars who 
would encourage it to go further in developing certain kinds of positive obligations. 
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Th is may be required in particular where the problems concerned cannot be solved 
by states in isolation, such as migration or environmental issues. Th e ECtHR thus is 
confronted with diff erent expectations on the role that it must play. 
 A second point of criticism has to do with the broad extent of the positive obligations 
that the ECtHR has recognised. Th e ECtHR has accepted, as explained earlier, vertical 
as well as horizontal positive obligations, and also those positive obligations with a 
social dimension. While all these positive obligations may be essential to come to a 
full realisation of the protection of fundamental rights, it has been argued that it may 
be diffi  cult to impose so many diff erent obligations on states. Some types of positive 
obligations are considered more diffi  cult to accept on the basis of fundamental rights 
than others. It may be concluded, for example, that compared to horizontal obligations, 
vertical positive obligations may generally be imposed more easily. Th is is because of 
their relation to negative obligations which, under the Convention, very closely and 
logically follow from the fundamental right itself. 
 Horizontal types of positive obligations are more diffi  cult to accept. As explained 
earlier, it is generally accepted that the state nowadays has an important role to play 
in ensuring the protection of the rights and interests of individuals, and this also 
applies to their private relations. Yet there are some potential problems to be taken into 
account. It has been argued, in particular, that the ECtHR must prevent the imposition 
of such positive obligations having negative eff ects on others. Aft er all, as has been 
mentioned, by recognising positive obligations the rights of others can be aff ected, 
which could even result in a suppressive eff ect. Essentially, then, the negative concept 
of freedom that is inherent to fundamental rights is impeded. Another diffi  culty related 
to the development of horizontal types of positive obligations is that it can be quite 
hard to establish at exactly what point states can be held responsible for violations of 
fundamental rights in the private sphere. Th e case-law of the ECtHR includes some 
indications; however, it is also still developing and the case-law on this issue is regarded 
as somewhat unpredictable. 
 In its case-law, the ECtHR has sought to address some of these criticisms and 
concerns. It has done so by both developing a doctrine of positive obligations and 
recognising some important limitations to the development of positive obligations. 
Th e ECtHR has clarifi ed, for example, that in some cases in order to incur a positive 
obligation under the Convention the state needs to have had knowledge of fundamental 
rights violations, there must be a direct and immediate link between a fundamental 
right and the positive obligation for the state, and the obligation should not give rise to 
an impossible or disproportionate burden. Th is also shows that, while the ECtHR may 
accept that states act to protect individuals from fundamental rights violations by other 
individuals, it may recognise a certain limit to imposing state responsibility for every 
type of violation which may take place, in particular those in the private sphere. 
 Although the ECtHR has thus developed a doctrine and some limits in its case-law, 
it has been criticised for its application, too. In particular, the doctrine is not always 
consistently applied and it still does not fully ensure the legal certainty and predictability 
that is so dearly needed. Scholars, applicants and practitioners very much want the 
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ECtHR to provide guidance on how fundamental rights are to be protected by the states 
parties. Th us, it is very important for the ECtHR to bring further clarity in its case-law 
on important topics such as the development of positive obligations. 
 Finally, an important point relating to the ECtHR ’ s doctrine that has been critically 
evaluated is its use of the margin of appreciation doctrine. As explained in chapter 
2, the ECtHR can decide to aff ord a wide margin of appreciation when it considers 
that the national authorities are better placed to judge over the proportionality or the 
reasonableness of fundamental rights interferences. In particular, the ECtHR may 
decide to grant a wide margin of appreciation to states when the issue concerns social 
or economic interests. Scholars have noted that the ECtHR does not always apply its 
margin of appreciation doctrine correctly, and that it too oft en aff ords a wide margin 
of appreciation to states when concerning their fulfi lment of positive obligations under 
the Convention. Such consistent application of a wide margin of appreciation to states 
in cases on positive obligations would correspond to a consistent lowering of the level 
of intensity of review, and this has been argued to aff ect the protection of the rights of 
individuals. While the ECtHR thus may have good reason to allow a wide margin of 
appreciation to states, it may also need to be careful in not granting it too easily, because 
this may invite criticism. 
 5.6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS LOOKING FORWARD 
TO THE ANALYSIS IN PART II 
 Th e development of positive obligations has many dimensions. Th ose that have been 
discussed in this chapter in the context of the ECtHR may be of interest for other courts 
which may be considering the development of (a doctrine of) positive obligations, 
such as potentially the ECJ. Th e ECtHR has used a concept of positive obligations for 
quite some time, which can provide a helpful source of inspiration as to what can be 
acceptable in the development of such a concept. As will be further explained in part II, 
the Convention is a very important instrument within the EU legal order, which may 
make it even more relevant for the ECJ to take the ECtHR ’ s approach as an example. Yet, 
there are some clear diff erences between the EU law and the Convention which might 
make the ECtHR ’ s doctrine less suitable to be applied by the ECJ. Such diff erences 
clearly need to be addressed to see to what extent a similar development of positive 
obligations could take place. One important aspect to take into account, for example, 
is that the ECtHR clearly is a human rights court, whereas the ECJ only deals with 
the protection of fundamental rights in some of the cases it delivers, even though the 
number of such cases are increasing in recent years. Moreover, there is the issue of 
competences which needs to be taken into account in the EU context, and such issues 
therefore will be central to part II of this study. 
 
 PART II 
 THE SCOPE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS WITHIN THE 
CONTEXT OF EU LAW  – AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE SPECIFIC PARAMETERS OF THE EU 
LEGAL ORDER AND THE EU SYSTEM OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION 
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 CHAPTER 6 
 MAIN PRINCIPLES OF THE EU SYSTEM OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION 
 6.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Fundamental rights are protected in a very diff erent framework by the EU as compared 
to the Council of Europe. Th e EU is not of itself a human rights organisation and it 
has never been given a general competence to protect fundamental rights. At the same 
time, the EU has adopted one of the most modern collections of fundamental rights. 
Th e EU is legally bound to comply with the Charter, and it has agreed to accede to the 
Convention. As a result of these (and other) developments, fundamental rights have 
been given an important place within the EU legal order. 
 Th is chapter aims to set out the main principles of the EU ’ s system of fundamental 
rights protection. Th is mainly serves as an introduction to this system so that a selection 
of topics, which are of particular importance to further examine the concept and the 
doctrine of positive obligations, can be studied further in the next chapters. 
 First, a brief explanation of how fundamental rights have come to be recognised 
within the EU legal order and the EU Treaties is provided (section 6.2.). Th e next 
section points out that there are in fact several rationales for the protection of 
fundamental rights under EU law which are of importance in order to understand 
the further development of fundamental rights protection within this system 
(section 6.3.). Subsequently, the recent important institutional developments in the fi eld 
of EU fundamental rights protection that have taken place are addressed (section 6.4.). 
Aft er that, the content and the specifi c status of the Charter are explained (section 6.5.), 
while the general principles of EU law are also examined, since they continue to provide 
a basis for the protection of fundamental rights by the EU (section 6.6.). Th en, the 
specifi c topics of the scope of application of the Charter (section 6.7.), the relationship 
between the protection of fundamental rights at EU level and at national level 
(section 6.8.), and the relationship between the EU and the Convention are discussed 
(section 6.9.). Some brief attention is also paid to the specifi c distinction that applies 
between rights and principles under the Charter (section 6.10.). Lastly, the the main 
fi ndings of this chapter are set out (section 6.11.). 
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 8  See ECJ 13 July 1989, C-5/88  Wachauf ; and ECJ 18 June 1991, C-260/89,  ERT . Th e determination of 
the scope of application of EU fundamental rights as regards member state action is further discussed 
in section 6.7. 
 9  See the Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 
fundamental rights of 5 April 1977 [1977] OJ L103/1. 
 6.2.  ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EU 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION 
 From the time when the European Economic Communities were established up 
until today, a series of initiatives have been taken so as to ensure that fundamental 
rights were recognised within this specifi c legal order. Originally, no mechanism was 
provided to ensure fundamental rights protection. 1 Quite early on concerns were raised 
over the lack of this protection at Community level. Th is occurred particularly aft er the 
ECJ had developed the principles of direct eff ect and supremacy of Community law in 
the landmark cases of  Van Gend en Loos and  Costa/ENEL . 2 Th e ECJ explained that on 
the basis of these principles, national law, including national constitutional principles, 
could be set aside in case of a confl ict with Community law. Consequently, national 
constitutional courts were concerned with the protection that they still needed to off er 
on the basis of the national constitutions and they referred preliminary questions to the 
ECJ on how to solve this confl ict. 3 In a line of cases delivered in the early 1970s, the ECJ 
ultimately accepted that fundamental rights were to be protected by the Community. 4 
Fundamental rights were to be protected under Community law as general principles 
of law; 5 and they were to be developed autonomously by the ECJ. 6 From that point on, 
the ECJ started to further develop these general principles of law in its case-law. It has 
taken the constitutions of the member states and international human rights treaties 
into account as an important source of interpretation, and it has pointed out that the 
Convention takes an especially important place. 7 Further, the ECJ has established in its 
case-law that these fundamental rights were to be protected by the EU institutions, as 
well as by the member states when they were implementing Community law. 8 
 Eventually, recognition of this judge-made law was given, most clearly, by the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1994. 9 Subsequently, it was decided that the rights which were 
protected in the EU needed to be codifi ed in the form of a written catalogue of 
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 11  Th is is also expressed in the fourth section of the preamble of the Charter. Some scholars have 
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 12  Article 6(3) TEU. 
 13  ECJ 28 March 1996,  Opinion 2/94 . 
 14  See the Preamble to the Draft  Agreement for the Accession of the EU to the European Convention for 
Human Rights, 47 + 1(2013)008rev2, Final Report to the CDDH, 10 June 2013. 
fundamental rights. 10 Th e main aim was to increase the visibility of these rights. 11 Th is 
resulted in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which was fi rst proclaimed in 2000. 
Aft er a failed attempt to adopt the Charter as part of the EU Constitution in 2005, the 
Charter was added, as a separate document, to the Lisbon Treaty, which came into 
force in December 2009. It has been given legally binding status as well as the status 
of primary law. In addition to this, the Lisbon Treaty has provided a legal basis for the 
accession of the EU to the Convention. 12 Earlier, the compatibility of the accession 
with the former Treaty on the European Community had been rejected by the ECJ in 
 Opinion 2/94 . 13 For that reason, the Lisbon Treaty thus provides a specifi c legal basis 
that allows, or rather obliges, the EU to accede. Th e accession is intended to allow 
external review by the ECtHR of the EU ’ s compliance with fundamental rights, and 
it will further help to ensure consistency between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg 
approach to the protection of fundamental rights. 14 
 All of these foregoing developments are now refl ected in Article 6 TEU which sets 
out the current system of fundamental rights protection of the EU as follows: 
 1) Th e Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted at Strasbourg, on 
12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties. Th e provisions of the 
Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defi ned in the Treaties. 
Th e rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall be interpreted in accordance with 
the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its interpretation and application 
with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that set out the sources of those 
provisions. 
 2) Th e Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not aff ect the Union ’ s competences as 
defi ned in the Treaties. 
 3) Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union ’ s 
law. 
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 Article 6 TEU thus shows that there are various sources of fundamental rights 
within the EU, which include the Charter, the general principles of EU law, national 
constitutional provisions, and the Convention. Th is raises a host of questions over the 
interrelationship between these various sources which will be discussed throughout 
this chapter (see sections 6.5. to 6.7.). Article 6 TEU also draws attention to one other 
important aspect that has not visibly changed over the years: the limited competences 
of the EU to protect fundamental rights. Article 6(1) TEU clearly stresses that the 
protection of fundamental rights may not lead to the extension or modifi cation of 
the existing powers of the EU and that the limited competences must be respected. 15 
Likewise, Article 6(2) TEU requires that the accession of the EU to the Convention 
cannot aff ect the competences of the EU. Th e relationship between the protection 
of fundamental rights and the limited competences of the EU is therefore of great 
importance. What exact competences the EU has to protect fundamental rights and 
how extensions of competences on the basis of the protection of fundamental rights 
nevertheless could take place is discussed in chapters 8 and 9. 
 Next to the changes that have been made to Article 6 TEU, it should also be noted 
that the protection of fundamental rights has been included as one of the values upon 
which the EU has been based. Article 2 TEU recognised the following democratic ideals 
as the foundations for the EU: 
 Th e Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. Th ese values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, 
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women 
prevail. 16 
 Further, according to Article 3 TEU, the aim of the EU is to promote these values 
and the well-being of its peoples. Th e EU is required to  ‘ combat social exclusion and 
discrimination, and it shall promote social justice and protection, equality between 
women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the 
child ’. In its external relations  ‘ the Union shall [again] uphold and promote its values ’ 
and contribute to the protection of human rights. Th us, the EU nowadays has as a clear 
and express objective to protect fundamental rights. 
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 6.3.  RATIONALES OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION 
WITHIN THE EU LEGAL ORDER 
 Before further discussing some of the institutional developments that have taken place 
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (see section 6.4.), it is useful fi rst to clarify 
the underlying rationale of fundamental rights protection within the EU legal order. 
 It is important to understand that the EU has evolved into a very powerful entity 
which can take actions in diff erent policy areas that include the  ‘ traditional ’ internal 
market and the area of freedom, security and justice, as well as its external relations. In 
those areas, the actions of the EU can interfere with individuals ’ fundamental rights, 
either directly on the basis of actions taken by the EU institutions, or indirectly through 
the implementation of EU law by the member states. For this reason, the actions of 
the EU institutions as well as the member states, where they are acting on the basis of 
powers granted under EU law, must be constrained by fundamental rights guarantees. 17 
Closely related to this rationale, the ECJ has also accepted the rule of law as an important 
rationale for the protection of fundamental rights. Th is was clearly so in the case of 
 Kadi , where it held: 
 … it is to be borne in mind that the Community is based on the rule of law, inasmuch as 
neither its Member States nor its Institutions can avoid review of their acts with the basic 
constitutional charter, the EC Treaty, which established a complete system of legal remedies 
and procedures designed to enable the Court of Justice to review the legality of the acts of 
the institutions.  … 
 It is also clear from settled case-law that respect for human rights is a condition of the 
lawfulness of Community acts  … and that measures incompatible with respect for human 
rights are not acceptable in the Community  … 18 
 Th e protection of fundamental rights by the EU and the ECJ is further interwoven 
with some important principles of EU law which include the principle of supremacy, 
as well as the principles of the unity and eff ectiveness of EU law in combination with 
the principle of autonomy of EU law. 19 Th e need to safeguard the supremacy of EU 
law was indeed, as discussed above, initially an important factor leading the ECJ to 
accept the protection of fundamental rights within the community ’ s legal order. 20 If the 
national constitutional courts were not to accept the supremacy of EU law based over 
the rights contained in the national constitutions and continued to build in reservations 
to accepting the supremacy of EU law, this would put the unity and eff ectiveness of EU 
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 21  ECJ 13 December 1979, C-44/79,  Hauer , para. 14. 
 22  Augenstein (2013). 
 23  ECJ 18 December 2014,  Opinion 2/ 13, paras 188 – 189; and ECJ 15 February 2016, C-605/115  J.N. , 
para. 47. 
 24  Recently, and most clearly, the ECJ has also clarifi ed that the member states can only apply higher 
standards of fundamental rights in areas falling within the scope of EU law on the basis of their own 
constitutions to the extent that this would not aff ect the  ‘ primacy, unity and eff ectiveness ’ of EU law, 
see ECJ 26 February 2013, C-399/11,  Melloni , para. 60. See further section 6.8. 
 25  ECJ 6 March 2014, C-206/13,  Siragusa , paras 31 – 32. Th is was reiterated in ECJ 10 July 2014, C-198/13, 
 Julian Hern á ndez and others , para. 47. 
 26  Th is rationale has raised clear criticism in the past, see further the discussion in section 7.6.2.1. on the 
approach of the ECJ in fundamental rights cases. 
law at risk. As the ultimate guardian of the Treaties, it would only be for the ECJ, and 
not the national courts, to assess the validity of Community law, and the ECJ therefore 
sought to protect fundamental rights within Community law itself. Th e ECJ has clearly 
expressed such concerns in the case of  Hauer : 
 Th e question of a possible infringement of fundamental rights by a measure of Community 
institutions can only be judged in the light of Community law itself. Th e introduction of special 
criteria for assessment stemming from the legislation or constitutional law of a particular 
Member State would, by damaging the substantive unity and effi  cacy of EU law, lead inevitably 
to the destruction of the unity of the Common Market and jeopardizing of the Cohesion of the 
Community. 21 
 Th e concern over the autonomous interpretation of EU fundamental rights remains 
of relevance today. 22 For example, this concern was expressed by the ECJ in  Opinion 
2/13 , in which the ECJ deemed the draft  agreement on the accession of the EU to the 
Convention to be incompatible with EU law. 23 Some more recent case-law of the ECJ 
also shows that the principle of supremacy, as well as the uniformity and eff ectiveness 
of EU law remain important rationales for the protection of fundamental rights by the 
EU. 24 In a revealing consideration, the ECJ held in the case of  Siragusa , which concerned 
the scope of application of EU law, that: 
 the objective of protecting fundamental rights in EU law … is to ensure that those rights 
are not infringed in areas of EU activity, whether through action at EU level or through the 
implementation of EU law by the Member States. Th e reason for pursuing that objective is the 
need to avoid a situation in which the level of protection of fundamental rights varies according 
to national law involved in such a way as to undermine the unity, primacy and eff ectiveness of 
EU law. 25 
 By themselves, EU fundamental rights are therefore necessary to protect the unity, 
primacy and eff ectiveness of EU law, even though their relation with the rule of law has 
also been recognised by the ECJ. 26 
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 27  Cf. de Witte (1999); and Muir (2014a), p. 238. 
 28  For the statistics, see European Commission, Staff  Working Document on the Application of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2015, SWD(2016), 158 fi nal, pp. 7 and 8. See also S á nchez (2012), 
p. 1577. In respect of the application of the Charter by Dutch courts, see Van Harten  & Grootelaar 
(2014). It has been explained that the increase in questions (also) coincides with the extension of the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ in the area of freedom, security and justice, see De B ú rca (2013), p. 173. 
 29  Before 2009, the ECJ referred to the Charter only on some occasions, see e.g. ECJ 27 June 2006, 
C-540/03,  Parliament v Council , para. 38. Advocates General have also referred to the Charter before 
it became legally binding. 
 30  See Augenstein (2013); and Sanchez (2012). Th is particular approach, as well as the further role played 
by the Court of Justice in the fi eld of fundamental rights is also discussed in chapter 10. 
 31  See in particular section 7.6.2. 
 32  See Communication from the Commission: Strategy for the eff ective implementation of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010) 573, 19 October 2010; and cf. Butler 
(2012). 
 33  See European Commission, 2015 Report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
SWD(2016), 158 fi nal; European Commission, Staff  Working Document on the application of the 
EU Charter of fundamental rights in 2015, SWD(2016), 158 fi nal; and European Commission Staff  
Working Paper, Operational Guidance on Taking Account of Fundamental Rights in Commission 
Impact Assessments, SEC(2011) 567, 6 May 2011. 
 6.4.  INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE FIELD 
OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION 
 Th e ECJ has played an important role in the protection of fundamental rights, as 
already appeared from the historical developments briefl y sketched in this chapter 
(see section 6.2.). 27 Th e ECJ continues to be a key actor in the protection of 
fundamental rights. Since the Charter became legally binding in 2009, national courts 
have increasingly raised questions to the ECJ on the interpretation and application of 
fundamental rights, and the ECJ itself is making more references to rights laid down 
in the Charter in its case-law. 28 In developing its case-law on fundamental rights in the 
years since the Charter has become legally binding, it has been noted that the ECJ has 
developed its own, to some extent, autonomous approach to protecting fundamental 
rights. 29 Th e ECJ now even primarily relies on the Charter as the main instrument for 
fundamental rights protection within the context of EU law. 30 Th e approach of the ECJ 
to protecting fundamental rights is discussed in greater depth in chapter 7. 31 
 Aside from the interpretation and application of fundamental rights given by the ECJ, 
it is important to mention that the other EU institutions are also increasingly engaging 
in fundamental rights matters. Aft er the Charter became legally binding in 2009, eff orts 
have been made by the EU institutions to ensure compliance with fundamental rights 
in the exercise of their competences, and also to making their initiatives in this fi eld 
more visible. Th e European Commission has, for example, adopted a strategy for the 
eff ective implementation of the Charter. 32 It  inter alia publishes annual reports on 
the application of the Charter and has drawn up checklists for determining whether 
legislation is in compliance with the (limits) placed on their actions by the rights 
guaranteed in the Charter. 33 Th e other institutions of the EU have also adopted such 
Intersentia116
Th e Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU
 34  See COREPER, Guidelines on Methodological Steps to be Taken to Check Fundamental Rights 
Compatibility at the Councils Preparatory Bodies, Council Document 10140/11, 18 May 2011, 
available online at  < http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l = EN & f = ST % 2010140 % 202011 % 20
INIT > . For a critical analysis of such checklists, see Morijn (2014). 
 35  See Muir (2014a); Muir (2014b); and Morijn  & Van Sasse van Ysselt (2012). 
 36  Council Regulation No 168/2007/EC of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights [1997] OJ L53/1. 
 37  As mentioned in C. Murphy,  ‘ On the Rocky Road to Accession: Final Draft  of the EU ’ s Accession 
Agreement to ECHR approved ’ , European Law Blog, 12/04/2013, http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p = 1680. 
 38  See e.g. Gragl (2014b); and Lock (2011). 
 39  Final Report to the CDDH, Draft  revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 10 June 2013, 
47 + 1(2013)008rev2. 
 40  At the time of writing (June 2016), the European Commission is still in the consultation phase with 
respect to the issues that were raised by the ECJ in Opinion  2/13 , see European Commission, 2015 
Report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, SWD(2016), 158 fi nal, pp. 8 – 9. 
checklists. 34 In addition, it has been observed that reference is increasingly being made 
to the provisions of the Charter, for example, in the recitals of legislative instruments of 
the EU institutions and in the provisions of such legislative instruments. 35 As discussed 
in more detail in chapter 8, the EU institutions have indeed adopted instruments 
in various areas that should ensure the promotion of fundamental rights. It is also 
noteworthy that a Fundamental Rights Agency has been established by the EU. Th is 
Agency mainly focuses on the provision of information and data on fundamental rights 
matters in the EU and does not have any enforcement powers as such. 36 
 Hence, the aim of the Charter to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights 
within the EU by making fundamental rights more visible, has to some extent been 
realised. By contrast, the road to the accession of the EU to the Convention has 
been  ‘ rocky ’. 37 Protocol No. 8 relating to Article 6(2) TEU as well as Declaration No. 
2 require that the specifi c characteristics of the EU and of EU law are protected in 
respect of the accession. Since the European Commission was designated as the 
negotiator of the accession process in June 2010, the technical matters of the accession 
have been extensively discussed in informal working groups of representatives of the 
member states of the EU and the states parties of the Council of Europe. Scholars 
have been closely following and reporting on the accession process. 38 In 2013, all of 
this led to the adoption of a package which includes a draft  accession agreement and 
a draft  explanatory report. 39 Th e draft  accession agreement  inter alia provides for a 
co-respondent mechanism which would allow the EU and its member states to become 
party to proceedings before the ECtHR involving violations of EU law, as well as a 
procedure of prior involvement so that the ECJ could determine the compatibility of 
provisions of EU law with fundamental rights prior to the review made by the ECtHR. 
Th e agreement was sent to the ECJ in a request for advice on its compatibility with the 
EU Treaties. Despite the creation of the diff erent mechanisms and the establishment of 
other safeguards in the agreement, the ECJ found several aspects of the draft  accession 
agreement to be incompatible with the EU Treaties. 40 As a result the accession process 
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 41  ECJ 18 December 2014,  Opinion 2/13 . See also the view of Advocate General Kokott in  Opinion 2/13 , 
which was delivered on 13 June 2014. 
 42  Some of the problematic eff ects of the incorporation of the Convention into EU law are discussed in 
section 6.9. 
 43  Th is provision has been included in the academic and the political debates on the problems occurring 
in Hungary as well as more recently in Poland concerning the alleged lack of respect for the rule of law 
and concerning fundamental rights issues related to the independence of the media and the position 
of the judiciary in those countries. 
 44  Cf. Editorial Comments (2012). Further mention must be made of Article 49 TEU, which establishes 
that respect for the foundational values of the EU (which includes respect for the rule of law and 
human rights) forms a condition for accession of new member states to the EU. 
 45  For the complications relating to Article 7 TEU see Editorial Comments (2016) and Editorial 
Comments (2015). 
 46  Recently the European Commission has started more informal dialogues and it has issued an opinion 
with respect to the concerns that have risen in Poland over the introduction of new rules aff ecting the 
independence of the judiciary as well as the media authority, see European Commission press release, 
 ‘ Commission adopts rule of law opinion on the situation in Poland ’ , Brussels 1 June 2016, IP/16/2015. 
 47  Article 6 TEU. 
has been put on hold; further steps have not yet been taken. 41 Th e fi nalisation of the 
accession itself is not expected for quite some time. Not only will the Commission have 
to modify the accession agreement in accordance with  Opinion 2/13 , the states parties 
of the EU and the Council of Europe would also still need to sign the agreement itself 
and thereaft er ratify it. 42 
 Lastly, it may be noted that over the past years, there has been much debate on the 
use of Article 7 TEU as a basis for action by the EU institutions to ensure fundamental 
rights protection. 43 If it appears that there is  ‘ a clear risk for a serious breach by a member 
state of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU ’  – which includes the respect for human 
rights and for the rule of law  – Article 7 TEU allows the Council to take certain actions. 
Th e Council must hear the member state involved and make recommendations, before 
it can resort to a more heavy sanction. Th e provision sets out a  ‘ nuclear option ’, which 
entails that the voting rights of member states can be suspended if it is determined that 
there is a clear risk of a serious breach of human rights or the respect for the rule of 
law. So far, this provision has not been put to use, despite serious concerns which have 
risen over the protection of fundamental rights in some member states. 44 Politically, 
it has proven diffi  cult to actually take concrete steps on the basis of this provision. 45 
Th erefore, actions are usually taken more indirectly and on an informal basis to address 
some of the more general rule of law issues in the member states which the EU seeks 
to address. 46 
 6.5.  THE CHARTER 
 With the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, as explained earlier, the Charter gained legally binding 
status and was given the same legal status as the EU Treaties. 47 Th e Charter contains a 
collection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights which are set out over 
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 48  Craig  & De B ú rca (2015), p. 396. 
 49  Cf. the fi ft h paragraph of the preamble of the Charter. 
 50  Gerards (2016), (section 1.). Cf. Heringa  & Verhey (2001), pp. 13 – 14. Also, Article 47 of the Charter 
is not restricted, as Article 6 ECHR is, to civil and criminal cases. 
 51  Article 51(1) is discussed in section 6.7.; Article 53 is discussed in section 6.8.; Article 52(3) is 
discussed in section 6.9.2.; and Article 52(5) is discussed in section 6.10. 
 52  It has been questioned whether the explanations provide the most authoritative source of interpretation 
of the Charter, as Article 52(7) merely requires the EU and member states courts to have  ‘ due regard ’ 
to these explanations which have been drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation 
of the Charter ’ s provisions, see e.g. Lock (2009), pp. 383 – 385; and Gragl (2014), pp. 1742 – 1743. 
 53  See e.g. ECJ 15 February 2016, C-601/15,  J.N. , para. 47. 
six diff erent chapters headed by the titles  ‘ Dignity ’,  ‘ Freedoms ’,  ‘ Equality ’,  ‘ Solidarity ’, 
 ‘ Citizens ’ rights ’ and  ‘ Justice ’. Th is primarily concerns a codifi cation of rights which 
were either already recognised by the ECJ in its case-law, by the member states, or 
which could be found in other international or regional human rights treaties. Th ere 
has thus been quite some debate about the added value of the Charter in relation to the 
rights that were already protected under EU law or by the member states ’ constitutions. 
Aft er all, it mainly contains rights which can be found elsewhere and the EU was 
already bound to protect such rights on the basis of the general principles which have 
been developed by the ECJ in its case-law. 48 Th e intentions for draft ing the Charter 
were, indeed, primarily to consolidate the rights which were protected within Europe 
and to give more visibility to these rights within the context of EU law. 49 Nevertheless, 
some rights contained in the Charter are considered to provide additional value to the 
rights which are guaranteed by the Convention. Examples thereof include the right to 
good administration, the right to conduct a business, the rights of the child, and several 
social and economic rights. 50 
 Another important and  ‘ novel ’ feature of the Charter is that it includes several 
provisions which further spell out how the Charter is to be applied in relation to 
national law and the ECHR, and how it is to be interpreted. Th ese  ‘ horizontal ’ 
provisions are contained in Article 51 to 54 of the Charter. Th ey have appeared to 
be of great importance, and some of which will be discussed in some more detail in 
this chapter, as well as in chapters 8 and 9. 51 In addition, the  ‘ explanations ’ which 
have been draft ed to further clarify the provisions of the Charter must be taken into 
account. Article 52(7) of the Charter specifi cally requires the ECJ and the national 
courts to give due regard to these explanations in the interpretation of the Charter. 52 
Th e explanations can be of great relevance, and the ECJ has already referred to these 
in its judgments. 53 
 Th e ECJ is thus given various directions by the specifi c text of the provisions of the 
Charter, and the explanations of the specifi c provisions of the Charter, regarding how 
to determine the scope of the rights which individuals must be given under EU law as 
well as the obligations on the EU institutions and the member states. Seeing that these 
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 54  For a discussion of the importance of an originalist interpretation of the Charter, see Brittain (2015). 
In comparison, an historical interpretation of the Convention has been considered less important, 
because the Convention is much older. Th e ECtHR has interpreted the Convention as a living 
instrument, which means that its interpretation of fundamental rights has evolved over the years, see 
section 2.6.2. 
 55  Th e Court of Justice has also used its case-law on general principles of law, in particular, to further 
interpret Article 16 of the Charter on the freedom to conduct a business, cf. ECJ 22 January 2013, 
C-283/11,  Sky  Ö sterreich , paras 41 ff . 
 56  See further Hofman  & Mihaescu (2013). 
 57  ECJ 17 July 2014, Joined cases C-141/12 and C-372/12,  YS and others , para. 67; ECJ 22 November 
2012, C-277/11,  M. , paras 81 ff .; and ECJ 5 November 2014, C-166/13,  Mukarubega , paras 43 ff . 
provisions and explanations have been draft ed relatively recently, it is expected that the 
ECJ will pay specifi c attention to these directions. 54 
 6.6.  THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 
 Aft er gaining binding force, the Charter has quickly become the main source of 
fundamental rights within the EU for the ECJ as well as for the other EU institutions 
(see section 6.4.). General principles of EU law, which initially were the only basis 
which the ECJ used to protect fundamental rights, continue, however, to be a relevant 
source for the protection of fundamental rights under EU law. In principle, when a 
specifi c fundamental right can be found in the Charter itself, the ECJ seems to prefer 
to rely on that written provision instead of the corresponding general principle of EU 
law. However, the ECJ still oft en refers to the right to eff ective judicial protection as 
a general principle of EU law alongside the written version of that right laid down 
in Article 47 of the Charter, or sometimes even instead thereof. 55 General principles 
of EU law thus continue to be considered to provide some added value to the rights 
laid down in the Charter. 56 Th ey also may function as a source of interpretation for 
the rights of the Charter. Th e right to eff ective judicial protection, for example, has 
been formulated very broadly in Article 47, while the more specifi c aspects recognised 
in the Court ’ s case-law on fundamental rights as principles may help to provide for 
some detail in explaining this provision. Th e general principles of EU law can also 
function as a complement to rights which have been formulated (too) narrowly in the 
Charter. Th is applies in particular to Article 41 of the Charter on the right to good 
administration. Th is provision has been formulated in such a way that it is addressed 
only to the institutions of the EU, and the ECJ has indeed declared that Article 41 of 
the Charter is limited to those institutions. However, it has also clarifi ed that when 
the authorities of the member states are implementing EU law, they nevertheless must 
respect the principles of good administration developed by the ECJ in its case-law, 
such as the principle of the rights of defence. 57 For this reason, and for the reasons 
mentioned earlier, general principles of EU law continue to play an important role for 
the protection of fundamental rights in the EU. 
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 58  See also Sarmiento (2013), pp. 1270 and 1274. 
 59  Of interest in this regard is the decision of the ECJ in the case of  Ledra Advertising which clarifi ed that 
the Commission must ensure that actions taken in the context of the European Stablity Mechanism 
respect fudamental rights, in particular, the right to property, see ECJ 20 September 2016, Joined cases 
C-8/15 and C-10/15, Ledra Advertising, paras 58 and 66. 
 60  See most recently Dougan (2015); and Sarmiento (2013). 
 61  ECJ 26 February 2013, C-617/10,  Å kerberg Fransson , para. 19. 
 62  Th e case of  Annibaldi represents a situation in which EU fundamental rights do not apply. Th e Court 
of Justice did not fi nd suffi  cient connection to specifi c rules of EU law that could have brought the 
situation within the scope of EU law, see ECJ 19 December 1997, C-309/96,  Annibaldi . 
 6.7.  THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF EU FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 
 6.7.1.  THE VERTICAL SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF EU 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 EU fundamental rights can only be applied to matters that fall within the scope of 
application of EU law. Article 51(1) of the Charter contains the main rule which 
governs the scope of application of the Charter ’ s provisions. Th is provision is immensely 
important as it provides the starting point for determining if the provisions of the 
Charter need to be applied. 58 Article 51(1) stipulates that: 
 Th e provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offi  ces and agencies of 
the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States, only when 
they are implementing Union law. Th ey shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles 
and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting 
the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties. 
 Th e provisions of the Charter are accordingly addressed, fi rst, to the institutions of the 
EU and, secondly, to the member states of the EU. Evidently, the EU institutions are 
bound to protect the rights of the Charter. 59 Th e application of EU fundamental rights 
to the actions of the member states is a more complicated matter. In fact, this topic has 
so far given rise to the greatest number of preliminary questions concering the Charter 
since it became legally binding. 60 Th e precise delimitation of the scope of application 
of EU fundamental rights to the actions of member states has not appeared to be easy. 
 For example, according to Article 51(1), the rights of the Charter are addressed 
to the member states in so far as they are  ‘ implementing Union law ’. In the case of 
 Å kerberg Fransson , the ECJ delivered a seminal judgment on what this phrase means. 
It has fi rst clarifi ed that the provision laid down in Article 51(1) followed from its 
earlier case-law. 61 Also, the explanations relating to Article 51 of the Charter referred 
to the earlier judgments of the ECJ in  Wachauf ,  ERT and  Annibaldi . Th e former two 
cases in particular had provided important guidance on when EU fundamental rights 
needed to be complied with. 62 Th e case of  Wachauf forms a classic situation of where 
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 63  ECJ 13 July 1989, C-5/88,  Wachauf . 
 64  See e.g. Sarmiento (2013). 
 65  ECJ 18 June 1991, C-260/89,  ERT , para. 43. Th is type of situation was affi  rmed more recently in ECJ 
30 April 2014, C-30/12,  Pfl eger and others , para. 35. 
 66  ECJ 26 February 2013, C-617/10,  Å kerberg Fransson , para. 21. In the explanations to the Charter a 
somewhat similar interpretation of Article 51(1) is given. In the second section thereof it is stated that 
 ‘ the requirement to respect fundamental rights defi ned in the context of the Union is only binding on 
the Member States when they act in the scope of Union law ’ . 
 67  Th is is explained further in section 9.2.1. It had been questioned by the Advocate General in the 
opinion on this case whether there was indeed a suffi  cient connection to EU law, see Opinion A-G 
Cruz Villal ó n in C-617/10,  Å kerberg Fransson , para. 40. 
 68  Cf. ECJ 21 December 2011, Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10,  N.S. and others . 
 69  See e.g. ECJ 22 November 2005, C-144/04,  Mangold ; and ECJ 16 September 2010, C-149/10,  Chatzi . 
EU fundamental rights need to be complied with by the member states. It concerns the 
situation where member states are implementing the provisions of a Directive. 63 In this 
situation, member states are considered to be acting on behalf of the Union, and this 
therefore is oft en referred to as the  ‘ agency situation ’. 64 Th e case of  ERT concerns the 
second  ‘ classic ’ situation where member states need to comply with EU fundamental 
rights. It concerns the situation where member states take measures that limit the 
fundamental free movement rights of the Treaty. When member states aim to justify 
such derogations from EU law, they need to comply with EU fundamental rights. 65 In 
the case of  Å kerberg Fransson , the ECJ has more generally explained that: 
 the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must  … be complied with where national 
legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, situations cannot exist which are 
covered in that way by European Union law without those fundamental rights being applicable. 
Th e applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter. 66 
 By developing this specifi c criterion of  ‘ where national legislation falls within the scope 
of European Union law ’, the ECJ has established a wide scope of application of EU 
fundamental rights. Th is criterion allows for various situations to be caught by the 
application of the Charter, including those where national laws have not been adopted 
to give eff ect to provisions of EU law. 67 Th e ECJ has also accepted that member states 
must respect EU fundamental rights when they have been given discretion to take 
certain measures in the implementation of EU law. 68 Th e ECJ has even accepted that 
some situations fell within the scope of EU law, even though it is still not entirely clear 
why it deemed this to be so. 69 Th e ECJ has not provided for a clear categorisation of the 
diff erent types of situations which fall within the scope of application of EU fundamental 
rights. Instead, it has approached the clarifi cation of the scope of application of EU 
fundamental rights in a casuistic manner. 
 In several judgments following the case of  Å kerberg Fransson , the ECJ has given 
further clarifi cation as to the scope of application of EU fundamental rights, which 
seem to stress that there needs to be a suffi  ciently close connection to EU law to allow 
Intersentia122
Th e Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU
 70  ECJ 6 March 2014, C-206/13,  Siragusa , paras 24 – 25. 
 71  See ECJ 8 November 2012, C-40/11,  Iida , para. 79; ECJ 10 July 2014, C-198/13,  Julian Hern á ndez and 
others , paras 32 ff .; and ECJ 27 March 2014, C-265/13,  Torralbo Marcos , paras 32 – 36. 
 72  Cf. ECJ 5 October 2010, C-400/10,  McB. ; ECJ 27 November 2012, C-370/12,  Pringle , paras 179 – 182; 
and ECJ 7 March 2013, C-128/12,  Sindicato dos Banc á rios do Norte and others ; and ECJ 27 November 
2012, C-370/12,  Pringle , paras 179 – 182; and ECJ 11 November 2014, C-333/13,  Dano . 
 73  It has been suggested that the lack of clarity about the scope of application of EU fundamental rights 
has had a  ‘ strong paralysing eff ect ’ , see Morijn (2014), p. 132. 
 74  Th is particular issue is further discussed in section 9.2. 
 75  Th e ECtHR has ensured that fundamental rights can be applied indirectly in disputes between private 
parties by accepting developing positive obligations for states. Cf. the discussions over the horizontal 
application of the Convention in section 2.8., and in relation to the doctrine of positive obligations, 
section 4.3. 
EU fundamental rights to be applied. In its judgment in the case of  Siragusa , the ECJ 
has explained that: 
 … the concept of  ‘ implementing Union law ’, as referred to in Article 51 of the Charter, 
requires a certain degree of connection above and beyond the matters being closely related or 
one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other …. 
 In order to determine whether national legislation involves the implementation for the 
purposes of Article 51 of the Charter, some of the points to be determined are whether that 
legislation intended to implement a provision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and 
whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it is capable of 
indirectly aff ecting EU law; and also whether there are specifi c rules of EU law on the matter 
or capable of aff ecting it … 70 
 Th is line of reasoning has also been reiterated in other cases. 71 In another series of 
judgments, the ECJ has clarifi ed that various measures fall outside the scope of 
application of EU fundamental rights. 72 
 Gradually, the ECJ is thus bringing clarity as to the exact scope of application of EU 
fundamental rights in respect of the actions of the member states. 73 Th ere needs to be 
a suffi  ciently strong connection to obligations that are laid down in EU law, which is of 
particular importance to ensure that the competences of the EU do not expand. 74 Th e 
topic of the scope of application of EU law is discussed in detail in chapter 9 to fi nd 
whether it allows for a development of positive obligations by the ECJ to take place. 
 6.7.2.  THE HORIZONTAL SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER 
 Another important dimension related to the scope of application of the Charter is its 
horizontal scope of application. Th e scope for the application of fundamental rights 
between two private parties is also of particular interest in relation to the development 
of positive obligations to protect fundamental rights under EU law. Th ey are two 
diff erent forms to secure that fundamental rights are respected in situations between 
two private parties. 75 
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 Article 51(1) of the Charter does not clarify of itself whether fundamental rights are 
to be given horizontal eff ect (see section 6.7.1.), because it is as such addressed to the 
EU institutions and the member states. 76 
 So far, the ECJ has accepted the horizontal direct eff ect of EU law in certain situations 
in its case-law, and it has also accepted a certain indirect horizontal eff ect of fundamental 
rights in its case-law. 
 In disputes with other individuals, the ECJ has established that individuals can 
directly rely on the EU ’ s Treaty provisions on the free movement of workers and services 
as well as establishment. 77 In this type of case, a certain indirect eff ect of fundamental 
rights can also be applied, that is, when one of the parties invokes a fundamental 
right as a justifi cation for the restriction of the free movement rights. 78 Furthermore, 
there can be an indirect eff ect of fundamental rights where individuals rely on certain 
provisions of EU secondary legislation in combination with provisions of fundamental 
rights in disputes with other private parties. 79 Th is may, in particular, occur in the area 
of employment law or in the area of privacy law, where there is specifi c EU secondary 
legislation that aims to secure the protection of fundamental rights in horizontal 
situations, such as the right to privacy and the protection of personal data which are 
protected by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. 80 In those cases, the indirect horizontal 
eff ect of EU fundamental rights in particular, and of EU law in general, is secured by 
the national courts that apply such rights. National courts have been required by the 
ECJ to interpret national law as far as possible in conformity with EU law (including 
fundamental rights), and to set aside national law which is not in conformity with EU 
law. 81 Th ey may further accept state liability for the incorrect implementation of EU law 
on the basis of the principle of loyal cooperation, as protected by Article 4(3) TEU. 82 
 It has further been debated, especially in recent years, whether the ECJ has also 
allowed for direct horizontal eff ect of fundamental rights on the basis of its judgments 
in the cases of  Mangold, K ü c ü kdeveci and  AMS . 83 In the cases of  Mangold and 
 K ü c ü kdeveci , the ECJ has required the national courts to apply the principle of non-
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 88  ECJ 15 January 2014, C-176/12,  AMS , para. 47. 
 89  See in particular De Mol (2013). 
discrimination on grounds of age, as a general principle of EU law, in a dispute between 
an employer and an employee. Th ese cases were brought within the scope of application 
of EU law on the basis of certain provisions laid down in EU Directives. However, in the 
case of  Mangold , the provision had not been implemented correctly into national law, 
and in the case of  K ü c ü kdeveci , the provision had not yet been implemented because 
the period for implementing the Directive had not expired. In the cases of  Mangold 
and  K ü c ü cdeveci , the ECJ decided that the national courts still needed to protect the 
principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age, and set aside national legislation if 
necessary to comply with that principle. 84 Th e ECJ has, however, always precluded the 
horizontal direct eff ect of provisions laid down in Directives itself, because Directives 
cannot by themselves confer obligations on individuals. 85 
 So far the ECJ has not extended the approach which it developed in  Mangold and 
 K ü c ü kdeveci to other cases on fundamental rights, and there seem to be as many 
proponents as opponents to its doing so. 86 In the  AMS case, the ECJ clearly rejected 
a horizontal direct application of the right to information and consultation within 
the undertaking as guaranteed by Article 27 of the Charter. 87 Th e ECJ held that this 
provision did not in itself confer rights on individuals which they could invoke as 
such. 88 Th e minimal reasoning of the ECJ in these cases, however, provides much room 
for debate on the potential for the horizontal application of EU fundamental rights in 
other types of cases and in respect of other types of fundamental rights. 89 
 6.8.  THE SCOPE FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER EU LAW AND THE 
PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
 When national measures fall within the scope of application of EU law and EU 
fundamental rights, there are consequences for the scope of application of national 
standards of fundamental rights. Where member states are  ‘ implementing Union law ’ 
within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter, they need to comply with the EU 
standard of fundamental rights, as explained in the previous section. Article 53 of the 
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Charter then allows the member states to provide for a higher level of protection of 
fundamental rights. Th is provision holds that: 
 Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely aff ecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fi elds of application, by Union law 
and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member 
States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Fundamental 
Freedoms, and by Member States ’ constitutions. 
 Questions have been raised as to what this provision would exactly entail. Would it 
(always) allow for the highest standards of fundamental rights, on the basis of national 
or other sources of international law, to be applied ? And how exactly does it aim to 
reconcile the application of parallel sources of fundamental rights ? Th e ECJ has given 
an answer to some of these questions in the case of  Melloni . 90 Th is case was about the 
execution of a European Arrest Warrant which was issued by the Italian authorities to 
execute a prison sentence determined in a judgment  in absentia against Mr Melloni. 
Th e Spanish constitutional court had referred questions to the ECJ in this case because 
the surrender would interfere with an essential component of the right to a fair trial 
as guaranteed under the Spanish constitution, and this was not indicated by the four 
exceptions under the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant that would 
allow national courts to refuse to agree to the surrender. Th e Spanish constitutional 
court asked the ECJ whether it could provide a higher level of protection on the basis 
of its national constitution in light of Article 53 of the Charter. In its judgment, the ECJ 
clarifi ed that: 
 … Article 53 of the Charter confi rms that, where an EU legal act calls for national implementing 
measures, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection 
of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as 
interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of EU law are not thereby 
compromised. 91 
 Th e protection of the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of EU law thus needed to be 
given priority over the highest level of fundamental rights protection. 92 In this case, 
the principle of mutual recognition, which was an important principle underlying the 
Framework Decision, would have been put at risk if Spain had refused the surrender 
based on its national constitution. Th e ECJ also explained in  Melloni that the Framework 
Decision refl ected a consensus that had already been reached by the member states 
regarding the procedural rights that were to be given to persons who are the subject of a 
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European Arrest Warrant. 93 Based on such considerations, the ECJ determined that the 
Framework Decision was to be considered compatible with the right to eff ective judicial 
review as guaranteed under EU law. 
 Some scholars have provided a nuanced account of this judgment as still allowing the 
member states the discretion to apply their national fundamental rights standards, even 
in situations that do fall within the scope of EU law. 94 Th ey consider that there is room 
for member states to apply their own fundamental rights standards in situations which 
are not completely determined by EU law, which the ECJ also clarifi ed in its judgment 
in  Å kerberg Fransson . In that case, there was clear discretion for the member states in 
the implementation of EU law. Th e ECJ also held, however, that national courts would 
fi rst need to send a preliminary question to the ECJ if they were to have doubts about 
the scope for applying higher standards of protection under EU law. 95 
 Especially in areas of EU law which are governed by the principle of mutual 
recognition, there can be a more limited scope for the application of higher standards of 
fundamental rights on the basis of national law, however. Under EU law, member states 
have decided to cooperate on civil, administrative and criminal matters on the basis of 
the principle of mutual recognition. Th is essentially means that they need to respect 
each other ’ s (diff erent) standards, and that there is mutual trust between the member 
states with regard to their compliance with (international) legal obligations, including 
the protection of fundamental rights. In several cases, concerns have been raised over 
whether other member states actually secured a suffi  cient level of fundamental rights 
protection based on their own national law. For example, in the case of  N.S. and others , 
member states were required to send asylum seekers back to the the member state in 
which they had fi rst arrived in the EU on the basis of the Dublin Regulation and on 
the basis of the principle of mutual recognition. 96 In that case, this would have meant 
that asylum seekers needed to be sent back to Greece, although there was a serious risk 
of violation of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment as a result of the 
poor conditions for the reception of asylum seekers in that member state. In response 
to the questions referred to it by national courts, the ECJ made it clear that national 
courts cannot transfer asylum seekers back to the member state of fi rst arrival  ‘ where 
they cannot be unaware of the systemic defi ciencies in the asylum procedure and in 
the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State ’ that amount to a real 
risk of treatment contrary to the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment 
guaranteed by Article 4 of the Charter. 97 
 Th is confl ict with the principle of mutual recognition also arose in the case of 
 Aranyosi and C ă ld ă ru , where national courts had asked questions to the ECJ about the 
Intersentia 127
Chapter 6. Main Principles of the EU System of Fundamental Rights Protection
 98  ECJ 5 April 2016, Joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15,  Aranyosi and C ă ld ă ru , paras 92 and 104. 
 99  ECJ 5 April 2016, Joined cases C-404/15 and C-659/15,  Aranyosi and C ă ld ă ru , paras 88 ff . 
 100  See ECJ 18 December 2013,  Opinion 2/13 , paras 191 – 192. 
 101  See ECJ 26 February 2013, C-617/10,  Å kerberg Fransson , para. 44; and ECJ 24 April 2012, C-517/10, 
 Kamberaj , para. 60; and ECJ 18 December 2014,  Opinion 2/13 , para. 179. As to the specifi c status 
which the Convention is expected to acquire under EU law, see also the View of Advocate General 
Kokott to  Opinion 2/13 , which was delivered on 13 June 2014, paras 197 – 207. 
 102  In comparison to the Convention, the rights of the Charter also are less negatively phrased. 
execution of two European Arrest Warrants issued by Hungary and by Romania, because 
it had serious concerns about whether the detention conditions in those member states 
complied with fundamental rights standards. 98 Again, the ECJ accepted that to be able 
to execute a European Arrest Warrant member states need to assess whether another 
member state is complying with fundamental rights, if they are in the possession of 
evidence of a real risk of inhuman and degrading treatment of individuals detained in 
member state which issued the European Arrest Warrant. In its judgment, the ECJ set 
out in detail under which conditions this postponement could take place and, indeed, 
what the national authorities would have to do when faced with this type of situation. 99 
 Th e cases of  N.S. and others and  Aranyosi and C ă ld ă ru show that the ECJ is willing to 
provide exceptions to the application of the principle of mutual recognition, especially 
where there are risks of serious interference with a fundamental right. However, the 
ECJ more generally stressed in  Opinion 2/13 that, save for exceptional circumstances, 
the member states need not check whether other member states are complying with EU 
law and with fundamental rights. 100 
 6.9.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND THE 
EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 6.9.1.  THE STATUS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND JUDGMENTS OF THE ECtHR UNDER EU LAW 
 Although the Convention has not yet been given a legally binding status under EU 
law, it plays an important role in this legal order. 101 As has already been explained, the 
rights under the Convention originally provided an important reference for the ECJ in 
the development of general principles of EU law in its case-law. Th e same rights laid 
down in the Convention are now also to be found in the Charter, spread throughout 
its diff erent chapters. Th e formulation of the rights in the Charter is oft en diff erent, 
however, to the extent that modern adaptations have been made to the formulation 
of the provisions of the Convention. 102 For example, Article 5 of the Charter, which 
prohibits slavery and forced labour, specifi cally makes provision for the prohibition of 
human traffi  cking, and therefore adds to the rights protected by Article 4 ECHR. 
Intersentia128
Th e Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU
 103  Douglas-Scott (2006), pp. 644 – 650. 
 Importantly, Article 52(3) of the Charter in general requires that the Convention 
must be taken into account in the interpretation of the rights laid down in the Charter. 
Article 52(3) of the Charter stipulates that: 
 In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of 
those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. Th is provision shall 
not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection. 
 Article 52(3) thus aims to provide consistency between the interpretation of 
fundamental rights under the Charter and the Convention. In the explanations to the 
Charter, a precise list of the specifi c rights of the Charter which are held to correspond 
to the rights of the Convention is provided. Some of the rights in the Charter have a 
much wider scope as compared to the corresponding provisions in the Convention, 
however, as is also expressly allowed for under the last sentence of Article 52(3). 
Th erefore, the explanations to the Charter include a list of rights which are to be given 
the same meaning as the corresponding Convention rights, but where the scope of the 
Charter provisions is wider. An important example is the right to a fair trial, which 
under Article 6 ECHR is limited to civil and criminal cases, while this restriction is not 
laid down in Article 47 of the Charter. Th is means that it applies to disputes in all areas 
of law, provided that they fall within the scope of EU law. 
 Article 52(3) of the Charter itself is not very clear about the degree to which the 
judgments of the ECtHR are to be taken into account in the interpretation of the 
corresponding Charter rights. Th e judgments of the ECtHR are specifi cally mentioned 
in the explanations to Article 52(3) as the authoritative source for the interpretation of 
the rights guaranteed by the Convention. Th ere, it is held that: 
 Th e meaning and the scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text of those 
instruments, but also by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union. Th e last sentence of the paragraph is designed to allow the 
Union to guarantee more extensive protection. In any event, the level of protection aff orded by 
the Charter may never be lower than that guaranteed by the ECHR. 
 Considering that the scope and the meaning of the rights of the Convention are to a 
great extent to be found in the case-law of the ECtHR, it seems quite evident that the 
judgments of the ECtHR are taken into account in the interpretation of the same rights 
laid down in the Charter. Th e ECJ has, especially in the past, made clear references in 
its case-law to specifi c judgments of the ECtHR which were relevant for it to interpret 
a fundamental right. 103 However, as has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, the 
current reasoning of the ECJ on fundamental rights matters is predominantly based 
on the EU ’ s own provisions of fundamental rights which are contained in the Charter. 
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References to provisions of the Convention and the case-law of the ECtHR by the ECJ 
have decreased since 2009. 104 Th is has given rise to the fear that the ECJ will not be 
willing to take the judgments of the ECtHR into account, and that it may therefore 
interpret fundamental rights in a diff erent way. 105 
 Also, in the explanations to Article 52(3) of the Charter, a certain limitation is 
expressed with regard to the eff ect of the Convention under EU law. It holds that: 
 Th is [Article 52(3)] means in particular that the legislator, in laying down limitations to 
those rights, must comply with the same standards as are fi xed by the detailed limitation 
arrangements laid down in the ECHR, which are thus made applicable for the rights covered by 
this paragraph, without thereby adversely aff ecting the autonomy of Union law and of that of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. 106 
 Th e autonomous interpretation of EU law indeed has been of great concern to the 
ECJ, and this could be aff ected if the Court were to fully bind itself to Convention 
as well as the judgments of the ECtHR on the protection of fundamental rights. 
 Opinion 2/13 also seems to show that the ECJ is not willing to fully bind itself, in 
particular, to the judgments of the ECtHR. To briefl y explain, in  Opinion 2/13 , in which 
the ECJ found several aspects of the draft  accession agreement to be incompatible with 
EU law, the ECJ stressed that the accession agreement must take into account that the 
EU is not to be considered to be a state and that the EU has created a new kind of legal 
order which has specifi c characteristics that need to be preserved. 107 Th e ECJ held that 
the autonomy of EU law would be put at risk by the external judicial review of the 
ECtHR if the ECtHR were to judge over the division of competences between the EU 
and its member states. 108 Crucial concerns which the ECJ raised in its opinion included 
that the accession agreement had not suffi  ciently taken into account that in certain 
areas, such as the area of freedom, security and justice, the member states ’ obligations 
are governed by the principle of mutual trust which, according to the ECJ, precludes the 
member states from checking whether other member states have observed fundamental 
rights, save in exceptional circumstances. 109 Also, in respect of the arrangements which 
have been envisaged for the establishment of the co-respondent mechanism, the ECJ 
found that the assessment of the admissibility of a request by the EU or a member states 
to become co-respondent in a procedure before the ECtHR would put the autonomy 
of EU law at risk. 110 Any (future) assessment made by the ECtHR in this procedure 
over the question whether the EU or a member state is responsible for a breach of the 
Convention, or whether they are jointly responsible, would frustrate the EU ’ s rules on 
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the division of competences between the EU and its member states. Also, the accession 
agreement does not provide for any specifi c arrangements as regards the jurisdiction of 
the ECtHR in the area of the common foreign and security policy. 111 In this particular 
area, the jurisdiction of the ECJ is restricted, and therefore, according to the ECJ, the 
jurisdiction of the ECtHR must be limited as well. 
 Th ese concerns may partially explain why the ECJ has expressed its reservations to 
fully accepting the Convention and the judgments of the ECtHR. According to the ECJ, 
the autonomy of EU law would be aff ected if interpretations on fundamental rights 
provisions provided by external sources such as the ECtHR were to become binding 
on the EU. 
 Despite all this, the ECJ still refers to the judgments of the ECtHR, even aft er it 
delivered  Opinion 2/13 . 112 Indeed, since the scope and the meaning of the rights of the 
Charter cannot, in accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, be interpreted more 
restrictively under EU law, there does not in fact seem to be room for the ECJ to provide 
an interpretation that goes beyond the scope and meaning which has been given under 
the Convention. 
 Th e specifi c way in which the ECJ has dealt with the Convention and the judgments 
of the ECtHR is discussed from a more critical perspective in chapter 7. 113 
 6.9.2.  OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION BETWEEN THE ECtHR 
AND THE ECJ 
 Since all of the EU member states are also party to the Convention, it may happen that 
individuals bring complaints to the ECtHR on matters related to EU law. On several 
occasions, the ECtHR has been asked to decide on violations of the Convention by its 
states parties in situations where there was a clear connection to EU law. Th erefore, 
there is, to some extent, an overlapping jurisdiction of the ECtHR and the ECJ and it 
is of importance for both courts to take each other ’ s case-law into account. Particularly 
noteworthy is the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece . 114 
Th is case concerned the transferral of asylum seekers under the EU Dublin Regulation 
(see section 6.8.). Th e case of  M.S.S. showed that there were serious shortcomings in 
the conditions for the reception of asylum seekers in Greece, as well as in relation to the 
procedures for application for asylum there. Th e ECtHR decided that asylum seekers 
could not be sent back to a certain member state if there was ground to believe that 
Intersentia 131
Chapter 6. Main Principles of the EU System of Fundamental Rights Protection
 115  ECtHR 21 January 2011, no. 30696/09,  MSS v. Belgium and Greece , para. 358. 
 116  ECJ 21 December 2011, Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10,  N.S. and others , paras 88 – 89. Cf. in 
relation to this ECJ 18 December 2014,  Opinion 2/14 , paras 191 – 194; and the discussion in section 6.8. 
 117  Most recently on the right to protection of personal data, cf. ECJ 8 April 2014, Joined cases C-293/12 
and 594/12,  Digital Rights Ireland ; ECJ 6 October 2015, C-362/14,  Schrems ; ECtHR 4 December 
2015, no. 47143/06,  Zakharov v. Russia . On the liability of internet search providers for individual 
comments, see ECJ 13 May 2014, C-131/12,  Google Spain ; and ECtHR 16 June 2015, no. 64569/09, 
 Delfi  and others v. Estonia . Also, in relation to the grounds for detention of aylum seekers, cf. ECJ 15 
February 2016, C-601/15 PPU,  J.N. ; and ECtHR 22 September 2015, no. 62116/12,  Nabil and others v. 
Hungary . 
 118  ECtHR 30 June 2006, no. 45036/98,  Bosphorus v. Ireland . 
 119  See also ECtHR 18 February 1999, no. 24833/94,  Matthews v. the United Kingdom , para. 33. 
 120  ECtHR 30 June 2006, no. 45036/98,  Bosphorus v. Ireland , paras 152 – 157. See further Costello (2006). 
 121  ECtHR 30 June 2006, no. 45036/98,  Bosphorus v. Ireland , paras 159 – 166. 
they would be put at risk of facing treatment which was contrary to the prohibition of 
degrading treatment as protected by Article 3 ECHR. 115 Shortly aft er this judgment, the 
ECJ itself also affi  rmed this approach in  N.S. and others  – although seemingly under 
somewhat more narrow conditions. 116 
 Th ere are several other overlapping areas of law or topics in which both the ECtHR 
and the ECJ have delivered judgments. Th is includes  inter alia the area of data protection 
as well as the detention conditions of asylum seekers. 117 
 It can be said that the ECtHR secures a certain form of indirect review of the 
fundamental rights obligations of states under EU law when it decides on cases where 
member states are implementing EU law, such as in the case of  M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece. If states do not have any discretion, however, to deviate from their obligations 
under EU law, the ECtHR can be expected to apply a very deferential type of review. 
Th e ECtHR developed this particular approach in the case of  Bosphorus . 118 In this case, 
the ECtHR clarifi ed that states are not precluded from transferring competences to 
international organisations such as the EU, provided that the rights of the Convention 
are secured. 119 States parties remain responsible for all acts and omissions which are 
based on domestic and international law. 120 Where states parties implement obligations 
from an international organisation which protects fundamental rights in a manner 
which is at least equivalent to the Convention, the ECtHR will, however, apply a 
presumption that states parties act in conformity with fundamental rights. Th e ECtHR 
has explained that this presumption can be rebutted if it considers that the protection of 
fundamental rights in the specifi c case is manifestly defi cient. In the case of  Bosphorus , 
the ECtHR came to the conclusion that the EU indeed provided an equivalent level of 
fundamental rights protection, taking into account the various steps the EU has taken 
over the years to ensure protection of fundamental rights, and also that the protection 
that was provided to the applicant in that case was not manifestly defi cient. 121 
 To clarify, this  Bosphorus approach does not apply to situations where member states 
have discretion in the implementation of EU law, nor in situations where the ECJ has 
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not already exercised control of fundamental rights compliance through a preliminary 
reference procedure. 122 
 Th is current limited approach of the ECtHR to the fundamental rights review of its 
states parties comprises one of the reasons why the accession of the EU to the accession 
is considered necessary. It is expected that, aft er accession, the ECtHR would no longer 
apply its  Bosphorus doctrine, 123 and the EU would then be considered equal to other 
states parties to the Convention. 124 
 6.10.  THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RIGHTS AND 
PRINCIPLES UNDER THE CHARTER 
 Th e Charter establishes a particular distinction between  rights and  principles . According 
to Article 52(5) of the Charter: 
 Th e provisions of this Charter which contain principles may be implemented by legislative 
and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offi  ces and agencies of the Union, and by acts 
of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in the exercise of their respective 
powers. Th ey shall be judicially cognisable only in the interpretation of such acts and in the 
ruling on their legality. 
 Article 51(1) also mentions rights and principles; this provision stipulates that 
rights must be  respected and principles must be  observed . Th e distinction between 
rights and principles is mainly relevant for the enforceability of individual claims 
through the courts, which is clearly more limited for principles than it is for rights. 
Such a special, more limited status for principles appeared necessary to be included 
in the Charter, especially because the Charter contains many social rights, which the 
member states did not like to be directly justiciable for individuals. 125 Problematically, 
however, it is not exactly clear which of the Charter ’ s provisions contain rights and 
which contain principles, nor are the implications of the divide immediately obvious. 
As has appeared from the discussions in part I, the distinction between clear rights 
and vague principles does not necessarily correspond to the distinction between civil 
and political rights as opposed to social, cultural and economic rights. Both types of 
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rights may confer relatively clear and subjective individual rights. 126 Little guidance 
is provided by the Charter as to which fundamental rights laid down in the Charter 
may be characterised as rights and which as principles, and its provisions do not as 
such clarify whether they contain rights or principles. Th e explanations to the Charter 
mention that principles appear in the fi eld of social law, in particular, and name as 
a few examples: Article 25 on the rights of the elderly, Article 26 on the integration 
of persons with disabilities and Article 37 on environmental protection. In addition, 
the explanations clarify that provisions of the Charter may contain both rights and 
principles at the same time, mentioning Article 23 on the equality between men and 
women, Article 33 on family and professional life and Article 34 on social security and 
social assistance as examples. Further clarifi cations as regards the distinction between 
rights and principles have deliberately been left  to be explored further in case-law. 
 Th e diff erence between rights and principles may be held to relate mainly to the 
nature of principles, which, contrary to rights, are not formulated very clearly and do 
not confer subjective rights on individuals. For that reason, suffi  cient leeway must be 
given to the legislative and executive authorities in the implementation of principles 
and thus the assessments by courts of such legislative and administrative acts must be 
restrained. Indeed, in the explanations to the Charter it is provided that: 
 Principles may be implemented through legislative or executive acts (adopted by the Union 
in accordance with its powers, and by the Member States only when they implement Union 
law); accordingly they become signifi cant for the Courts only when such acts are interpreted 
or reviewed. Th ey do not however give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union ’ s 
institutions or Member States authorities. 127 
 Judicial review of principles must, according to the explanations, be limited to the 
interpretation and the assessment of the legality of EU law. Consequently, in the 
absence of any action taken by the EU, individuals cannot invoke principles as such 
as a ground for review. It remains somewhat unclear as to whether courts would only 
be able to interpret or review the legality of EU acts in light of a principle if those acts 
directly aimed at implementing a particular principle, or whether such review could 
go beyond such acts and be addressed in respect of a much broader range of legislative 
or executive acts in view where that principle would be of relevance. Interestingly, the 
divide between rights and principles in the Charter also has implications for the extent 
to which courts are allowed to defi ne positive obligations. 
 So far, it appears that the ECJ has tried to stay clear of touching upon this Charter 
distinction. Several cases have been brought before the ECJ in which the interpretation 
of Article 52(5) of the Charter appeared relevant, but in all of them the distinction was 
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 130  ECJ 22 May 2014, C-356/12,  Glatzel , paras 74 – 76. 
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the meaning of Article 52(5) of the Charter, has been used by the Court of Justice to assess the legality 
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only discussed in the opinions of the Advocates General. 128 In the case of  AMS , which 
was concerned with the application of Article 27 of the Charter guaranteeing the right 
of workers to information and consultation within an undertaking by national courts, 
the ECJ held that  ‘ for the article to be fully eff ective, it must be given more specifi c 
expression in European Union or national law ’, but did not refer to Article 52(5) as 
such. 129 So far, it is only in the case of  Glatzel that the ECJ addressed the matter. 130 Th is 
case was about the compatibility of the minimum standards of the physical fi tness of 
drivers of motor vehicles, laid down in an EU Directive,  inter alia in light of Article 
26 of the Charter on the integration of persons with a disability. Th is provision has 
been indicated by the explanations to the Charter as an example of a principle and was 
addressed by the ECJ as follows: 
 the principle enshrined by that article does not require the EU legislature to adopt any specifi c 
measure. In order for that article to be fully eff ective, it must be given more specifi c expression 
in European or national law. Accordingly, that article cannot by itself confer on individuals a 
subjective right which they may invoke as such  … 131 
 Th e Court ’ s interpretation confi rms that the main diff erence between rights and 
principles relates to the lack of precision which is inherent to the nature of principles. 
A principle, therefore, does not confer individual subjective rights. Article 26 
(which stipulates that  ‘ Th e Union recognises and respects the rights of persons with 
disabilities to benefi t from measures designed to ensure their independence, social 
and occupational integration and participation in the life of the community ’ ) does not 
confer subjective rights, nor does it contain much precision. Also, in the case of  Glatzel , 
the ECJ concluded that it could apply the principle as a ground for interpreting and 
reviewing the legality of the Directive as it intended to implement that principle in its 
provisions. 132 Th e ECJ thus adopted quite a narrow view as to the material scope of 
application of the principle in the interpretation and the review of legality of EU law. 133 
Moreover, this narrow view may be contested if it is taken into account that it would be 
very diffi  cult to hold EU institutions responsible for not observing principles in their 
activities, as they could very easily plead that those act did not intend to implement 
particular principles. Th is would clearly undermine the eff ective protection guaranteed 
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by these principles. Either way, however, scrutiny of EU law by the courts in light of 
principles will be restrained due to the generally broad formulation of principles, which 
do not provide clear-cut guidance to the courts. 
 6.11.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Th e importance of protecting fundamental rights has clearly been recognised under EU 
law. At fi rst, the ECJ played a strong role in the development of fundamental rights at 
the EU level, albeit under strong pressure by the national constitutional courts. By now, 
a clear political response has been given in order to ensure that fundamental rights are 
adequately protected within the scope of EU law. Th e entire range of actions which can 
be taken by the EU institutions and the member states in the diff erent policy fi elds of 
the EU are constrained by fundamental rights norms. Th e main rationale for this, as 
has been explained in this chapter, is not only to protect the rights of individuals and 
companies, but also to ensure the protection of the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of 
EU law. 
 At present, the Charter, which became legally binding in 2009, plays a central place 
in the protection of fundamental rights in the case-law of the ECJ, and it has become 
important to the political institutions. Th e rights laid down in the national constitutions 
and the rights guaranteed by the Convention also continue to be respected within the 
scope of EU law, in accordance with Article 6 TEU, and may still play a (limited) role. 
 Although since the Lisbon Treaty the EU is subject to an obligation to accede to 
the Convention, which could prevent divergences in the interpretation of fundamental 
rights, it has not yet complied with this obligation and the ECJ has expressed important 
reservations. Indeed, the ECJ currently appears to favour the development of the Charter 
over the incorporation of the Convention. In recent judgments the ECJ has made fewer 
references to the judgments of the ECtHR, and has paid more attention to interpreting 
the rights laid down in the Charter, including its  ‘ horizontal clauses ’ (Article 51 to 54 of 
the Charter). Th ereby, it has also responded to the increasing number of questions that 
have been raised on the interpretation of these horizontal clasuses. Th is has helped the 
Court to specify some rules on the scope of application of the Charter and the standards 
of fundamental rights applied at the national level and under the Convention. In the 
two landmark cases of  Å kerberg Fransson and  Melloni , the ECJ has made clear that the 
Charter has a wide scope of application, and that the member states can apply a higher 
level of fundamental rights protection to the extent that this does not aff ect the unity, 
primacy and eff ectiveness of EU law. 
 Much clarity has therefore already been provided regarding the protection of 
fundamental rights in the EU. Nevertheless, many questions on the Charter and the EU ’ s 
system of fundamental rights protection are still waiting to be answered. Th ese include 
the extent to which the notion of positive obligations can be recognised within the EU ’ s 
system. Th e remainder of this study is devoted to an examination of this question. 
 

Intersentia 137
 CHAPTER 7 
 THE INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
AND JUDICIAL CULTURE OF THE ECJ 
 7.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Th is chapter will explore further to what extent a development of positive obligations 
by the ECJ can be expected on the basis of its institutional position and its particular 
judicial culture. Th e ECJ has quite a diff erent institutional position compared to the 
ECtHR, at least in some respects, and it also has a rather diff erent judicial culture. Th ere 
is a great complexity of factors which the ECJ must take into account and diff erent 
 ‘ audiences ’ to which the ECJ must listen that can pull it in diff erent directions. Th ese 
factors can have an impact on the potential for a development of positive obligations by 
this particular court. 
 Th is chapter starts off  by discussing two specifi c judgments of the ECJ (section 7.2.). 
In one of these judgments, the ECJ decided not to recognise a positive obligation to 
protect a fundamental right (the case of  Bostock ); while in the other case, it did impose 
a positive obligation on the member states (the case of  Chatzi ). Both of these cases have 
been heavily criticised. It has been held that the ECJ did too little in the fi rst case and 
too much in the second case. Th ese are two types of criticism the ECJ may easily incur. 
Th e aim of this chapter is to place such judgments in the perspective of the diff erent 
roles and judicial styles that the ECJ may adopt, and to examine whether and how the 
ECJ could respond to the arguments of its critics. Aft er discussing the judgments of the 
ECJ in the cases of  Bostock and  Chatzi , and the criticism which these judgments have 
incurred, various specifi c factors relating to the judicial style as well as the institutional 
position of the ECJ are discussed that could explain its approach in these, as well as 
other judgments. Th ese factors include the role and judicial style of the ECJ in general 
(section 7.3.); the procedures that are used to bring fundamental rights cases before the 
ECJ (section 7.4.); the institutional position of the ECJ  vis- à -vis the EU institutions and 
the member states (section 7.5.); as well as the specifi c role played by the EU and the 
ECJ in the fi eld of fundamental rights (section 7.6.). Lastly, some fi nal conclusions are 
given on the extent to which the judicial style and the institutional position of the ECJ 
allow room for a development of positive obligations (section 7.7.). 
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 1  ECJ 24 March 1994, C-2/92,  Bostock . 
 2  Article 4(1) of Council Regulation 857/84/EEC of 31 March 1984 adopting general rules for the 
application of the levy referred to in Article 5c of Regulation (EEC) No 804/68 in the milk products 
sector [1984] OJ L90/13. 
 3  ECJ 24 March 1994, C-2/92,  Bostock , paras 19 – 20. 
 4  ECJ 24 March 1994, C-2/92,  Bostock , paras 18 – 24. 
 5  Weiler  & Lockhart (1995b), pp. 605 – 617. 
 7.2.  DOING TOO LITTLE OR RATHER TOO MUCH ? 
 7.2.1.  THE BOSTOCK CASE 
 Th e Bostock case, which was brought to the Court in the early 1990s, was about 
the implementation of a Community Regulation on the common organisation of the 
market in milk and milk products. 1 Mr Bostock was a farmer in the United Kingdom 
who had leased a plot of land for the production of milk. He had made considerable 
improvements to the land to allow for milk production, and had been allocated 
certain quota under the said Community Regulation. Aft er the lease of the land had 
been discontinued, he was left  without any compensation by his landlord, nor was 
he compensated in any other way, and he suff ered fi nancial loss as a result. No obligation 
to compensate was provided for in the respective Community Regulation. 2 Th is led to the 
question whether the member states could be put under an obligation to take certain 
measures to protect the right to property of farmers under Community law, a question 
which was referred to the ECJ. Th e national court that considered this case in particular 
requested the ECJ to clarify whether a compensation regime needed to be introduced 
on the basis of Community law to protect the right to property for such tenants. Th e 
ECJ replied that: 
 Th e right to property safeguarded by the Community legal order does not include the right to 
dispose, for profi t, of an advantage, such as the reference quantities allocated in the context of 
the common organization of a market, which does not derive from the assets or occupational 
activity of the person concerned  … 
 It follows that the protection of the right to property guaranteed by the Community legal 
order does not require a Member State to introduce a scheme for payment of compensation 
by a landlord to an outgoing tenant and does not confer a right to such compensation directly 
on the tenant. 3 
 According to the ECJ, Community law thus did not (specifi cally) require member states 
to introduce a compensation regime to protect the right to property of a tenant. 4 Th is 
outcome, as well as the reasoning leading up to the Court ’ s decision, has been fi ercely 
criticised by Weiler and Lockhart. 5 According to Weiler and Lockhart, this judgment 
provides an example of how the ECJ has expressly allowed member states to breach the 
fundamental rights of an individual without off ering them any means of compensation, 
Intersentia 139
Chapter 7. Th e Institutional Characteristics and Judicial Culture of the ECJ
 6  Weiler  & Lockhart (1995b), pp. 609 – 610. 
 7  ECJ 13 July 1989, C-5/88,  Wachauf , para. 19. 
 8  See section 8.4.4. 
 9  Weiler  & Lockhart (1995b), p. 617. 
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even though the member states were clearly acting as  ‘ agents of Community law ’ and 
they were bound to protect the right to property. 6 In the view of Weiler and Lockhart, 
the ECJ seemed to have established as much in the previous case of  Wachauf on a very 
similar position. Th ere, it had held that: 
 … Community rules which, upon the expiry of the lease, had the eff ect of depriving the lessee, 
without compensation, of the fruits of his labour and of his investments in the tenanted holding 
would be incompatible with the requirement of the protection of fundamental rights in the 
Community legal order. Since those requirements are also binding on the Member States when 
they implement Community rules, the Member States must, as far as possible, apply those rules 
in accordance with those requirements. 7 
 On the basis of this judgment Weiler and Lockhart had expected that the ECJ would 
ensure the protection of the right to property by the member states in the case of 
 Bostock as well. Community law itself had caused for the interference to take place, that 
is, by introducing a specifi c regime on milk production, and should therefore have also 
ensured that fundamental rights protection would be secured by the member states if 
they acted in that situation on the basis of Community law. 8 Th e Court, reasoning as it 
did, failed to ensure this protection. 9 
 Th e judgment of the ECJ in the case of  Bostock was rather brief, which is, as will 
be explained, characteristic of the Court ’ s judgments, especially under the preliminary 
reference procedure. It is therefore diffi  cult to discover why the ECJ took this particular 
approach. Th ere are several possible explanations which could be given, which are further 
examined throughout this chapter. One of them is that the ECJ may have followed the 
position taken by the Advocate General in this case. In the opinion of Advocate General 
Gulman, it had been argued that Community law had actually intentionally granted wide 
discretion to the member states to implement the regime and to make arrangements to 
protect fundamental rights on the basis of their national laws. 10 Another possibility is 
that the ECJ had left  the issue to be decided by the EU legislature. Th e ECJ may have 
wanted to avoid interfering in matters where the member states were competent to take 
action, thus respecting its subsidiary position in that regard. 
 7.2.2.  THE CHATZI CASE 
 Th e Court ’ s more recent judgment in the case of  Chatzi seems largely opposed to its 
approach in the case of  Bostock . 11  Prima facie , the question at issue in this case seemed 
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a simple one to answer: does the right to parental leave under EU law entitle the parents 
of twins to a double period of leave ? 12 Under an EU Directive, member states were 
required to ensure that the right to parental leave was guaranteed for a period of at least 
three months. 13 Further room was left  to the member states to provide more extensive 
protection. Th e question referred to in the case of  Chatzi came from a court in Greece 
where the period of parental leave for one child was fi xed at nine months. 
 Th e ECJ ruled that the right to equal treatment needed to be taken into account 
in order to ensure the protection of the rights of parents of twins, and also provided 
further reasoning as to what that would entail. Th e Court clarifi ed that: 
 Th e Member States can … defi ne, subject to compliance with the minimum three-month 
threshold imposed by the Framework Agreement in respect of the duration of parental leave, 
the detailed temporal rules under which parental leave may be taken. Th is discretion means 
in particular that, when Member States decide to set a period of parental leave that is longer 
than the minimum period prescribed by the Framework Agreement, they can lay down 
adjustments to the rules for the case of successive births of children. 
 It follows that the national legislature has wide freedom of action when establishing the 
parental leave regime that is applicable to parents of twins and enables them to receive 
treatment that takes due account of their particular needs. 
 In this regard, it should be stated that, generally, a duration appreciably longer than the 
minimum duration prescribed by the Framework Agreement and a certain degree of 
fl exibility granted to the parents to take the leave on the basis of the age of the child are such 
as to make it easier to deal with the increased burdens connected with bringing up twins. 
Likewise, detailed implementing rules which, in accordance with paragraph 6 of the general 
considerations in the Framework Agreement, make substantial provision for fl exible ways of 
organising work are such as to facilitate reconciliation of the requirements of work and the 
particular constraints that bringing up twins involves. 
 However, it is also possible to conceive of and adopt other measures that are appropriate 
for the purpose of meeting the particular needs of the parents of twins, such as material 
assistance, in the form, for example, of a right of access to childcare centres, or fi nancial aid, 
in the form, inter alia, of specifi c benefi ts allowing the method of care to be freely chosen. 
 It is for the national court, which has sole jurisdiction to assess the facts of the dispute before 
it, to determine whether the body of national rules off ers suffi  cient possibilities to meet, in a 
specifi c case, the particular needs of the parents of twins in their work and family life. 
 In view of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the second question is that clause 2.1 
of the Framework Agreement is not to be interpreted as requiring the birth of twins to confer 
entitlement to a number of periods of parental leave equal to the number of children born. 
However, read in the light of the principle of equal treatment, this clause obliges the national 
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legislature to establish a parental leave regime which, according to the situation obtaining in 
the Member State concerned, ensures that the parents of twins receive treatment that takes 
due account of their particular needs. It is incumbent upon national courts to determine 
whether the national rules meet that requirement and, if necessary, to interpret those national 
rules, so far as possible, in conformity with European Union law. 14 
 Hence, in contrast to  Bostock , the ECJ in  Chatzi made clear that there does exist a 
positive obligation for the national legislature to protect the right of equal treatment of 
parents of twins. Th e ECJ even rather elaborately explained what type of measures could 
be taken by the member states. Once again, however, this has invited some criticism, 
but of a diff erent nature. Th e measures required by the judgment, it has been argued, 
would actually seem to fall within the scope of a more extensive protection that may 
voluntarily be provided by the member states at national level, and this would have 
justifi ed a more deferential approach by the ECJ. 15  Chapter 11 will discuss the tension 
between this judgment and the limited powers of the EU in the fi eld of fundamental 
rights protection. 16 
 Th e question to be addressed in the present chapter, however, is what other factors 
might explain and justify this rather generous approach of the ECJ ? In  Chatzi it could 
have been that the ECJ was intent on providing an eff ective protection of fundamental 
rights, and wanted to play a stronger role in that fi eld. Secondly, the uniform and 
eff ective application of EU law could have provided an interest which the ECJ was 
especially eager to protect. Th e direct imposition of a positive obligation on the national 
legislature instead of on the court is  prima facie diffi  cult to reconcile with the role that 
the ECJ is expected to play in the preliminary reference procedure; however, there have 
also been other examples of this more  ‘ intrusive ’ approach, mainly where the uniform 
application and eff ectiveness of EU law was at stake. 
 7.3.  THE ROLE AND JUDICIAL STYLE OF THE ECJ 
IN GENERAL 
 As can be gleaned from the two cases discussed above, the ECJ is not given the task 
only of providing an interpretation of fundamental rights. It inevitably also must do 
so in conjunction with provisions of EU primary or secondary law. 17 Th e ECJ must, in 
accordance with Article 19(1) TEU, ensure that  ‘ in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaties the law is observed ’. Th e EU Treaties and the various instruments of secondary 
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law, such as Directives and Regulations, primarily, or in most cases, contribute to the 
functioning of the EU internal market or the area of freedom of security and justice 
without internal frontiers. Th e ECJ is competent to determine whether and how the EU 
institutions and the member states must comply with EU law, and it assesses the validity 
of EU law. Th e primary subjects of the judgments of the ECJ are the EU institutions 
and the EU member states and their courts. Although individuals are also regarded 
as important subjects of EU law, following from the establishment of the principle of 
direct eff ect that allows individuals to invoke EU law directly before their national 
courts, the ECJ does not oft en address individuals or their complaints directly. 18 Th us, 
the ECJ deals with quite diff erent audiences and diff erent subject matters compared to 
any other supranational court. 
 Th e role of the ECJ in shaping EU law is generally accepted to be an important one. 
Th e ECJ has  inter alia developed the principles of direct eff ect and supremacy, which are 
considered foundational for the character and the eff ects of EU law. 19 Also, the ECJ has 
always played a crucial part in securing the Community ’ s (main) objective, of achieving 
economic integration. In the fi eld of the free movement rights, in particular, the ECJ has 
been willing to interpret concepts such as those of workers and services very broadly, 
and has quite easily accepted that the requirement of a trans-border movement would 
be fulfi lled. 20 Such case-law has helped to expand the scope of EU law and its infl uence 
at national law considerably. 21 Th e economic free movement rules have been regarded 
by the ECJ as  ‘ fundamental ’ rights or freedoms in themselves. 22 While this would seem 
to lead to the conclusion that the ECJ is mainly interested in economic integration, this 
would be a misconception. 23 Th e ECJ has also played an important role in achieving 
other goals, including the protection of fundamental rights, even if this would put the 
economic interests of the EU at risk (see section 7.6.). 24 
 Th e important judgments of the ECJ in these diff erent fi elds are not always very 
elaborately reasoned. Th e judgments of the ECJ have been characterised as  ‘ short, tense 
and magisterial ’ or, put in a more negative way, as  ‘ Cartesian ’ or  ‘ cryptic and apodictic ’. 25 
Th is may make it diffi  cult to fi nd out what rationales and theories the ECJ actually uses 
to base its judgments on. Th e allegedly minimalistic style of reasoning of the ECJ also 
stands in stark contrast to the approach of the ECtHR, which elaborates in a much 
more detailed fashion what may be required to ensure the eff ective protection of the 
Convention provisions. 26 In its judgments, the ECJ generally relies on a  ‘ linguistic, 
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systemic/constitutional and purposive ’ method of interpreting EU law. It rarely has 
regard to, for example, historical interpretation. 27 
 Th e ECJ ’ s brief and formal way of reasoning can partly be explained by the fact that 
the ECJ delivers its judgments in a collegiate fashion. To the dissatisfaction of some, 
there is no system of concurring or dissenting opinions, so that the judgments are 
written as if the ECJ only has one voice. 28 Th e ECJ must fi nd consensus among all 
of the judges that have been assigned to a case. Th is implies that the rulings of the 
ECJ only consist of the very essential part to which all the judges were able to agree 
to. 29 Sometimes, the judgments of the ECJ do refl ect that there are diff erent views on 
a particular matter, for example when the judgment includes some of the viewpoints 
that have been submitted by the parties and the intervening parties to a case. Th e 
parties to the case (such as those before the national courts), the member states, and the 
EU institutions may submit written and oral observations. 30 Generally one would not, 
however, fi nd non-governmental organisations represented in the procedures before 
the ECJ, as there is no general procedure which allows such third party intervention. 31 
Th is may restrict the types of arguments that are presented to and dealt with by the 
ECJ in fundamental rights cases. It may therefore be the case that possibilities to defi ne 
positive obligations to protect fundamental rights could escape the attention of the ECJ, 
seeing that it deals with diff erent types of parties and diff erent types of arguments. 
 Th e ECJ is advised by the opinions of Advocates General on its cases, which means 
that the EU system of adjudication can be characterised as a bifurcated system. 32 
Advocates General deliver their opinions on a case prior to the judgment of the ECJ, and 
they are meant to assist the ECJ in its task of adjudication. 33 Th e ECJ oft en follows the 
judgments of the Advocates General, although there are also some noticeable exceptions 
to that rule. 34 In comparison to the judgments of the ECJ, the opinions of Advocates 
General are written in a much more elaborate fashion. Th ey tend to provide the bigger 
picture as regards the underlying legal issues of a case, and they can be of a much more 
academic nature. Th e opinions of the Advocates Generals can be informative to the ECJ 
with regard to, for example, relevant legal doctrines, its own prior case-law or rather 
judgments from other courts, the arguments that were provided by the (intervening) 
parties during the oral or written hearings, and even sometimes the factual aspects of a 
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Bot in C-300/11, ZZ; Opinion AG Sharpston in C-58/12,  Group Gascogne , para. 118; Opinion AG 
J ä ä skinen in C-131/12,  Google Spain , paras 119 and 134; Opinion AG Cruz Villal ó n. in C-176/12, 
 AMS , paras 36 ff . 
 36  See also section 8.4.1. 
 37  Lasser (2004), p. 112. 
 38  Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report 2014, completed on 1 January 2015, 
pp. 9 and 88. 
 39  Article 20 of the Statute of the Court of Justice. 
 40  Cf. Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual Report 2014, completed on 1 January 2015, 
p. 8 – 9; See also Court of Justice of the European Union, Annual report 2015 judicial activity, completed 
on 1 January 2016, p. 10. In 2015, 43 per cent of the judgments of the ECJ were delivered without the 
opinion of an Advocate-General. 
case. It is interesting to fi nd that in these opinions, the doctrine of positive obligations 
has already been dealt with on several occasions. 35 
 For the purposes of analyses such as that undertaken in the current study, it is 
generally of interest to have a look at the opinions of the Advocates Generals. Th ey 
may provide for the theoretical underpinnings not expressed in the judgments of the 
ECJ itself, and they may also show additional arguments that have been brought by the 
diff erent parties to a case. Th ey may thus explain, for example, why the ECJ decided 
not to deal with the doctrine of positive obligations itself. In the case of  Bostock , for 
example, the Advocate General had provided quite an elaborate argumentation as to 
why the ECJ would not need to recognise a positive obligation under Community law. 
Th e Advocate General had argued that there were suffi  cient mechanisms provided for 
at national level to secure that the right to property was protected. 36 Such opinions 
can oft en compensate for the defi cits that can be experienced in the terse and formal 
reasoning of the ECJ. 37 It is important to mention, however, that in recent years, the role 
of Advocates General has been restricted. Changes have been made to enable the ECJ to 
cope with its workload and to deliver its judgments much more swift ly than it has done 
in the past (preliminary rulings on average taking 15 months). 38 Th ese new regulations 
also allow for the ECJ to dispense with the opinions of the Advocates General in certain 
types of cases, 39 and in recent years it has frequently made use of this possibility. 40 
 From this general characterisation of the judicial style of the ECJ and its specifi c 
judicial system, it can be seen why a theory of positive obligations would not necessarily 
be found in the case-law of the ECJ. Th e main focus of the ECJ is on interpreting 
specifi c provisions of secondary EU law, and it does not reason only on the basis of 
fundamental rights provisions. Its judicial style of reasoning is terse, which may also 
explain why the judgments do not clearly reveal whether the ECJ recognises a positive 
obligation or not. 
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pp. 160 – 176. 
 42  See European Commission, 2015 Report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
SWD(2016), 158 fi nal, pp. 9 – 10. Th is report shows that the Commission has  inter alia launched 
infringement procedures over the independence of the Hungarian data protection authority and the 
forced retirement of judges in Hungary; however, it also shows that the Commission did not clearly 
do so on fundamental rights grounds, see ECJ 6 November 2012, C-286/12,  Commission v. Hungary ; 
and ECJ 8 April 2014, C-288/12,  Commission v. Hungary . 
 43  Cf. ECJ 27 June 2006, C-540/03,  Parliament v. Council . 
 44  Article 265 TFEU. 
 45  Th is procedure fi rst requires a request to be sent to one of the EU institutions to act before the ECJ 
can be requested to decide on the legality of the omission, and it requires that a specifi c obligation laid 
down by EU law can be identifi ed. See also Craig  & De B ú rca (2015), pp. 537 – 539. 
 7.4.  THE SPECIFIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
PROCEDURES BEFORE THE ECJ 
 To be able to understand the style of reasoning of the ECJ further, it is of great 
importance also to look at the specifi c procedures which are used to bring fundamental 
rights challenges to the ECJ. It is especially of interest to take a closer look at the 
preliminary reference procedure, which is the main procedure through which the ECJ 
deals with issues related to fundamental rights. 41 Th is procedure can provide room for 
the national courts to decide about how the protection of EU law will best be secured 
within the national legal system, which means that the ECJ does not necessarily need 
to provide specifi c details on how fundamental rights would need to be protected, and 
what measures need to be taken. It is also of interest to look at the annulment procedure 
which can be started by individuals in quite limited circumstances to challenge 
fundamental rights protection, which, for that reason, will only briefl y be discussed. 
 Th ere are other procedures available under law EU law to challenge infringements 
of EU law which will not be discussed in much detail in this research. Th is includes 
the infringement procedure which the European Commission can initiate against 
member states if they fail to protect fundamental rights in the implementation of EU 
law. On some occasions the European Commission has initiated this procedure for 
that reason. 42 Also, the European Parliament can raise questions concerning the lack of 
fundamental rights protection, ultimately before the ECJ, if it fi nds that fundamental 
rights have not suffi  ciently been taken into account in certain legislative processes. 43 
Lastly, it is interesting to note that the EU Treaties provide for a procedure which can 
be used by the EU institutions as well as the member states regarding the omissions 
of (other) EU institutions. 44 Th is could become of concern in relation to a lack of 
compliance with any positive obligations to protect fundamental rights. At the same 
time, it may prove diffi  cult to fulfi l the conditions to start this procedure, and it is rarely 
used. 45 For that reason, this procedure is not further considered in this chapter. 
 Another important aspect is that the ECJ has only limited jurisdiction to review the 
actions of the EU in the area of common, foreign and security policy on the basis of 
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Article 275 TFEU. Th e Court has jurisdiction, however, to review restrictive measures 
taken against individuals in this area, such as the sanctioning measures which the EU 
has taken in attempts to combat terrorist activities and nuclear proliferation. Th is is 
addressed in section 7.4.2. 
 7.4.1.  THE PRELIMINARY REFERENCE PROCEDURE 
 7.4.1.1.  Th e Specifi c Function of the Preliminary Reference Procedure 
 Under the preliminary reference procedure, national courts can, and in some situations 
must, on the basis of Article 267 TFEU, refer questions to the ECJ on the interpretation 
of EU law and/or on the validity of acts of secondary EU law. 46 Th e eff ective functioning 
of the preliminary reference procedure is based on a system of cooperation between the 
national courts and the ECJ in which both have their own tasks. 47 Whereas national 
courts must ensure that EU law is applied correctly at national level, the ECJ has the 
prerogative of determining how EU law must be interpreted and of assessing the validity 
of the acts of the EU institutions. Article 267 TFEU stipulates that if questions are raised 
on the interpretation or validity of EU law before the national courts, and the answer 
to such questions is considered necessary to enable them to give a judgment, they may 
request the ECJ to give an answer to such questions. While there is discretion for the 
lower courts to make a reference to the ECJ, courts of last instance of the member states 
(against which there is no judicial remedy under national law) are obliged to do so. A 
further interpretation of the scope of the discretion of the lower courts, as well as of the 
scope of the obligation of the courts of last instance, is provided by the case-law of the 
ECJ. 48 National courts do not need to make a reference for a preliminary ruling when 
the ECJ has already provided an interpretation of a specifi c matter ( acte  é clair é ) , nor do 
they need to make a reference if the correct application of EU law  ‘ may be so obvious 
as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question 
raised is to be resolved ’ ( acte clair ). 49 
 Th e preliminary reference procedure is of great importance for the ECJ to be able to 
ensure the uniform and eff ective application of EU law at national level. 50 Th is procedure 
is also important for the ECJ to ensure that fundamental rights are interpreted in a 
uniform way and to ensure the eff ective protection of fundamental rights within the 
scope of EU law. From the very brief explanation of how the preliminary reference 
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EU law incorrectly, see ECJ 30 September 2003, C-224/01,  K ö bler . A further critical characterisation 
of the relations between the national courts and the ECJ under the preliminary reference procedure is 
given by Bobek, see Bobek (2013). 
 54  According to the case-law of the ECtHR, national (highest) courts must motivate their refusals to 
refer preliminary questions to ensure the protection of the right to a fair trial, see ECtHR 8 April 2014, 
no.17120/09,  Dhahbi v. Italy . Th e ECJ has recognised that individuals do have an important role to 
play to protect fundamental rights before their national courts, see ECJ 5 February 1963, C-26/62,  Van 
Gend en Loos , para. 24. See also section 7.6.2.2. 
 55  Lenaerts (2013), p. 1309. 
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procedure works, it may already be clear, however, that the eff ective functioning of the 
preliminary reference procedure is dependent on a good relationship between the ECJ 
and the national courts. 51 National courts must be willing to bring relevant cases to 
the ECJ which would allow it to, for example, develop a concept of positive obligations 
under EU law. 
 7.4.1.2.  Th e Dialogue with the National Courts 
 Th e preliminary reference procedure is based on a dialogue between the ECJ and the 
national courts. 52 If national courts refrain from referring questions to the ECJ, it may 
not be able to guarantee that EU law is interpreted uniformly at national level. Th e ECJ 
must thus ensure that it gives useful answers to the questions which are raised by the 
national courts, but not interfere too much in matters which the national courts are 
competent to resolve on the basis of national law. Th e subsidiary position of the ECJ  vis-
 à -vis the member states (including their national courts) is more generally explained in 
section 7.5.2. National courts therefore also have an important role to play in bringing 
questions to the ECJ over the application of the doctrine of positive obligations in 
relevant areas of EU law. 53 Individuals may suggest in the national procedure that a 
preliminary question would be useful, but it is ultimately up to the national courts to 
decide about this. 54 
 Th e ECJ is generally intent to answer only the questions raised by the national courts. 
In fact, as will also be discussed below, the ECJ is not inclined to take into account 
provisions of fundamental rights if it is not expressly invited to do so by the national 
courts; it rather aims to base its answer on provisions of primary and secondary EU 
law. 55 Generally, it seems that the degree of precision of the questions that are posed by 
the national courts, and the factual and legal guidance they may off er, are determinative 
for the level of detail of the answers given by the ECJ to those questions. 56 In the  Bostock 
case, for example, the ECJ provided little more than a straightforward answer to the 
question that had been referred, and it was up to the national court to fi gure out how 
fundamental rights protection would have to be provided. In recent years, it has been 
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seen that national courts are increasingly raising questions on the application and 
interpretation of fundamental rights. 57 Although this could be seen as an invitation to 
further detail the interpretation of such fundamental rights, the answers of the ECJ to 
these questions may still be rather formal and brief. 
 Given that the preliminary reference procedure is characterised by cooperation 
between the ECJ and the national courts, the ECJ may decide to leave specifi c questions 
as to the application of its judgment to be resolved at the level of the national courts. 
In addition, the ECJ also oft en seems intent on answering only the particular legal 
problem that has been laid out in the specifi c case before it, rather than providing 
general principles that can be applied in other cases as well. 58 Lenaerts has explained 
that a certain  ‘ judicial prudence ’ underlies this approach. Th e ECJ will wait until further 
questions reach the Court instead of addressing potentially diffi  cult legal questions 
which may not be solved beforehand. 59 
 Taking all this into account, it seems hard to explain the ECJ ’ s judgment in the case 
of  Chatzi . 60 Without being asked to do so directly by the national court, the ECJ there 
provided instructions to the national legislature on how the framework agreement 
would have to implemented in order to be faithful to the principle of equal treatment. 61 
Indeed, this was an exceptional case: the ECJ very rarely gives such a direct task to the 
national legislature. It may only be speculated why the ECJ rendered the judgment it did. 
Perhaps the ECJ considered that it would be best for the national legislatures to ensure 
that discrimination in an important fi eld of EU law would be prohibited, rather than 
having the national courts seeking for other solutions (judicially or administratively) 
to accommodate the judgment of the ECJ. However, it does not seem to fi t well with 
the character of the preliminary reference procedure as the Court has developed it in 
its case-law. 
 Chatzi is also a-typical since the ECJ generally has been much more willing to impose 
quite far-reaching obligations on the national courts instead of the national legislatures. 
Several of the positive (procedural) obligations which it has imposed are discussed in 
chapter 11. 62 National courts have  inter alia been required to set national provisions 
aside if they confl ict with such fundamental rights and read national law in conformity 
with EU fundamental rights. 63 
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 It can thus be concluded that the scope for a development of positive obligations 
will generally depend on the degree to which national courts specifi cally inquire about 
such issues at the Court. If asked by the national courts, the ECJ does seem willing to 
determine the solutions which must be provided at national level to ensure the eff ective 
application of fundamental rights. In the area of national procedural rules and remedies, 
it can be seen that the case-law of the ECJ is more elaborate and more detailed because 
the national courts have referred many questions. 64 In response to these, the ECJ has 
been willing to provide guidance on the requirements that follow from EU law. In other 
cases, the ECJ may not be asked specifi cally what the requirements may be, and perhaps 
some form of positive obligations would need to be fulfi lled at national level. In such 
cases, it may rather be for the national courts to determine whether certain measures 
need to be taken by the legislative or administrative authorities to ensure the eff ective 
application of EU law. 
 7.4.2.  DIRECT ACTIONS 
 Th ere are fewer occasions in which individuals directly challenge EU acts or omissions 
directly before the ECJ. Th e relative rareness of this has to do with the criteria that have 
to be met by individuals in order to have  locus standi before the ECJ based on Article 
263 TFEU and which have been interpreted restrictively by the ECJ. 65 Individuals can 
challenge acts that are addressed to them, but they must be directly and individually 
concerned to be able to challenge legislative acts such as directives and regulations. 66 
Th e latter do not constitute  ‘ regulatory acts ’ for which the standing rights have been 
strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty, and which require individuals only to be directly 
concerned. 67 
 Cases have been brought to the ECJ on alleged fundamental rights infringements 
by individuals in one area in particular. Th ese are complaints that have been brought 
by individuals in relation to the sanction decisions which have been imposed on 
individuals who are considered to be affi  liated to terroristic organisations, who have 
been associated with nuclear proliferation, or who have connections with certain 
governments that have been overthrown. Th e various judgments in the  Kadi cases, in 
particular, have brought to light some of the serious shortcomings in the procedures 
that generally lead up to the adoption of such sanction decisions. 68 In this connection, 
the ECJ has quite actively developed a number of principles and procedures that would 
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need to be complied with by relevant institutions competent to take such decisions. 
Indeed, in this area the ECJ may be said to have developed quite a number of positive 
procedural obligations. 69 
 Th e direct actions that are brought before the ECJ are by their very nature far more 
restrictive in comparison to the individual complaint procedure as is provided for under 
the Convention system. Greer and Williams fi nd that this provides limited opportunities 
for social justice institutions or suff ering individuals to actually bring their complaints 
before the ECJ. 70 Serious fundamental rights infringements are therefore not likely to 
reach the ECJ through direct actions. 
 It is much more common for fundamental rights issues to be raised before the ECJ 
via the preliminary reference procedure, and it is usually through this procedure that 
fundamental rights issues of individuals may be addressed by the ECJ, although in a 
more indirect way. 71 In that respect, there is a greater potential for a development of 
positive obligations under the preliminary reference procedure. 
 7.5.  THE INSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE ECJ 
 7.5.1.  SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE SUPRANATIONAL 
POSITION OF THE ECJ 
 An examination of the development of positive obligations by the ECJ must take account 
of the specifi c function that courts generally exercise in modern democracies governed 
by the rule of law. If it would appear that the eff ective protection of fundamental rights 
requires far-reaching legislative or burdensome obligations to be fulfi lled, this may 
be best decided by political institutions rather than by courts, let alone supranational 
courts. 72 Political institutions directly enjoy the legitimacy to take decisions on those 
matters, at EU level as well as at national level. Where judicial decisions would amount 
to the  ‘ exercise of decision-making power ’, the ECJ could easily be accused of judicial 
activism. 73 In its relation with the national authorities, the supranational position of 
the ECJ could provide even greater reason for the ECJ to exercise caution in examining 
what the eff ective protection of EU law would require, as it could be at too great a 
distance to be able to adequately judge such situations. 74 Th e principle of subsidiarity 
thereby clearly is also involved, as was briefl y addressed in section 7.4.1.2., but for the 
present context it relates to the constitutional division of powers in a democracy. In 
relation to the development of positive obligations, the ECJ may want to refrain from 
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specifying too clearly what measures need to be established by the EU institutions or 
by the member states to eff ectively protect fundamental rights from the viewpoint 
of the principle of separation of powers (see section 7.5.2.) and also, for the national 
authorities, the principle of subsidiarity (see section 7.5.3.). Th e specifi c meaning of the 
principle of subsidiarity in relation to the proper distribution of competences between 
the EU and the member states is later discussed in chapter 8. 75 
 Th e intensity of the ECJ ’ s review more generally, thus with respect to the actions of 
the EU institutions and the member state, can also depend on the area of EU law that is 
at stake. Various scholars, such as Gerards and Craig, have noted that when it comes, for 
example, to the protection of the Treaty ’ s free movement rules, the ECJ has been willing 
to examine quite carefully the reasonableness or the appropriateness of the decisions 
that were taken by the member states. 76 Th e ECJ has even be willing to exercise strict 
review of the member states ’ interferences with fundamental rights. 77 Th e ECJ could 
also take a step further and clarify what government action would be necessary to 
protect fundamental rights eff ectively in such areas. It must be acknowledged here, 
however, that the ECJ has yet to develop a very clear theory as to the intensity levels of 
its review. 78 It can be quite diffi  cult to assess beforehand whether the ECJ will exercise 
strong or weaker forms of judicial review in specifi c cases. Th e approach of the ECJ in 
the fi eld of fundamental rights, specifi cally, has, in the past, been characterised as one 
of great restraint. 79 However, more recently, the ECJ has shown that it is indeed willing 
to provide interpretation of fundamental rights in areas where it is much needed, and 
it has been willing to strike down EU legislation for violations of fundamental rights. 80 
Th e more general roles played by the EU and the ECJ in the specifi c area of fundamental 
rights are discussed in section 7.6. 
 7.5.2.  THE ROLE OF THE ECJ TOWARDS THE EU INSTITUTIONS 
 Th e ECJ has been said generally to exercise deferential review with respect to the 
legislative decisions that are taken by the EU institutions. 81 Th e ECJ has declared on 
various occasions that it would respect the discretionary powers which were given 
to the EU legislature on issues involving political, economic, social and technical 
questions, and therefore restricted its own review. 82 Th e ECJ is not easily willing to 
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annul EU legislation that might be contrary to certain principles and rights laid down 
in the EU Treaties. In the past, the ECJ has not shown itself ready to strongly engage 
in the protection of fundamental rights and to declare EU legislation void on grounds 
of fundamental rights. 83 Muir had explained that also, more recently, the ECJ has not 
decided to annul EU legislation on the basis of incompatibility with fundamental rights, 
especially because EU legislation had specifi cally been adopted to ensure an eff ective 
protection of fundamental rights in a certain area. 84 
 Th e ECJ has, however, also shown that on some occasions, including in fundamental 
rights cases, it may exercise a more stringent review of EU legislation. 85 Th e ECJ has 
done so where an important EU interest was at stake, 86 where violations of important 
fundamental rights were to be prevented, 87 as well as where there was a particularly 
serious interference with a fundamental right. 88 Th e intensity of the review of the ECJ 
in cases of EU legislation may thus depend on diff erent factors. 
 A deferential type of review by the ECJ can, fi rst of all, mean that the ECJ does not 
undertake an elaborate or full substantive assessment of EU legislation. 89 Th e ECJ will 
have regard to the specifi c choices that have already been made by the EU legislature, and 
it will only intervene if the measure that has been chosen is manifestly inappropriate in 
view of the objective which is pursued by that measure. 90 In fundamental rights cases, 
it can also been seen that the ECJ has regard to the specifi c recitals in the preamble of 
Directives and Regulations which refl ect the wishes of the political institutions, and it 
does not further develop fundamental rights standards of its own. 91 
 Interestingly, the ECJ has some other ways of showing a deferential review towards the 
EU institutions, which allow room for a development of positive obligations to protect 
fundamental rights. Th is includes a  ‘ reconciliatory interpretation ’ and a procedural 
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type of review. Th e  ‘ reconciliatory interpretation ’ has been explained by Lenaerts 
as follows: 
 in order to safeguard the legitimate objectives pursued by the EU legislator, the ECJ will fi rst 
do everything within its jurisdiction to interpret secondary EU law in accordance with primary 
EU law. It follows that, in so far as the ECJ does not interpret secondary EU law in a  contra 
legem fashion, the annulment or declaration of invalidity of an act adopted by the EU legislator 
operates as the  ultima ratio in order to uphold the rule of law. 92 
 Th us, according to Lenaerts, the annulment of EU legislation is generally not a helpful 
outcome of judicial review. Instead, and preferably, the ECJ could provide fundamental 
rights protection by further interpreting EU legislation in such a way that it also or still 
accommodates for the protection of fundamental rights. Th is technique may, as Muir 
has explained, either constrain or complement the actions that need to be taken on 
the basis of EU legislation. 93 Muir points to the case of  Chatzi as an example of where 
the ECJ applied  ‘ an interpretative technique tying the legislature ’ s hands ’. 94 In this case, 
as has been explained, the ECJ decided to interpret the provision of EU secondary 
legislation in such a way that it imposed a positive duty on the national legislature to 
ensure the eff ective protection of the principle of equal treatment. Th e ECJ held in this 
case that: 
 under a general principle of interpretation, a Community measure must be interpreted as far as 
possible, in such a way as not to aff ect its validity and in conformity with primary law as a whole 
 … , including with the principle of equal treatment. 95 
 Th us, this reconciliatory interpretation technique would seem to allow for the ECJ to 
develop certain positive obligations. 
 Several scholars have noted that the judgment of the ECJ in the case of  N.S. and others 
forms another case where the ECJ re-interpreted EU legislation to  ‘ save ’ its validity. Th is 
case was about the transfer of asylum seekers to other member states. 96 Under the Dublin 
Regulation, member states are required to send asylum seekers to the member state in 
which they fi rst arrived and which is responsible for dealing with the asylum application. 
In the case of  N.S. and others , the ECJ held that the obligations of the member states 
under the EU Dublin Regulation must be read in light of the prohibition of inhuman 
and degrading treatment as guaranteed in Article 4 of the Charter. 97 Th is means that 
the member states and their national courts cannot transfer an asylum seeker under the 
Dublin Regulation where they cannot be unaware of the fact that in the member state 
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of fi rst arrival there is a serious risk of treatment which is contrary to Article 4 of the 
Charter. 98 Again, this amounts to a certain positive obligation for the member state to 
ensure fundamental rights protection, as discussed further in chapter 11. 99 Th e other 
choice which the ECJ could have made was to conclude that the EU legislature failed 
to secure an eff ective protection of fundamental rights by laying down the specifi c 
obligations for the member states in EU secondary legislation, and it could perhaps 
have declared the Regulation null and void. Instead, however, the ECJ decided to read 
the obligations of the member states under the Dublin Regulation in light of Article 4 
ECHR, and thus compatible with this provision. 
 By developing positive obligations for the member states in cases such as  Chatzi and 
 N.S. and others , the ECJ actually aims to respect its position towards the EU institutions, 
and it still allows for an eff ective protection of fundamental rights. It may, indeed, be 
considered more intrusive if the ECJ were to establish that a certain (well-considered) 
decision was contrary to EU law on substantive points than if the ECJ restricted itself 
to merely defi ning what additional requirements may need to be fulfi lled to eff ectively 
protect fundamental rights. Such additional requirements can be expected to be 
of an administrative, judicial and procedural nature. Th e development of legislative 
obligations in particular, however, could be considered to be too intrusive a method of 
interfering in the powers of the EU institutions. 100 
 Secondly, the ECJ has applied a procedural type of review in its case-law on the 
legality of EU legislation. Th is technique focuses on the procedural shortcomings 
in the adoption of EU legislation rather than on substantive shortcomings as such, 
and thereby also aims to respect the deferential position of the ECJ  vis- à -vis the EU 
legislature. 101 A clear example of procedural review by the ECJ is shown in the case 
of  Volker und Markus Schecke . 102 Th is case was about the validity of a provision laid 
down in an EU Regulation which required member states to publish information on 
the benefi ciaries of European agricultural funds, which included the publication of the 
amounts received by those benefi ciaries, the names of the natural or the legal persons 
and their municipality and, if available, the postal code of residence. In reviewing the 
proportionality of this measure, the ECJ noted that: 
 [t]here is nothing to show that, when adopting [the contested provision], the Council and 
the Commission sought to strike such a balance between the European Union ’ s interest in 
guaranteeing the transparency of its acts and ensuring the best use of public funds, on the one 
hand, and the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, on the other 
hand. 103 
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 Th e ECJ thus specifi cally had regard to whether the EU legislature itself had aimed to 
ensure the protection of fundamental rights, and seeing that it had not, the ECJ decided 
to annul the respective EU Regulation. 
 In other cases, a procedural type of review can also be noticed. 104 An example is 
the case of  Schrems , which concerned the decision of the European Commission which 
established that the United States provided an adequate level of protection of personal 
data on the basis of the use of the safe harbour principles. 105 Th is decision had the eff ect 
that the EU member states and their undertakings could transfer the personal data of 
EU citizens to the United States. Th e CJEU indicated in its judgment on this case that 
the Commission decision itself did not provide any clarity over whether there existed 
rules in the United States intended to limit interferences with the rights to privacy and 
of personal data, and to provide eff ective legal protection against such interferences. 106 
Th e ECJ decided to annul the Commission decision and it stated that in order for the 
Commission to adopt its (next) decision  ‘ it must fi nd, duly stating reasons, that a third 
country in fact ensures, by reason of its domestic law or its international commitments 
a level of protection of fundamental rights essentially equivalent to that guaranteed 
under the EU legal order  … ’ . 107 Th e ECJ thus sent a clear signal to the European 
Commission that it had failed to do its own work of making the assessment, and the 
ECJ specifi cally required the Commission to explain in its own decisions how it aimed 
to ensure compliance with fundamental rights. 
 As stated in the beginning of this section, the ECJ has also shown that it sometimes is 
willing to exercise a fuller review of EU legislation, including on grounds of fundamental 
rights. Especially where important fundamental rights are at stake, or where there are 
serious interferences with fundamental right, the ECJ may decide to exercise stronger 
review. Th e ECJ attributed quite some importance to the seriousness of the interference 
with a fundamental right in the case of  Digital Rights , for example. 108 A similar approach 
is visible in the  Kadi judgment, in which the ECJ established that there had been serious 
shortcomings in the protection of certain procedural fundamental rights; these seemed 
to provide a reason for the ECJ to exercise strong review of the measures taken by the 
competent EU authorities. 109 In those cases, the ECJ is also willing to move away from 
its generally brief and formal reasoning, and to explain what the eff ective protection 
of fundamental rights would specifi cally require. Th e last judgment in  Kadi is, in fact, 
very elaborate and detailed as to the types of procedural protection which the EU 
institutions need to provide when they decide to impose a sanction on an individual. 
Th e ECJ thereby also established certain positive procedural obligations for the EU 
institutions. 110 
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 In sum, there are various approaches which the ECJ can take in its review of EU 
legislation. While it mainly applies a deferential review of EU legislation, as explained 
earlier, this may actually give rise to positive (procedural) obligations for the member 
states or for the EU institutions themselves. 
 7.5.3.  THE ROLE OF THE ECJ TOWARDS THE MEMBER STATES 
 It is rather diffi  cult to discern to what extent the ECJ deliberately aims to express its 
subsidiary position towards the national authorities. In this context the ECJ rarely 
specifi es the intensity of its review and, perhaps, it is not really necessary to do so. 
Aft er all, the preliminary reference procedure, which is primarily used to ensure the 
correct application and interpretation of EU law at national level, is organised in such 
a way that it aims to be respectful of the subsidiary position of the ECJ. In the fi eld of 
fundamental rights protection, the ECJ will rarely provide an interpretation of specifi c 
provisions of fundamental rights that may be relevant to a case if it is not specifi cally 
asked to do so by the national court, which can be seen as an expression of its subsidiary 
position in this fi eld. 111 As explained in section 7.4.1., national courts are only required 
to ask for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ if they consider that it would be necessary 
to solve the particular dispute that lays before it. National courts rather than the ECJ 
are thus primarily competent to apply EU law at national level and therefore establish 
whether or not national authorities may have violated EU (fundamental rights) law in 
the particular circumstances of a given case. Th e ECJ engages in a dialogue primarily 
with the national courts over the interpretation of EU law at national level, and may 
not tell the national legislatures or administrative authorities directly whether they 
have violated EU law. Th e example of  Chatzi has (therefore) been described as an 
incidental example of where the ECJ did choose to develop a positive obligation 
expressly for the national legislature. 
 Over time, the ECJ has introduced some hierarchical elements in relation to national 
law and its application by the national authorities. By developing the principle of 
supremacy, for example, the ECJ has made very clear that EU law takes priority over 
any national law that might stand in confl ict with it. 112 Furthermore, in some cases, 
the ECJ is willing to undertake a stricter assessment of the application of EU law at 
national level by determining whether certain measures fulfi l the requirements of 
a proportionality test. Th is is particularly visible in the context of the free movement 
rights. 113 While the ECJ has thus developed a more active approach in ensuring the 
protection of EU law at national level, it may be necessary for the ECJ to seek additional 
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ways to respect its subsidiary position and to refrain from delivering all too intrusive 
rulings. Th ere is good reason for doing so, because the ECJ is ultimately dependent on 
the national courts to continue to send questions that will allow it to ensure the uniform 
and eff ective application of EU law. 114 
 Perhaps for that reason, in the specifi c context of the protection of the free movement 
rights, the ECJ has shown that it is willing to apply a more deferential type of review. 
Th e Court appears to do so in particular if the national authorities are pursuing certain 
objectives concerning which there is no consensus within the EU. 115 Th e cases of 
 Omega and  Sayn-Wittgenstein have been indicated as clear examples of this approach. 
In the case of  Omega , the German government was seeking to protect the right to 
human dignity as it is protected under the German constitution to justify a restriction 
of the freedom to provide services. 116 Th e ECJ held that  ‘ it is not indispensable in 
that respect for the restrictive measure issued by the authorities of a Member State to 
correspond to a conception shared by all Member States as regards the precise way in 
which the fundamental right or legitimate interest is to be protected ’. 117 Th ereby, the 
ECJ allowed room to the member states to decide how they would ensure protection of 
this fundamental right under EU law, and it also exercised quite deferential review of 
the proportionality of the restriction of the free movement provision in this case. Th e 
ECJ applied a similar approach in the case of  Sayn-Wittgenstein , which concerned the 
restrictive use of titles of nobility. In this case, the ECJ even more explicitly recognised 
that member states were granted a margin of appreciation. 118 Th e ECJ also paid 
attention to the protection of Article 4(2) TEU on the respect for national identity, 
which provides a clear basis for allowing member states discretion in the application of 
EU law at national level. 119 Th e ECJ did not exercise strict review over the restriction of 
the right to free movement, and concluded that the measure taken did not seem to 
constitute an unjustifi able interference with EU law. 
 Most of the questions on the Charter that are referred to the ECJ by the national 
courts are concerned with the protection of the (procedural) right to eff ective judicial 
protection and the right to good administration. 120 Th e ECJ has been willing to develop 
certain far-reaching procedural standards in response to those questions, such as 
the requirement that national courts need to provide for interim measures. 121 Th is 
active development of procedural standards may be regarded as problematic from the 
viewpoint of the limited powers of the EU in this area. It may also be said, however, that 
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the ECJ has in fact developed an approach in its case-law which is very much respectful 
of the arrangements made at national level. Th e ECJ has developed case-law in which it 
has always stressed that it respects the principle of national procedural law, and only on 
a very few occasions has it required for the national courts or authorities to provide for 
new remedies or new procedural rules. 122 Th e ECJ could impose further requirements 
on the basis of the procedural rights which are protected under the Charter or it could 
develop clearer procedural positive obligations on the member states. 123 However, the 
ECJ so far continues to stress the principle of national procedural autonomy in its case-
law and, therefore, it clearly aims to allow member states discretion within the context 
of the procedural protection of EU law. 124 
 Th e case of  DEB shows an interesting example of where the ECJ has had specifi c 
regard to whether there was consensus at the level of the member states concerning 
the protection of a specifi c procedural fundamental right. 125 In this case, the ECJ was 
required to determine whether the right to legal aid, as protected by Article 47(3) of the 
Charter had to be granted to legal persons as well as natural persons. Th e ECJ held that 
this provision  ‘ must be interpreted in its context, in the light of other provisions of EU 
law, the law of the Member states and the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights ’. 126 Th e ECJ recognised that the grant of legal aid to legal persons was not yet a 
common principle that was shared by all member states. Further, it pointed out that 
those member states which did recognise legal aid for legal persons made a distinction 
between profi t-making and non-profi t-making legal persons. 127 Th e ECJ further had 
regard to the case-law of the ECtHR on this issue, from which it could derive various 
factors that needed to be taken into account to determine whether legal aid would need 
to be granted, and it concluded that the grant of legal aid to legal persons is not in 
principle impossible. 128 Th e ECJ showed a very careful approach in this case, which was 
geared to discovering whether there was a consensus between the member states. It was 
ultimately left  to the national court to apply the principles which the ECJ had set forth 
in its judgment. 129 
 On the basis of this approach, the ECJ could decide in future cases to fi rst look at 
whether there is a certain degree of consensus as to the existence of a certain types 
of positive obligation, before it will impose this obligation on its own. Th e ECJ can, 
of course, undertake its own comparative assessment in this respect, but it may also 
have regard to the case-law of the ECtHR, which can reveal whether a certain type of 
positive obligation can already be recognised. If there does not appear to be suffi  cient 
consensus, the ECJ could be expected to allow further discretion to the member states 
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to provide for fundamental rights protection based on their own (higher) standards. 
Th e member states may do so, on the basis of the ruling of the ECJ in the case of  Melloni , 
as long as this does not aff ect the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of EU law. 130 
 In some exceptional cases, the ECJ has also specifi cally allowed the member states 
discretion to provide fundamental rights protection on the basis of their national law 
and on the basis of the Convention. In the case of  Dereci , for example, an important 
question that needed to be answered was whether the national rules on residence 
requirements fell within the scope of EU law and whether the EU ’ s standards of 
fundamental rights thus needed to be applied. 131 Th e ECJ clarifi ed that: 
 if the referring court considers, in the light of the circumstances of the disputes in the main 
proceedings, that the situation of the applicants in the main proceedings is covered by European 
Union law, it must examine whether the refusal of their rights of residence undermines the right 
to respect for private and family life provided for in Article 7 of the Charter. On the other hand 
if it takes the view that the situation is not covered by European Union law, it must undertake 
the examination in light of Article 8(1) ECHR. 132 
 Th e ECJ thus clearly left  room to the national court to decide whether its questions 
fell within the scope of EU law, but it was also willing to add that there might be other 
grounds that could be used for fundamental rights protection, such as protection on the 
basis of the Convention. 
 Th e ECJ adopted a similar approach in the case of  Willems and others . 133 Th is case 
was about the compatibility of the EU ’ s Regulation on Biometric Passports with the right 
to privacy or the right to the protection of personal data as are guaranteed by Articles 7 
and 8 of the Charter. Th is Regulation imposes a requirement on the member state to 
obtain and to store certain biometric data of individuals (such as their fi ngerprints) in 
order to issue passports. 134 Th e Regulation does not establish further specifi c rules on 
the use and storage of this biometric data by persons and authorities at the national level 
for purposes other than verifying the identity of indivuals, such as for the detection 
and prosecution of criminal off ences. In the case of  Willems and others , individuals 
had complained before their national courts about the lack of safeguards that were 
provided for the use of their biometric data by the national authorities. Several national 
courts referred questions to the ECJ on this issue, including the question whether, in 
order to ensure the protection of the right to privacy and the right to the protection of 
personal data, the member states would need to guarantee by law that the biometric 
data collected on the basis of that Regulation would indeed not be used and stored 
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for purposes other than those established by the Regulation. 135 In its response to the 
preliminary questions the ECJ decided that the rules regarding the use and the storage 
of the biometric data fell outside of the scope of the Regulation, and that it formed part 
of the exclusive competence of the member states. Th e ECJ pointed out that it had been 
made explicit in a specifi c provision and a recital that the Regulation  ‘ does not provide 
a legal base for setting up or maintaining databases for storage of those data in Member 
States, which is strictly a matter of national law ’. 136 As a consequence of this judgment, 
a legislative obligation to ensure the protection of the right to privacy and the right to 
the protection of personal data in relation to the storage and use of the biometric data 
could not be derived on the basis of EU fundamental right provisions. 
 It is of interest to note, however, that, aft er the ECJ explained in the case of  Willems 
and others that the issue which was raised fell outside the scope of EU law, it held that: 
 the foregoing considerations are without prejudice to any examination by the national courts of 
the compatibility of all the national measures relating to the use and storage of biometric data 
with their national law and, if appropriate, with the European Convention on the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  … 137 
 Clarifi cation such as this can help the ECJ to overcome criticisms that it is not taking 
fundamental rights seriously, while it at the same time pays respect to the division of 
powers between the EU and the member states. 138 
 7.6.  THE EU AND THE ECJ ’ S ROLE IN THE FIELD OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 Th e foregoing sections have illustrated how the ECJ may take diff erent approaches 
towards fundamental rights cases, depending on various factors. Th is section aims to 
explain and discuss more specifi cally what role the ECJ generally plays in its protection 
of fundamental rights, as well as the role that it is expected to play by the member 
states and their national courts and also by scholars. First, a brief background sketch 
is given on the discussions of the EU as a potential human rights organisation, since 
this also could infl uence the position which the ECJ is expected to take in fundamental 
rights cases (section 7.6.1.). Subsequently, the evolving role of the ECJ in the fi eld of 
fundamental rights protection is explored in more detail (section 7.6.2.). 
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 7.6.1.  THE EU AS A HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATION ? 
 Th ere has been quite some discussion as to whether or not the EU is to be regarded as 
a human rights organisation. Alston and Weiler are well known among the academic 
discipline for having advocated a strong EU human rights policy. 139 Ensuring respect 
for fundamental rights, in their view, would give rise to a wide range of measures that 
need to be undertaken by the EU. It would, for example, be necessary to appoint a 
specifi c Commissioner for Human Rights within the European Commission to help 
the member states in developing policies and initiatives to strengthen the protection 
of human rights. Moreover, the EU legislature would always have to attach a  ‘ human 
rights clause ’ to its legislation dealing with issues such as transparency, the availability 
of information to interested parties, providing possibilities of appeal and the availability 
of legal aid. Also, the EU would need to address the problems relating to the standing 
rights for individuals before the ECJ. 140 Overall, Alston and Weiler suggest measures 
which would require important reforms to be undertaken by the political and the 
administrative bodies of the EU. 
 Th e EU is a very powerful organisation, having a great amount of fi nancial resources 
and considerable political leverage, and it is therefore frequently called upon to use these 
means to protect fundamental rights. 141 Th e EU could, for example, fi ll in the gaps or 
complement the actions taken by other international organisations, such as the ECtHR. 142 
 Others have seriously questioned whether such a comprehensive fundamental rights 
policy should be adopted by the EU. 143 As is oft en mentioned, the EU was never created 
to promote the protection of fundamental rights. Only later it was recognised that 
fundamental rights need to be secured at the Community level, primarily in relation 
to the actions taken by the institutions. 144 Notably, Von Bogdandy has provided an 
important counter-critique to the proposals of Alston and Weiler, arguing against 
bringing fundamental rights within the  ‘ core ’ of the EU. 145 In his view, the main 
question that needed to be asked was whether there are serious shortcomings in the 
protection of fundamental right within the member states of the EU, and whether the 
existing mechanisms would not provide appropriate responses. Von Bogdandy pointed 
out that the Charter itself indicates that it is (mainly) meant to make fundamental 
rights more visible and enhance the protection of fundamental rights within the EU 
context. 146 Von Bogdandy further questioned whether a  ‘ human rights policy ’ could 
be developed by the EU at all, 147 and he seriously doubted whether there would be 
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suffi  cient political legitimacy to put the protection of fundamental rights at the core of 
the EU ’ s activities. 148 
 More recently, however, also Von Bogdandy and others have expressed their concern 
over the fundamental rights situation in several member states of the EU. 149 Th e 
protection of the rights of national and religious minorities and the treatment of asylum 
seekers by some of the member states of the EU has raised questions regarding the 
adequacy of the mechanisms at national level for protecting fundamental rights. Von 
Bogdandy and others have held that the very foundations of the EU could be threatened 
by such fundamental rights violations, especially in situations where the EU applies the 
principle of mutual recognition in its diff erent policies. Th e EU must be able to rely on 
the democratic functioning of the member states, and their adherence to fundamental 
rights. 150 
 Of increasing concern for the protection of fundamental rights within the scope 
of EU law are the legislative acts which have been adopted by the EU in the area of 
freedom, security and justice together with the acts taken by national authorities in 
the implementation thereof. In this area, national authorities and courts are required 
to cooperate with each other on the basis of the principle of mutual trust and mutual 
recognition. Th ey must recognise each other ’ s administrative and judicial decisions, 
while the protection of various fundamental rights can easily be at stake in such areas. 
Cases have been brought to the ECJ in which national courts have raised concern 
over the protection of the rights of the child and the right to family life, as well as the 
prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, in other member states. 151 On the 
basis of such cases, cooperation between the member states based on the principle of 
mutual recognition can be regarded as very problematic. 152 
 Von Bogdandy and others have therefore explored whether the mechanisms provided 
for under EU law could be used to address such concerns. Taking into account the 
lack of political willingness to use the procedure prescribed for under Article 7 TEU, 
they suggest that individuals should be allowed to claim their rights before the national 
courts, by relying on fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law, if there appear to be 
systemic violations of those rights. 153 In their view, the presumption that the national 
authorities and national courts will respect the essence of fundamental rights must be 
applied. As a corollary, the EU would be required to take further action in the area 
of fundamental rights protection in certain exceptional situations, that is, when this 
presumption is rebutted. 
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 Th e various and developing viewpoints of scholars such as Alston and Weiler and 
Von Bogdandy refl ect the diff erent conclusions that could be reached as to what the 
endeavour of protecting fundamental rights in the EU would need to look like. On the 
one hand, it could be argued that the EU should indeed (and perhaps in a moral sense, 
must) make better use of its powers to make a diff erence with regard to the fundamental 
rights issues with which multiple member states struggle. 154 Also, the case has been 
made that the EU ’ s modest approach with respect to the protection of fundamental 
rights within its internal legal order stands in stark contrast to what it aims to realise in 
its external relations. 155 It has been remarked that there is a discordance between the 
EU ’ s internal and the EU ’ s external powers seeing that the external fundamental rights 
powers of the EU are addressed much more clearly by the EU Treaties and that actions 
are indeed undertaken by the EU on the basis of these fundamental rights powers. 156 In 
its external relations, the EU is adopting specifi c action plans to protect human rights 
and democracy and it has developed the practice of including human rights clauses in 
agreements with third countries. 157 On the other hand, in its internal law, it is likely 
that the EU would be viewed with suspicion if it took a further, more  ‘ activist ’ approach, 
seeing the more limited competences it has there. 158 Many would indeed agree that the 
EU is simply not intended to be a human rights organisation. 159 
 As explained in  chapter 6 , the political institutions of the EU have taken a series 
of important steps which have, at least, given fundamental rights a more prominent 
place within the architectural design of the EU. 160 Th e EU has its own Charter, it has 
the obligation to accede to the Convention, and respect for human rights is clearly 
mentioned among the values upon which the EU is based. 161 Especially as a result 
of the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, it has been argued that the EU 
has entered into a new phase in which the Charter must be taken into account in the 
legislative processes and the ECJ will also need to engage more clearly with the rights 
of the Charter. 162 Th e EU institutions themselves are more clearly paying attention to 
the protection of fundamental rights  inter alia by drawing up checklists which they take 
into account when developing their policies. 163 In some areas, where the EU enjoys 
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specifi c competences to take action, certain Directives have also been adopted by the 
EU, especially in the area of non-discrimination. 164 Some scholars have also held that 
the EU is increasingly making use of its indirect competence to protect fundamental 
rights, as explained in chapter 8. 165 Moreover, as discussed in the next section, the ECJ 
is more actively engaging in fundamental rights protection and it has delivered some 
important judgments in this fi eld. 
 Despite the foregoing, it is still questionable whether the EU actually can be said to 
have developed a fundamental rights policy of its own. Douglas-Scott has adequately 
depicted this by stating that  ‘ the protection of fundamental rights in the EU has evolved 
in an  ad hoc , confusing, incremental way and that there exists no clear, conceptual 
underpinning to the rights protected in the EU ’. 166 
 Also, others have noted that, although fundamental rights have been given a more 
prominent place under EU law, it remains unclear which direction the EU should take 
in this fi eld. 167 Th e competences of the EU to actively protect fundamental rights by 
adopting legislation are in particular still limited, as explained in chapter 8. 
 Seeing that the member states have thus not attributed a clear and broad competence 
to the EU to take action in this fi eld, there continue to be calls for a more restricted 
development of the protection of fundamental rights at EU level. 168 On this basis, De 
Schutter has also held that  ‘ the EU is called upon to better protect and promote human 
rights in its law and- and policy-making, [while] it is at the same time asked to act with 
restraint in this fi eld ’. 169 
 Th ere clearly is an ambivalence that is also refl ected in the EU Treaties and in the 
Charter in various provisions governing the protection of fundamental rights by the 
EU. On the basis of Article 51(1) of the Charter, the EU is required to respect, protect 
and even observe fundamental rights, while Article 51(2) of the Charter stresses that the 
protection of fundamental rights cannot extend or modify the competences of the EU. 170 
Various other provisions of the Charter also specifi cally call on further concretisation 
to be made either by means of national or EU law, such as Article 30 that holds  ‘ Every 
worker has the right to protection against unjustifi ed dismissal, in accordance with 
Union law and national law and practices ’. Th is may concern a principle within the 
meaning of Article 52(5) of the Charter which would require the ECJ to provide for 
judicial restraint when interpreting such rights. 171 Overall, therefore, there do not yet 
seem to be very clear principles that could inform the EU at what point it is required to 
undertake action to protect fundamental rights. 
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 7.6.2.  THE ECJ AS A HUMAN RIGHTS COURT ? 
 Of all the EU institutions, the ECJ is considered to have played (and still plays) an 
essential role in the protection of fundamental rights within the EU legal order. Below, 
the role the ECJ played before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force is explained (section 
7.6.2.1.) and also the role it has played since this Treaty entered into force (section 
7.6.2.2.). Th ere is a certain continuity in the Court ’ s approach, but there are also some 
notable diff erences between these two periods. Th e section thereaft er refl ects in more 
detail on the existence of and expectations for a development of fundamental rights 
doctrines by the ECJ, such as a doctrine of positive obligations (section 7.6.2.3.). 
 7.6.2.1.  Th e Role of the ECJ Pre-Lisbon 
 At the very beginning, the ECJ was the primary actor among the EU institutions which 
dealt with fundamental rights challenges, mainly on request by the national courts 
through the preliminary reference procedure. 172 Th e ECJ was the fi rst to recognise 
that fundamental rights were to be protected under Community law at the time when 
the Treaties of the European Community did not provide for a system of fundamental 
rights protection. 173 From that perspective, the ECJ has been regarded as an important 
guardian of the protection of fundamental rights within the EU. 174 
 Initially, the ECJ was led to accept the protection of fundamental rights at Community 
level, because of the concerns that had risen over the supremacy of Community law. 175 
Th e eff ects of EU law on national law, and in particular on the national constitutions, 
had become an important source of tension. 176 Th e ECJ responded to these concerns by 
accepting that fundamental rights were protected as general principles of Community 
law. Later on, the ECJ clarifi ed on a few occasions that the protection of fundamental 
rights by the Community was also necessary to uphold respect for the rule of law. 177 
 Th e original approach of the ECJ to protecting fundamental rights has been 
criticised. In particular, Coppel and O ’ Neill have questioned whether the ECJ was really 
willing to take fundamental rights seriously. 178 Coppel and O ’ Neill found that the ECJ 
had adopted a defensive approach in its protection of fundamental rights, because it 
chiefl y aimed to protect the principle of supremacy of Community law, and only for 
that reason decided to accept fundamental rights at the Community level. Coppel and 
O ’ Neill further claimed that the ECJ employed an  ‘ off ensive approach ’ to fundamental 
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rights. According to them, the ECJ had deliberately extended its jurisdiction into a 
wide range of areas to be able to expand its infl uence, and not per se to genuinely 
ensure the protection of fundamental rights. 179 Coppel and O ’ Neill found it particularly 
problematic that the ECJ brought the  ERT situation, that is the situation where member 
states derogate from the free movement provisions, within the realm of its fundamental 
rights jurisdiction. 180 Th ey also alleged that the ECJ had, in most cases, let Community 
objectives prevail over interests of fundamental rights protection. According to Coppel 
and O ’ Neill: 
 these common outcomes are not coincidental but follow directly from an instrumental 
manipulation of the nature and importance of the concept of fundamental rights protection. 
In each case the Court has manipulated the usage of fundamental rights principles, endowing 
these principles with just enough signifi cance in Community terms to allow for the triumph of 
the Community will. 181 
 Th is harsh criticism has, to some extent, been countered by Weiler and Lockhart. 182 
Th ey found that there was simply no clear evidence to substantiate the claim that the 
Court indeed only used fundamental rights in a defensive or even an off ensive way. 
According to Weiler and Lockhart, Coppel and O ’ Neill put forward a one-sided and in 
some case even incorrect analysis. 183 
 At the same time, Weiler and Lockhart also expressed concern over the approach 
of the ECJ. Th ey particularly pointed to the case of  Bostock , which was discussed in 
beginning of this chapter. 184 According to Weiler and Lockhart, the ECJ did too little 
in its judgment to ensure that the member states would indeed undertake action at 
national level to protect fundamental rights in this case, and it had left  too much 
discretion in that regard. 185 Th e approach of the ECJ was rather restrained, and was 
not very fundamental rights friendly, which has also been noticed for other cases. Th e 
ECJ has accepted the competence to review national measures in light of fundamental 
rights, but in its judgments on fundamental rights cases it oft en left  much discretion to 
the national courts to decide how they would ultimately secure the protection of those 
rights. Also commenting on such judgments, in contrast De Witte found that: 
 Th e prudent attitude of the Court of Justice is commendable. Th ere is no justifi cation for going 
beyond and undertaking the full-scale  ‘ incorporation ’ of Community fundamental rights into 
the national legal orders, as happened in the United States. Indeed, there is no glaring human 
rights defi cit in the legal orders of the Member States, which the ECJ should set out to remedy. 
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In some of them, such as Germany, Italy, and Spain, there are sophisticated systems for the 
judicial protection of constitutional rights; in others, such as France, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands, the European Convention on Human Rights is enforced by the courts as a quasi-
constitution. Also, all Member States are (unlike the EU) subject to the supervision of the 
European Convention organs in Strasbourg. 186 
 Th e case of  Bostock is illustrative of this generally restrained approach. As also proposed 
by the Advocate General in the opinion to the case, the ECJ may have wanted to refrain 
from substituting its own assessment over the choices that should be made by the Union 
or the domestic legislature. Th e ECJ ’ s decision to expand the scope of the Community ’ s 
standards of fundamental rights had only briefl y been rendered previously in the 
case of  Wachauf , which was considered controversial at the time. Th ere is therefore 
something to be said for a deferential approach of the ECJ in the fi eld of fundamental 
rights, especially in respect of member states ’ actions. Weiler and Lockhart have also 
explained that the ECJ is in a very delicate position, since it is not a fundamental rights 
court by nature. Nevertheless, Weiler and Lockhart advised the ECJ to prevent future 
 ‘ attacks ’ on its position with regard to fundamental rights protection. 187 For this reason, 
they also held that the ECJ should have provided for better protection of fundamental 
rights in the case of  Bostock . In particular, they explained that there was a suffi  cient 
basis under Community law, which would have allowed the Court to impose the said 
positive obligations on the member states. 188 
 Th e diffi  cult position in which the ECJ may fi nd itself when deciding about 
fundamental rights, can also been seen in its case-law about the confl icts between 
free movement provisions and fundamental rights. In cases such as  Schmidberger and 
 Omega , the ECJ accepted that fundamental rights can be invoked as a justifi cation for 
the restriction of fundamental rights. 189 Th e ECJ has approached the protection of 
fundamental rights in these cases as a form of interference with the free movement 
rights, and subjected the protection of these interests to a balancing test. Th e ECJ 
has established that the protection of fundamental rights must be necessary to allow 
interferences with the fundamental freedoms. Th is approach has raised questions as 
to whether, in the Court ’ s view, the market values of the fundamental freedoms might 
rank higher than fundamental rights. 190 Th e ECJ is directly required to protect two 
diff erent interests and must ensure the protection of both, since it has developed the 
free movement provisions as  ‘ fundamental freedoms ’ of their own. 191 Seen from that 
perspective, the recognition of fundamental rights as interests which could override 
the  ‘ economic ’ fundamental rights of the Community would be commendable. Still, 
in many cases the ECJ has ultimately chosen the protection of the free movement 
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provisions over the protection of fundamental rights. 192 Th e ECJ thus will not always 
reach the most favourable outcome in terms of fundamental rights protection. 
 Overall, the ECJ has been closely followed and criticised even before the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In this period, the ECJ has oft en been willing to make 
references to the Convention as well as the case-law of the ECtHR in the interpretation 
of fundamental rights as general principles of Community and of EU law. 193 Th e ECJ 
has also been willing to revise its previous interpretations of fundamental rights by 
following the interpretation that was later given by the ECtHR in similar cases. 194 Since 
the ECJ follows the ECtHR ’ s approach it could be inferred that the ECJ is willing to take 
fundamental rights seriously, considering that the ECtHR is a human rights court and 
is better able to decide about fundamental rights cases. Th is has, moreover, also been in 
the interest of a consistent interpretation of fundamental rights seeing that the ECtHR 
and the ECJ have ended up deciding on very similar fundamental rights matters. 195 
Nevertheless, it is equally true that the ECJ for this period has been accused of taking 
fundamental rights insuffi  ciently seriously, in particular because in many cases, it seems 
that it has allowed economic and internal market interests to prevail over fundamental 
rights. 
 7.6.2.2.  Th e Role of the ECJ Post-Lisbon 
 Th e Lisbon Treaty has brought about some notable eff ects and changes in comparison 
to the period before. For one thing, the ECJ is increasingly engaged in fundamental 
rights protection. National courts are increasingly referring questions to the ECJ on 
the application and the interpretation of the Charter. 196 Th e specifi c provisions of the 
Charter have given rise to many new questions, such as Article 51(1) which provides 
a limited scope of application of the fundametal rights laid down in the Charter. 197 
Aside from providing further clarifi cation of such novel provisions, the ECJ has also 
been more active in deciding that EU legislation is void because of an incompatibility 
with fundamental rights. In doing so, the ECJ has handed down some very important 
judgments on the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. Th e example of the 
 Digital Rights case on the Data Retention Directive has shown that the ECJ is willing to 
annul EU legislation if it fails to secure adequate protection of fundamental rights. 198 
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Th ere are by now many more examples in which the ECJ has taken this decision. 199 For 
these reasons, further attention has been drawn in the recent years to what role the ECJ 
can play in the protection of fundamental rights in Europe. 
 It is interesting to fi nd that the approach of the ECJ has to some extent changed as 
compared to its approach before the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. In its more recent 
case-law, the ECJ refers primarily to relevant provisions of fundamental rights as laid 
down in the Charter, and on fewer occasions, it refers to the provisions laid down in the 
Convention. 200 Th e ECJ thereby seems to maintain some distance from the Convention. 
In the case of  Å kerberg Fransson , the ECJ explained that: 
 it is to be remembered that whilst Article 6(3) TEU confi rms, fundamental rights recognised by 
the ECHR constitute general principles of the European Union ’ s law and whilst Article 52(3) of 
the Charter requires rights contained in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the ECHR to be given the same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR, the latter 
does not constitute, as long as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument 
which has been formally incorporated into European Union law. Consequently, European 
Union law does not govern the relationship between the ECHR and the legal systems of 
the Member States, nor does it determine the conclusions to be drawn by a national court in 
the event of a confl ict between the rights guarantee by that convention and a rule of national 
law ( … ). 201 
 Th e ECJ thus expresses some reservations on the full eff ect of the Convention under 
EU law and, rather, seems intent on developing its own autonomous approach to 
fundamental rights. Th e concern of the ECJ for an autonomous interpretation of EU 
law has also been made apparent in  Opinion 2/13 , in which the ECJ pointed out various 
reasons why the draft  accession agreement was incompatible with EU law. 202 
 In other respects, the case-law of the ECJ shows a certain continuity. Th e ECJ has 
not, for example, radically altered its style of reasoning in response to its renewed 
role in fundamental rights cases, nor has it started to develop (many) fundamental 
rights doctrines in its case-law. 203 Th e ECJ oft en continues to rely on its traditional, 
rather formal and terse reasoning, as has been discussed in a previous section. 204 Th e 
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ECJ generally does not spell out in detail what specifi c requirements follow from the 
protection of fundamental rights. 
 The ECJ therefore still considers that its primary role is that of safeguarding EU 
law. It does not consider itself to be a human rights court. 205 The current President 
of the Court, Lenaerts, has also explained that the ECJ ’ s formal approach must be 
maintained because it fits best with its task that it shares with the national courts. 206 
The national courts must be given discretion to accommodate the rulings of the 
ECJ, and the ECJ may therefore not provide far-reaching solutions in respect of the 
national situation. 
 Th is particular approach of the ECJ post-Lisbon has been criticised. According to De 
B ú rca, the minimalistic style of reasoning of the ECJ does not fully show the extent to 
which it actually takes into account the concerns that are related to fundamental rights 
protection, and the diff erent viewpoints that can be taken. 207 It has also been submitted 
that the Court ’ s traditional methods of interpretation (grammatical and teleological 
interpretation) are not suitable in fundamental rights cases. 208 Oft en it concerns very 
diffi  cult cases, which confront the ECJ with the member states ’ most sensitive policies, 
and in which the ECJ needs to apply fundamental rights provisions that off er very little 
guidance as to how they must be interpreted. In such cases, more openness on the part 
of the ECJ with regard to its reasoning and the choices it makes could help to counter 
criticism of judicial activism, as has been argued by Gerards. 209 Th e particular line of 
case-law of the ECJ in the cases of  Mangold and  K ü c ü ckdeveci , in which the Court 
allowed for a certain horizontal eff ect of fundamental rights, for example, has especially 
been criticised because of the minimalistic and self-referential style of reasoning. 210 Th e 
Court has not clearly explained the rationale underlying its approach in these cases. 
Aside from claims of judicial activism, 211 this line of case-law has also caused much 
legal uncertainty. 212 
 Moreover, the ECJ has been criticised because of its more recent position towards 
the Convention and the judgments of the ECtHR as explained above. Th e ECJ does 
not provide insight into whether, and to what extent, it has taken into account relevant 
judgments of the ECtHR. 213 Th is has given rise to fears, over whether the EU meets 
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the minimum level of fundamental rights protection that is guaranteed under the 
Convention. 214 
 Th e ECJ does not consistently refer to the judgments of the ECtHR that could be 
relevant for the interpretation of fundamental rights. At the same time, this approach 
can be explained by its desire for an autonomous interpretation of fundamental rights. 
As explained in  chapter 6 , the explanations of the Charter also specifi cally requires 
attention to be paid to the autonomy of EU law and that of the ECJ in relation to the 
standards for limiting the rights of the Charter. 215 Th e explanations to Article 52(3) 
of the Charter state that the EU and national legislatures  ‘ must comply with the same 
standards as are fi xed by the detailed limitation arrangements laid down in the ECHR  … 
without thereby adversely aff ecting the autonomy of Union law and that of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union ’. 216 It might thus be expected that the ECJ would 
undertake a diff erent assessment with regard to the limitation of fundamental rights as 
compared to the ECtHR. Th e Charter also has a specifi c clause for limiting fundamental 
rights, laid down in Article 52(1). 217 Some scholars have held that the case-law of the 
ECJ has indeed demonstrated a diff erent approach towards the limitation of fundamental 
rights. 218 
 It has already been mentioned that the ECJ takes into account the scope and meaning 
of fundamental right as developed by the ECtHR in its case-law. 219 Th ere are plenty of 
cases in which the ECJ still refers to the judgments of the ECtHR as a further support 
in its fundamental rights cases. 220 Several authors have commended the ECJ for this. 
In particular when it is confronted with cases on sensitive and complex matters, it is 
considered valuable if the ECJ refers to judgments of the ECtHR as a further ground of 
support for its decision. 221 
 Th ere are several examples of cases in which the ECJ has specifi cally referred to the 
judgments of the ECtHR in order to impose a positive obligation on either the EU 
institutions or on the member states. Th e ECJ has, for example, specifi cally relied on the 
judgments of the ECtHR to establish that the right to an eff ective remedy as guaranteed 
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by Article 47 of the Charter requires that a remedy must be provided before the General 
Court to allow undertakings to claim damages as a result of lengthy competition 
procedures. 222 Th e ECJ pointed out a certain judgment of the ECtHR which established 
that states must take measures to ensure that the right to a fair trial under Article 
6 ECHR is guaranteed within a reasonable time, and if they fail to do so, they must 
provide for compensation. 223 
 By contrast, there are also some examples of cases in which the ECJ has not yet 
recognised relevant case-law of the ECtHR. 
 First, there is the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of  Tarakhel v. Switzerland . 224 In 
this case, the ECtHR decided that Switzerland would violate the prohibition of inhuman 
and degrading treatment under Article 3 ECHR by transferring a family with minor 
children back to Italy on the basis of the rules established under the Dublin Regulation. 
Under the Dublin Regulation, as explained earlier, the EU member states are required 
to send asylum seekers back to the specifi c member state where they fi rst arrived in the 
EU, which, in this case, was Italy. Th e ECtHR took into account the extremely vulnerable 
position of a family with minor children and their specifi c needs and considered that 
they required particular protection. 225 Th e ECtHR established that Switzerland would 
need to request individual guarantees from Italy to ensure that upon arrival, the family 
would be accepted in conditions which were adapted to the age of children and that 
the family would be kept together. 226 Th e ECtHR thus imposed an obligation on the 
Swiss authorities to obtain insurances from the public authorities of another state 
party to which they send asylum seekers. Previously, the ECJ has expressly followed 
the interpretation of the ECtHR in the  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece case on the Dublin 
Regulation. However, so far the ECJ has not embraced the position of the ECtHR in 
the case of  Tarakhel v. Switzerland . Instead it held, very generally, in  Opinion 2/13 , that: 
 when implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume 
that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so that not only may 
they not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another 
Member State than that provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may not check 
whether that other Member State has actually, in a specifi c case, observed the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the EU. 227 
 Th is interpretation of the ECJ could provide reason to believe that it would accept in 
very limited situations, perhaps more limited than the ECtHR, that member states 
need to seek individual guarantees from other member states to secure the protection 
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 231  See recently ECJ 9 September 2015, Joined cases C-72/14 and C-197/14,  X. and T.A. van Dijk , paras 
54 – 61. 
 232  See also Lacchi (2016). 
 233  See also section 7.4.1. 
 234  See section 7.5.3. 
of fundamental rights when transferring an asylum seeker to another member state. It is 
of special importance, according to the ECJ that the member states should thus uphold 
the principle of mutual recognition in this context. Th e ECJ could be criticised for this 
particular position. However, in another more recent case, the ECJ took a diff erent 
approach and allowed room for the member states and their national courts to apply 
exceptions to the principle of mutual recognition. In the case of  Aranyosi and C ă ld ă ru , 
which was about the execution of a European Arrest Warrant, the ECJ allowed room for 
the member states and their national courts to set the principle of mutual recognition 
aside under certain circumstances, which the ECJ further clarifi ed in its judgment. 228 
Th is case, which was discussed in  chapter 6 , may show that the ECJ is thus willing to 
follow the approach of the ECtHR by specifi cally taking individual circumstances into 
account. 
 As a second illustration, the case-law of the ECtHR on the protection of the right to a 
fair trial of individuals in relation to the preliminary reference procedure has also not yet 
been recognised by the ECJ. 229 In its case-law, the ECtHR has established that national 
courts of last instance must provide reasoning for their refusal to refer a preliminary 
reference to the ECJ on questions of interpretation of EU law. 230 Th e ECtHR requires 
the national courts to explicitly mention the reasons which the case-law of the ECJ 
provides on the exceptions to the obligations of the national courts under Article 267 
TFEU (the  Cilfi t case-law). 
 So far, the ECJ has not endorsed this interpretation of the ECtHR, although it is 
clearly relevant in respect of the obligations which the member states of the EU must 
fulfi l within the scope of EU law. It is not clear whether the ECJ would also recognise 
an obligation for the member states to give reasons for their decision not to make a 
reference for a preliminary ruling. Th e ECJ has always held in its case-law that the 
preliminary reference procedure gives discretion to the national courts to decide 
whether a preliminary reference is necessary. 231 Under EU law, there are no remedies for 
individuals enabling them to obtain a reference for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ. 232 It 
is therefore questionable whether the ECJ would be willing to accept an obligation for 
the national court to provide reasons for their decisions not to refer a question to the 
ECJ, as it is diffi  cult to square with the specifi c character of the preliminary reference 
procedure. 233 Moreover, the ECJ might consider this to be an issue that falls within the 
area of national procedural autonomy. 234 
Intersentia174
Th e Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU
 235  See Gerards (2015), p. 47; Douglas-Scott (2011), p. 649; S á nchez (2012), p. 1592; Gerards (2011a), 
p. 90; and K ü hling (2009), p. 490. Th e Court of Justice has, however, paid attention to concepts of 
indirect and direct discrimination in its case law, see Gerards (2015), p. 47. 
 236  Besson (2011a), p. 117. See also section 6.7.2. 
 237  See ECJ 9 December 1997, C-265/95,  Commission v. France ; and ECJ 12 June 2003, C-112/00, 
 Schmidberger ; and cf. De Vries  & Mastrigt (2013), pp. 274 – 276; Trstenjak  & Beysen (2013); and Alston  & 
Weiler (1999), p. 10. 
 238  ECJ 22 January 2013, C-283/11,  Sky  Ö sterreich . 
 239  See in particular ECJ 8 April 2014, C-293/12,  Digital Rights Ireland ; para. 48; and ECJ 6 October 2015, 
C-362/14,  Schrems , para. 78. 
 Th ere is thus some uncertainty over whether the ECJ would always arrive at the same 
decisions as the ECtHR has reached, especially in the cases mentioned here. As has 
been discussed, it is not unlikely that the ECJ will go its own way. Th is does not need to 
be problematic, but if the ECJ decides to provide for a diff erent approach towards the 
protection of fundamental rights than the ECtHR, in matters falling within the scope of 
EU law, it would be desirable to pair this to a greater openness in its reasoning behind 
its judgments, as well to off er better insight into the choices the ECJ makes. Th is would 
be in the interest of providing legal certainty and could ensure a further legitimation 
of its decisions. 
 7.6.2.3.  Th e Development of Fundamental Rights Doctrines by the ECJ 
 Th e ECJ has so far been slow in developing fundamental rights doctrines in its case-
law. 235 However, the ECJ has developed certain doctrines in other areas, such as in the 
fi eld of the free movement law, where it has accepted the horizontal eff ect of the free 
movement rights. 236 Th e ECJ has even established that member states are under a positive 
obligation to protect the free movement rules from interferences committed by private 
parties. 237 Th is might give rise to a certain expectation that such positive obligations 
would also be created by the ECJ to ensure the protection of EU fundamental rights. 
However, the ECJ has not clearly engaged in the development of such obligations, nor 
in the development of a clear doctrine of positive obligations. 
 Th ere are some judgments of the ECJ on fundamental rights, in which the ECJ has 
provided a much more elaborate reasoning and insight into its approach. Th e  Sky 
 Ö sterreich judgment is largely regarded as a good example of where the ECJ carefully 
examined whether the EU legislature had struck a right balance in the protection of 
the freedom to conduct a business and the right to freedom of expression under the 
Audiovisual Media Directive. 238 Th e ECJ thereby closely followed the proportionality 
assessment laid down in Article 52(1) of the Charter. Also, in several cases, the Court 
has specifi cally had regard to the seriousness of a fundamental rights interference. 239 If 
the interference with a fundamental right is serious, it seems that the Court will apply 
a more strict review. Th e ECJ has developed case-law in which it allows exceptions to 
the application of the principle of mutual recognition in the case of an interference with 
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 248  Gerards (2012b); and Gerards (2011a). 
an absolute fundamental right, such as Article 4 of the Charter on the prohibition of 
inhuman and degrading treatment. 240 
 It has been argued that it is necessary for the ECJ to develop its fundamental rights 
doctrines further. Some scholars have also, in particular, encouraged the ECJ to start 
developing a doctrine of positive obligations. 241 Th e development of these and other 
doctrines has been considered necessary for various reasons. First, fundamental rights 
doctrines in general provide further clarity, certainty and predictability to the actors 
that are subject to a particular fundamental rights regime. 242 It has especially been held 
that it would be necessary for the ECJ to start developing fundamental rights doctrines, 
since it is now confronted with a greater number of cases that involve fundamental 
rights. 243 Several scholars also maintain that the development of fundamental rights 
doctrines would be necessary to enable the Court to play a strong role in the fi eld of 
fundamental rights, and thereby enhance the legitimacy of EU law. 244 In that respect, 
the ECJ is expected to make up for the democratic defi cits in the EU. Some authors 
cherish serious concerns over the legitimacy of the decisions that are taken by the EU 
institutions, and expect the ECJ to respond to those concerns by developing a clear 
fundamental rights discourse. 245 Th e ECJ would, in particular, need to ensure the 
legitimacy of EU decisions  vis- à -vis the national constitutional courts seeing that these 
courts still express concerns over the existence of an adequate level of protection of 
fundamental rights at the EU level. EU law can have a clear impact on the rights of 
individuals as a result of the eff ect given to the principles of supremacy and of direct 
eff ect of EU law as well as other principles. Th erefore, the ECJ needs to ensure that EU law 
is legitimated by democratic ideals, including the protection of fundamental rights. 246 
In the view of these scholars, the ECJ needs to show that it takes fundamental rights 
seriously by undertaking a strong review of the measures of the EU institutions in light 
of fundamental rights. If it did so, the national courts would also be willing to entrust 
the ECJ with the power necessary to adjudicate in the fi eld of fundamental rights. 247 
 In developing fundamental rights doctrines, the ECJ has been urged to consider 
the doctrines and methods of interpreting fundamental rights which the ECtHR has 
developed, including the methods of interpretation of meta-teleological reasoning, 
autonomous or consensus interpretation, and a margin of appreciation doctrine. 248 
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Th is could still allow room for the ECJ to give expression to specifi c characteristics of 
EU law, while also providing for some clarity. 249 As explained in the previous section, 
there might be reasons for the ECJ to undertake a diff erent assessment of the limitations 
of fundamental rights under EU law. In the development of a doctrine of positive 
obligations, for example, the ECJ could be expected to take into account the limited 
fundamental rights competences of the EU and the limited scope of application of EU 
fundamental right, which will be explained in  chapters 8 and 9. 
 Whether and when the ECJ would indeed want to develop its fundamental rights 
doctrines further may also depend on the types of cases that are brought to the Court. 
More elaborate refl ections on whether the ECJ could be expected to develop a doctrine 
of positive obligations are, therefore, given in chapter 11. Th is chapter examines specifi c 
examples of judgment of the ECJ on cases giving rise to positive obligations, and 
evaluating certain problematic aspects of those cases. 
 7.7.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Th is chapter has discussed a variety of factors that shape the institutional position and 
the judicial culture of the ECJ. It has been explained that the ECJ is a court which 
deals with much wider issues than only fundamental rights protection, and it employs 
a rather specifi c style of reasoning, which is relatively formal in nature and which 
is usually not very elaborate. Th is by itself means that there is less potential for a 
development of positive obligations by the ECJ in its case-law. Some of the specifi c 
features relating to the institutional position as well as the judicial culture of the ECJ 
are of particular importance for the potential development of positive obligations by 
this Court. First, the ECJ is very much dependent on the questions which are referred 
to by the national courts under the preliminary reference procedure, which forms 
the main procedure used to ensure the protection of fundamental rights within the 
context of EU law. Generally, the ECJ is intent on answering only questions which are 
specifi cally formulated by the national courts, and the national courts may therefore 
play an important role in the further development of positive obligations at the EU level 
by referring relevant questions to the ECJ. Oft en, the ECJ is also inclined to have regard 
to the specifi c choices that have been made by the EU legislature, including in cases on 
fundamental rights, and it will not easily overturn those choices. Th e ECJ has diff erent 
ways of showing a deferential review towards the EU institutions. Th ese include a 
 ‘ reconciliatory approach ’ and a procedural type of review. Interestingly, both of these 
techniques actually provide room for a development of positive obligations, mostly 
of a procedural nature, which can be directed at the judiciary or the administrative 
authorities of the member states. In cases where there are important interests of EU law 
at stake, such as the protection of the free movement provisions as well as when serious 
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interferences with fundamental rights have taken place, it could also be expected that 
the ECJ would further allow for a development of positive obligations, as it applies a 
more strict review of the fundamental rights requirements in such cases. 
 It has been explained in this chapter that the ECJ has not radically altered its judicial 
style in response to the increase of fundamental rights cases that have been brought 
since the Charter has become binding. It has, moreover, been slow in developing its 
own fundamental rights doctrines, even if it has stressed the autonomy of EU law in 
cases on fundamental rights. Th e approach of the ECJ in fundamental rights cases has 
been criticised for that reason. According to the critics, the case-law of the ECJ creates 
legal uncertainty, and this casts doubts as to whether the ECJ indeed takes fundamental 
rights protection seriously. Th is is considered problematic, especially by those who 
consider that the ECJ should play an important and active role in the protection of 
fundamental rights within the context of EU law, because of the concerns over the 
democratic legitimacy of EU law. From this perspective, it would be valuable for the 
ECJ to clearly show to the national courts that it now takes fundamental rights concerns 
suffi  ciently into account. 
 Finally, it has been explained that if the ECJ, perhaps in response to criticism on 
its case-law, were to develop fundamental rights doctrines, it has been advised in the 
literature to take the case-law of the ECtHR as its source of inspiration. Th e ECtHR 
has much experience in dealing with fundamental rights matters, and therefore enjoys 
legitimacy. At the same time, it is expected that in developing its own and autonomous 
approach, the ECJ will also take into account principles and concerns that are specifi c 
to EU law. 
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 CHAPTER 8 
 EU COMPETENCES AND SUBSIDIARITY IN 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS PROTECTION 
 8.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Th e limited competences of the EU are oft en mentioned as a problematic issue in relation 
to its obligation to protect fundamental rights. 1 Th e limits related to the competences 
of the EU are addressed at diff erent places in the Charter, the explanations to the 
Charter, the EU Treaties as well as in the context of the accession to the Convention, 
and in the discussions related thereto. 2 Th e EU does not have a general competence 
to take action to protect fundamental rights, so how can positive obligations which 
may require legislative, administrative or judicial measures to be fulfi lled actually be 
accommodated within the context of EU law ? Would the ECJ, fi rst, be expanding the 
competences of the EU institutions if it were to impose positive obligations on them 
to ensure the protection of fundamental rights in the implementation of certain policy 
fi elds of EU law ? Secondly, would the ECJ (always) be interfering in the competences of 
the member states, if it were to impose obligations on them to take additional measures 
to ensure that fundamental rights are protected within the scope of EU law ? Th irdly, 
would the ECJ leave gaps in the protection of fundamental rights if it decided that there 
was no scope to accept positive obligations on the basis of the limited competences 
of the EU ? To gauge the potential for the development of positive obligations by the 
ECJ, the issue of competences is clearly important. Th is chapter examines whether and 
within what limits the defi nition of negative or positive obligations can be reconciled 
with the principle of limited EU competences. To answer this question, this chapter will 
address the inherently complicated relationship between the EU ’ s limited competences 
and its obligation to protect fundamental rights. 3 
 As this chapter will show, this thesis takes the principle of attributed powers of the 
EU as the main starting point for determining the extent to which positive obligations 
can be incorporated into EU law. An important reason for this is the clear emphasis 
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which has been placed on the principle of limited competences within the context of 
fundamental rights protection by the EU in various legal provisions and documents. 
Th is approach further takes into account that the member states have already provided 
for mechanisms which secure the protection of fundamental rights, and these can also 
be used to ensure the eff ective protection of EU law. As will be explained, however, there 
are also other viewpoints that can be taken on how the concept of positive obligations 
can be incorporated into EU law. Several scholars take into account principles of 
international law and of state responsibility to justify imposing positive obligations on 
the EU as a whole. Th ese should accordingly be met by all the EU institutions, including 
the ECJ, which may pass certain obligations on to the member states. 
 Th is chapter will fi rst briefl y explain what the basic principles governing the division 
of competences between the EU and the member states entail (section 8.2.). Th ereaft er, 
an in-depth discussion will follow on how the competences of the EU to protect 
fundamental rights can be defi ned, looking mainly at the academic discussions on this 
topic (section 8.3.). As there are some fundamental rights competences for the EU, the 
following section discusses how it may be decided when the EU would have to make use 
of these competences and undertake certain actions to ensure the eff ective protection 
of fundamental rights (section 8.4.). Aside from the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality, other relevant principles and considerations will be discussed, which 
have been derived from the academic debate on this topic, the case-law of the ECJ, and 
reports of the European Commission relating to specifi c EU legislative proposals on 
the protection of fundamental rights. Th is section will explain how these principles 
and considerations interrelate. As a fi nal point, this chapter will examine how it can 
further be ensured that room is given to the member states to apply their own national 
standards of fundamental rights and the standards of international human rights 
treaties (section 8.5.). Th e chapter ends with some brief conclusions (section 8.6.). 
 8.2.  THE PRINCIPLE OF ATTRIBUTED COMPETENCES AND 
THE DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE EU AND ITS 
MEMBER STATES 
 Th e principle of attributed powers means that the EU can only act within the limits 
of the competences which have been conferred to it by the member states in order to 
achieve its objectives. 4 Th is basic defi nition of the principle of attributed powers, also 
known as the principle of conferral, is given in Article 5(2) TFEU. In addition, Article 
4(1) TFEU explains that the member states retain the competences which they have 
not conferred to the EU. Th ese principles are at the heart of the existence of the EU 
and they are of key concern for defi ning the powers of the EU. Of equal importance is 
the distinction which has been made between diff erent types of competences. Th e EU 
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 5  Craig (2004). 
 6  Article 3(2) TFEU further determines when the conclusion of an international agreement falls within 
this category. 
 7  Th e manner in which the EU may cease such competences is determined by Declaration 18 to the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
 8  It is stressed by Protocol No. 25 to the Lisbon Treaty that member states are still allowed to take action 
when the EU has exercised a shared competence because such action does not cover the whole area, 
but  ‘ only covers those elements governed by the Union act ’ . 
has exclusive, shared and complementary competences, and Articles 3 to 6 TFEU list 
the diff erent areas which fall within each one of these competences. 5 Th e categorisation 
of these diff erent competences has important implications for the degree of power 
which the EU and the member state can exercise in a given area, which is indicated by 
Article 2 TEU. 
 Accordingly, in areas of exclusive competences to act, the EU has the exclusive power 
to legislate and adopt legally binding acts. Th is applies  inter alia to the customs union, 
the establishment of competition rules within the internal market and the conclusion 
of certain international agreements. 6 Th e member states in these areas may only act if 
they have been empowered by the EU or in implementation of EU acts. Th us in areas of 
exclusive competences, the room for member state action is very limited. 
 In areas of shared competences, there is generally much more room for member states 
to take action. Here, both the EU and the member states may adopt legally binding acts. 
Th ere is no exhaustive list that can be given of the policy fi elds in which the EU has 
such shared competences. Instead, Article 4(1) TFEU explains that in areas which have 
not been indicated by the Treaty provisions as providing an exclusive or supplementary 
competence, competences are shared. Article 4(2) TFEU mentions the area of social 
policy, the environment and the area of freedom, security and justice as examples of 
such areas. Th e possibilities for use of these competences by the member states may 
fl uctuate, or rather diminish over time, depending on whether or not the EU has 
adopted any acts. Th is is because, on the basis of Article 2(2) TFEU, the member states 
exercise their competences to the extent that the EU has not exercised its competence, 
or when the EU has decided to cease exercising its competences. 7 As soon as the EU 
has taken action within an area of shared competences, the area becomes  ‘ pre-empted ’. 
Th e degree of power of the EU within this category of shared competences may vary 
widely between the diff erent areas concerned. 8 Th e EU may have exhaustively regulated 
a particular area, which then severely restricts the competences of the member states, 
but the EU also may provide for minimum harmonisation, leaving power to a larger 
degree at national level. 
 Th e third category of EU competences is that of the complementary competences. 
Th is implies that the EU is allowed to take action to support, coordinate and 
supplement the actions of the member states, yet, as determined by Article 2(5) TFEU, 
without superseding the competences of the member states. Areas in which the EU has 
complementary competences are health, industry and culture. In these areas, the EU 
may not go as far as harmonising the member states ’ laws and regulations. 
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 13  A striking example is provided by the establishment of a directive harmonising patient ’ s rights based 
on Article 114 TFEU. Th is legal basis can be used to ensure the establishment of the internal market, 
 Th ere are a few other areas in which the EU may take action, even though they are 
not as such indicated as an exclusive, shared or complementary competence by the 
Treaty. Article 2(3) TFEU determines that the EU has a competence to coordinate the 
economic, employment and social policies of the member states. According to Article 
2(4) TFEU, the EU may also take measures in the fi eld of the common foreign and 
security policy and the defence policy. Th ese areas used to be part of a separate pillar 
in the former Community ’ s structure. Th ey remain somewhat diff erent, as the actions 
of the EU and the jurisdiction of the ECJ to review the lawfulness of those actions are 
subject to specifi c limitations. 9 
 Th e diff erent categories of competence show generally which degree of power the 
EU may exercise in a certain area and, importantly, how the division between the 
competences oft he member states and the EU works. Yet, the indication of an area as 
an exclusive, shared or complementary competence remains, to some extent, merely a 
starting point. Further indications for determining the degree of power which can be 
exercised by the EU and the member states are the exact subject matter on which the EU 
may take action, the type of acts than can be adopted (regulations, directives, minimum 
or maximum harmonisation etc.), and the type of legislative procedures that must be 
followed. Th is is determined by the particular legal bases which have been provided for 
throughout the Treaty and by other types of EU acts which lay down such rules. Th us, 
within the diff erent categories of competences generally, there may be varying degrees 
of power which may be held by the EU. 
 Despite the fact that there are fairly detailed rules on the division of competences 
between the EU and the member states and certain restrictions that need to be respected, 
the expansion of the competences of the EU has given cause for concern. 10 Th e Lisbon 
Treaty aimed to address this by laying down further rules and mechanisms to help 
curb the expansion of EU competences. It also has provided for the categorisation 
of the diff erent competences, and it has placed further emphasis on the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, which are explained in section 8.4.3. 11 
 Th e expansion of competences of the EU has been attributed, partly, to the very 
broad interpretation of the competences by the EU institutions. 12 Th ere are some 
powers which have been laid down in quite a broad way in the EU Treaties. Of concern 
here, in particular, are Article 114 TFEU, which allows for the adoption of harmonising 
measures with the object of the establishment and functioning of the internal market, 
and Article 352 TFEU, which provides for a residual power to take measures to attain 
one of the objectives set out in the Treaty. Th ese provisions have been used to justify the 
adoption of a wide range of actions by the EU. 13 
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 14  ECJ 29 November 1956, C-8/55,  F é d é ration charbonni è re de Belgique v. High Authority . 
 15  Prechal, De Vries  & Van Eijken (2011), p. 242. 
 16  Cf. also Barents (2008), p. 349. 
 17  Craig (2004); and Dashwood (2006). 
 18  Article 51 of the Charter also specifi cally addresses the limits related to the powers of the EU. In the 
context of the Charter, it is expected that the ECJ will take these limits into account when applying the 
Charter ’ s provisions, see Groussot, Pech  & Petursson (2013), p. 100. 
 Some scholars also particularly blame the ECJ for the expansion of the EU 
competences. Th e ECJ has, for example, accepted, to some extent, the idea of implied 
powers, which entails that the EU may act if this is necessary to achieve an objective 
that is in principle to be pursued by an explicit power. 14 Th e ECJ has also adopted quite 
a deferential approach in checking whether the EU institutions have made use of the 
correct legal basis. Lastly, the ECJ has appeared to have allowed for an expansion of the 
EU ’ s competences by bringing a wide range of matters within the scope of EU law. 15 Th e 
ECJ has interpreted, for example, the free movement rules in a particularly extensive 
manner. As soon as the ECJ decides that such matters fall within the scope of these 
provisions, the member states must ensure respect for EU law, even when they have not 
conferred specifi c powers to the EU to act in such fi elds. 16 
 Th us, to understand the expansion of EU competences, it is of importance to take 
account of a variety of factors  – broad Treaty provisions, the approach of the EU 
institutions and the approach adopted by the ECJ. 17 Th is is particularly useful in relation 
to the potential to identify positive obligations. Th ese factors will help to identify the 
limits to the competences for imposing such obligations and, in addition, they may help 
to highlight whether recognition of positive obligations could lead to an unwarranted 
expansion of competences and, if so, how this could be avoided. In this respect it is 
important to point out that, while the limits related to the principle of attributed powers 
are primarily concerned with the legislative powers of the EU and are thus addressed 
to the EU legislature, it is also considered that the ECJ needs to show respect for these 
limits. 18 
 8.3.  EU COMPETENCES TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 
 8.3.1.  SILENCE IN THE EU TREATIES AND THE CASE-LAW OF 
THE ECJ 
 Th e EU Treaty rules do not specifi cally identify a competence of the EU to undertake 
action to protect fundamental rights. Th e question of what kind of competences the EU 
has, if any, to protect fundamental rights for long formed a topic of academic debate. 
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 19  Alston  & Weiler (1999), pp. 24 – 25. See also Weiler  & Fries (1999), pp. 158 – 161; Eeckhout (2002), 
pp. 981 – 988; and Besson (2011b), pp. 44 – 55. 
 20  ECJ 28 March 1996,  Opinion 2-94 . In  Opinion 2/13 , in which the ECJ was asked to determine whether 
the specifi c modalities for arranging the accession of the EU to the Convention was compatible with 
EU law, the EU ’ s competences to protect fundamental rights were only addressed in negative terms, 
see Opinion 2/13, 18 December 2014, paras 160 – 161. 
 21  ECJ 28 March 1996,  Opinion 2/94 , paras 2 – 26. 
 22  ECJ 28 March 1996,  Opinion 2/94 , para. 27. Th e ECJ partly reiterated this in ECJ 17 February 1998, 
C-249/96,  Grant , para. 45. 
 23  Cf. Alston  & Weiler (1999), pp. 24 – 25; and Eeckhout (2002), pp. 982 – 983. 
 24  ECJ 28 March 1996,  Opinion 2/94 , paras 34 – 35. Later, this was partly reiterated in ECJ 17 February 
1998, C-249/96,  Grant , para. 45. 
It is also mostly in these debates that answers to that question may be found, as will be 
discussed further below. 19 
 Th e  ‘ competence issue ’ has only briefl y been addressed by the ECJ in  Opinion 2/94 . 20 
In this opinion, the ECJ was asked to examine the compatibility of the accession of the 
European Community to the Convention  – which was delivered at a time where the 
Treaties did not yet include a specifi c legal basis for the EU to do so. Th e ECJ emphasised 
the principle that there must be a specifi c power on the basis of which the Community 
may act. It clarifi ed that a power may be expressly provided for in the Treaty, but it may 
also be implied therefrom. 21 Th e ECJ concluded that  ‘ No Treaty provision confers on 
the Community institutions any general power to enact rules on human rights or to 
conclude international conventions in this fi eld ’. 22 According to the ECJ there was thus 
no  general power for the Community to protect fundamental rights. Several scholars 
have argued that in the opinion the ECJ did not deny the existence of a competence for 
the Community in the fi eld of fundamental rights protection altogether, and that it left  
room for the existence of another type of competence to protect fundamental rights. 23 
Th e ECJ ’ s fi nding on the existence of a fundamental rights competences in  Opinion 2/94 
must further be viewed against the background of this opinion. In  Opinion 2/94 , the 
ECJ was only asked to fi gure out whether the Community was competent, at the time, 
to accede to the Convention. Th e ECJ explained in the opinion that: 
 Respect for human rights is … a condition for the lawfulness of the Community acts. 
Accession to the Convention would, however, entail a substantial change in the present 
Community system for the protection of human rights in that it would entail the entry into of 
the Community into a distinct international institutional system as well as integration of all 
the provisions of the Convention into the Community legal order. 
 Such a modifi cation of the system for the protection of human rights in the Community, 
with equally fundamental institutional implications for the Community and for the Member 
States, would be of constitutional signifi cance and would therefore be such as to go beyond 
the scope of Article 235 [ ex Article 352 TFEU]. It could be brought about only be way of 
Treaty amendment. 24 
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 25  Specifi cally in the area of the EU ’ s external policies, it is emphasised further by Articles 3(5) and 21(2) 
TEU that the value of human rights is to be upheld, promoted and consolidated. 
 26  Cf. Besson (2011b), p. 40. Besson refers to these provisions as the  ‘ standstill clauses ’ . 
 27  Th ere has been some disagreement over whether or not there was already a competence provided 
under the treaty regime existing at the time which would allow the accession. In particular, Article 351 
TFEU has been pointed out as a relevant basis, see Alston  & Weiler (1999), pp. 22 – 27; and Weiler  & 
Fries (1999), pp. 154 – 165. 
 28  See in particular Muir (2014a). 
 29  See Prechal, De Vries  & Van Eijken (2011), p. 242. 
 30  See Besson (2011b), pp. 50 – 53; Prechal, De Vries  & Van Eijken (2011), p. 214; Van der Velde (2009), 
pp. 74 – 78; De Schutter (2004), pp. 29 – 31; and Heringa  & Verhey (2001), pp. 19 – 20. 
 31  See in particular Alston  & Weiler (1999). 
 Article 6(2) TEU has now given eff ect to the requirement for a clear legal basis for 
the accession of the EU to the Convention. Th e Treaties have also made clear that the 
protection of human rights constitutes one of the objectives of the EU. Article 2 TEU 
indicates that  ‘ respect for human rights ’ is one of the values upon which the EU has 
been founded, and Article 3 TEU clarifi es that the promotion of such values forms 
an objective of the EU. 25 Th e exact competences of the EU to ensure fundamental 
rights protection are, however, still not as such defi ned by the Treaties. Instead, the 
competence issue is mainly addressed in negative terms. 26 Article 6 TEU stipulates that 
neither the provisions of the Charter nor the accession can aff ect or extend in any way 
the competences of the EU as defi ned in the Treaties. Such limitations appear to be 
based on the principles which the ECJ developed in  Opinion 2/94 on the competences 
of the Community to protect fundamental rights, as has been mentioned above. 27 Yet, 
as discussed, the precise implications of these limitations are not entirely clear. 
 If the protection of fundamental rights would only require the EU institutions or the 
member states to refrain from taking action, which means that it would comply with a 
negative obligation, this does not necessarily give rise to a direct confl ict with the limited 
competences of the EU. Aft er all, in that situation provision of fundamental rights only 
set limits to action, instead of demanding new action to be taken. Even there, however, 
some scholars have argued that the compliance with a negative obligation, in situations 
falling within the scope of EU law, can be considered problematic from the perspective 
of the principle of attributed powers. 28 In their view, the defi nition of fundamental 
rights limits by the ECJ or by the EU legislature can still broaden the scope of EU law 
in an area where the EU does not have clear competences, because the exercise of the 
member states ’ powers at national level are then further restricted. 29 
 In relation to the positive measures which may be required to ensure eff ective respect 
for fundamental rights, the issue of competences has been considered particularly 
pressing. 30 Th ere is a wide range of measures that have been envisaged as necessary 
for the EU to take. Th is includes institutional measures and practical arrangements 
to provide for monitoring and reporting mechanisms, as well as legislative measures 
designed to promote and protect fundamental rights across the many diff erent policy 
fi elds of the EU. 31 It is unclear whether there is any scope for the EU to adopt such 
measures on the basis of its existing competences. 
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 32  On these external fundamental rights competences, see Besson (2011b), pp. 48 – 50. Th e discordance 
between the EU ’ s internal and external powers to protect fundamental rights has briefl y been explained 
in section 7.6.1. Th e examples of positive obligations in the EU context are discussed in chapter 11. 
 33  Alston  & Weiler (1999), pp. 22 – 27. See also Weiler  & Fries (1999), pp. 159 – 160; and De Schutter 
(2004), pp. 17 – 18. 
 34  Alston  & Weiler (1999), pp. 22 – 27. 
 35  Weiler  & Fries (1999), pp. 158 – 159. 
 36  Alston  & Weiler (1999), pp. 26 – 27. 
 37  Weiler  & Fries (1999), p. 158. 
 Clearly, there is thus a debate on the limited competences of the EU to protect 
fundamental rights at EU level, although it is more outspoken in relation to positive 
obligations than in relation to negative obligations. To understand the consequences of 
this debate for the potential to develop a doctrine of positive obligations for the EU, it is 
important to further analyse what powers the EU may have in this fi eld. Th e following 
subsections therefore discuss the diff erent types of fundamental rights powers which 
are generally recognised, and it indicates several provisions in the Treaty and in the 
Charter that are relevant to this debate. Th is discussion will not pay further attention to 
the EU ’ s fundamental rights powers in its external relations. Th is study mostly focuses 
on the EU ’ s fundamental rights competences based on its internal law, and the examples 
that can be found in the case-law of the ECJ are also based on that law. 32 
 8.3.2.  A GENERAL POWER TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 Some scholars believe that there is a certain general power for the EU to protect 
fundamental rights, even though the ECJ denied the existence of such a power in  Opinion 
2/94 . Alston and Weiler have been the most forceful in defending this position. 33 Th ey 
found that in order to ensure respect for fundamental rights in matters that cut across 
the diff erent fi elds of Community law, certain general measures need to be taken, and 
that appropriate legal bases for doing so were provided by Community law. 34 Such 
measures could entail monitoring and reporting mechanisms or legislative measures 
designed to protect the fundamental rights of citizens which could be aff ected when 
they exercise the free movement rights. 35 Alston and Weiler pointed to Article 352 
TFEU in particular as an appropriate basis to allow for the adoption of certain general 
measures to protect fundamental rights, which provides for a residual legal basis for 
EU action. 36 In addition, Article 114 TFEU has been mentioned as a basis that would 
allow broad measures to be taken in relation to the establishment and the functioning 
of the internal market. 37 Th e use of both these legal bases for adopting fundamental 
rights actions must be approached very carefully, however. In  Opinion 2/94 , the ECJ 
explained  – in respect of the former version of Article 352 TFEU  – that it  ‘ cannot be 
used as a basis for the adoption of provisions whose eff ect would, in substance, be to 
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 38  Regulation No. 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights [2007] OJ L53/1. Alston  & Weiler mainly rely on the former version Article 308 TEC, see 
Alston  & Weiler (1999), pp. 21 – 22. 
 39  However, there are some recent developments in relation to Article 7 TEU, see section 6.4. 
 40  Cf. Von Bogdandy, Kottmann, Antp ö hler, Dickschen, Hentrei  & Smrkolj (2012), p. 490. 
 41  Besson (2011b), p. 47. Initially Article 352 TFEU was used as the relevant basis for adopting Directive 
76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions 
[1976] OJ L39/40. 
 42  See Besson (2011b), p. 46; and Muir (2014b), p. 33. 
 43  Directive 2016/80/EU of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [2016] OJ L119/1. See Directive 
95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31. 
amend the Treaty without following the procedure which it provides for that purpose ’. 38 
Moreover, as indicated in section 8.2., the use of Articles 114 and 352 TFEU by the EU 
is especially considered to have contributed to the problem of the expansion of the EU ’ s 
competences, and for that reason, it is oft en looked at with some suspicion. 
 It could further be argued that Article 7 TEU allows the EU to take certain general 
measures to protect fundamental rights, because this power is not as such restricted to 
a specifi c competence fi eld of the EU. Th is provision allows the Council to take certain 
actions if  ‘ there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred 
to in Article 2 TEU ’. As explained earlier, the respect for human rights is mentioned by 
Article 2 TEU as one of the key values of the EU. Based on this provision, the Council 
can make recommendations to the member state and, ultimately, suspend the voting 
rights of a member state if its response remains insuffi  cient. So far, the far-reaching 
powers provided by Article 7 TEU to intervene in the area of fundamental rights have 
not been used. 39 Th ere has been a great lack of political willingness to actually make 
use of this provision. 40 Th is could certainly cast some doubt as to whether the EU has a 
viable general power to protect fundamental rights on the basis of this provision. 
 Interestingly, however, Article 352 TFEU has been used as a legal basis to adopt 
certain general measures in the fi eld of fundamental rights. Th is provision was relied on 
to establish the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU, which is mainly entrusted with 
the task of disseminating and collecting information on fundamental rights problems 
in Europe. 41 
 8.3.3.  SPECIFIC POWER TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 In some areas, the member states have attributed a specifi c power to the EU to protect 
certain fundamental rights. 42 Article 16(2) TFEU, fi rst, allows the EU to enact rules 
relating to the protection of personal data by the EU institutions, bodies, offi  ces and 
agencies and the member states in so far as they carry out activities falling within the 
scope of EU law and rules relating to the free movement of such data. Th is provision 
has, for example, been used to adopt the General Data Protection Regulation. 43 Next, 
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 44  Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 on implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of race or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22; Directive 2000/78 of 27 November 
2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ 
L303/16. 
 45  Eeckhout (2002), p. 985. 
 46  See Article 3 of Directive 2000/43/EC. 
 47  For the use of the term  ‘ indirect power ’ see Besson (2011b), pp. 44 – 45; Weiler  & Fries (1999), 
pp. 154 – 158; and Muir (2014b), p. 33. For the use of the term  ‘ accessory or functional rule making 
power ’ , see Eeckhout (2002), pp. 984 – 985. Also cf. Muir (2014a), p. 226; and Ladenburger (2012), 
p. 23. 
 48  Cf. the arguments made by Alston  & Weiler (1999), p. 20; Weiler  & Fries (1999), pp. 154 – 155; and 
Eeckhout (2002), pp. 982 – 983. 
Article 19 TFEU allows the EU to take action to combat discrimination based on 
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
Th is provision has led to the adoption of the Race Equality Directive, as well as the 
Framework Equality Directive. 44 Th irdly, of importance to mention in this respect is 
Article 157(3) TFEU, which allows measures to be taken to ensure the application of 
the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters 
of employment and occupation. 
 In the areas defi ned by these provisions, the EU may thus develop policies which 
aim to protect certain fundamental rights. While these powers relate only to certain, 
perhaps narrowly defi ned, fundamental rights issues, they can be of great importance 
for the EU because their subject matters relate to multiple policy fi elds of relevance for 
the EU, such as labour law and free movement law. Since these powers may cut across 
diff erent fi elds of EU law, they have been typifi ed as horizontal fundamental rights 
powers. 45 Moreover, these specifi c powers of the EU to protect fundamental rights have 
been interpreted quite broadly by the EU legislature. For example, the Race Equality 
Directive provides a broad material scope of application. Its provisions apply to matters 
such as employment and working conditions, but also housing as well as education. 46 
Th erefore, although the specifi c competences of the EU are directed to restricted fi elds, 
they can have eff ects in a broad area. 
 8.3.4.  INDIRECT POWER TO PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 8.3.4.1.  An Indirect, Accessory or Functional Rule-making Power 
 Several scholars have argued that the EU has an indirect power to protect fundamental 
rights, which is sometimes referred to as an accessory or a functional rule making 
power. 47 Th is is understood as a power for the EU to adopt rules or measures to protect 
fundamental rights when exercising its specifi c competences under the Treaties. 48 
When the EU, for example, adopts certain acts on the basis its powers in the area of 
asylum law, it can be understood to have an accessory power to ensure that relevant 
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 49  Eeckhout, e.g., has held that  ‘ the Charter would be a nonsense if the EU institutions did not have the 
power to ensure, through appropriate rule-making, that human rights are respected in the process of 
applying the acts which they adopt ’ , see Eeckhout (2002), p. 984. 
 50  Other bases to be found for this position include that the ECJ has held that  ‘ respect for human rights is 
a condition for the lawfulness of EU law ’ , see ECJ 28 March 1996,  Opinion 2/94 , para. 34; ECJ 23 April 
1983, C-294/83,  Les Verts v. Parliament , para. 23; and ECJ 18 December 2014,  Opinion 2/13 , para. 
169. Th e ECJ only very incidentally has held that the EU institutions have a (positive) duty to ensure 
the observance of fundamental rights, see ECJ 26 November 1996, C-68/95,  T. Port v. Bundesanstalt 
f ü r Landwirtschaft  und Ern ä hrung , para. 40; and ECJ 11 July 1985, C-60/84,  Cin é th è que v. F é d é ration 
nationale des cin é mas fran ç ais , para. 26. 
 51  Section 8.3.4.4. further discusses some provisions of the Charter that could specifi cally require certain 
measures to be taken by the EU. More generally, it can be held that many of the Charter ’ s fundamental 
rights are phrased as empowering rights ( ‘ everyone has the right to … ’ ). Especially in contrast to the 
provisions of the Convention which are mainly phrased as defensive rights (for example,  ‘ no one 
shall be deprived of … ’ ), the rights of the Charter seem to give more direct ground for entitlement to 
governmental action. 
 52  Besson (2011b), p. 50. 
 53  It has been explained that the EU also used indirect competences to address several of the fundamental 
rights challenges in Hungary, see Dawson  & Muir (2013), p. 1964; and cf. the 2013 Report on the 
application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, pp. 13 – 14. De Schutter has provided a list 
of areas of EU law where close connections to fundamental rights protection can be found, see De 
Schutter (2004), pp. 18 – 19. 
 54  See Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of 
asylum seekers [2003] OJ L31/18; and Eeckhout (2002), p. 984. 
 55  See Articles 82, 83 and 85 TFEU. For some current legislative proposals of the Commission in this 
fi eld, see  < http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/criminal-rights/index_en.htm > . 
fundamental rights are respected in relation to the actions which it undertakes. 49 Th e 
EU has, aft er all, an obligation to ensure that its actions comply with fundamental rights 
on the basis of Article 6 TEU. 50 Article 51(1) of the Charter also expresses that the 
Union institutions and the member states (must) respect and  ‘ promote the application ’ 
of the rights of the Charter in accordance with their respective powers. In the text of 
the preamble to the Charter, the EU even is called upon to  ‘ strengthen ’ the protection of 
fundamental rights. 51 If the EU is to comply with these obligations or tasks within the 
exercise of its competences, then it must be implied that it has an indirect competence 
to protect fundamental rights. 52 
 Th ere are various examples from which it appears that the EU makes use of an 
indirect competence to protect fundamental rights. 53 It has been argued that the 
establishment of certain minimum standards in the area of asylum law, such as 
the EU Directive for the reception conditions of asylum seekers in the EU, is based 
on the indirect competence of the EU to protect fundamental rights in that fi eld. 54 Next, 
there are various legislative instruments, as well as some that await adoption, in the area 
of criminal law. Th is includes a Directive to protect the principle of the presumption of 
innocence and the right to be present at trial, and a Directive to safeguard the rights of 
children suspected and accused in criminal proceedings. 55 Further, there is a specifi c 
provision to be found in the Audiovisual Media Directive which aims to ensure the 
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 56  Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2010 on the 
coordination of certain provisions laying down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive). 
See in particular Article 15 and preambles 48 and 55. 
 57  Muir (2014a), pp. 226 – 227. An example is Article 9(1)(c) of  Directive 2010/13 of 10 March 2010 on the 
coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member 
States concerning the provision of audiovisual media services [ 2010 ]  OJ L95/1 ) which protects the 
respect for human dignity and the prohibition of discrimination on various grounds. 
 58  Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention 
of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or public communications networks [2006] OJ L105/54. See also Muir 
(2014a), p. 226. 
 59  ECJ 8 April 2014, Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12,  Digital Rights Ireland . 
 60  Muir (2014a), pp. 226 – 227. It has become somewhat of a standard practice for the EU institutions to 
undertake assessments of compliance of their legislative actions on the basis of so-called fundamental 
rights checklists. See, for example, European Commission, Operational guidance on taking account 
of fundamental rights in Commission impact assessments, SEC(2011) 567 fi nal. 
protection of the right to information and the pluriformity of the media. 56 Moreover, 
EU Regulations and Directives oft en include provisions specifi cally to ensure the right 
to be heard or the right to an eff ective judicial remedy, which could be considered to 
form an expression of the EU ’ s indirect competence to protect those rights. 57 
 Also to be mentioned is the former Data Retention Directive which was adopted 
on the basis of Article 95 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), 
the former version of Article 114 TFEU. Th is Directive laid down important rules 
regarding the protection of the right to privacy and the protection of personal data in 
relation to the retention of data by telecommunication providers which could be used 
for the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crimes. 58 Article 114 TFEU, 
which is a legal basis that allows the EU to adopt harmonising measures with the object 
of the establishment and functioning of the internal market, was thus (necessarily) used 
to ensure indirectly that certain fundamental rights were protected. Th is Directive was 
declared invalid by the ECJ, however, which considered that its provisions provided 
insuffi  cient protection to the right to privacy and the protection of personal data. 59 
 In addition, it can be seen that specifi c recitals of Directives and Regulations oft en 
mention certain fundamental rights which need to be taken into account by the EU 
institutions or the member states in the implementation of the provisions of such 
instruments. More recently, it has been noted that fundamental rights are increasingly 
receiving attention in EU legislation, which can result in such recitals being included 
in Directives or Regulations. 60 Th is may also result in the adoption of specifi c legal 
provisions, such as those mentioned above. 
 While the EU could thus take diff erent sorts of measures on the basis of this indirect 
competence and, in diff erent areas, it would seem that certain limitations apply. Th e 
indirect competence to take action to protect fundamental rights is always dependent 
on the existence of an explicit power for EU authorities to take legislative or other 
kinds of actions in a certain fi eld. Eeckhout has clarifi ed that this  ‘ is not an autonomous 
power to legislate on human rights, as it is strictly a function of the other, non-human 
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 61  Eeckhout (2002), p. 983. Also cf. Dougan (2015), p. 1202. 
 62  De Schutter (2004), p. 30. 
 63  See e.g. ECJ 5 October 2000, C-376/98,  Germany v. Parliament and Council ; and ECJ 10 December 
2002, C-491/01,  British American Tobacco (Investment) and Imperial Tobacco . More recently, see ECJ 
4 May 2016, C-358/14,  Poland v. Parliament and Council ; and ECJ 4 May 2016, Joined cases C-477/14 
and C-547/14,  Pillbox 38 . 
 64  ECJ 5 October 2000, C-376/98,  Germany v. Parliament and Council , para. 99. 
 65  ECJ 5 October 2000, C-376/98,  Germany v. Parliament and Council , paras 77 – 83. 
 66  ECJ 4 May 2016, C-358/14,  Poland v. Parliament and Council , para. 34. 
rights powers which are conferred on the institutions ’. 61 Th erefore, in the exercise of 
its indirect competence to protect fundamental rights, the EU is bound by the specifi c 
limitations that apply to its explicit power. As a consequence, the EU may only be able 
to lay down minimum standards of fundamental rights protection, because such a 
limitation could apply on the basis of the explicit power. 62 Another implication of the 
accessory character of this indirect competence seems to be that the EU cannot take 
action if the only or primary aim of its action is to secure fundamental rights protection. 
 Th e existence of an indirect competence of EU fundamental rights is thus largely 
based on academic theories, while its existence also further seems to show in the 
legislative practices of the EU. It is not clearly expressed in the EU Treaties nor in 
the case-law of the ECJ. Still, the case-law of the ECJ may provide grounds to believe 
that the ECJ could (in the future) accept the indirect competence of the EU to protect 
fundamental rights. Th e ECJ has accepted in other case-law that the EU legislature uses 
Article 114 TFEU, the internal market basis, to pursue certain health objectives. Th e 
ECJ has been asked to decide about the legality of the use of Article 114 TFEU (and 
its former versions) as a legal basis to adopt the diff erent Tobacco Directives, which 
have been contested on various occasions. 63 Th ese Directives have provided rules which 
restrict the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco. Th e ECJ has found that 
such measures can be adopted on the basis of Article 114 TFEU, but the measure must 
 ‘ genuinely have as its object the improvement of the conditions for the establishment 
and functioning of the internal market ’. 64 Th e ECJ has held that the establishment of 
rules to ensure the protection of human health is thus not fully prohibited, but it also 
has found that the legal basis of Article 114 TFEU cannot be used to circumvent this 
limitation. 65 Here, it is of interest that Article 168(5) TFEU specifi cally excludes that 
harmonisation measures can be undertaken by the EU in the area of health protection. 
More recently, the ECJ has affi  rmed, in respect of another challenge to the validity of 
a new EU Regulation laying down rules on tobacco, that  ‘ the EU legislature cannot be 
prevented from relying on that legal basis on the ground that public health protection 
is a decisive factor in the choices to be made ’. 66 Th e ECJ specifi cally noted in this regard 
that Articles 168(1) and 114(3) TFEU hold that a high level of protection of human 
health should be guaranteed in the EU ’ s policies and activities. 
 Potentially, the ECJ could express similar considerations on the use of Article 114 
TFEU (or another legal basis) by the EU legislature to ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights within the context of EU law. An important diff erence being, of 
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53. In this judgment, the ECJ clarifi ed that there was an obligation for the Commission to provide 
information to the national courts. 
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C-213/89,  Factortame , paras 19 – 20 (principle of eff ectiveness). 
 69  ECJ 19 November 1990, Joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90,  Francovich , paras 33 – 36. 
course, that there is no clause in the Treaty expressly prohibiting the harmonisation 
of fundamental rights standards, as there is for the harmonisation of laws in the area 
of health protection, nor does the EU Treaty specifi cally express that a high level of 
fundamental rights protection is guaranteed. Th e ECJ could, however, take other 
obligations laid down in the EU Treaties or in the Charter into account, such as those 
generally expressed in Article 6 TEU and Article 51(1) of the Charter. 
 In addition, there are various other relevant provisions laid down in the EU Treaties 
and the Charter that can be taken into account by the ECJ in its review of EU legislation. 
Th ese provisions, which are discussed in the following subsections, indicate more 
clearly (although some are more general than others) what types of positive measures 
could be undertaken by the EU legislature, as well as by the member states, to ensure 
the eff ective protection of fundamental rights, especially in relation to the exercise of 
the indirect competence which the EU is considered to have. 
 8.3.4.2.  Article 4(3) TEU: Th e Principle of Loyal Cooperation 
 It is of interest to mention the principle of loyal cooperation as laid down in Article 4(3) 
TEU fi rst. Th is provision may indirectly serve as a basis to set requirements to protect 
fundamental rights within the scope of EU law, in particular for the member states. 
Article 4(3) TEU stipulates that: 
 Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfi lment 
of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the 
Union. Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union ’ s tasks and refrain from any 
measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union ’ s objectives. 
 While this provision seems to be aimed at the member states only, the ECJ has 
clarifi ed that the EU institutions are also bound to comply with the obligation of loyal 
cooperation  vis- à -vis the member states and among the EU institutions themselves. 67 
It could, therefore, be used as a basis for imposing further (positive) obligations on 
the EU institutions as well as on the member states. Indeed, the ECJ has mentioned 
the principle of loyal cooperation in its case-law as a foundation for the establishment 
of some important and seemingly far-reaching principles, such as the principle of 
supremacy. 68 Th e ECJ has also clarifi ed that the principle requires the member states 
to secure that individuals can bring procedures at national level to claim damages as a 
result of state responsibility for breaches of EU law. 69 Th e ECJ has moreover used the 
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principle of loyal cooperation as a basis for imposing an obligation on the member 
states to take all necessary and appropriate measures to prevent violations of the free 
movement provisions by obstacles committed by private parties. 70 
 In some cases, the ECJ has emphasised the importance of the principle of loyal 
cooperation in the area of fundamental rights protection. In  Opinion 2/13 on the draft  
agreement for the accession of the EU to the Convention, for example, the ECJ set 
forth the principle of loyal cooperation among the main principles to be taken into 
account within the context of the accession of the EU to the Convention. 71 Also, in 
the case of  Å kerberg Fransson , the principle of loyal cooperation was used to support 
the conclusion that the Charter is applicable to member states ’ measures falling within the 
scope of EU law. 72 More particularly, the principle of loyal cooperation has been used 
by the ECJ as a basis to develop the principle that national authorities must interpret 
national law as far as possible in light of the wording and the purpose of EU law, which 
includes respect for certain fundamental rights. 73 Lastly, the principle that interim 
measures must be provided by national courts to secure the eff ective protection of EU 
law was based by the ECJ on the principle of loyal cooperation, and has been used to 
protect fundamental rights. 74 
 Yet, the use of the principle of loyal cooperation as a basis to develop far ranging 
obligations is not uncontested. In particular, Article 4(3) TEU does not give clear 
directions as to what types of measures must be taken. According to Temple Lang the 
principle has been invoked especially in cases  ‘ when a new legal issue or a new situation 
arises, where there is little or no relevant case-law and arguments are being based on 
general principles ’. 75 If only for that reason, the principle must be used very cautiously 
by the ECJ in the development of fundamental rights obligations, especially in areas 
where there are no very clear and specifi c fundamental rights powers. 
 8.3.4.3.  Article 19(1) TEU: Provision of Remedies at National Level 
 Further, in relation to the indirect competences of the EU to protect fundamental rights, 
it is important to mention Article 19(1) TEU. Th is provision stipulates that  ‘ Member 
States shall provide remedies suffi  cient to ensure eff ective legal protection in the fi elds 
covered by Union law. ’ 
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 Th is provision has been included in the Lisbon Treaty, and must be read against the 
background of the discussions on the competence of the EU to establish requirements 
in relation to the procedural rules at national level. 76 Th e ECJ has clarifi ed that the 
principle of national procedural autonomy applies where there are no specifi c 
procedural rules that have been established to protect EU law. 77 Th us member states are 
considered to have retained their competence in the fi eld of procedural law. At the same 
time, the ECJ has been willing actively to guide the remedies and powers that need to 
be provided by national courts and administrative authorities to ensure the eff ective 
application of EU law. 78 Th is can include certain positive obligations for the member 
states, as explained in chapter 11. 79 Th e formulation of these obligations by the ECJ has 
created tensions in view of the limited competences of the EU in the fi eld of procedural 
law. Th e new Article 19(1) could be seen as providing a clearer basis under EU law for 
requiring the member states to introduce or amend their procedural rules. It could 
therefore also provide a basis for certain procedural obligations which are related to the 
protection of fundamental rights. Th e ECJ has already used this new provision as a basis 
for a requirement to introduce a remedy at national level. 80 At the same time, the Court 
has stressed that it is important not to read too much into Article 19(1), by expressly 
holding that  ‘ neither the Treaty nor Article 19 TEU intended to create new remedies 
before the national courts to ensure the observance of European Union law other than 
those are already laid down by national law ’ and explaining that remedies would only 
need to be created incidentally. 81 Indeed, as Van Gerven has held,  ‘ frequently there is no 
need to create new remedies under national law but just to broaden the scope of existing 
ones ’. 82 It still remains true, however, that Article 19(1) could off er an interesting basis 
for requiring such an extended reading of existing remedies. 
 8.3.4.4.  Charter Rights Calling for Positive Measures 
 Th ere are several rights and provisions laid down in the Charter itself that could 
provide a further basis for the EU legislature and the ECJ to derive positive measures, 
and provide indications of what types of measures would have to be taken to protect 
those rights. 
 First, Article 51(1) of the Charter is relevant to identifying when the EU institutions 
could or should act. Th is provision stipulates that the EU institutions and the member 
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states  – in so far as they are implementing EU law  –  ‘ shall respect the rights, observe the 
principles and promote the application ’ of the provisions of the Charter  ‘ in accordance 
with their respective power and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as 
conferred on it in the Treaties ’. Th is provision thus only provides a very general 
requirement for the EU institutions, as well as the member states, to take the rights 
of the Charter into account in the exercise of their powers under EU law. Th e use of 
somewhat strong language in this provision  – that is,  ‘ the promotion of fundamental 
rights ’  – suggests, to some extent, however, that the EU institutions, as well as the 
member states, are required actively to ensure the protection of fundamental rights 
which can be aff ected when they are exercising their powers under EU law. 
 Secondly, and more specifi cally, Article 52(1) of the Charter expressly requires 
that interferences with fundamental rights must be provided for by law as one of the 
requirements that must be met for interference to be justifi ed under EU law. 83 Th is 
provision could, therefore, provide an important basis for taking legislative action. Th e 
ECJ has not yet shed much light on how the legality requirement under Article 52(1) 
is to be interpreted within the context of EU law. 84 It can be important, however, to 
take into account the case-law of the ECtHR on the requirement of restrictions to be 
 ‘ prescribed by law ’. Article 52(3) of the Charter, which requires that rights of the Charter 
which correspond to those of the Convention are given the same meaning and scope 
as is provided for under the Convention, specifi cally refers to the limitation criteria 
of the Convention. 85 For this reason, it could be expected that similar principles will 
be applied in relation to the interferences with fundamental rights on the basis of EU 
law, while Article 52(3) also allows for a higher level of protection to be provided and 
the autonomy of EU law to be respected. 86 Th e Convention ’ s legality requirement for 
limitations of fundamental rights is construed rather broadly in the ECtHR ’ s case-law. 
Depending on the subject matter, limitations may be provided for by legal provisions 
and by case-law. 87 Th e ECtHR also particularly looks at the  ‘ quality of the law ’ and 
requires that states provide adequate legal protection against arbitrariness. According 
to the ECtHR, the legal framework must indicate with suffi  cient clarity the scope of the 
discretion and the way in which it is exercised. 88 Th is is especially relevant when public 
authorities have obtained wide discretionary powers to take measures that interfere 
with an individual ’ s fundamental rights, such as secret surveillance of communications 
or the storage and use of a person ’ s fi ngerprints and DNA samples. Interpreted in a 
similar manner, the legality requirement of Article 52(1) of the Charter could be taken 
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to include an obligation for the EU institutions to establish procedural or material 
safeguards to prevent arbitrary interferences with fundamental rights that could be 
caused by action taken by the EU in the exercise of its competences. 89 
 Th irdly, there are several other provisions of the Charter which guarantee specifi c 
fundamental rights and indicate in more detail what kind of guarantees would have to 
be provided to secure those rights. 90 Th e right to protection of personal data (Article 8), 
for example, prescribes requirements which must be fulfi lled in the processing of data 
(para. 2) and requires control to be exercised by an independent authority (para. 3). 
Th is could imply that such a control system needs to be set up, although it is far from 
clear who should take action to do so  – the member states or the EU institutions. 
Similarly, but more straightforwardly, the right to good administration (Article 41) 
provides specifi c rights and/or obligations which must be protected/fulfi lled by the EU 
administrative authorities, such as the obligation to give reasons for its decisions (para. 
2(c)), and to make good any damages (para. 3). Elsewhere, the positive obligation to 
provide legal aid to ensure an individual ’ s access to justice is specifi cally listed under the 
right to an eff ective remedy and a fair trial (Article 47). 
 Fourthly, there are various rights which have been included in the Charter that may 
be looked at as a basis for positive obligations as they require, by their very nature, 
active measures to be taken for their full realisation. 91 Th is applies, above all, to the 
rights contained in the Charter ’ s Chapters on Equality (III) and on Solidarity (IV) 
which include  inter alia the rights of the child (Article 24); 92 the entitlement to social 
security and social assistance (Article 34); and the protection of the environment 
(Article 37). Th ey also include several work related rights such as the protection in 
the event of unjustifi ed dismissal (Article 30) and the right to fair and just working 
conditions (Article 31). Th e right to education (Article 14) forms a right which depends 
on measures taken by the government, to be found in another part of the Charter. In 
relation to some of those and other provisions of the Charter, it is interesting to fi nd 
that they expressly require protection to be provided in accordance with EU laws and/
or national laws and practices. Some examples thereof include Article 35 on health care 
and Article 28 on the right of collective bargaining and action. Th ese provisions may 
not give rise to direct judicial claims for positive action, as they would most probably 
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constitute  ‘ principles ’ within the meaning of Article 52(5) of the Charter (see chapter 6), 
yet they could give rise to certain actions by the EU institutions and the member 
states in so far as their policies under EU law would aff ect those specifi c fundamental 
rights. 93 
 8.3.5.  REMAINING TENSIONS: COMPETENCE CREEP OR 
PROTECTION GAPS ? 
 As concluded in the foregoing subsections, it is plausible that the EU has some 
fundamental rights competences which could allow it to take (legislative) action to 
protect fundamental rights, and thereby ensure that certain positive measures which 
can be related to the protection of fundamental rights are undertaken. Sections 8.3.4.2. 
to 8.3.4.4. have indicated several relevant legal bases to be taken into account in 
this regard. It has even been argued that, when all these competences are looked at 
in combination, it can be maintained that the EU has a complementary or otherwise 
a shared competence to protect fundamental rights. 94 Even if this were true, the 
fundamental rights competences are still limited. Th ey are restricted to very specifi c 
competence fi elds (such as non-discrimination and privacy) or they need to be accessory 
to the actions taken by the EU on an express legal basis. As such, the fundamental 
rights powers of the EU are not expressly listed by the EU Treaty rules, which creates a 
certain tension in view of the principle of attributed powers. 95 From the viewpoint of 
the principle of attributed powers, criticism therefore can still be raised in relation to 
certain action the EU has taken to protect fundamental rights. At the same time, it is 
equally possible to criticise the EU for failing to take action for the reason that there is 
no competence to act. 96 Both lines of criticism will be briefl y explained in this section 
to complete the discussion of the scope and the limits of the fundamental rights powers 
of the EU. 
 Th e fi rst line of criticism is related to the risk of  ‘ competence creep ’, that is, the risk 
of silent and surreptitious expansion of the competences of the EU. Such expansion 
can, for example, be caused by an over-broad interpretation of a legal basis by the EU ’ s 
institutions. 97 One of prime examples that is oft en discussed in relation to competence 
creep is the adoption of the Race Directive, due to its broad scope of application. 98 Th e 
Race Directive was adopted on the basis of Article 19(2) TFEU, which forms one of the 
EU ’ s specifi c fundamental rights bases. Th is Directive forbids direct as well as indirect 
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forms of discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin in a diverse range of 
areas including access to employment, working conditions, social security, health care, 
education and housing. 99 In some of these areas the EU has not been attributed any 
powers at all (housing) or only powers which cannot be used to harmonise the laws of 
the member states (health care and education). Moreover, as Eeckhout has commented 
(writing at a time when the Treaty on European Community law was still in force) 
 ‘ some of those matters come within EC competences which are weak in character 
(e.g. education), and with respect to others it is diffi  cult to see any link at all with the 
Community ’ s powers ’. 100 Also in relation to the establishment of the Fundamental 
Rights Agency, it has been noted that this requires a broad interpretation of the EU ’ s 
powers. 101 Th e EU ’ s residual legal basis, that is, Article 352 TFEU was used for this, 
while the ECJ had clearly held in  Opinion 2/94 that this legal basis could not be used as 
a general basis to enact rules to protect fundamental rights. 102 
 Next, the use by the EU of an indirect competence to protect fundamental rights can 
be criticised. Seeing that there is a broad range of areas where EU law has ramifi cations 
for the protection of fundamental rights, Muir fi nds that (all) EU legislation can in eff ect 
easily be used as a  ‘ vehicle for fundamental rights protection ’. 103 It can be considered 
problematic if the EU uses certain legal bases to ensure fundamental rights and that 
legal bases were conferred for diff erent policy objectives:  ‘ Such a use of legislation 
giving eff ect to a policy objective that is initially diff erent from fundamental rights 
protection may be perceived as a circumvention of limits on EU competences and feed 
virulent criticisms  … ’ 104 
 It is therefore necessary that a further political debate takes place over whether, and 
to what extent fundamental rights protection should be provided for in specifi c policy 
fi elds under EU law. 105 
 Th e second line of criticism is related to a totally diff erent risk, which is that of 
 ‘ underprotection ’ of fundamental rights. Here, the main concern is that the EU cannot 
take action in specifi c situations because of the limited powers of the EU, which could 
lead to protection gaps. It is especially feared that the limited powers of the EU do 
not allow it to take action in response to fundamental rights issues that cut across the 
diff erent policy fi elds of the EU, especially now that it is not easy to have recourse to one 
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of the broad legal bases which the Treaty provides for. 106 Another possible gap that has 
been pointed out is that an eff ective protection of fundamental rights could require a 
maximum harmonisation of the rules of the member states, while the specifi c legal bases 
provided for under EU law may only allow for a minimum harmonisation. Th is could, 
in particular, take place with respect to the protection of fundamental rights in the area 
of asylum law, but also in the area of criminal law, as some scholars have pointed out. 107 
In both areas, member states need to cooperate on matters regulated by EU law, while 
the diff erences in terms of the substantive and procedural fundamental rights between 
the member states could provide an obstacle to their cooperation. 108 As such, however, 
this should not so much give rise to worries over the eff ective protection of fundamental 
rights. It must be concluded that a protection gap would only manifest itself in areas of 
exclusive competences. In areas of shared and complementary competences, (potential) 
problems could still be solved at national level, where the national authorities can take 
action (or are obliged to do so under the Convention) to provide for eff ective protection 
of fundamental rights. 
 Importantly, there is an increasing interest in clarifying the division of powers 
between the EU and the member states in the fi eld of fundamental rights protection. 109 
It seems that in the legislative processes more attention is now being paid to the impact 
of certain EU actions on fundamental rights protection especially aft er the Lisbon 
Treaty. 110 Th is provides potential that the EU legislature will decide whether certain 
kinds of measures will need to be taken by the EU institutions or by the member states 
in the implementation of EU law at national level, when this is necessary to eff ectively 
protect fundamental rights. If such issues remain undefi ned, however, the ECJ could 
instead be asked to clarify and determine how exactly the competences of the EU and 
the member states in respect of fundamental rights protection must be divided. 111 
 Besson has explained that it can be very diffi  cult to determine which powers need to 
be conferred to the EU to ensure fundamental rights protection in all its policies, since 
the specifi c requirements of fundamental rights may only become clear in very concrete 
circumstances. 112 In respect of the concept of positive obligations, it is indeed clear 
that they are oft en revealed only in circumstances which cannot always be foreseen by 
legislatures, and therefore are also defi ned by courts on a case-by-case basis. 113 Th en, 
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the theoretical diffi  culty that would arise is that there is no competence available at 
EU level that could legitimate certain actions are undertaken by the EU institutions to 
protect fundamental rights in that particular situation. 
 Th us a certain risk of competence creep as well as a certain risk of underprotection 
is perceived and it is of clear importance to take this into account in examining to what 
extent the EU can actively protect fundamental rights. It is submitted, however, that 
to be able to assess whether such risks are real, it is also relevant to have a look at the 
actual reasons and the specifi c situations in which it becomes necessary for the EU to 
undertake positive measures to protect fundamental rights. Th ese reasons and more 
general situations are discussed in the next section. More specifi c situation types are 
discussed in chapter 11, where specifi c case-law examples are provided. 
 8.4.  REASONS FOR ACTIVELY PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS AT EU LEVEL 
 8.4.1.  DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR INCORPORATING A THEORY 
OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS WITHIN EU LAW 
 In order to estimate the potential for the development of positive obligations in the 
EU context, it must be determined at what point it actually can be expected that the 
EU will use its powers to protect fundamental rights and impose obligations on the EU 
institutions and the member states accordingly. 
 Th ere are diverging views as to when the EU is required to take action to protect 
fundamental rights, which has to some extent already been discussed in chapter 7. 114 
A similar ambiguity can be seen in the literature on the establishment of positive 
obligations under EU law. De Schutter has held that: 
 Th e question  when positive obligations may be identifi ed which impose on the institutions of the 
Union to adopt certain measures for the eff ective protection of fundamental rights recognized 
in the Charter is more controversial than  whether such positive obligations may in principle be 
derived from the Charter. 115 
 It has been argued that the EU has obligations to adopt certain measures to protect 
fundamental rights and that it needs to perform a more active role in this fi eld. 
Ahmed and Butler, in particular, have argued that the EU is indeed bound to fulfi l 
certain positive obligations. 116 Th ey have mainly based their argument on principles 
of international law. In their view, the EU is bound by customary international law, 
and by several international human rights treaties to which it has acceded itself. Th ese 
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instruments can give rise to certain positive obligations for the EU. EU law itself 
stipulates in Article 351 TFEU that rights and obligations which arise from treaties 
to which the member states have signed up before they acceded to the EU (or before 
1 January 1958) shall not be aff ected by the EU Treaties. Th is would imply that EU 
law cannot override the obligations of the member states under, for example, the 
Convention or the UN human rights treaties. Ahmed and Butler argue that when the 
member states are no longer able to protect the rights and obligations provided for 
under the said treaties autonomously, as a result of the transfer of competences to the 
EU, the EU itself would be bound to comply with the positive obligations arising from 
the protection of such treaties. Th is theory appears especially relevant in areas where 
the EU enjoys exclusive powers, because national powers in those areas have been pre-
empted. However, Ahmed and Butler also fi nd this theory to be relevant in areas of 
shared or complementary competences. 117 
 Stubberfi eld has also argued that the EU is likely to incur positive obligations on the 
basis of principles of international law in the specifi c context of the return of asylum 
seekers under the Dublin Regulation. 118 Stubberfi eld holds that, once the EU accedes to 
the ECHR, the EU could incur some of the positive obligations which have been defi ned 
by the ECtHR. Th e specifi c criteria which have been formulated by the ECtHR to impose 
the relevant positive obligations on the states parties are, according to Stubberfi eld, also 
to be applied to the EU, because  ‘ insofar as the EU adopts the attributes and powers of 
a sovereign state, it must assume commensurate obligations ’. 119 In Stubberfi eld ’ s view, 
it is of importance, fi rst, to determine to what degree an action or omission of the EU 
contributes to the breach of a fundamental right and, secondly, to what degree the EU 
should have anticipated the fundamental rights breaches and should have taken action 
to avoid them. 120 Stubberfi eld also fi nds that positive obligations would mainly become 
relevant in areas where the EU enjoys exclusive powers. In the particular context of 
the Dublin returns, member states ’ obligations have not, as such, been pre-empted 
by the EU. Nevertheless, Stubberfi eld argues that this area is characterised by a high 
degree of coercion, and that there is little room left  for the member states to exercise 
the discretion that they have been given. 121 Th erefore, there is good reason to attribute 
responsibility for fulfi lling certain positive obligations to the EU. She applies the criteria 
of causation and the existence of knowledge from the case-law of the ECtHR to arrive at 
the conclusion  inter alia that the European Commission is likely to be found responsible 
for having to take action to investigate fundamental rights infringements in the context 
of the Dublin Regulation. 122 
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 125  Cf. ECtHR 30 June 2005, no. 45036/98,  Bosphorus v. Ireland ; and ECtHR 6 December 2012, no. 
12323/11,  Michaud v. France . 
 126  ECtHR 30 June 2005, no. 45036/98,  Bosphorus v. Ireland , paras 155 – 158. 
 127  Cf. Gragl (2014b), p. 19. 
 128  See further Gragl (2014b). 
 129  At the same time, diff erent reservations have been built in (the co-respondent mechanism and the 
procedure of prior involvement) to preclude the ECtHR from deciding whether the EU or its member 
states can be held accountable for an infringement of fundamental right, and perhaps for fulfi lling 
certain positive obligations. Th is will still have to be decided on the basis of the EU ’ s internal laws  inter 
alia on the basis of the division of powers between the EU and the member states. 
 Such legal principles and the argumentations of these scholars could form valid 
reasons for the EU to adopt active measures to protect fundamental rights. However, 
for several reasons, these approaches also can be considered problematic. 123 
 One of the fi rst obvious problems is that the EU is not yet (directly) bound by the 
obligations which Ahmed and Butler and Stubberfi eld have derived from international 
human rights law. Clearly, the EU is not yet bound to the Convention since it has not 
acceded yet. Also in respect of the other international instruments, it is questionable 
whether they would directly bind the EU, given the approach the ECJ so far has taken to 
this. 124 Furthermore, as long as the EU has not acceded to the Convention, the ECtHR 
will hold the member states accountable for the actions they have taken as a result of 
transferring powers to international organisations such as the EU. 125 On the basis of its 
 Bosphorus doctrine, the ECtHR will only apply a presumption of equivalent protection 
of fundamental rights provided for by an international organisation in situations where 
a state is fully bound to comply with its obligations under the law of that international 
organisation, and where a state does not have discretion to deviate from its international 
obligations. 126 Once the EU has acceded to the Convention, the ECtHR is expected 
to deviate from its  Bosphorus doctrine. 127 It may then be expected that the EU will 
indeed incur positive obligations following from the judgments of the ECtHR. 128 Th e 
fi nalisation of the accession can still take quite some time. 129 In the meantime, it is 
diffi  cult to maintain that specifi c obligations for the EU to protect human rights follow 
from the Convention or any other international treaties that it is not itself a party to. 
 In relation to this, it is also relevant to take into account that the approaches of Ahmed 
and Butler and Stubberfi eld are mainly focused on fundamental rights protection in 
areas of exclusive powers of the EU. Th is seems to disregard that in most situations, the 
EU enjoys shared or complementary powers with the member states, and it is mostly 
here that the concerns over the protection of fundamental rights by the EU would seem 
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to arise. 130 Th e principle of attributed competences, and the division of competences 
between the EU and the member states thus are important principles to take into 
account. 131 Consequently, in most situations, a failure to fulfi l (positive) obligations 
to protect fundamental rights cannot exclusively be attributed to the EU. Seemingly 
for these reasons, the ECJ itself has very clearly stated in  Opinion 2/13 , that  ‘ the EU is, 
under international law, precluded by its very nature from being considered a State ’. 132 
 Principles of state responsibility could also, instead, form valid reasons for relying 
on the mechanisms provided for at national level to secure the eff ective protection of 
fundamental rights in the application of EU law. At national level, it can, in principle be 
expected that a regulatory and institutional framework to protect fundamental rights 
is provided for. Th is framework may be based on the national constitutions as well 
as on the obligations under the Convention. A similar perspective has been taken by 
Advocate General Gulmann in the opinion in the case of  Bostock . 133 Th is case, which 
was discussed in chapter 7, was concerned with the adverse consequences of the 
establishment of a system of milk quotas by Community law for the protection of the 
right to property of a specifi c farmer. In the opinion in this case, Advocate General 
Gulmann argued that: 
 Th e fact that a legal problem has arisen as a result of the adoption of Community rules is, in my 
view, not in itself suffi  cient to entail that the solution adopted for that problem by the national 
authorities must necessarily respect the fundamental rights applying in the Community legal 
order. Th e starting point is that such problems can and should be resolved within the framework 
of the national legal systems in accordance with the solutions which apply in the Member States 
to corresponding legal problems that have arisen on the basis of national legislation. Th e most 
natural solution in a situation such as this is that individuals have their rights protected within 
the framework of the respective national legal system. Th ere is no reason to believe that the 
Member States ’ legal systems cannot perform that task adequately. It is not insignifi cant in this 
respect that the Member States of the Community are all States that are governed by the rule of 
law and are obliged to respect the fundamental rights as laid down in the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 134 
 Th is argumentation makes clear that it is instructive to think about the arrangements 
that may already have been made at national level to ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights and the fufi lment of positive obligations. 135 Yet, this argumentation 
cannot always be validly applied, as will be discussed in more detail later. 
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 In sum, it is diffi  cult to hold that there is a broad competence for the EU to protect 
fundamental rights and a concomitant power to impose positive obligations on the 
EU institutions and the member states, although certainly there are sound arguments 
for doing so. Moreover, even if it is accepted that the EU should take on stronger 
responsibility in this fi eld, account should be taken of the powers and responsibilities 
of the member states to protect fundamental rights. 
 8.4.2.  AN APPROACH BASED ON THE DIVISION OF POWERS 
BETWEEN THE EU AND THE MEMBER STATES 
 In determining whether and to what extent the EU may be required to adopt positive 
measures to protect fundamental rights, this study uses an approach which is diff erent 
from that of scholars such as Ahmed and Butler and Stubberfi eld, who base their views 
on the need to respect international and European human rights obligations. Th e 
approach taken in this study is based on the internal rules relating to the protection 
of fundamental rights within EU law. It is grounded in the protection of fundamental 
rights under the rules laid down in the EU ’ s own Charter and its Treaties, and it has 
regard to the existing mechanisms within the member states for the protection of 
fundamental rights. It is thus very sensitive towards the specifi c competences which 
have been attributed to the EU. It also accepts that a deliberate choice has been made by 
the draft ers of the Treaty and the Charter to limit the protection of fundamental rights 
by the EU to the specifi c actions that may be undertaken on the basis of its competences 
(Article 51(1) of the Charter) and to prohibit the EU institutions from going beyond 
these existing powers (Article 51(2) of the Charter). Th is approach may continue to 
be relevant for determining the positive obligations even aft er the accession of the EU 
to the Convention, since the accession stipulates that the competences of the EU must 
continue to be respected. 136 
 Compared to the arguments discussed in section 8.4.1., the approach envisaged here 
presents a much more modest account of the obligations which the EU could incur on 
the basis of fundamental rights. It is not likely to give rise to the creation of a certain 
institutional framework or other structural obligations, such as, for example, Alston 
and Weiler have proposed. It is more concerned with the regulatory framework that 
must be provided for by the EU to ensure fundamental rights protection. 137 
 Taking this particular internal perspective into account, the following subsections 
dicuss a range of diff erent reasons which could indicate at what point the EU is required 
to undertake certain action to protect fundamental rights and potentially fulfi ll certain 
positive obligations. Evidently, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are 
discussed fi rst, as they form the main set of principles within EU law for determining 
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when the EU must use its powers to protect fundamental rights in areas of shared 
and complementary competences (section 8.4.3.). As will be explained, they provide 
for a very broad ground to determine whether any action by the EU in the fi eld of 
fundamental rights is necessary, and more specifi c grounds are needed to substantiate 
such claims. In academic debates as well as in the preparatory documents for legislative 
proposals of the European Commission, such grounds can be found. Th ey reveal that 
it can be necessary to establish a connection between EU acts and fundamental rights 
infringements (section 8.4.4.); a certain risk of a race to the bottom in fundamental 
rights standards (section 8.4.5.); and/or adverse eff ects for the primacy, unity and 
eff ectiveness of EU law (section 8.4.6.). Depending on the actual circumstances, several 
of these grounds may be relevant for determining the need for any action by the EU. Th e 
diff erent grounds discussed in sections 8.4.3. to 8.4.6. mostly play a role in situations 
where the EU enjoys shared or complementary competences with the member states. 
Th ey may also be relevant in areas of exclusive powers, but it is important to recognise 
that the member state may not be given any room to ensure fundamental rights 
protection on their own. 138 
 8.4.3.  SUBSIDIARITY AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 Th e principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are of key importance in general to 
determine whether the EU has a competence to act. Within the context of fundamental 
rights protection, the principle of subsidiarity is also particularly stressed by Article 51(1) 
of the Charter. Th is provision, which relates to the scope of application of the EU Charter, 
stipulates that  ‘ Th e provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, 
offi  ces and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity … ’ . 
As a clarifi cation, the explanations relating to the provisions of the Charter state that 
this refers to the  ‘ logical consequences of the principle of subsidiarity and  … the fact 
that the Union only has those powers which have been conferred upon it ’. 139 
 Th e principle of subsidiarity is defi ned generally in Article 5 TEU as follows: 
 in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competences, the Union shall act only if and in 
so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be suffi  ciently achieved by the member 
state, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or 
eff ects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. 
 Th is principle is therefore mainly relevant for actions which fall outside the EU ’ s 
exclusive competences. Article 5(3) TEU requires a two-pronged test to be undertaken 
to determine whether the requirements of subsidiarity are met. It must fi rst be 
ascertained whether action may be suffi  ciently undertaken at national level to achieve 
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the envisaged objective and, second, whether the scale or eff ects of the proposed action 
constitute a reason for the EU to undertake action. 140 
 Th e underlying general rationale of the principle of subsidiarity is that action is taken 
as closely as possible to the citizens of the EU. 141 Applying this principle to matters 
concerning fundamental rights protection, it seems most logical to assume that it is 
at national level where the interests of fundamental rights protection could be served 
best. 142 Here a parallel can be drawn to the meaning of the subsidiarity principle in 
the case-law of the ECtHR, which equally implies that fundamental rights protection 
preferably is provided for at the national level. 143 Th e principle could be applied to the 
EU in much the same vein. Th e application of fundamental rights standards as laid 
down in the national constitutions by the national authorities would generally be held 
to cater best for the needs of individuals. 144 
 Nevertheless, the principle of subsidiarity may still justify action to be taken at 
EU level to protect fundamental rights. 145 In line with the principle of subsidiarity, 
fundamental rights protection would have to be secured by the EU where such protection 
cannot adequately be achieved by the member states alone and the scale or eff ects of EU 
action also provide a benefi cial outcome. Especially where matters have a transnational 
dimension or member states need to fulfi l (international) treaty obligations, there 
would be valid reasons for the EU itself to undertake action to protect fundamental 
rights. Relevant fundamental rights matters to be addressed at the EU level could, for 
example, be related to protection of the environment or combating terrorism. 146 
 Th e application of the principle of subsidiarity in the context of fundamental rights 
protection may not always be straightforward. In practice, it can appear quite diffi  cult 
to apply this principle in a consistent manner. 147 To what extent, for example, does the 
second criterion of Article 5(3) TEU (scale or eff ects of EU action) have an independent 
meaning, if according to the fi rst criterion it is already established that actions can 
not suffi  ciently be achieved at national level ? Aside from that, how can it really be 
determined that uniform standards are necessary to develop an eff ective EU policy ? 
 Specifi cally in relation to the protection of fundamental rights by the EU, Muir has 
pointed out that measuring fundamental rights protection in terms of eff ectiveness is 
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inherently diffi  cult. 148 Fundamental rights have a specifi c function and are of a specifi c 
nature, which generally sets them apart from any other EU law. 149 Fundamental 
rights function to regulate the relationship within states and it may, for that reason, 
be diffi  cult to measure their cross-border eff ects. Also, it may not make sense to 
undertake a comparative effi  ciency test with regard to the impact of the establishment 
of fundamental rights standards on the national or the EU level, because fundamental 
rights always require some prioritising or a balancing exercise to be undertaken. 150 
Muir therefore fi nds that the principle of subsidiarity cannot provide a useful yardstick 
for determining whether action must be undertaken by the EU to protect fundamental 
rights. Th ere are thus some doubts as to whether the principle of subsidiarity is suitable 
for determining whether the EU needs to take action to protect fundamental rights. 
 Th e principle of proportionality is described in Article 5(4) TEU in relation to the 
division of competences between the EU and the member states. It requires that 
 ‘ the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the Treaties ’. Th is refl ects the general meaning that is to be given to 
the proportionality principle. 151 If a choice can be made between several means, then 
the least onerous one must be chosen, and the disadvantages thereof must not be 
disproportionate to the aims pursued. Th is principle is perhaps more straightforward 
than the subsidiarity principle and could imply, for example, that Directives would have 
to be adopted instead of regulations. 
 Both the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are considered as important 
instruments to limit the expansion of the powers of the EU. 152 Certain formal 
mechanisms have been introduced with the Lisbon Treaty to ensure compliance with 
these principles. A separate protocol, for example, has been added to the EU Treaties 
on subsidiarity and proportionality, requiring the European Commission when 
preparing new legislative acts to adopt a  ‘ detailed statement making it possible to 
appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality ’. 153 Also, 
the role of the national parliaments has increased, as they are now allowed to block 
legislative proposals by the European Commission if they consider that the principle of 
subsidiarity is not complied with. 154 Th ere is thus quite some interest in the application 
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of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality by the political institutions at EU 
and at national level. 155 
 Since there is increasing interest in compliance with the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality of the legislative proposals of the EU, it is possible to explore 
how these principles are actually applied in respect of the actions taken by the EU 
to protect fundamental rights. A few reports that have been draft ed on the legislative 
proposals of the EU have been examined in this study in order to fi nd how such 
principles are applied. Th e explanatory memorandum on the proposal for the General 
Data Protection Regulation, for example, shows that cross-border fl ows of personal 
information was an important factor which contributed to the decision of the EU to 
further harmonise the standards of the member states on privacy and personal data 
protection. Th e explanatory memorandum shows that the increasing cross-border fl ows 
of personal information pose specifi c challenges for the enforcement of data protection 
legislation by the member states. 156 Th ere are divergent levels of data protection in the 
diff erent member states, and therefore uniform rules on protection of personal data 
would be needed. In the explanatory memorandum it is held that such rules could best 
be provided by adopting legislation in the form of a Regulation. 157 
 Similarly, the increasing cross-border movement of individuals proves to be an 
important consideration in adopting minimum (procedural) fundamental rights 
standards in the area of criminal law. In the impact assessment on the proposal 
for a Directive protecting the rights of children suspected or accused of criminal 
proceedings, it is explained that the increasing numbers of individuals travelling across 
borders require that proper and eff ective action is undertaken at EU level to protect 
the rights of those who become involved in criminal proceedings. 158 Member states 
are not considered to be well able to deal with these actions alone, especially when 
they concern vulnerable persons such as children. 159 For that reason, certain minimum 
standards are adopted to secure the right to a fair trial, inter alia, in a Directive on the 
right to the interpretation and translation of criminal proceedings, a Directive on the 
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right to information in criminal proceedings, and a Directive on the right of access to a 
lawyer and communication with a third party in cases of deprivation of liberty. 160 
 Th ese examples show that the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality can 
provide important and helpful considerations when deciding the type and degree of 
action that the EU needs to take in the area of fundamental rights protection. Th ey 
can be especially helpful in respect of the cooperation between the authorities of the 
member states, and in situations where the rights of vulnerable persons are at stake. At 
the same time, as discussed earlier, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
oft en merely provide for a very general starting point for determining whether EU 
action is required. In other situations it can still be diffi  cult to measure the eff ects of EU 
action in relation to fundamental rights protection and the need to take action. Indeed, 
an equally strong argument can be made for the protection of certain rights by the 
national authorities. Hence, although the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality 
are important in deciding whether there is a competence for the EU to take action to 
protect fundamental rights, and to impose obligations on the EU intitutions and on the 
member states, it will not be suffi  cient to look only at these principles when making 
that decision. 
 8.4.4.  CONNECTIONS BETWEEN EU ACTS AND FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS INFRINGEMENTS 
 If it appears that certain actions of the EU interfere with certain fundamental rights, it 
could be expected that the EU takes action to protect those rights or compensate for 
the (potential) harm done. Th e EU could, for example, adopt preventive and remedial 
measures and defi ne the restricted circumstances in which such interference may 
legitimately be made by the EU institutions or the member states. Indeed, one primary 
justifi cation for the EU to take measures in the fi eld of fundamental rights protection 
would actually be to secure that its own acts do not as such cause an unjustifi ed 
interference with fundamental rights. For example, if the EU were to intervene in the 
internal market by adopting certain trading rules, which could directly interfere with 
the fundamental rights of individuals or undertakings such as the right to property, 
it could be reasoned that the EU would need to adopt rules on arrangements for 
compensation. Likewise, if the European Commission were to interfere with the rights 
to privacy during an inspection on the basis of competition rules, it would be necessary 
for certain remedies to be provided at EU level so that individuals are able to complain 
about infringements and, if appropriate, to enable the act that led to the breach to be 
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declared void. Such  ‘ corrective measures ’ may be necessary to ensure compliance with 
the negative obligation not to violate fundamental rights as such and/or to prevent 
interferences with fundamental rights by public (administrative) authorities. 161 
Especially in situations where a direct causal connection between EU acts or decisions 
and fundamental rights infringements can be made, it seems logical that the EU will 
undertake certain actions to ensure that unjustifi ed interferences do not take place. 
As such, this also follows from the principles of international law underlying the 
attribution of state responsibility, and from the system for justifying restrictions on the 
basis of the Convention. 162 
 Th e competence for the EU to protect fundamental rights in this context is clearly 
an indirect competence, which follows from and is accessory to the express and direct 
competences granted to it under the EU Treaties. Th e specifi c legal bases which have 
been discussed in sections 8.3.4.2. to 8.3.4.4., such as the principle of loyal cooperation 
and the legality requirement under Article 52(1) of the Charter, are relevant here to 
defi ne the measures that may need to be taken by the EU. If the EU were to exercise such 
an indirect competence in an area of EU law where it has exclusive powers, it would 
be logical to assume that the EU also secures that the relevant measures are taken to 
secure compliance with (negative) fundamental rights obligations. Th is is because the 
member states would not enjoy any discretion to ensure protection. However, in areas 
of shared and supportive competences, discretion could, in particular, have been given 
to the member states to adopt (detailed) rules on preventive and remedial measures. 163 
Th e member states may be required to apply their own national regimes for protection 
of fundamental rights to their actions taken under EU law. 164 Th ere is good reason for 
setting such requirements, which has been explained by the EU independent network 
of experts on fundamental rights as follows: 
 with few exceptions, the violations of the Charter may result not directly from the activities of 
the Union  – as would be the case in particular if secondary law of the EU were to impose to the 
Member States to commit violations of fundamental rights  – but could rather originate from 
the margin of appreciation which is left  to the Member States by EU instruments. 165 
 It may thus be diffi  cult to construe a clear causal connection between the acts of the EU 
and the fundamental rights infringements under EU law. Nonetheless, the margin of 
appreciation that was provided for to the member states under EU secondary legislation 
has been addressed in several cases which have been brought before the ECJ. One such 
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case is  Parliament v. Council , which concerned the protection provided for under the 
Family Reunifi cation Directive. 166 Th e Directive expressly allowed member states to 
apply integration criteria to children over the age of 12 before authorising their entry 
and residence. 167 Th e Directive did not further clarify what kinds of safeguards would 
need to be provided at national level to prevent unjustifi ed and arbitrary interferences 
with the right to respect for private and family life in that case. In its judgment on this 
particular case, the ECJ explained that  ‘ A provision of a Community act could, in itself, 
not respect fundamental rights if it required, or expressly or impliedly authorised, the 
Member States to adopt or retain national legislation not respecting those rights ’. 168 
However, the ECJ still concluded in this case that  ‘ the Directive leaves the Member States 
a margin of appreciation, it is suffi  ciently wide to enable them to apply the Directive ’ s 
rules in a manner consistent with the requirements fl owing from the protection of 
fundamental rights ’. 169 
 Th e ECJ thus found that member states are required to ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights within the exercise of EU law provisions, but it also trusted them to 
be able and competent to do so on the basis of their national legislation. In other cases, 
the ECJ has clarifi ed that the member states must  ‘ ensure that they do not rely on an 
interpretation of an instrument of secondary legislation which would be in confl ict with 
the fundamental rights or with the other general principles of EU law ’. 170 Th erefore, EU 
secondary legislation does not always need to spell out all the detailed rules to ensure 
that restrictions are provided for by law, which may be required by Article 52(1) of the 
Charter. 
 So the question remains at what point, then, it could be expected that legislative 
action is undertaken at EU level to secure the protection of fundamental rights in areas 
of shared or complementary competences. Is there a certain responsibility that could be 
attributed to the EU to take such action ? 
 It seems that the existence of serious interferences with fundamental rights in the 
implementation of EU law at national level would provide an important justifi cation 
for the EU legislature to adopt provisions laying down substantive and procedural 
safeguards to prevent arbitrary interferences with fundamental rights. Th is conclusion 
can be reached on the basis of the case of  Digital Rights Ireland . 171 However, other 
cases of the ECJ also demonstrate that serious interferences with fundamental rights 
can provide an important reason to ensure fundamental rights protection at EU level. 172 
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 173  Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the 
retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available 
electronic communications services or of public communications networks [2006] OJ L105/54. 
 174  Opinion of AG Cruz Villal ó n in Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12,  Digital Rights Ireland , paras 
115 – 117. 
 Th e case of  Digital Rights was about the former Data Retention Directive, 
which required the member states to ensure that certain metadata gathered by 
telecommunication providers was retained for the purpose of the prevention, 
investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crimes. 173 Th e Directive formulated 
some safeguards, such as demanding a minimum and a maximum period to be set for 
the retention of the data. For the most part, however, it left  considerable discretion to 
the national authorities in providing for further arrangements, such as those related 
to the access of public authorities to those data. Did the EU legislature thereby fail 
to secure adequate protection of fundamental rights ? In answering this question, the 
Advocate General reasoned as follows: 
 It is necessary in that regard, fi rst of all, to explain that a situation in which the European 
Union restricts itself to adopting legislation harmonising provisions invariably adopted by 
the majority of the Member States is not comparable to a situation in which the European 
Union decides, additionally, to make such legislation applicable generally. 
 In the fi rst case, the European Union can  … essentially leave to the national legislatures the 
task of ensuring that the legislation adopted on their own initiative and entailing a limitation 
on fundamental rights contains all the guarantees necessary to ensure that the limitations and 
their application ( ‘ access ’ ) comply with all the quality of law requirements and the principle 
of proportionality. 
 In the second case, on the other hand, where the limitation on fundamental rights stems from 
the legislation of the European Union itself and is therefore attributable to it, the European 
Union legislature ’ s share of the responsibility is quite diff erent. In the case of directives, it 
is clear that it will be for the Member States to set out in detail the guarantees necessary to 
regulate the limitation on fundamental rights in an instance such as the present one. However, 
the European Union legislature must play a leading role in defi ning those guarantees. It is 
from this perspective that it is necessary to examine compliance with the quality of the law 
requirement. 174 
 According to the Advocate General, therefore, it makes a diff erence whether EU law 
has merely harmonised the provisions of national law, or whether it has imposed a new 
obligation on the member states which could interfere with fundamental rights. Because 
the Data Retention Directive did not establish an optional regime for the member states 
to take measures in respect of the retention of data, and instead imposed obligations 
on the member states which could interfere with fundamental rights, the Directive 
 ‘ should have been accompanied by a simultaneous development as regards guarantees 
and therefore have led the European legislature to regulate in outline the very broad 
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 175  Opinion of AG Cruz Villal ó n in  Digital Rights Ireland , para. 118. 
 176  Opinion of AG Cruz Villal ó n in  Digital Rights Ireland , para. 120. 
 177  ECJ 8 April 2014, Joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12,  Digital Rights Ireland , paras 60 – 61. 
 178  Further support for this argument could also be found in the case of  Parliament v. Council , see ECJ 
5 September 2012, C-355/10  Parliament v. Council . Th is specifi c case was brought by the European 
Parliament against the adoption of EU measures in the context of see border surveillance measures. 
At para. 77, the ECJ held that  ‘ it is important to point out that provisions conferring powers of public 
authority on border guards  – such as the powers conferred in the contested decision, which include 
stopping persons apprehended, seizing vessels and conducting persons apprehended to a specifi c 
location  – mean that the fundamental rights of the persons concerned may be interfered with to 
such an extent that the involvement of the European Union legislature is required ’ . Th e ECJ seems to 
indicate in this judgment that because of the seriousness of the interferences that could take place, the 
EU legislature needs to be involved to spell out the further conditions and safeguards that would have 
to be provided. 
authority conferred on the Member States with regard to access to the data and their 
use, by the adoption of specifi cations in the form of principles ’. 175 Th e Advocate General 
further argued that: 
 Th e European Union legislature cannot, when adopting an act imposing obligations which 
constitute serious interference with the fundamental rights of citizens of the Union, entirely 
leave to the Member States the task of defi ning the guarantees capable of justifying that 
interference. It cannot content itself either with assigning the task of defi ning and establishing 
those guarantees to the competent legislative and/or administrative authorities of the Member 
States called upon, where appropriate, to adopt national measures implementing such an act or 
with relying entirely on the judicial authorities responsible for reviewing its practical application. 
It must, if it is not to render the provisions of Article 51(1) of the Charter meaningless, fully 
assume its share of responsibility by defi ning at the very least the principles which must govern 
the defi nition, establishment, application and review of observance of those guarantees. 176 
 Th us, according to the Advocate General, in case of serious interferences with 
fundamental rights on the basis of EU law, there is a greater responsibility for the EU 
to ensure that appropriate measures are taken to prevent or remedy fundamental rights 
infringements, and less discretion can be given to the member states. Th e ECJ, to a 
certain extent, agreed. It decided in its judgment on the  Digital Rights case that the EU 
legislature had failed to secure suffi  cient respect for fundamental rights because the 
Directive lacked clear substantive and procedural safeguards in relation to a serious 
interference with the right to privacy and the protection of personal data. 177 
 In deciding who is to regulate fundamental rights issues in relation to secondary 
EU law, it thus could be of particular importance to look at whether EU legislation 
imposes new obligations on the member states, and whether they may cause a serious 
infringement of fundamental rights when further (corrective) measures may be needed 
to eff ectively secure those fundamental rights. 178 
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rights, Report on the situation of fundamental rights protection in the European Union in 2003, CFR-
CDF.repEU.2003, pp. 31 – 32; and Barnard (2011), pp. 648 – 649. 
 180  Th is was recognised in ECJ 8 April 1976, C-43/75,  Defrenne v. Sabena (No 2) , paras 8 – 9:  ‘ Article 119 
pursues a double aim. First, in light of the diff erent stages of the development of social legislation in 
various member states, the aim of Article 119 is to avoid a situation in which undertakings established 
in States which have actually implemented the principle of equal pay suff er a competitive disadvantage 
in intra-community competition as compared with undertakings established in States which have not 
yet eliminated discrimination against women workers as regards pay. ’ 
 181  De Schutter (2004), pp. 5 – 7. 
 182  Benett  & Raab (2006). 
 8.4.5.  PREVENTING A RACE TO THE BOTTOM 
 Because free movement of individuals and of undertakings can take place throughout 
the EU, it has been argued that there is a certain risk that member states are tempted 
to lower their level of fundamental rights standards. Th is risk of a  ‘ race to the bottom ’ 
forms an important ground, according to De Schutter, for the EU to introduce measures 
to prevent the downgrading of the standards of fundamental rights within the EU. 179 
 A race to the bottom was feared early on, in relation to the protection of the social 
rights of workers under Community law. 180 It was argued that the free movement of 
undertakings and the free movement of workers within the Community would create 
a risk that undertakings would be attracted to doing business mostly with and within 
member states with a relatively low standard of fundamental rights. Th e necessity to 
comply with a high standard of fundamental rights protection could have been seen as 
a disadvantage for undertakings. Member states could, for that reason, be tempted to 
lower their standards to attract foreign investments. Potentially, undertakings could also 
decide to relocate to member states where the fundamental rights standards were lower 
than elsewhere. Action at EU level was therefore considered necessary to address the 
lowering of the social rights standards. It was for this reason, according to De Schutter, 
that the member states decided to confer competences to the European Community to 
take legislative action in relation to the right to equal pay for men and women and in 
relation to the right to paid leave. 181 
 Th is  ‘ race to the bottom ’ argument still seems to be relevant in present circumstances. 
It has been suggested that there is a risk that the member states may lower their 
standards of privacy rights because of the important role played by the free movement 
of information and data on a world-wide scale. 182 It is common knowledge that the 
business models of social media giants such as Facebook and Google is based, to a 
considerable extent, on the free fl ow of information and of personal data. Compliance 
with high standards of fundamental rights would form an obstacle to their business 
models and thus discourage their establishment in member states which have high 
standards on privacy rights. Th erefore, there is a good reason for high standards of 
privacy standards to be established at EU level. 
 Outside the sphere of the internal market, De Schutter has also found that there is a 
similar risk for a race to the bottom in the standards of fundamental rights protection 
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 183  De Schutter (2004), pp. 20 – 21. 
 184  Th e risk of forum shopping in the context of asylum applications is also indicated by the Court in ECJ 
21 December 2011, Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10,  N.S. and others , para. 79. 
 185  De Schutter (2004), pp. 3 – 4. 
 186  De Schutter (2004), pp. 21 – 22. 
 187  Stubberfi eld (2012), p. 127. 
 188  Article 82(2) and 83(1) – (2) (criminal law), Article 153(2)(a) (social rights in the labour area). 
 189  Cf. Article 78 and 79 TFEU. 
in the area of asylum law. 183 In the absence of border controls within the EU, asylum 
seekers could decide to go forum shopping for the most favourable standards within the 
EU. 184 In response, member states might also want to restrict the rights of these asylum 
seekers to prevent high numbers of asylum applications. Again, the establishment of 
common standards at EU level could prevent this race to the bottom. De Schutter has 
argued that: 
 although the Member States are recognized the possibility to fully respect fundamental rights 
under their jurisdiction, whichever accommodations this requires from the Union …, States are 
neither encouraged, nor do they have incentives to,  develop human rights beyond the minimal 
obligation to respect them. 185 
 Th us, in areas of shared (and potentially also complementary) competences, the EU 
would be best placed to secure a high level of fundamental rights protection. De 
Schutter has further explained that it is necessary for the EU to go beyond providing 
for only minimum standards of fundamental rights protection to prevent a race to the 
bottom, because the member states do not have an incentive to provide for higher levels 
themselves in certain areas of EU law. 186 
 In relation to this, Stubberfi eld has also argued that states could be tempted to 
 ‘ hide behind the organisational veil ’ and even try to escape their fundamental rights 
obligations under international law in areas falling within the scope of EU law if they 
only need to comply with minimum standards of fundamental rights. 187 In some 
areas of EU law, this is diffi  cult to achieve, because it has been determined that only 
minimum standards and rules can be established on the EU level. For example, in 
the area of criminal law, only minimum standards may be established to improve the 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension and to defi ne 
certain serious criminal sanctions and off ences. 188 Th e competences of the EU to take 
certain actions in the area of asylum law are, however, no longer restricted to adopting 
minimum rules. It could, therefore, develop a Common European Asylum System on 
the basis of its competences. 189 Based on the argument of the risk of the  ‘ race to the 
bottom ’, such competences could then indeed be used to the fullest extent possible. 
 While the justifi cation for adopting EU action to ensure fundamental rights 
protection on the basis of the aim to prevent a  ‘ race to the bottom ’ seems compelling, 
it must be admitted that it can in fact be quite diffi  cult to establish that a downgrading 
of fundamental rights standards actually takes place as a result of the free movement of 
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p. 649. 
 191  See in particular section 6.3. for an explanation of this rationale for the EU system of fundamental 
rights protection. 
 192  Barnard (2011), p. 645. 
 193  De Schutter (2008), p. 550. 
 194  See e.g. preambles 2, 7 and 11 of the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Directive) COM(2011) 11 fi nal. 
individuals and undertakings within the EU. So far, no statistical data showing this has 
been provided. 190 For that reason, it still may be useful to rely also on other arguments 
when seeking to establish a sound basis for taking EU action. 
 8.4.6.  ENSURING THE PRIMACY, UNITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
OF EU LAW 
 Th e protection of the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of EU law constitutes an important 
consideration in the case-law of the ECJ on fundamental rights. 191 It can be argued that 
it may also provide the EU with an important ground for justifi cation of the adoption of 
rules to protect fundamental rights in areas of shared or complementary competences. 
 Th e establishment of uniform rules by the EU legislature may become necessary 
when there exists a variety of fundamental rights standards throughout the member 
states that actually hampers the eff ectiveness of EU law itself. According to Barnard, 
this particular reason formed an important ground for the decision of European 
Community to adopt rules to ensure the protection of workers ’ social rights within 
the internal market. 192 Barnard discusses that it was expected that the divergence of 
fundamental rights standards in the diff erent member states could create obstacles to 
the free movement of workers and the free movement of undertakings. Such obstacles 
and distortions to the market needed to be removed in order to secure integration and 
the eff ective functioning of the market. Th erefore, rather than serving as a correction 
to the destructive eff ects of the market leading to a race to the bottom, as discussed in 
section 8.4.5., the adoption of certain standards in the fi eld of social rights of workers 
at EU level could be justifi ed as ensuring a level playing fi eld to the benefi t of economic 
operators active within the internal market. 
 Similarly, in the area of data protection, the protection of the eff ectiveness of EU 
law also seems to form an important driver behind the establishment of uniform 
standards on fundamental rights. 193 Th e explanatory memorandum to the proposal for 
the EU ’ s General Data Protection Regulation shows that the fragmentation of privacy 
standards was considered an important rationale for further harmonisation of the 
rules of the member states on that issue. 194 Th e diff erences between the member states 
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 195  Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data 
(General Data Protection Directive) COM(2011) 11 fi nal, p. 6. 
 196  See also section 6.8. 
 197  Impact Assessment for a Commission proposal for a Directive on procedural safeguards for children 
suspected or accused in criminal proceedings, SWD (2013) 480, 27 November 2013, p. 32. Further cf. 
De Schutter (2008), pp. 550 – 555. 
 198  Besson (2011b), p. 56. 
constitute obstacles to the pursuit of economic activities within the EU and they could 
distort competition. In the absence of common rules, practical challenges arise for the 
enforcement of data protection legislation and, for that reason, uniform rules need to 
be established at EU level. 195 
 In some areas, such as the area of freedom, security and justice, it has, instead, 
been decided that the judicial and administrative authorities of the member states 
must cooperate on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition. 196 Th is basically 
implies that they must cooperate on the basis of divergences in the fundamental rights 
standards of the diff erent member states. In relation to some topics, it has been decided 
that certain minimum standards related to such areas are to be established at EU level 
to secure the eff ective application of such cooperation mechanisms, as illustrated by the 
directives in the area of criminal law pointed out earlier. 197 
 Th us to address the risks for the protection of the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness 
of EU law, the EU could also decide to intervene in a certain area by harmonising the 
standards of fundamental rights. 
 8.5.  PROVIDING ROOM FOR THE APPLICATION OF 
NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS STANDARDS 
 As alluded to in sections 8.4.1. and 8.4.2., there remain important arguments that 
fundamental rights protection should be provided at national level in situations that are 
related to EU law. It may be preferable that national authorities, which are closest to the 
individuals whose fundamental right are aff ected, make the appropriate arrangements. 
In this situation it can, however, be important that EU law expressly clarifi es that the 
member states have discretion to apply their national standards of fundamental rights 
law, and the human rights standards under international treaties. 
 It has sometimes been argued that EU law does not suffi  ciently address this issue of 
the desirability of regulation of fundamental rights matters on the national rather than 
the EU level. Th ere are some general provisions which aim to regulate such confl icts, 
such as Article 351 TFEU and Article 53 of the Charter, yet in practice these provisions 
do not appear to be readily applied. 198 Article 351 TFEU clarifi es that the (human 
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rights) treaties or agreements which member states have signed up to before their 
accession to the EU are not aff ected by the EU Treaties. Yet, in the second paragraph of 
this provision, member states are required to  ‘ take all appropriate steps to eliminate the 
incompatibilities established ’. What exactly is expected of member states in this respect, 
and what room are they aff orded to comply with those treaties ? Th is remains unclear. 199 
With respect to the application of Article 53 of the Charter, which allows member states 
to apply higher standards of fundamental rights, there appear to be even more worries, 
especially since the ECJ clarifi ed in the judgment of  Melloni that higher standards 
of national fundamental rights may be applied by national authorities and courts in 
respect of obligations stemming from EU law, as long as this does not compromise  ‘ the 
primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of EU law ’. 200 
 Th e EU legislature could secure that rules of EU law more  ‘ harmoniously ’ co-exist 
with the standards of national or international fundamental rights by clarifying the 
scope available to the member states to apply those standards. 201 In Directives and 
Regulations, specifi c derogation clauses could be included, or they could determine 
that the rules of EU law would have to be interpreted in line with the relevant standards 
of international law. De Schutter fi nds that Article 52(3) of the Charter provides helpful 
inspiration for drawing up such clauses. 202 Th is provision demonstrates a specifi c link 
between the interpretation of the Charter ’ s rights and the rights of the Convention. 203 
With respect to norms coming from other European or international sources of 
fundamental rights law, which are relevant for the protection of fundamental rights in a 
certain area of EU law, such links could also be established. One way of providing such 
protection is by inserting so-called  ‘ optioning rules ’ in EU secondary legislation, which 
allow the member states to make their own choices on the protection of fundamental 
rights. 204 
 In areas which are, to a large degree, exhaustively regulated by EU law, it could even 
be highly desirable to include such clauses. Th is does not necessarily and only apply 
to areas of exclusive competences, however. Stubberfi eld has explained, for example, 
that the area of asylum law is de facto highly regulated by EU law and there is a fairly 
prescriptive relationship between the EU and the member states which, in eff ect, 
creates the impression that the member states enjoy very little discretion. 205 It also 
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seems necessary to include specifi c clauses on the scope for application of national and 
international fundamental rights areas where there are many diff erent legal regimes 
that could be applied to a specifi c area of EU law, such as the area of asylum law. 206 
 8.6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Th e scope for the adoption of measures by the EU to ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights and the imposition of positive obligations has raised many questions, 
given that the EU has not been conferred a clear and general competence to protect 
fundamental rights under the EU Treaty. Th is chapter has explained that the EU arguably 
does have some powers to protect fundamental rights. Th e EU can be said to have 
specifi c fundamental rights powers relating to certain concrete topics (section 8.3.3.), 
as well as a more indirect power to protect fundamental rights in other areas where it 
has been given explicit powers to undertake its diff erent policies (section 8.3.4.). Th e 
indirect competence to protect fundamental rights must be understood as an accessory 
competence that is based on, and limited to, the explicit powers the EU has been given 
in several policy fi elds. Th is indirect competence can be used to ensure that the EU 
does respect fundamental rights in the exercise of its explicit powers. It is less certain 
whether there exists a more general power to protect fundamental rights, which could 
allow the EU to take action in areas where it does not have an explicit and concrete 
competence. At the least, it could be argued that the EU must be very careful in relying 
on this more general power. 
 Th ere are several reasons why the EU may want to adopt measures to ensure 
fundamental rights protection (section 8.4.). Th e principle of subsidiarity provides a 
very general argument or justifi cation as to why action would be needed. It can be 
necessary for the EU legislature to take action when very clear connections can be 
made between EU acts and fundamental rights infringements, when there is a risk of 
a  ‘ race to the bottom ’ in the protection of fundamental rights standards, and where the 
primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of EU law itself is at stake. Which of these may provide 
relevant grounds for EU action is very much dependent on the specifi c circumstances, 
the specifi c area of law, and the (fundamental rights) interests that must be taken into 
account. Th ese diff erent grounds may also apply simultaneously. 
 Th ere are various legal bases to be found in the EU Treaties and in the Charter that 
contain clearer indications on some of the types of measures which can be undertaken 
by the EU legislature, or by the member state in the implementation of EU law at the 
national level, to ensure the eff ective protection of fundamental rights (see sections 
8.3.4.2. to 8.3.4.4.). Th ese legal bases are useful to help the EU institutions decide 
how and to what degree they could exercise their indirect competence to protect 
 206  Cf. Muir (2014a), p. 227. See further Besselink (1998). 
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fundamental rights. Th is  inter alia includes the principle of loyal cooperation and the 
legality requirement in relation to fundamental rights interferences. 
 Th ese legal bases will also be especially relevant for the ECJ to take into account if 
cases are brought which reveal that the EU institutions and the member states, in the 
implementation of EU law at national level, have failed to secure the eff ective protection 
of fundamental rights, even though a relevant competence for the EU to take actions 
in that fi eld could have been construed. Th ese legal bases, in combination with the 
reasons for taking action at EU level discussed in this chapter may provide important 
arguments for the ECJ to allow it to formulate positive obligations in its case-law. Such 
specifi c cases are discussed in chapter 11. 
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 CHAPTER 9 
 THE LIMITED SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
OF EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 9.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Th e scope of application of EU fundamental rights is of great signifi cance. It is of 
importance to determine at what point fundamental rights matters fall within the scope 
of Union law, because then the ECJ becomes competent to exercise judicial review and 
to set fundamental rights standards. Th is has implications for the powers that can 
be exercised by the EU institutions and the member states in the respective areas. 1 
Moreover, if the ECJ were to apply EU fundamental rights to situations where there are 
no rules of EU law, and therefore no powers for the EU, this would have the eff ect of 
unacceptably extending the EU ’ s powers. Th e scope of application of EU fundamental 
rights is also of particular importance for exploring the (potential) development of 
positive obligations on the basis of EU law. Th e main question to be asked in that 
respect is to what degree it can be expected that positive obligations could indeed fall 
within, or rather outside, the scope of application of EU law. 
 In answering this question, the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter is of central 
concern. Th is chapter discusses, fi rst, how scholars have interpreted the meaning of this 
provision (section 9.2.). What scope and what limits do they derive from this provision 
for the protection of fundamental rights by the ECJ, and how do they expect the ECJ to 
accommodate a notion of positive obligations into EU law on the basis of this provision ? 
By fi nding answers to those questions, a theoretical framework for a development of 
positive obligations is set out which aims to respect the limits laid down in Article 51. 
Next, it is examined how the ECJ itself has interpreted and applied Article 51 of the 
Charter (section 9.3.). In this regard, three types of situations which the ECJ has found 
to fall within the scope of application of EU fundamental rights will be discussed. It is 
submitted that the EU in fact enjoys diff erent types of powers in these three types of 
situations. Th e existence of these diff erent types of powers needs to be acknowledged 
when assessing whether it would be possible for the ECJ to develop positive obligations 
in its case-law. Th is chapter is rounded up by some fi nal conclusions on the scope which 
Article 51 seems to allow for the development of positive obligations, and the limits that 
need to be taken into account (section 9.4.). 
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 9.2.  ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON A DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
BY THE ECJ 
 9.2.1.  BACKGROUND TO ARTICLE 51 OF THE CHARTER AND 
ITS MAIN EFFECTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS 
 Chapter 6 already discussed, to some extent, the meaning of Article 51(1) on the scope 
of application of the Charter. 2 It should be noted that Article 51 of the Charter is 
comprised of the following two paragraphs: 
 1. Th e provisions of the Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offi  ces and agencies 
of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only 
when they are implementing Union law. Th ey shall therefore respect the rights, observe the 
principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers 
and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties. 
 2. Th e Charter does not extend the fi eld of application of Union law beyond the powers of 
the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify powers and tasks as 
defi ned in the Treaties. 
 Th is provision limits the scope of application of the rights of the Charter to actions 
taken by the EU institutions and agencies and to the member states. Th e Charter only 
applies to the actions of the member states when they are  ‘ implementing Union law ’. 
 Several scholars have argued that the limits laid down in Article 51 were intentionally 
included to prevent a federalising eff ect, 3 which could potentially be brought about 
by an activist approach of the ECJ towards the application of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter. Such eff ects have been experienced in the United States, where 
the Supreme Court started reviewing measures of the states on the basis of the federal 
Bill of Rights, even in contexts where states were exercising their own competences. 
It was feared that, if the ECJ were to adopt a similar approach, the application of the 
Charter would further encroach on the member states ’ powers and the protection of 
their national constitutional rights. 4 
 Th e fi rst and the second paragraph of Article 51 clearly aim to preserve the limitations 
to the competences of the EU. Th is means that the powers of the member states to 
pursue their sovereign policies and to apply their national standards of fundamental 
rights may not be unduly limited on the basis of EU fundamental rights standards. 
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From the perspective of the principle of attributed powers, as discussed in chapter 8, it 
would be problematic if an interpretation of fundamental rights given by the ECJ were 
to lead to a harmonisation of national law if there were no specifi c powers for the EU to 
adopt legislative measures in a certain fi eld. 5 It is therefore necessary that the ECJ has 
regard to the limited scope of application of the Charter and respects the division of 
competences between the EU and the member states. 6 
 More specifi cally, in relation to the development of positive obligations, Heringa 
and Verhey have argued that  ‘ Article 51 necessarily reduces to a great extent the 
consequences which might otherwise fl ow from fully accepting the meaning and scope 
of the ECHR. Th at meaning and scope include positive obligations, but these can only 
be imposed upon the Community or the Union within their already existing powers. ’ 
 Other scholars have also submitted that Article 51 was specifi cally included in the 
Charter to prevent the ECJ from following the example of the ECtHR in expanding the 
reach of the fundamental rights by means of developing positive obligations. 7 For that 
reason, they argue, Article 51 now clearly stipulates that the limited powers of the EU 
preclude that  ‘ any new power or task ’ is established. 
 It is thus clear that the ECJ cannot, like the ECtHR, reason, in an abstract fashion 
and purely based on a fundamental rights provision, what state action may be required 
to ensure the eff ective protection of those rights and, if necessary, formulate positive 
obligations. 8 Instead, the ECJ must always pay close attention to the scope of EU law 
and it must make sure not to set requirements that fall outside that scope. 
 As a consequence, it is to be expected that the ECJ will only establish positive 
obligations which relate to a specifi c fi eld in which the EU is entitled to exercise powers 
and where a specifi c rule of EU law provides the basis for the EU institutions and the 
member states to take certain measures. Article 51 clearly precludes the ECJ from 
developing any self-standing positive obligations, that is, obligations which have no 
basis in EU law at all. Th e ECJ is thus, in principle, expected to formulate supportive 
positive obligations only. Th is is a type of obligation which, as explained in chapter 3, is 
inextricably linked to the negative obligation to protect fundamental rights and which 
is necessary to prevent violations of such a negative obligation. 9 Examples of such 
supportive positive obligations include procedural and remedial positive obligations. 
Chapter 11 will demonstrate that these kinds of obligations have indeed been developed 
in the case-law of the ECJ. 10 
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 15  Opinion A-G Sharspton in C-34/09,  Zambrano , para. 163. 
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aimed at preventing. See further Groussot, Pech  & Petursson (2013), pp. 99 – 101; Besson (2011b), 
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 9.2.2.  GAPS IN PROTECTION OR COMPETENCE CREEP ? 
 Concern has been expressed that, given the limitations of Article 51 of the Charter, the 
ECJ will lack suffi  cient powers to ensure the eff ective protection of fundamental rights 
and to recognise positive obligations. Heringa and Verhey, for example, noted that: 
 It is feasible that a situation could occur in which the Community or the Union infringes one 
of the rights laid down in the Charter. At the same time it could happen that under the Court ’ s 
case-law this infringement could give rise to a corresponding positive obligation. If the Union 
does not have the power to meet such an obligation it could happen that the infringement (of 
the negative obligation) could and would be remedied, whereas the violation of the positive 
obligation (the substance of the right is  de facto illusory) would remain. Th is would create a 
potential situation of confl icts and confusion, which would not contribute to the transparency 
and eff ectiveness of human rights protection. 11 
 Heringa and Verhey thus envisaged that situations might arise in which the specifi c 
powers needed to provide fundamental rights protection had not been conferred by the 
member states to the EU. Indeed, it must be recognised that the specifi c requirements 
of fundamental rights can sometimes only become clear in concrete circumstances and 
they cannot therefore always be foreseen in the process of conferring competences. 12 
Heringa and Verhey concluded that Article 51 of the Charter limits the possibility 
of providing eff ective protection of fundamental rights, and could create gaps in the 
protection of fundamental rights. Th ey specifi cally noted that the ECJ may not be able 
to ensure, on the basis of Article 52(3) of the Charter, that the rights of the Charter are 
given the same meaning and scope as the rights of the Convention, because they require 
positive obligations to be met. 13 
 Such concerns could be dismissed if a broader reading were to be given to the scope 
of application of the rights of the Charter. Advocate General Sharpston has famously 
argued that the ECJ needs to interpret the scope of application of EU law broadly so that 
it can be ensured that the fundamental rights of EU citizens are eff ectively protected. 14 
Sharpston has held that the protection of fundamental rights can be made dependent 
on  ‘ the existence and scope of a material EU competence ’. 15 Th is would not require that 
there is a specifi c provision of EU law which applies to a situation at hand, nor that 
secondary legislation is actually enacted in that fi eld of competence. On the basis of this 
approach, a broad range of situations could be brought within the scope of application 
of EU fundamental rights. 16 Some scholars have further suggested that, in exceptional 
Intersentia 225
Chapter 9. Th e Limited Scope of Application of EU Fundamental Rights
 17  See further for their views, section 7.6.1.; and Von Bogdandy, Kottmann, Antp ö hler, Dickschen, 
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the eff ect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights 
conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union ’ , see ECJ 8 March 2011, C-34/09,  Zambrano , 
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 22  See Groussot, Pech  & Petursson (2013), p. 100; and Prechal, De Vries  & Van Eijk (2011), pp. 213 – 215 
ff . Also see De B ú rca (1998), p. 221; and Dubout (2014), p. 195. 
 23  Prechal, De Vries  & Van Eijken (2011), p. 235. 
situations, there should be room for the ECJ to ensure fundamental rights protection 
in areas where the EU does not, as such, enjoy any powers. Von Bogdandy and others 
argued that this would be necessary in situations where the protection of the essence of 
the fundamental rights of EU citizens is at stake. 17 In their view, there is a presumption 
under EU law that member states retain sovereign powers to protect fundamental 
rights only as long as they can indeed ensure that the essence of fundamental rights 
is protected. Th e ECJ could accept jurisdiction in such cases on the basis of Article 20 
TFEU, which protects EU citizenship. 18 
 So far, the ECJ has showed itself ready to accept quite a broad scope of application for 
EU fundamental rights. 19 Th e ECJ has extended the scope of application of the Charter 
in some cases to situations where the connection with EU law was, in fact, rather weak. 20 
Th e ECJ has also applied the Charter in situations where the EU was not given a specifi c 
power to take legislative action in the relevant area. 21 In other situations it has not been 
clear (at least from the viewpoint of national law) whether the power to take certain 
measures really derived from EU law. Scholars have concluded that the resulting scope 
of application of the Charter is wider than the legislative scope of application of EU 
law. 22 As a result of this broad reading of the scope of application of EU fundamental 
rights, there would perhaps be room to allow for the acceptance of positive obligations, 
indeed more than would be expected by Heringa and Verhey, and eff ective protection 
of fundamental rights could be realised more easily. 
 It has also been suggested that an over-broad scope of application of EU fundamental 
rights can give rise to confl icts with the principle of attributed powers, especially in 
light of the potential creation of positive obligations. Prechal, De Vries and Van Eijken 
stated that: 
 at the very moment when a matter is within the scope of the Treaty, the Member States 
competences to act are limited by the relevant Treaty provisions, general principles of law or 
fundamental rights. Yet this form of what is primarily considered a negative intervention may 
imply, upon second analysis, positive obligations  – that is to say, obligations for the Member 
States to act. Th is, however, is oft en believed to be primarily a matter of implementation of EU 
legislation. Unsurprisingly, this shift  from negative to positive obligations raises questions in 
relation to the principle of attributed powers. 23 
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 Prechal, De Vries and Van Eijken have explained that when specifi c matters are 
brought within the scope of EU law by the ECJ, the EU institutions might too easily 
be triggered to take legislative action. Th ey argue that this directly and possibly unduly 
expands the competences of the EU. 24 In their view, this would be problematic in light 
of the principle of attributed powers. 25 It would also be problematic if the ECJ were 
to defi ne certain actions for the EU institutions and for the member states while the 
procedural guarantees that are inherent to the legal basis for EU actions as such had 
not been ensured. 26 Some concerns thus also stem from the political nature of positive 
obligations. As was noted in chapter 4, similar concerns have been expressed with 
respect to the development of positive obligations by the ECtHR. 27 Again, that might 
be a reason for the ECJ to be wary of defi ning such obligations, especially when there 
is no clear connection to EU law. Prechal, De Vries and Van Eijken conclude that the 
principle of attributed powers does not provide for a helpful framework that could be 
applied if positive obligations were to arise under EU law. Th is actually puts the ECJ in a 
very diffi  cult position in responding to relevant cases that could potentially be brought. 
Prechal, de Vries and Van Eijken call upon the EU legislature instead to further clarify 
what limits need to be taken into account by the ECJ, and they further call upon the ECJ 
to apply judicial wisdom in dealing with these situations. 28 
 Perhaps it may be replied to this that the principle of attributed powers, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, can already help to delimit the Court ’ s powers to impose such 
positive obligations. Article 51 of the Charter requires the ECJ to take into account that 
the limited powers of the EU must be respected, that the division of the power between 
the EU and the member states may not be aff ected, and that the powers of the EU 
may not be expanded. Th ese specifi c limits follow from the general Treaty rules on the 
limited powers of the EU, which have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter. 
Th e explanations on the Charter also mention in relation to Article 51 that account 
must be taken of the  ‘ logical consequences of the principle of subsidiarity and of the 
fact that the Union only has those powers which have been conferred upon it ’. Th us, the 
limits on the powers of the EU, as well as the specifi c interpretation of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the context of fundamental rights protection, could provide a relevant 
framework to be taken into account by the ECJ in deciding what obligations follow from 
the Charter. 29 Th is particular framework is set out in the conclusios of chapter 10. 30 
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 9.2.3.  RESPONDING TO GAPS IN THE PROTECTION OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: FLEXIBILITY IN THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
OF EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS LAW 
 Positive obligations are, in principle, established in situations of omissions of the state. 
Oft en it concerns certain gaps in the policies and laws of the state which reveal that 
insuffi  cient protection is provided for the fundamental rights of some, potentially 
vulnerable, indiviuals. 31 In relation to the situation of gaps in the protection of EU 
law, some scholars have thought of ways in which the ECJ could respond to ensure 
protection particularly on the basis of general principles of law (which include 
fundamental rights). 32 Th is is particularly interesting for the purposes of this study, 
since gap-fi lling in the sphere of fundamental rights protection may require positive 
measures to be taken by the national authorities or the EU institutions. 
 First, Lenaerts and Guiti é rrez-Fons have looked more generally at how the ECJ could 
respond to certain gaps in EU law on the basis of general principles of EU law. 33 Th ey 
fi nd that general principles of law can have three functions under EU law: they can 
be a ground for judicial review, an aid to interpretation, or a basis for gap-fi lling. 34 
According to Lenaerts and Guiti é rrez-Fons: 
 the gap-fi lling function of general principles, which is grounded in the Treaties themselves, 
ensures the coherence of the EU legal order without encroaching upon the choices made by 
the authors of the Treaties or by the EU legislature. It follows that such gap-fi lling function is 
consistent with the principle of separation of powers. Vertically, when engaging in gap-fi lling, 
the ECJ endeavours to fi nd a comprise guaranteeing that the project of European integration 
is not put at risk, whilst making sure that its decisions are suffi  ciently close to the practice 
and values to national courts to enjoy recognition and credibility in the Member States. In 
deploying a comparative analysis, the ECJ will seek the solution that does not risk encountering 
incomprehension or resistance in some Member States. 35 
 Th e use of general principles in gap-fi lling thus prevents the scope of application of EU 
law from being interpreted too rigidly. It could be argued that a similar use could be made 
of fundamental rights as general principles in relation to cases on positive obligations. 
According to Lenaerts and Guti é rrez, in order to fi nd out whether a positive obligation 
can be imposed in response to a certain gap that has been left  by the EU legislature and/
or the national legislature, the ECJ needs to look at the current practices and values of 
the member states. Th e judgment of the ECJ in the case of  K ö bler is taken as an example 
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 37  Lenaerts  & Guti é rrez-Fons (2010), p. 1634. 
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to illustrate this. 36 In this judgment, the ECJ established that individuals should be 
given a remedy before their national courts, to enable them to claim compensation as a 
result of an incorrect interpretation of EU law by their national court of last instance. 37 
In determing this, the ECJ specifi cally paid attention to the fact that the member states 
already applied principles of state liability to decisions of national courts in one way 
or other, so it could also require the member states to ensure that individuals can 
claim compensation where there has been an incorrect interpretation of EU law by the 
national courts. 38 Th e member states would only need to extend their existing remedies 
to apply to situations concerned with EU law and for most member states, apparently, 
there would be no need to create entirely new remedies. 39 A positive obligation that 
might seem to be imposed by the ECJ in this case, that is, the creation of a remedy, 
could also potentially be fulfi lled by the member states on the basis of their national 
laws and their existing judicial frameworks. 
 Van der Velde has also discussed how the ECJ could respond to any gaps in the 
protection of EU law, specifi cally those that require positive obligations to be formulated 
to ensure protection of fundamental rights. 40 In his response to other scholars who 
have held that the limited scope of application of fundamental rights precludes the ECJ 
from accepting positive obligations, Van der Velde has suggested that the ECJ could 
use the concept of  ‘ indirect competences ’ to enable it to recognise positive obligations 
under EU law. Th e concept of an  ‘ indirect competence ’ is explained in chapter 8. 41 In 
short, it entails that the EU has competence to protect fundamental rights when it is 
exercising its explicit legal powers, for example those which it has in the area of the 
internal market or in the area of freedom, security and justice. Th e ECJ may be required 
to defi ne positive obligations that have not yet been recognised under national law or by 
the ECtHR. Th ere are some diffi  culties related to this solution, as explained in chapter 
8. Th e existence of an indirect competence of the EU to protect fundamental rights 
remains accessory to the explicit powers of the EU, and the restrictions which apply to 
the exercise of such explicit powers must be taken into account. Th ere are thus limits to 
be mindful of, however, the notion of gap-fi lling can provide some room for the ECJ to 
accept positive obligations if the EU legislative framework shows certain gaps. 
 In developing positive obligations on the basis of an indirect or a specifi c competence 
to protect fundamental rights and/or in gap-fi lling, the ECJ must not only ensure 
that it respects the vertical division of powers, but also, as Prechal, De Vries and Van 
Eijken have explained, the horizontal division of powers. 42 Th e horizontal division of 
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powers is concerned with the relation between the ECJ and the other institutions of the 
EU. 43 Article 13(2) TEU specifi cally determines that  ‘ Each institution shall act within 
the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the 
procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them ’ and that  ‘ the institutions shall 
practice mutual sincere cooperation ’. 44 Th is requires that the ECJ, when interpreting 
EU law, must take into account the specifi c Treaty provision on the basis of which the 
relevant rule of EU law had been enacted. Th ese legal bases determine more specifi cally 
what the EU institutions and what the member states are entitled to do under EU law. 
 Th e main example that is put forward as an illustration of how the interpretation 
of fundamental rights by the ECJ could lead to confl icts with the horizontal division 
of powers, are the judgments of the ECJ in the cases of  Mangold and  K ü c ü ckdeveci . 45 
In those cases, discussed in some detail in chapter 6, the ECJ decided that individuals 
can rely on the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age in a case before 
the national court, even though the provisions of an EU Directive have not yet or not 
yet correctly been implemented in national law. 46 Th e ECJ requires that the national 
court sets aside a provision of national law to ensure the protection of the principle of 
non-discrimination in these cases between private parties. However, such an eff ect was 
precluded by the provisions of EU secondary law that were considered applicable to the 
case. For that reason, Prechal, De Vries and Van Eijken have stated that the judgments 
of the ECJ in  Mangold and  K ü c ü kdeveci can be regarded as examples of  ‘ judicial 
competence creep ’. 47 Th ey have held that the ECJ ruled in contravention of the horizontal 
limits of the powers of the EU, because the EU legislature had explicitly wanted to grant 
discretion to the member states in the implementation of the Directive. 48 In order to 
prevent such competence creep, the ECJ is thus advised to be careful to take the vertical 
and horizontal dimensions of its limited powers into account, which would also apply 
to cases on positive obligations. It may be diffi  cult, however, for the ECJ to determine 
the exact scope of the powers of the EU. Chapter 8 explained that there are diff erent 
views on the extent of the fundamental rights competences of the EU. Moreover, in 
some areas there may have been no clear political debate over whether fundamental 
rights protection should be provided for at supranational level, and this may leave the 
ECJ in a diffi  cult position. 49 It is thus essential for the ECJ to still show  ‘ judicial wisdom ’ 
in this area. 
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 9.3.  THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 51 BY THE ECJ 
 Th is section will discuss how broadly the ECJ has indeed interpreted Article 51 of the 
Charter, and where it fi nds that the limits of the scope of application should be placed. 
Th e underlying reasoning that has guided the ECJ ’ s interpretation of the scope of 
application of EU fundamental rights under the Charter has not been made very clear 
in its case-law. However, it has on some occasions stated that the scope of application 
of EU fundamental rights is restricted on the basis of the limited powers of the EU 
(section 9.3.1.). A look is taken at three diff erent types of situations which have been 
recognised by the ECJ as falling within the scope of application of EU fundamental 
rights, in order to see the potential for a development of positive obligations in those 
diff erent situations (section 9.3.2.). Further, it is clarifi ed that the ECJ has also decided 
in some situations that the member states enjoy sovereign powers under EU law so that, 
generally, EU fundamental rights cannot be applied in those situations (section 9.3.3.). 
Lastly, attention is drawn to the scope which the ECJ allows for member states to apply 
their own standards of fundamental rights on the basis of national law (section 9.3.4.). 
 9.3.1.  THE RELATION BETWEEN THE LIMITED SCOPE OF 
APPLICATION OF EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE 
LIMITED POWERS OF THE EU 
 As explained in chapter 6, the ECJ held in its seminal judgment in the  Å kerberg 
Fransson case that EU fundamental rights apply to the actions of the member states 
where  ‘ national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law ’. Th is seems 
to be broader than the limitation which is laid down in Article 51 of the Charter itself, 
which is that member states must be  ‘ implementing Union law ’. In  Å kerberg Fransson , 
the ECJ explained the scope of application of the Charter in relation to the principle of 
the limited competences of the EU in the following way: 
 Where  … a legal situation does not come within the scope of European Union law, the Court 
does not have jurisdiction to rule on it and any provision of the Charter relied upon cannot, 
of themselves, form the basis for such jurisdiction  … 
 Th e considerations correspond to those underlying Article 6(1) TEU, according to which 
the provisions of the Charter are not to extend in any way the competences of the European 
Union as defi ned in the Treaties. Likewise, the Charter, pursuant to Article 51(2) thereof, 
does not extend the fi eld of application of European Union law beyond the powers of the 
European Union or to establish any new power or task for the European Union, or modify 
powers and tasks as defi ned in the Treaties  … 50 
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 Similar considerations have been put forward by the ECJ in other judgments on the 
scope of application of EU fundamental rights, notably in  Pfl eger , which is discussed 
further below. 51 Th e ECJ has emphasised these limits in cases that were brought before 
it on situations which had only a very faint connection to EU law, and in which it 
decided that EU fundamental rights could, for that reason, not be applied. 52 Th ere 
are also several examples of cases in which national courts had referred questions 
to the ECJ on the protection of fundamental rights in relation to the areas of social 
security and immigration law. 53 In these cases the ECJ decided that it manifestly lacked 
jurisdiction to rule on the questions that were referred to it by the national courts. 54 
Th ese matters in principle fall within the competences of the member states; and the 
ECJ also found that the referring courts had provided little guidance as to why those 
specifi c situations that were at issue would (otherwise) fall within the scope of the EU 
Charter. Considering athis, the ECJ thus generally aims to respect the limited powers 
of the EU by restricting the scope of application of EU fundamental rights. 
 On some recent occasions, the ECJ has expressly drawn attention to the existence of a 
specifi c obligation that needs to be laid in EU law as a requirement for EU fundamental 
rights to be applied. Th e absence of such a specifi c obligation of EU law has provided 
a reason for the ECJ to fi nd that EU fundamental rights could not be applied to the 
actions of the member states. 55 In the  Julian Hern á ndez case, the ECJ held that: 
 … fundamental European-Union rights could not be applied in relation to national legislation 
because the provisions of EU law in the area concerned did not impose any specifi c obligation 
on Member States with regard to the situation at issue in the main proceedings. 
 … the mere fact that a national measure comes within an area in which the European Union 
has power cannot bind it within the scope of EU law, and, therefore, cannot render the 
Charter applicable. 56 
 Here, the ECJ explains that it is not suffi  cient to only point out in general that a situation 
falls within an area in which the EU happens to have a competence to act. Th e same 
point also seems to have been made by the ECJ in the cases of  Iida and  Siragusa . In 
these cases the ECJ clarifi ed that  ‘ the concept of  “ implementing Union law ” requires 
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a certain degree of connection above and beyond the matters covered being closely 
related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other ’. 57 
 Overall, therefore, it seems that the ECJ is well aware of the need to limit the scope 
of application of the EU Charter. Nevertheless, as the next section will show, matters 
are slightly more complicated in relation to some of the case-law of the ECJ. In some 
of its judgments, the ECJ has chosen to provide protection of fundamental rights, 
even though there was no clear obligation laid down in EU law and/or the EU did not 
actually seem to enjoy any power in the area concerned. 
 9.3.2.  THE SPECIFIC SITUATIONS WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
‘IMPLEMENTING UNION LAW ’ 
 In exploring how the limited scope of application of the EU relates to the limited 
powers of the EU, it is useful to distinguish three types of situations which show a 
diff erent relation to the principle of attributed powers. 58 Th ese three situations, briefl y 
mentioned in chapter 6, are the agency situation, the situation of measures derogating 
from the EU fundamental freedoms, and optioning rules. 59 As will be explained, in 
each of these situations the EU exercises a diff erent type of competence, which has 
important implications for the extent to which the ECJ can develop fundamental rights 
standards. It is argued that this also impacts on the extent to which the ECJ can develop 
positive obligations in these diff erent situations. 
 9.3.2.1.  Th e Agency Situation 
 Th e fi rst type of situation that has been distinguished by the ECJ with respect to the 
actions of the member states, concerns the classic agency situations, or the  Wachauf 
situation. 60 In this situation, member states take measures to implement specifi c 
provisions of secondary EU law. Here, the competence of the member states to take 
measures emanates from EU law, and it could therefore be rationalised that EU law must 
also ensure that the member states exercise these powers with respect for fundamental 
rights. Th e application of EU fundamental rights standards to this agency situation 
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seems clearly in harmony with the division of powers between the EU and the member 
states. 61 Even when the member states enjoy discretion in implementing provisions of 
EU law, it would still be logical to assume that the EU standards of fundamental rights 
are applied, because the member states continue to act as  ‘ agents ’ of EU law. 62 Negative 
as well as positive obligations could thus be imposed on the member states in such 
situations to ensure that fundamental rights are protected 
 As held already, there are also examples of cases in which the member states 
seemingly were acting as agents of EU law and were for that reason brought within the 
scope of application of EU fundamental rights, even though the connection to EU law 
was somewhat weak. Th e specifi c situation in the case of  Å kerberg Fransson can be taken 
as an example to explain this. 63 In  Å kerberg Fransson , the ECJ examined the application 
of a Swedish rule that allowed a criminal sanction to be imposed on an individual for tax 
evasion even though an administrative sanction had already been imposed. Th is raised 
questions in light of the principle of  ne bis in idem . Th e ECJ held that the tax penalties 
and criminal proceedings which were instituted by the national authorities against the 
applicant for tax evasion formed an implementation of obligations laid down in EU 
law. 64 Th e ECJ explained that several provisions of the applicable Directives and Article 
4(3) TEU imposed a (general) obligation on the member states to take all legislative and 
administrative measures to ensure the collection of VAT that was due on its territory 
and to prevent the evasion thereof. 65 Th e ECJ further pointed to Article 325 TFEU as 
a relevant provision, since this provision requires the member states to take measures 
to counter illegal activities aff ecting the fi nancial interests of the EU through eff ective 
deterrent measures. 66 Th e ECJ recognised in its judgment that the national legislation 
upon which the tax penalties and criminal proceedings were found had not actually 
been adopted to transpose the said provisions of EU law. It held, however, that this did 
not imply that EU fundamental rights standards could not be applied. Aft er all, the 
application of the criminal and administrative proceedings in this case were, in the 
end, imposed as eff ective penalties for conduct prejudicial to fi nancial interests of the 
European Union. 67 
 It can be contested whether the member state in such a case really acts as an agent 
of EU law. In the case of  Å kerberg Fransson , it could just as easily have been decided 
that the measures that were taken did not constitute implementation of EU law, as 
it was not obvious that the power to take those measures had been conferred on the 
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member state under EU law. 68 In fact, it could have been argued that the principle of 
national procedural autonomy applied in this case. 69 Th e choice made by the Court can, 
arguably, only be explained by its rather functional approach to the application of EU 
fundamental rights standards. 70 On the basis of this approach  ‘ it is not the intention 
of the  State , but the  function of the State act regarding the implementation of EU law 
which matters ’. 71 From the viewpoint of EU law, it could be argued that the member 
states were mandated to take certain actions in the case of  Å kerberg Fransson . 72 Th ese 
mandates were laid down in the provisions that were indicated by the ECJ, even though 
they gave broad discretion as regards the choice for certain implementing measures. 
From the national law perspective, however, it can be diffi  cult to accept that such 
matters are also governed by EU law. Th erefore, there are also cases, albeit exceptional 
ones, in which the Court did expressly take into account that national legislation was 
not adopted to give eff ect to EU law, in particular in the context of EU citizenship law, 
where the member states clearly still enjoy certain sovereign powers. 73 In the case of 
 Iida , the ECJ also expressly took into account whether the national legislation at issue 
was actually intended to implement provisions of EU law. 74 
 Most of the agency-type situations show that certain arrangements may already have 
been made at the national level to secure the protection of fundamental rights. Th ey 
may form part of the member states ’ own legal and administrative structures, as the 
example of  Å kerberg Fransson shows. Nevertheless, complying with EU fundamental 
rights standards could, if necessary, require the member states to further amend certain 
laws or policies. Th e case of  DEB shows an example where member states would need to 
make such adjustments. 75 Th is case was about a German undertaking that had suff ered 
fi nancial loss as a result of the fact that the German government was too late with 
the implementation of EU Directives establishing an internal market in natural gas. 76 
Th e undertaking involved wanted to lodge a complaint to establish state liability and 
to claim compensation, but it did not fulfi l the criteria for the grant of legal aid to be 
able to start the court proceedings on the basis of national law. Th e ECJ held that the 
principle of eff ective judicial protection needed to be ensured in this situation, and that 
it could require the German authorities to grant legal aid (based also on the specifi c 
circumstances of the case). 77 Amendments would therefore specifi cally need to be 
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made to protect the fundamental right of legal persons such as  DEB , which could in 
particular be aff ected by the establishment of rules at EU level in the internal market. 
 If, moreover, the protection of fundamental rights at the national level in these 
agency situations would show certain omissions, it would seem legitimate for the ECJ to 
impose a positive obligation on the member states. Aft er all, it needs to be secured that 
the exercise of powers emanating from EU law at the national level are in compliance 
with negative as well as positive fundamental rights standards. As chapter 8 explains, 
the ECJ would then need to have regard to the existence of a certain fundamental rights 
competence for the EU, such as a specifi c or an indirect fundamental rights competence, 
to be able to impose a positive obligation. 
 9.3.2.2.  Th e Situation of Derogation from the Free Movement Rules 
 Th e second situation where EU fundamental rights standards have been accepted as 
applying to the actions of the member states is when they derogate from the Treaty 
rules on free movement. 78 Th e ECJ has defi ned this type of situation in the case of  ERT 
and, more recently, in the case of  Pfl eger . In the  Pfl eger case, Austria had introduced a 
new law on games of chance which meant that gaming machines which were operated 
without a licence could be confi scated and destroyed. 79 In addition, administrative 
or criminal penalties could be imposed on persons involved in the organisation of 
unlicensed games. Th e ECJ held that the freedom to choose an occupation, the freedom 
to conduct a business, and the right to property (Articles 15 to 17 of the Charter) needed 
to be protected by Austria in order to justify its restriction of the freedom to provide 
services (Article 56 TFEU). 80 
 Th e application of the EU standards of fundamental rights to this situation type 
leads to some disagreement among scholars. In particular, it can be questioned whether 
in this situation the measures that are taken by the member states actually fi nd their 
basis in EU law (that is, on the basis of the derogation clause in the free movement 
provision). 81 Member states could fi nd that such measures are, in fact, taken on the 
basis of powers granted to them by national law, so the EU institutions should not 
intervene. 82 In the case of  Pfl eger , for example, the area of games of chance is not 
harmonised under EU law. 83 With regard to this type of situation, Besselink has, for 
example, explained that:  ‘ they [the member states] engage in an act which does not have 
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the EC as its effi  cient cause and yet is governed by EC law. In this case, EC law is not 
constitutive or attributive, but merely regulative with regard to Member State action. ’ 84 
 Craig explained the application of EU fundamental rights in these types of cases 
in, seemingly, quite a diff erent way, that is, one which is more closely geared to the 
principle of attributed powers. Craig found that: 
 Th e Member State in a case such as  ERT is prima facie caught by a violation of free movement 
law, and is then seeking to act on a power given by EU law to provide a defence to that violation. 
It is in that sense implementing a power of defence or derogation provided by EU law, which 
only operates within certain conditions, including compliance with rights, are satisfi ed. 85 
 While this may be considered as a reasonable explanation, it is still unclear exactly 
how the ECJ rationalises the application of EU fundamental rights standards in this 
situation. In the case of  Pfl eger , which is more recent than the  ERT case, the ECJ merely 
explained that  ‘ Th e use by a Member State of exceptions provided for by EU law in order 
to justify an obstruction of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the Treaty must  … 
be regarded  … as  “ implementing Union law ” within the meaning of Article 51(1) of 
the Charter ’. 86 Th is does not provide much clarity as to whether the Court would thus 
fi nd that the situation is in fact similar to the one where the member states are acting 
as agents of EU law. 
 It is generally accepted that the ECJ scrutinises measures taken by the member states 
that restrict the free movement provisions. Th e ECJ has clearly been given a power to 
do so. 87 Th e member states ’ justifi cations for such restrictions need to be in conformity 
with EU law, and this includes respect for fundamental rights. Nonetheless, there is a 
certain diff erence as compared to the agency situation discussed in the previous section, 
because there are no specifi c obligations that have been laid down by the EU legislature 
in secondary EU law. When derogating from the free movement rules, member states 
are oft en exercising their own, to a large extent, sovereign policies. It has been seen that 
derogations from the free movement law are taken in policy areas that can be quite 
sensitive, such as the area of gambling. 88 Th e way in which the member states pursue 
such policies may greatly diff er. In such areas, the EU may expressly have been excluded 
from having power to take legislative measures. If the ECJ were to actively intervene in 
such an area where there are no legislative powers for the EU, a certain tension arises 
in view of the principle of attributed powers. Some criticism as to the application of EU 
fundamental rights standards is thus possible. However, it is also generally accepted 
that the member states need to comply with EU standards of fundamental rights when 
they seek to justify a restriction of the free movement provisions. 
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security); and ECJ 1 April 2008, C-267/06,  Maruko (on same-sex relations), para. 59. 
 It has been argued that in the situation of derogating from the free movement rules, 
the ECJ should adopt a diff erent approach to fundamental rights, or, at the least, it 
should apply diff erent standards. Some scholars have suggested that the Court should 
leave it up to the national courts to determine whether fundamental rights have been 
complied with, and restrict itself to examining whether the principles of proportionality 
and non-discrimination have been respected. 89 Others have submitted that the ECJ 
should restrict itself to applying the standards which must be complied with under the 
Convention. 90 Most in fact seem to argue that the ECJ should grant much discretion to 
the member states seeing that there is a great diversity between the member states as to 
how they pursue their national policies which are subject to the review of the ECJ in the 
 ERT situation. 91 Th e ECJ could, further, clarify more generally that the member states 
have some leeway in applying their own national fundamental rights standards beyond 
the standards which they need to comply with under EU law. 92 Also, it has been found 
that the ECJ should diff erentiate the strictness of its review on the basis of the specifi c 
fundamental right which is under review. A less deferential review could, for example, 
be applied when it concerns fundamental rights of a more economic nature, when it 
concerns a violation of a  ‘ core human rights ’, or where a  ‘ serious or persistent breach of 
a fundamental right ’ takes place in a member state. 93 
 As discussed earlier, the ECJ has not, in general, made clear what standard of review 
it applies in these cases. In some cases, the ECJ seems to have recognised the limited 
legislative powers of the EU without clarifying what eff ect that would have on its 
own standards of review. In the  Viking Line case, for example, the ECJ examined the 
justifi cation given for a restriction of the freedom of establishment in the light of the 
protection of the right to strike. 94 A Finnish shipping company wanted to establish itself 
in Estonia as the wages paid in Estonia were lower those that had to be paid in Finland. 
Th e company was then confronted by the Finish trade union which threatened to strike 
against its plans. In the case that was brought before the Court, the Danish and the 
Swedish government argued that the conditions for exercising the right to strike were 
governed by national law, and that since the Community does not have a competence to 
regulate the right to strike on the basis of Article 137(5) TEC (now Article 153 TFEU), 
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the measures taken with regard to collective action fell outside the scope of Community 
law. 95 Th e ECJ held, in response to these objections, that: 
 even if, in the areas which fall outside the scope of the Community ’ s competence, the 
Member States are still free, in principle to lay down the conditions governing the existence 
and exercise of the rights in question, the fact remains that, when exercising that competence, 
the Member States must nevertheless comply with Community law … 
 Consequently, the fact that Article 137 EC does not apply to the right to strike or to the right 
to impose lock-outs is not such as to exclude collective action such as that at issue in the main 
proceedings from the application of Article 43 EC. 96 
 Th us, the ECJ recognises the competence of the member state to regulate the right to 
strike, while it also fi nds that in the same context requirements can be imposed on 
the basis of the free movement provisions under Community law. In its examination 
of the restriction of the free movement of services, the ECJ held that the right to take 
collective action and the right to strike are guaranteed as general principles under 
Community law, but that they are also subject to certain restrictions. 97 Article 28 of the 
Charter, for example, states that it is to be protected in accordance with Community 
law and national law and practices. Th e ECJ found that the right to take collective 
action for the protection of workers can provide a legitimate interest that can justify a 
restriction of the Treaty ’ s free movement provisions. 98 Th e ECJ further noted that the 
Community has an economic as well as a social purpose based on the objectives listed 
in the Treaty, which means that the rights of free movement need to be balanced against 
objectives pursued by social policy. Nonetheless, in its proportionality assessment of 
the measures that had been taken by the member state, the ECJ mainly set out several 
strict conditions that needed to be fulfi lled to protect the free movement of services. It 
held, for example, that it would need to be assessed by the national court whether the 
collective action taken could reasonably be considered to fall within the objective of 
protecting workers. 99 Th is would not be the case if it were established that the jobs or 
conditions of employment at issue were not seriously threatened. Th e national court 
also needed to examine whether there were less restrictive means that could be taken to 
protect the right to collective action than a strike. 100 
 Th e approach of the ECJ in this case has been criticised because the Court did not 
seem intent on further strengthening the protection of the fundamental right at issue. 101 
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Th is could be explained because of the clear lack of a regulatory competence of the EU 
to protect the right to strike, as was mentioned earlier. At the same time, the Court 
could also have taken a diff erent approach to show respect for the choices made by the 
member states in their own, sensitive, policy fi elds, such as it did in the case of  Omega 
and  Sayn-Witgenstein , where it affi  rmed the discretion that the member states enjoyed 
in making their own assessment in cases showing a confl ict between the free movement 
provisions and fundamental rights. 102 Moreover, the ECJ could have set requirements 
for the assessment of the proportionality of the restriction of the fundamental rights, 
aside from those that related to the restriction of the free movement provision. It had 
clearly done so in the case of  Schmidberger . 103 Seeing the diff erent approaches in these 
cases, the Court does not yet seem to have a single solution yet for the assessment that 
needs to be made in this type of situation, and it thus unclear what standard it will 
impose and for what reason. 
 Th e question for the purpose of this research is whether the ECJ would also be 
willing to impose further positive obligations on the member states in this type of 
situation. It could be argued that if a strict review of the measures taken by the member 
states cannot be undertaken because of the tension that this would create in light of the 
division of powers between the EU and the member states, there also is not much room 
to  ‘ interfere ’ by imposing strict positive obligations. Th e ECJ could, rather, be expected 
to grant considerable discretion to the member states in deciding on the meaures they 
would take in this area, provided that these measures meet the requirements of the 
protection of the free movement provisions as such. Moreover, in this type of situation 
it is diffi  cult to fi nd out what kind of fundamental rights competence the EU is given, 
and thus whether the EU can be held to have been given an indirect competence to 
protect fundamental rights, which could further justify the imposition of positive 
obligations (see chapter 8). 
 Because of this particular tension in view of the principle of attributed powers, it is 
submitted that the ECJ needs to be very careful when recognising positive obligations 
under these specifi c circumstances. 
 9.3.2.3.  Th e Situation of Optioning Rules 
 As chapter 6 briefl y mentioned, the ECJ has also applied EU fundamental rights 
standards in situations where the member states are given a clear discretionary power 
under EU law. 104 In particular, in the case of  N.S. and others , the ECJ decided that when 
member states exercise a discretionary power that is granted to them under EU law, 
the member states are implementing EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the 
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Charter, and they must comply with EU fundamental rights standards. 105 Sarmiento has 
argued that in this type of situation, the member states are applying an optioning rule 
under EU law. 106 Th is is diff erent from a situation where the member states are given 
discretion in the implementation of EU law when they are acting as agents of EU law. 
Th is distinction can be explained by looking in more detail at the specifi c rules which 
brought the circumstances of the case of  N.S. and others within the scope of application 
of the Charter. Th is case was about the Dublin Regulation which, as explained earlier, 
lays down an obligation for member states to return asylum seekers to the country of 
fi rst arrival within the EU which is responsible for dealing with an asylum application. 107 
Th e Dublin Regulation also provides that member states may decide to deal with the 
asylum application themselves. Th e ECJ held in relation to this rule, what Sarmiento 
thus calls an  ‘ optioning rule ’, that it  ‘ grants member states a discretionary power which 
forms an integral part of the Common European Asylum System provided for by the 
FEU Treaty and developed by the European Union legislature ’ and that it: 
 forms part of the mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for an asylum 
application provided for under that regulation and, therefore, merely an element of the 
Common European Asylum System. Th us, a member state which exercises that discretionary 
power must be considered as implementing European Union law within the meaning of 
Article 51(1) of the Charter. 108 
 In this situation, EU law is thus constitutive for the exercise of a specifi c power by the 
member states  – without a provision of EU law being in place, the member states could 
not take regulatory action. At the same time, the member states are not placed under 
an obligation to exercise the specifi c powers granted to them. Rather, as in the case 
of  N.S. and others , the member states can use the discretionary power to apply their 
own policies, based on their sovereign powers and in accordance with international 
human rights law. Sarmiento has defi ned the type of provisions of  N.S. and others as 
an  ‘ optioning rule ’, because it grants the member states a choice or an option to take a 
variety of actions in an area governed by EU law. 109 Sarmiento has further explained 
the diff erence from the agency situation discussed above, and fi nds that there can be 
discretion for the member states in both situations to exercise the power. In the case of 
optioning rules, however, the member states have been given the choice to make use of 
the specifi c power under EU law, whereas in the case of mandating rules, the member 
states are, from the start, under an obligation to exercise the specifi c power. Th us by 
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contrast, in the case of  Å kerberg Fransson , the member states were under an obligation 
under EU law, on the basis of a mandating rule, to undertake a specifi c activity. 110 
 In the situation where optioning rules are applied, there seems to be limited power 
for the EU to regulate the protection of fundamental rights as well. Since the EU 
specifi cally grants these discretionary powers to the member states, it could be argued 
that there is room for the ECJ to assess whether the member states have complied 
with EU standards of fundamental rights. Yet, in comparison to the  ERT situation, the 
review that can be undertaken by the ECJ in the application of the EU fundamental 
rights standards by the member states could be expected to be even more restricted, 
because of the deliberate choice that has been made under EU law not to regulate these 
standards. Th erefore, to impose positive obligations on the member states would again 
be diffi  cult since the member states have  ‘ deliberately ’ been granted a discretion to use 
these powers. Th e ECJ can thus be expected to impose positive obligations only in a 
very limited form. 
 9.3.3.  THE SOVEREIGN POWERS OF THE MEMBER STATES 
 Th e ECJ has explained that, in some cases, the member states still enjoy sovereign 
powers, even if there is a clear substantive connection to EU law. Th e case of  Dano is an 
example of such a case. 111 In its judgment, the ECJ established that the conditions for 
receiving social benefi ts do not fall within the scope of application of EU fundamental 
rights even though there are EU rules which coordinate the social security systems of 
the member states. Th e ECJ explained that the specifi c EU Regulation at issue had not 
intended to lay down the conditions creating the right to  ‘ special non-contributory 
benefi ts ’  – which is an important term that is used in the provisions of the Regulation  – 
and that therefore the member states had retained their competence to lay down the 
conditions for the grant of such benefi ts. 112 Th us, the Court had regard to the fact that 
the member states had expressly aimed to exclude a certain area from the scope of 
application of EU law. Th erefore, it decided that member states are not implementing 
EU law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter when they are determining 
the conditions for granting social benefi ts. Consequently, the ECJ could not review 
the specifi c refusal at issue, which was the grant of such benefi ts to two Romanian 
nationals, in light of the principle of non-discrimination. 
 Th e Court has shown a similar approach in the case of  Willems and others . 113 In 
this case, the question at issue was whether the use and storage of biometric data for 
purposes other than the issuing of passports and identity cards was precluded by EU 
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law. Under the EU Regulation, member states incurred an obligation to store such data 
for the purpose of issuing passports and identity cards. 114 In its judgment in the case 
that was referred by the national court, the ECJ pointed out that a recital and a provision 
had been included in the said Regulation, which made it clear that the use and storage 
of the biometric data for other purposes than those stated under the Regulation was to 
be governed by national law and not by EU law. 115 On that note, the ECJ decided that it 
did not need to determine the compatibility of the storage and use of biometric data for 
other purposes, such as for the detection and prosecution of criminal off ences, in light 
of the fundamental rights to privacy and the protection of personal data as guaranteed 
by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. Th e Regulation was not applicable to those issues. 116 
 Th e ECJ may thus take into account, in particular, the choices that have been made by 
the EU legislature with regard to application of EU law to certain situations that might 
have some connection to EU law. In the cases of  Dano and  Willems and others , it was, to 
some extent, clearly indicated by the EU legislature that the specifi c areas fell outside the 
scope of application of EU fundamental rights, because they had been mentioned in EU 
secondary law. Sometimes, such indications are not very clearly provided in secondary 
EU legislation. Th e case of  Julian Hern á ndez , for example, concerned a specifi c Spanish 
rule that restricted entitlement to remuneration of employees who were dismissed 
by an employer that had become insolvent, to a limited period. Th e ECJ decided that 
this matter fell outside the scope of application of EU law. 117 It pointed out that the 
relevant Directive (on the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of the 
employer) had stated that it  ‘ shall not aff ect the option of the Member State to apply or 
introduce laws, regulations or administrative provisions which are more favourable to 
employees ’. 118 According to the ECJ, this meant that this  ‘ does not grant the Member 
States an option of legislation by virtue of EU law, but merely … recognises the power 
which the Member States enjoy under national law to provide for … more favourable 
provisions outside the framework of the regime established by that directive ’. 119 Th us, 
if EU legislation provides for a rule that allows for more favourable protection at 
the national level, the ECJ may decide that such a situation falls outside the scope of 
application of EU law. 
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 In some cases where the ECJ has recognised that member states enjoy certain 
sovereign powers, it has also decided that EU fundamental rights may still be applied, 
albeit to a limited extent, that is, merely as aids to interpretation. In its judgment on 
the  McB. case, the ECJ recognised that the questions that were raised by the national 
court concerned an area where the member states enjoy sovereign powers. 120 Th is case 
was about the removal of a child by its mother to another member state. Th e father of 
the child claimed custody rights before the national court, which had to apply certain 
rules laid down in the Brussels IIbis Regulation on the jurisdiction, recognition and 
enforcement of certain matters related to family law. 121 Th e ECJ, mindful of the fact that 
the questions raised were also concerned with the rights to custody of a child, affi  rmed 
that there are limited competences of the EU in this fi eld and held that  ‘ there should 
be no assessment of national law as such ’. It held that the Charter should be interpreted 
solely for the purpose of the interpretation of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 122 Th us, 
in such cases the ECJ still applies a very careful approach in developing fundamental 
rights standards. 
 All in all, in these situations where, according to the ECJ, the member states enjoy 
sovereign powers, it can be expected that the ECJ will not scrutinise the compliance by 
the member states of their respect for fundamental rights, or as in the case of  McB. , only 
in a very limited way. Th erefore, the ECJ would also not be expected to develop positive 
obligations in this type of situation. 
 9.3.4.  THE DISCRETION FOR THE MEMBER STATES TO APPLY THEIR 
OWN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS STANDARDS 
 As has been alluded to in section 9.3.2.1., the ECJ has clarifi ed that the member states 
still have room to apply their own standards of fundamental rights in situations which 
fall within the scope of EU fundamental rights. Th e ECJ has interpreted Article 53 of 
the Charter  – which more broadly addresses the application of fundamental or human 
rights stemming from the national constitutions or from international treaties in fi elds 
where EU law also applies  – to mean that: 
 where an EU legal act calls for national implementing measures, national authorities and courts 
remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the 
level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, 
unity and eff ectiveness of EU law are thereby not compromised. 123 
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 Some scholars have interpreted this as a further form of intrusion by the ECJ into the 
powers of the national authorities to apply the fundamental rights laid down in their 
own constitutions. 124 Th e protection of the  ‘ primacy, unity and eff ectiveness ’ is in that 
respect regarded mainly as a limitation to the protection of national standards. It is 
also possible to give a rather diff erent reading to the judgment, which is more friendly 
towards the preservation of the national powers. Indeed, Sarmiento has argued that by 
its rulings in the  Melloni and  Å kerberg Fransson the ECJ may have aimed to address 
the division of competences between the EU and the member states in the fi eld of 
fundamental rights. Sarmiento has noted that: 
 In  Melloni and  Å kerberg Fransson the ECJ has confi rmed the shared nature of fundamental rights 
protection, guaranteeing Member State action in areas not previously pre-empted by EU law. 
Recognizing the relevance of national fundamental rights when EU rules grant discretionary 
choice to Member States, but imposing strict primacy once a domain is completely determined 
by EU rules, the ECJ emphasizes the importance of a coordinated separation of tasks between 
the Union and the Member States in the area of fundamental rights protection. 125 
 According to Sarmiento, the ECJ had actually aimed to clarify how the standards of EU 
law and national law interact in areas of EU law depending on the competences that are 
exercised. 126 It could concern exclusive, shared or complementary powers, as discussed 
in chapter 8. 127 Sarmiento explains that areas could either be completely determined 
by EU law, in which case there is no discretion for the member states and, accordingly, 
the EU standard of fundamental rights does not only apply, but also must prevail over 
the national standard of fundamental rights. By contrast, when an area is only partially 
determined by EU law, the member states enjoy discretion in implementing EU law. 
Th is means that they may apply their national standard of fundamental rights if these 
go beyond the EU standard of fundamental rights. 128 
 From this perspective, when the member states enjoy considerable discretion under 
EU law, there could be an important reason for the ECJ to refrain from formulating very 
specifi c positive obligations that would need to be complied to protect fundamental 
rights within the context of EU law. 
 9.4.  CONCLUSIONS 
 On the basis of the analysis conducted in this chapter, it can be held that there is room 
for the ECJ to accept that positive obligations to protect fundamental rights fall within 
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the scope of application of EU law. Article 51 of the Charter clearly poses constraints 
on the ECJ in this regard, because it requires the ECJ to pay attention to the specifi c 
fi elds in which the EU is entitled to exercise powers and to specifi c rules laid down 
in EU primary and secondary law. It is therefore to be expected that the ECJ would 
primarily defi ne a supportive type of positive obligation to protect fundamental rights 
within the scope of EU law. Th is concerns an obligation that is necessary to secure 
that the EU institutions and the member states, in their implementation of EU law, 
comply with the negative obligation not to violate fundamental rights. In responding 
to certain gaps that may still have been left  in the legislative frameworks of the EU, 
and in the implementation thereof by the member states, the ECJ could be asked to 
determine whether certain (regulatory) actions on the EU institutions and the member 
states would need to be undertaken. In that regard, the ECJ may seek to secure that 
its solutions comply with the current practices and values of the member states and 
prevent a too rigid application of the scope of application of EU fundamental rights. 
 Th e analysis of the case-law of the ECJ on the interpretation of Article 51(1) of the 
Charter has further shown that it is, to some extent, still diffi  cult to fi nd the specifi c 
viewpoint of the ECJ on the reach of the EU fundamental rights obligations, especially 
towards the actions of the member states. Generally, it seems straightforward: 
when the EU has exercised certain competences and the national authorities act in 
implementation of EU law, EU fundamental rights apply. In this classic agency situation 
on the application of EU fundamental rights to the member states, there is room for 
the ECJ to formulate negative as well as positive obligations to ensure the protection 
of fundamental rights. Th e complexity is, however, that there are various areas where 
the member states have retained their sovereign powers, even though EU law and EU 
fundamental rights still may play a role. In particular, this may apply in relation to the 
situation of national derogations from the EU fundamental freedoms or the exercise 
of fully discretionary powers. Th is may result in a situation where the member states 
are asked to comply with EU fundamental rights standards, while they are conducting 
certain policies, such as protecting the right to strike, which clearly fall outside of the 
sphere of the legislative competences of the EU. In that respect, the ECJ may need to be 
very careful if imposing positive obligations of a legislative kind on the member states. 
Moreover, now that EU law itself does not provide a clear mandate on the member 
states to ensure the protection of fundamental rights, the ECJ would not be expected 
actively to interfere in the fundamental rights policies, which member states mostly 
base on their own national laws. Th e ECJ would thus not be expected to impose positive 
obligations in those situations. 
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 PART II  – CONCLUSIONS 
 10.1.  THE SPECIFIC PARAMETERS OF EU LAW DEFINING 
THE SCOPE AND THE LIMITS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 In this chapter, the main fi ndings of the analysis undertaken in part II are presented. 
Th is part has studied the specifi c system of fundamental rights protection in the EU 
to fi nd out whether it allows for any development of positive obligations by the ECJ. 
Th e Charter provides some potential for the recognition of positive obligations. It 
contains a great variety of fundamental rights which could require active measures 
to be taken by the EU institutions as well as by the member states. Th e Charter also, 
however, lays down some important conditions for protecting such fundamental rights 
in the EU context. It determines  inter alia that the Charter only applies to the actions 
of the EU institutions and the member states in so far as they are implementing EU 
law. Th is important condition necessarily limits the scope for a development of positive 
obligations. However, as has also been explained, it does not exclude such development 
altogether. Th ere are various other conditions that can be expected to be of infl uence in 
the development of positive obligations in the context of EU law. 
 In this chapter, it is fi rst of all explained that the use of the preliminary reference 
procedure plays an important role in the (potential) development of positive obligations 
by the ECJ (section 10.2.). Aft er that, the main relevant legal bases for a development 
of positive obligations on the basis of EU law are indicated (section 10.3.). Th en it is 
explained how the limited competences of the EU, in combination with the limited 
scope of application of EU fundamental rights, can allow for the recognition of a 
concept of positive obligation by the ECJ, albeit to a limited extent (section 10.4.). In 
this section in particular, the conclusions following from chapters 8 and 9 are drawn 
together. Lastly, a few other, more specifi c factors that can infl uence the degree to which 
the ECJ could be expected to further develop positive obligations in its case-law are 
addressed. Th ese mainly concern the specifi c institutional position of the ECJ and the 
role it can be expected to play in protecting fundamental rights (section 10.5.). 
 Th e conclusions on the scope and the limits for a development of positive obligations 
are used in chapter 11 to further assess their application in specifi c case-law examples, 
and they form the basis for the fi nal conclusions in chapter 12. 
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 10.2.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER THE PRELIMINARY REFERENCE PROCEDURE 
 Within the EU context, claims relevant to fundamental rights protection are generally 
not brought to the ECJ directly by individuals. As has been discussed in chapter 7, the 
preliminary reference procedure by national courts constitutes the most important 
procedural avenue that is used to clarify how fundamental rights must be protected 
under EU law. 1 Th is is the result, partly, of the restrictive interpretation of the standing 
requirements for individuals to bring direct actions to the ECJ that would allow them 
to address fundamental rights violations. It also has to do, however, with the fact 
that in most circumstances, national authorities rather than the EU institutions are 
responsible for the protection of EU law and the implementation and enforcement 
of EU law. Th us, it is mostly before the national courts that issues concerning the 
protection of EU fundamental rights will arise. Hence, national courts play a very 
important role for the potential (further) development of positive obligations under EU 
law, and the development of positive obligations is, to a certain extent, dependent on 
the willingness of national courts to refer questions on the protection of fundamental 
rights to the ECJ. Th ey may be encouraged by the parties in a particular case to make 
such preliminary references, but ultimately it is the national court ’ s prerogative 
to decide on the referral. Th e national court also decides on the formulation of the 
question as well as on the level of detail with which it formulates the inquiry into the 
relevant measures. 
 Under the preliminary reference procedure, the ECJ may decide to leave quite 
some discretion to the national authorities. Th e national courts and authorities are 
then relatively free to determine how to apply the ECJ ’ s requirements and how to 
accommodate for the new interpretations in their national laws and practices. National 
courts can then potentially decide to formulate positive obligations on the basis of their 
own constitutions and they may especially look at the case-law of the ECtHR to fi nd the 
positive obligations they need to comply with under the Convention. 
 It can thus, overall, be concluded that there are some procedural limitations to 
the development of positive obligations in the EU context. Th e process depends on 
the national courts to referring relevant cases to the ECJ. In addition, there is little 
room for individuals to raise questions over potential gaps in the protection of their 
fundamental rights. Finally, the national courts may be given considerable some leeway 
when implementing the ECJ ’ s judgments in their own case-law. 
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which refers to the establishment of a data protection institution and could thus require institutional 
measures to be taken. 
 10.3.  THE RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER EU LAW 
 Th e fi ndings of part II have also shown that the Charter contains important provisions 
for a development of positive obligations. Th e Charter, which only became binding 
in 2009, for the most part contains a codifi cation of the rights which were already 
guaranteed by the ECJ as general principles of EU law in its case-law, supplemented 
by rights which were to be found in other national and international instruments of 
fundamental rights. Consequently, it mainly concerns rights that the member states 
were already bound to respect. Moreover, it may be noted that, in its case-law, the 
ECJ had developed several crucial principles regarding the scope of application of 
EU fundamental rights and the interrelationship with other sources of fundamental 
rights. Nevertheless, the advantage of the Charter is that it provides greater clarity as 
to which fundamental rights are guaranteed and how this should be done. Since 2009 
it has become the main point of reference in the case-law of the ECJ to determine 
the application and the interpretation of the fundamental rights that are guaranteed 
by the EU. In addition, it has led to an increase in the number of ECJ judgments that 
deal with fundamental rights protection. Seeing this, the Charter could also potentially 
encourage the ECJ to further develop principles on how fundamental rights are to be 
protected within the context of EU law, including those which relate to a concept of 
positive obligations. 
 In general terms, the Charter requires the EU institutions and the member states, 
in so far as they act within the scope of EU law, to  ‘ respect the rights, observe the 
principles and promote the application ’ of the Charter ’ s provisions. It has been argued 
that this could be taken to mean that there is room for the EU institutions and the 
member states to take positive measures to protect fundamental rights within the 
context of EU law. Chapter 8 has also indicated various other provisions of the Charter 
which can provide a more specifi c basis to determine what types of measures could 
be relevant to be undertaken by the EU legislature as well as by the member states to 
eff ectively secure those rights. 2 Of the fundamental rights that have been included in 
the Charter, several, by their very nature, require active measures to be taken, such as 
the social and economic types of fundamental rights. So far, the ECJ has not engaged 
in the interpretation of such rights, however, and it can be held that there is a limited 
basis for the ECJ to develop positive obligations in relation to those rights. Moreover, 
Article 52(5) of the Charter implies a specifi c limitation to the judicial development of 
positive obligations if a provision contains a  ‘ principle ’ instead of a  ‘ right ’. Th e ECJ still 
has to decide which particular provisions include such  ‘ principles ’ instead of  ‘ rights ’, as 
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only few indications on this issue have been given in the explanations to the Charter. It 
is expected, however, that the notion of principles mainly relates to social and economic 
rights, or perhaps more generally most of the provisions which have been headed under 
the  ‘ solidarity ’ chapter of the Charter. 3 
 Article 52(3) of the Charter could further provide an especially important basis for a 
development of positive obligations. Th is provision requires that the provisions of the 
Charter which correspond to the rights of the Convention  – that is, most of the civil and 
political rights  – are to be given the same scope and meaning as the Convention rights. 
Th e Convention has, indeed, always formed an important source of inspiration for the 
interpretation of fundamental rights by the ECJ. Th e ECJ has oft en used the provisions 
of the Convention as well as the case-law of the ECtHR as a basis for interpreting 
fundamental rights within the context of EU law. It is in the interest of consistency 
that it should do so. It has been explained that in recent years the ECJ has shown to be 
intent on developing an autonomous interpretation of fundamental rights on the basis 
of the Charter. Seemingly for that reason, it is now less frequently making references 
to relevant provisions of the Convention and judgments of the ECtHR. Th erefore, it is 
possible that the ECJ could also decide to provide for an autonomous interpretation of 
the positive obligations that need to be respected within the context of EU law. Th e ECJ 
has, however, continued to refer to the case-law of the ECtHR, and there are several 
examples in which the ECJ has also relied on specifi c examples of positive obligations 
that were developed the ECtHR. 4 Th us, it would seem that the ECJ is generally willing 
to accept the (relevant) positive obligations that have been formulated by the ECtHR. 
 Another potential legal basis for the development of positive obligations that is of 
interest is Article 52(1) of the Charter. As part of the proportionality requirement 
for fundamental rights interferences, this provision determines that interferences of 
fundamental rights must be provided for by law. In relation to the interferences that 
might take place because of certain acts taken on the basis of EU law, this could require 
a certain legislative framework to be set up in order to prevent or further limit such 
interferences. 
 In addition to the Charter, the EU Treaties also contain some general legal bases for 
the development of positive obligations. In particular, the principle of loyal cooperation 
(Article 4(3) TEU) and the requirement to provide for remedies at the national level 
to secure the protection of EU law (Article 19(1) TEU) could be of interest. 5 Th ese 
provisions require the member states to adopt general and procedural measures, and 
have been used by the ECJ to establish some important principles of EU law and to 
impose obligations on the member states to ensure the eff ective protection of EU law at 
the national level. Th ese principles can therefore also be expected to play an important 
ground which the ECJ would use to formulate positive obligations, especially if it is 
seen that gaps have been left  in the protection of fundamental rights in the EU context. 
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 Th us, there are several legal bases and sources available under EU law, which could 
be used by the ECJ when developing positive obligations in its case-law. Indeed, when it 
is clear that certain actions are necessary in relation to the policies and the acts that the 
EU institutions are competent to adopt, the ECJ may be expected to require that the EU 
legislature and policy-making bodies ensure that certain positive measures are taken 
(see section 10.4.). 6 Furthermore, in the implementation of EU law at the national level, 
it could be expected that certain procedures and regulations will be adopted to secure 
fundamental rights if the existing legal and administrative framework at national level 
would not already ensure suffi  cient protection. If gaps nonetheless are found in EU 
legislation or in their implementation at national level, the national courts and the ECJ 
may be asked to defi ne whether certain actions need to be taken by the EU institutions 
or by the member states to eff ectively secure fundamental rights. It may, aft er all, not 
always be possible for the EU legislature to predict how the policies and actions of 
the EU in practice will aff ect the protection of fundamental rights of individuals or 
a specifi c group of individuals and what measures will be required to safeguard these 
rights in an eff ective manner. Th us, the national courts and the ECJ may still need to 
play an important role. 
 10.4.  THE LIMITED COMPETENCES OF THE EU IN 
COMBINATION WITH THE LIMITED SCOPE OF 
APPLICATION OF EU FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 Article 51 of the Charter recalls that EU fundamental rights apply only in limited 
situations, and that the EU has limited competences, which must not be aff ected by 
the application of the Charter.  Prima facie the scope for a development of positive 
obligations thus seems to be very much restricted, since the EU has not been given 
clear competences to protect fundamental rights. As discussed in chapters 8 and 9, 
various scholars have argued that Article 51 of the Charter to some extent stands in the 
way of a recognition of positive obligations by the ECJ. Some scholars therefore have 
looked for other justifi cations for the acceptance of positive obligations. Th ey have, 
for instance, pointed to principles relating to state responsibility for the protection of 
fundamental rights under international law as a possible ground that could be used 
to develop positive obligations within the context of EU law. 7 In chapter 8, it has been 
explained, however, that such approaches do not take suffi  cient account of the rules 
relating to the division of competences between the EU and the member states, nor do 
they provide suffi  ciently strong reasons to be able to conclude that it is indeed at EU 
Intersentia252
Th e Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU
level that fundamental rights are best protected. In most situations, the EU does not 
enjoy exclusive powers to take measures, and EU law provides much discretion for the 
member states to provide for protection. Th e approach developed in this study is thus 
based on the internal rules of the EU on the division of powers between the EU and the 
member states. Th is aims to meet the concern expressed in the Charter itself, as well 
as elsewhere, that the competences of the EU should not be unwarrantedly expanded. 
 It has been argued in part II of this study that the ECJ can accept positive obligations 
if they meet the requirements of Article 51(1) of the Charter. Th is means that positive 
obligations need to relate to a specifi c fi eld in which the EU is entitled to exercise powers 
as well as to certain rules of primary and/or secondary EU law. Since the ECJ needs to 
pay attention to the specifi c fi eld in which the EU is entitled to exercise a power and to 
any specifi c rules of EU law that apply to a given situation, it is expected that the ECJ 
will, primarily, formulate a supportive type of positive obligation. Th is type of positive 
obligation could be necessary to ensure that the EU does not fail to comply with its 
negative obligations in the sphere of fundamental rights protection, as well as to ensure 
that it provides for remedial measures when interferences do take place. 
 Given these conditions, in deciding whether it could accept a positive obligation, the 
ECJ would fi rst need to have regard to the degree to which and the way in which the EU 
has chosen to protect fundamental rights in a given situation. For example, rules laid 
down in an EU Directive on equal treatment law would clearly bring a situation within 
the scope of application of EU fundamental rights. However, some specifi c rules may not 
yet be clear from the text of the Directive. EU secondary law may, for example, not have 
established what kinds of procedural requirements must be met by the EU institutions 
or by the member states to eff ectively protect the relevant fundamental rights (for 
example, the prohibition of discrimination) within that framework. Where this seems 
to leave a gap in the protection of fundamental rights, the ECJ could consider imposing 
a positive obligation to close this gap. To be able to impose a positive obligation on the 
member states or the EU institution on the basis of fundamental rights in that situation, 
however, there needs to be a certain competence under EU law to do so. Article 51(1) of 
the Charter specifi cally requires that the limitations on the competences of the EU are 
respected, and this also follows from Article 5 TEU which holds that the EU can only 
take action if it is conferred with a specifi c competence. Th is means that the ECJ could 
only impose a positive obligation on the EU institutions (or on the member states) to 
act if the legal basis in the EU Treaties allows for this. In the case of non-discrimination, 
such a competence can possibly be found in Article 19 TFEU. For positive obligations 
related to other fundamental rights, however, such as socio-economic rights, it may be 
much more diffi  cult to fi nd such an express legal basis. In that case, it could be argued 
that the member states retain the freedom to fi ll any gaps themselves, and it is not up to 
the ECJ to determine how they should use this freedom. 
 Surely, this means that the ECJ has to establish whether there is a concrete competence 
for the EU to act in all cases where it might consider imposing positive obligations. In 
this respect, it is relevant to reiterate that there is no general fundamental rights power 
that is not related to specifi c competence fi elds of the EU. Th e ECJ has acknowledged 
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this, and there is no basis under the Treaties to be able to argue diff erently. Beyond this 
limitation, however, it is generally agreed that the EU still has certain specifi c as well 
as indirect competences to be able to protect the fundamental rights when it exercises 
one of its competences that is explicitly indicated by the EU Treaty. 8 When such specifi c 
competences exist, as in non-discrimination law, for example, it is relatively obvious 
that the ECJ might decide to impose some positive obligations. For the development 
of positive obligations in other areas, however, the indirect competences of the EU to 
protect fundamental rights are especially important. Th e notion of indirect competences 
basically entails that when the EU has explicit competences to act, such as in the fi eld 
of the internal market or in the area of freedom, security and justice, it also, implicitly 
or indirectly, has the power to protect fundamental rights, because it needs to ensure 
that its actions respect and perhaps even promote fundamental rights. At the same 
time, as discussed in chapter 8, there are two important conditions that must be met 
in this respect. First, any type of action that is established to ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights by the EU, needs to be shown to be accessory to the exercise of 
the explicit competences on which such action is based. Secondly, the form of such 
action must remain within the boundaries that have been established by the draft ers of 
the Treaty concerning the explicit power. Th is may entail, for example, that maximum 
harmonisation of national law is excluded, or that only supportive actions can be taken. 
Still, this would mean that there is room to adopt supportive positive obligations on the 
basis of an indirect competence to protect fundamental rights. 
 As mentioned above, however, it is not enough for a certain topic to fall within the 
(explicit or indirect) competences of the EU for the ECJ to be allowed to impose a 
positive obligation. Just as important is to determine whether and to what degree a 
specifi c positive obligation would fall within the scope of application of EU fundamental 
rights. Aft er all, Article 51(1) of the Charter stipulates that fundamental rights need only 
be respected (and, consequently, positive obligations may only be imposed) when EU 
law is applicable. Th erefore, as argued in chapter 9, some EU action would already need 
to have been undertaken to allow for further imposition of any positive obligations. 
Consequently, if there is a competence to act for the EU institutions, but it has not 
yet been used to draft  secondary legislation, or if a Directive leaves a certain matter 
entirely to the discretion of the member states, a particular issue may not yet fall within 
the scope of EU law and, consequently, of the EU Charter. In that case, there is clearly 
no room for the ECJ to oblige the member states or the EU institutions to protect such 
fundamental rights in a particular manner. 
 Again, however, this limitation to the potential for the development of positive 
obligation by the ECJ must be put into perspective. Chapter 9 has explained that the 
ECJ has accepted a broad reading of the scope of application of EU fundamental rights. 
In fact, the scope of application of EU fundamental rights may even be broader than 
that of the EU ’ s legislative competences as such. Th e broad scope of application could 
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be useful to reason that obligations may be imposed on the EU institutions or on the 
member states to protect fundamental rights. Th e ECJ may need to apply a fl exible 
interpretation to the scope of application to be able to respond to the gap-fi lling 
function of fundamental rights that can give rise to positive obligations. 9 
 More specifi cally in relation to member states ’ action (or inaction), three diff erent 
types of situations have been discussed in which the ECJ has decided to hold the EU 
fundamental rights applicable. Th e potential for development of positive obligations is 
closely related to these three situations. 
 First, EU fundamental rights apply when the member states act as agents of EU law. 
Th is is the case where the member states take measures to implement specifi c provisions 
of secondary EU law, such as Directives and Regulations. In the agency situation, 
there seems to be scope for the ECJ to accept positive obligations, since it needs to 
be ensured that the actions taken by the EU institutions comply with fundamental 
rights guarantees, both negative and positive. Such compliance then also needs to be 
ensured if the actions are implemented by the member states at the national level. In 
determining the form that positive obligations can take in this type of situation, the 
ECJ needs to have regard to the kind of fundamental rights competences enjoyed by 
the EU. It may either concern a fi eld where the member states are applying provisions 
of EU law that derive from the specifi c fundamental rights competences of the EU, or a 
fi eld in which the member states are applying provisions of EU law in which the EU is 
considered to enjoy an indirect competence to protect fundamental rights, and where 
the two conditions mentioned earlier have been met (that is, the positive obligation 
must be accessory, and it must respect the degree to which harmonising measures can 
be taken). 
 In the other two types of situations that have been defi ned by the ECJ, that is, where 
member states derogate from EU law, and where they make use of optioning powers  – 
it would be less logical to accept that the ECJ could develop positive obligations. It 
has been argued that in these situations, it is far less obvious that the actions taken 
by the member states directly derive from EU law; quite to the contrary. 10 Member 
states are instead developing their own policies based on national law, and these can 
concern quite sensitive policy areas for which there is no legislative competence for the 
EU to take action. Th erefore, it would be more diffi  cult to fi nd that the EU enjoys an 
indirect competence to protect fundamental rights which it could use to actively protect 
fundamental rights. It would be very diffi  cult to accept that the ECJ could require 
legislative positive obligations to be taken if the EU does not enjoy any competence to 
take such action. 
 Th us, when the ECJ wishes to develop positive obligations on the basis of EU law, 
it needs to be aware of an intricate combination and interrelatedness of the limited 
competences of the EU and the scope of protection of fundamental rights. It constantly 
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needs to check both whether the EU would be competent to act to protect a certain 
fundamental right (even if this competence may be an indirect one), and to what extent 
the EU fundamental rights can be held to apply to the actual situation at hand. Clearly, 
this implies that the potential for development of such positive obligations is rather 
limited, but it also has been argued that this is not necessarily problematic from the 
viewpoint of fundamental rights protection. In most situations the national authorities 
retain the power to provide fundamental rights protection on the basis of their own 
laws. 
 10.5.  WHY AND WHEN COULD THE ECJ ACCEPT POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS ? 
 Th e ECJ can thus accept positive obligations to protect fundamental rights on the basis 
of EU law based on the existing judicial procedures and the limited competences of the 
EU in combination with the limited scope of application of EU fundamental rights. 
In most situations, however, there is no clear obligation for it to do so, especially as 
many fundamental rights can also be protected on the national level. Nonetheless, as 
explained in chapters 7 and 8 in particular, there can be important arguments as to why 
fundamental rights protection needs to be ensured at the EU level. Th ese are addressed 
below. 
 10.5.1.  REASONS FOR ACTIVE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS AT THE EU LEVEL 
 In determining whether and when the EU legislator could use its fundamental rights 
competences, there are various considerations that could play a role. It is suggested 
that the considerations which have been set out in chapter 8 also should be taken into 
account by the ECJ when considering to accept positive obligations. 
 First, the principle of subsidiarity can provide a helpful standard in determining 
whether it is necessary to take action under EU law. Article 51(1) of the Charter even 
expressly requires the ECJ to take into account the principle of subsidiarity. 11 Th e 
principle of subsidiarity requires an eff ectiveness test to be undertaken within the 
meaning of Article 5(3) TEU. Th is means, as explained in chapter 8, that action is 
secured best by the EU when certain objectives cannot adequately be achieved by the 
member states and the scale or eff ects of EU action also provide a benefi cial outcome. 
In many situations, fundamental rights would not appear to have any cross-border 
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eff ect as they apply to the relations within states only. Generally, therefore, the principle 
of subsidiarity oft en could provide a good reason to argue that action to ensure the 
protection of fundamental rights must be taken at the national level, since the national 
authorities are closest to the individuals whose interests must be protected. Nonetheless, 
there are specifi c examples that can be taken from EU legislative practices (for example, 
the impact assessments or the explanatory memorandums to legislative proposals), 
which explain that there may be certain cross-border dimensions to the protection of 
fundamental rights. Th is is especially true, for example, in relation to the enforcement 
of privacy rights. Since there clearly are cross-border fl ows of information, it may be 
necessary to establish uniform rules on the protection of personal data at the EU level 
to be able to eff ectively enforce the relevant privacy rights. Th e principle of subsidiarity 
can point towards acceptance or positive obligations by the ECJ, but also, as mentioned 
earlier, towards rejection thereof. 
 Secondly, the degree of the connection between EU acts and fundamental rights 
infringements could provide an important consideration arguing for preventive and 
remedial measures to be established, or for certain compensation to be made for the 
harm that is caused by the adoption of certain policies by the EU. In particular, it could 
be considered necessary to take such action if EU legislation has not harmonised certain 
laws and practices that were already in place at the national level but, rather, introduced 
new obligations for the member states that could interfere with fundamental rights. Also, 
it could be expected that certain preventive or remedial measures will be formulated 
at EU level where EU legislation or decisions could lead to serious fundamental rights 
interferences. 12 It may be expected that the ECJ would want to establish such relevant 
positive obligations, since it has been willing to establish important principles in the 
area of freedom, security and justice in order to prevent serious interference with 
fundamental rights from taking place. 
 Th irdly, the ECJ could take into account that fundamental rights are best secured 
at EU level in circumstances where there is a risk that EU free movement law might 
indirectly lead to a lowering of the fundamental rights standards of the member states. 
For example, in the area of privacy law, it has been argued that there is a risk that member 
states would lower their standard of protection in order to attract certain undertakings 
whose business models rely on the use of personal data. Member states could start to 
compete with each other and entice such undertakings to establish themselves in their 
jurisdiction, by off ering the least possible number of  ‘ obstacles ’ in terms of the privacy 
standards which must be applied. In those circumstances, action would be needed at 
EU level to prevent the member states from deciding to provide for a lower level of 
fundamental rights standards. Also, in the area of asylum law, it could be argued that 
a high level of fundamental rights standards is best secured under EU law, since the 
member states may not be willing to go beyond the minimum level of protection of 
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fundamental rights that they are required to provide on the basis of their international 
human rights obligations. 13 
 Fourthly, the argument could be used that the establishment of standards of protection 
of fundamental rights at the EU level is in the interest of securing the primacy, unity and 
eff ectiveness of EU law itself. In areas where the national authorities need to cooperate 
on the basis of EU law, for example in areas where the principle of mutual recognition 
applies, a certain level of uniformity in the standards of fundamental rights protection 
applied by the member states may be needed. 14 Provided that there is a competence 
for the EU to take action in this fi eld, it can be expected that the ECJ would formulate 
relevant positive obligations from this perspective. 
 In some situations, these considerations may not be of any great assistance, or they 
may be outweighed by the concerns of the member states, which wish to retain their 
own standards of fundamental rights protection. Th e ECJ may then specifi cally want 
to explain that the member states should be left  suffi  cient scope to apply their own 
fundamental rights standards, and there are specifi c techniques allowing it to do so. 15 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that these factors may be at least of some assistance in 
determining when the indirect competence to impose positive obligations can be 
actually used. It is thus suggested that the ECJ could take these considerations into 
account in actively shaping the positive obligations that need to be complied with by 
the EU institutions and its member states. It is clear, moreover, that in areas of exclusive 
competences, that is, in areas where there is no discretion for the member states to 
apply their own rules to ensure the protection of fundamental rights, the ECJ will need 
to formulate relevant positive obligation at the EU level. 
 10.5.2.  THE ROLE OF THE ECJ IN THE FIELD OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 
 In general, it is still quite diffi  cult to conclude exactly what role the ECJ aims to play in 
the fi eld of fundamental rights, and thus whether it would be willing to avail itself of 
the existing competences and other factors as discussed above. Neither the EU Treaties 
nor the Charter provide very clear indications as to its particular role. On the one hand, 
fundamental rights have acquired an important place in the EU ’ s legal order yet, on 
the other hand, there remains much emphasis on the limited competences of the EU. 
Seeing the emphasis on the limited competences, it could be expected that the ECJ 
would be wary of developing positive obligations in its case-law. As discussed earlier, 
the ECJ can choose to apply quite deferential review, especially where it concerns 
sensitive economic and social choices that need to be taken by the EU legislature, and 
it may wait for the national courts to raise relevant questions. Even in cases where the 
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ECJ deals with fundamental rights issues, it appears to cherish its formal style and 
does not elaborate much on how fundamental rights are to be protected, nor which 
fundamental rights doctrines are of relevance to take into account. Indeed, it can be 
concluded that, so far, the ECJ has been rather slow to develop fundamental rights 
doctrines in its case-law. 
 Based on the fi ndings in chapter 7, it may be argued that the ECJ could do more to 
protect fundamental rights in an eff ective manner. Especially in some areas, there are 
fears that the ECJ too easily lets the interests of EU law prevail. From this perspective 
it could be of importance for the ECJ to respond in more detail to the questions raised 
by the national courts over potential positive obligations that need to be complied 
with, within the scope of application of fundamental rights. It may also wish to meet 
the concerns raised over the uncertainty and unpredictability of how fundamental 
rights are to be protected as well as those over the eff ective and genuine protection 
of fundamental rights by the EU. It could do so by developing fundamental rights 
doctrines  – such as a positive obligations doctrine  – which could be specifi cally geared 
to the particular characteristics and features of the EU legal system. 
 In developing such fundamental rights doctrines in its case-law, the ECJ does not 
necessarily need to  ‘ invent ’ such doctrines, and it could rely on how other courts have 
dealt with various fundamental rights theories. In particular. the ECtHR is considered 
to provide for useful priciples for protection of fundamental rights which could be taken 
into account by the ECJ. Th e ECtHR has set forth a doctrine of positive obligations 
which was explained in part I of this study. At the same time, as already mentioned, 
the ECJ needs to interpret fundamental rights autonomously, and protect important 
interests of EU law. In the development of a positive obligations doctrine, the ECJ 
therefore could, in particular, be expected to pay attention to the limited competences 
of the EU and the limited scope of application of EU fundamental rights, as explained 
earlier. 
 10.5.3.  THE JUDICIAL STYLE OF THE ECJ 
 Lastly, in developing positive obligations in its case-law, it is important to remember 
that it might not fi t with the judicial culture of the ECJ as such to clearly determine 
what actions the EU institutions or the member states are to take to ensure an eff ective 
protection of fundamental rights. Th e ECJ is known for its brevity in answering the 
questions which are referred to it by national courts and for leaving them much leeway 
to implement such answers, as discussed in chapter 7. In some areas of EU law in 
particular (such as asylum law), where national courts oft en have requested guidance 
from the ECJ on the interpretation of fundamental rights, the reasoning of the ECJ has, 
so far, been terse. Th e ECJ may, therefore, develop positive obligations in its case-law in 
a rather less elaborate and precise manner than the ECtHR. 
 Th e ECJ might also fi nd that it is not well-placed, for example given its position 
 vis- à -vis another particular political institution, to establish what measures need to be 
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taken by public authorities to eff ectively protect fundamental rights. Th e ECJ generally 
prefers to answer the questions of the national courts on the basis of available legal 
basis under the EU Treaties and under EU secondary law, rather than on the basis of 
the provisions of fundamental rights. Indeed, if the ECJ were to indicate specifi cally 
what measures are required to be taken by public authorities, it could become subject to 
claims of judicial activism. Arguably, by indicating such specifi c measures, it could be 
seen to be overstepping the boundaries of its mandate. Again, in developing a doctrine 
of positive obligations specifi c to the EU context, this should be accommodated. 
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 CHAPTER 11 
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EU 
LAW: OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE 
CASE-LAW OF THE ECJ 
 11.1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Th is chapter aims to portray and further discuss the examples of positive obligations 
that are present in the case-law of the ECJ. Some of these examples have already been 
addressed in the discussions in part II. Here, an overview is given of these and other 
examples of positive obligations so that some further insight can be given into the kinds 
of positive obligations that can be recognised within the context of EU law. In addition, 
a selection of fi ve case are reviewed further and assessed in light of the conclusions 
reached in part II on the scope of, and the limits on, the development of positive 
obligations under EU law (see chapter 10). Th is analysis aims to establish whether (if at 
all) the development of positive obligations by the ECJ raises confl ict with the specifi c 
principles of EU law. 
 Th e following section fi rst briefl y explains how the distinction between the concepts 
of positive and negative obligations can be made within the context of EU law and for 
what specifi c reasons it is relevant to make this distinction (section 11.2.). Aft er that, an 
overview of the diff erent examples of positive obligations from the case-law of the ECJ 
is given (section 11.3.). On the basis of this overview, the types of positive obligations 
that can so far be recognised within the current case-law of the ECJ are identifi ed 
(section 11.4.). A further examination is then made of some specifi c judgments of the 
ECJ to fi nd out whether or not the ECJ has overstepped the specifi c limits of EU law, or 
whether the approach adopted is too restrictive (section 11.5.). Th e chapter is rounded 
up by a conclusion (section 11.6.). 
 11.2.  THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE 
OBLIGATIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF EU LAW 
 Th e ECtHR also has contrasted the recognition of negative obligations which, more 
traditionally, follow from the protection of fundamental rights, with the recognition 
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of positive obligations. 1 Th e ECtHR in principle adopts a diff erent approach when 
examining whether states have complied with their negative or positive fundamental 
rights obligations. Th e ECtHR has further stated that the scope for positive obligations 
under the Convention is limited. Th is evidently raises the question what exactly is the 
diff erence between positive and negative obligations. As explained in part I, the way in 
which the ECtHR has made the distinction between positive and negative obligations in 
its case-law has been debated and criticised. 2 Th is distinction can be diffi  cult to make. 3 
Th erefore, it is of interest to clarify how the distinction is actually to be made within the 
context of EU law. 
 First of all, it should be recalled that the concept of positive obligations within the 
context of EU law was defi ned in the introductory chapter as follows:  ‘ An obligation to 
take active measures which is based on the protection of fundamental rights and which 
is not already specifi ed by EU (secondary or primary) law. ’ 4 
 As this defi nition shows, and as explained in the introductory chapter, it is important 
to take into account the role that is played by provisions of secondary and primary 
EU law. Such provisions may already lay down the conditions and the actions which 
EU institutions or member states must take to ensure fundamental rights protection, 
so that there is no need to formulate positive obligations on the basis of fundamental 
rights provisions. 
 In the particular context of EU law, the positive obligations that may be accepted by 
the ECJ can be expected to be closely linked to negative obligations. Th is is because 
necessarily there will always be a certain act or a certain provision that needs to bring 
the situation within the scope of application of EU fundamental rights. Th e example of 
the case of  T. Port , which was also used in the introductory chapter of this study, can 
further illustrate this. 5 In that case, the ECJ established that the Community institutions 
were under the obligation to take measures to protect the fundamental rights of 
traders in the transition to the common market. Ahmed and Butler have argued that 
the imposition of this positive obligation by the ECJ concerned a  ‘ corrective ’ measure 
that needed to be taken to repair the damages suff ered by the violation of a certain 
fundamental right. 6 Th erefore, to their mind, this case would in fact not illustrate a 
 ‘ true example ’ of a positive obligation. 7 Ahmed and Butler are correct in pointing out 
that in the case of  T. Port , the measures which the ECJ imposed on the Community 
institutions were related to a positive act that was already established by Community 
law. Nevertheless, this makes it no less a positive obligation. Th e case-law of the ECtHR 
also shows several examples of such positive obligations, that is, obligations which have 
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a strong connection to positive measures which had previously been taken by the states. 8 
In the case of  Marckx v. Belgium , for example, the ECtHR imposed a positive obligation 
on the states parties to ensure the legal recognition of the family rights of children 
born out of wedlock. 9 In that case, the state had also taken a certain positive act, by 
establishing a legislative and administrative framework for the recognition of family 
rights, and it could have been argued that the state violated its negative obligation in 
respect of children born out of wedlock. 
 Th ere are several features discussed in part I that explain what sets positive obligations 
apart from negative obligations. 10 Th ese features are also relevant in the EU context. 
Th ese are that positive obligations, contrary to negative obligations, (i) do not follow 
(directly) from provisions on fundamental rights and their structure, but need to be 
implied in individual cases; (ii) require states to take active measures which can (only) 
relate to certain gaps in their policies; (iii) and have an  ‘ alternative ’ structure, which 
means that they leave a choice as to the measures which need to be taken by states. 
 Applying these conceptual diff erences to the, arguably, positive obligation by the ECJ 
in the case of  T. Port , it can fi rst be seen that the obligation for Community institutions 
to take active measures to protect the right to property of the undertaking also did 
not follow directly from the specifi c provision on the right to property. Instead, it was 
formulated by the ECJ in an individual case and it appeared in individual circumstances 
of hardship for the particular undertaking. Secondly, as indicated by the Court, it 
appeared that the EU institutions would have to take certain positive measures to 
protect fundamental rights. Th irdly, there was a choice of diff erent measures that 
could be taken by the Community institutions to ensure that the right to property is 
eff ectively protected. Th ese could be of a more practical nature or of a legal nature. 
Perhaps, certain rules would have to be established by the EU institutions to deal with 
these kinds of cases. 
 A further explanation of how the distinction between positive and negative obligations 
can be made has been given by several scholars in the specifi c context of the case-law of 
the ECJ on national procedural rules. 11 In this context, the principle of eff ective judicial 
protection has provided an important basis for the ECJ to impose either negative or 
positive obligations on the member states. Prechal and Widdershoven explained that: 
 the principle of eff ective judicial protection implies both a  negative and a  positive obligation. 
Here a  ‘ negative obligation ’ means that national provisions which fail to satisfy the requirements 
of the principle of eff ectiveness or eff ective judicial protection must be set aside. In other words, 
they are eliminated. Th e positive obligation, on the other hand, is that new national powers or 
remedies have to be created. 12 
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 Th us in EU law as much as in the Convention system, the diff erence is that certain active 
measures must be taken by states in order to ensure the protection of fundamental 
rights, such as granting certain powers to public authorities or creating new remedies. 
Prechal and Widdershoven further explain this by looking at the judgments of the 
ECJ in  Factortame and  Unibet . In the case of  Factortame , the ECJ specifi cally required 
national courts to grant interim relief to ensure the eff ective protection of EU law, 
while under the domestic laws of the United Kingdom (where the case originated), this 
particular remedy could not be provided. 13  ‘ New national powers or remedies ’ would 
need to be created, requiring the member states to take certain actions, potentially of 
a legislative kind. Th is, therefore, could be said to amount to the establishment of a 
positive obligation by the ECJ. 14 Likewise in the case of  Unibet , the ECJ also specifi cally 
indicated that interim measures needed to be provided to ensure the protection of the 
principle of eff ective judicial protection. 15 
 Oft en in the context of these national procedural rules, the ECJ, holds that member 
states only need to respect the requirements of eff ectiveness and equivalence. 16 Within 
these  ‘ negative ’ limitations, member states are, in principle, free to apply their own 
procedural standards and rules if EU (secondary) law does not prescribe particular 
procedural standards which must be provided for at national level. In this approach, the 
member states would primarily appear to incur a negative type of obligation. Hence, 
Van Cleynenbreugel has explained that the ECJ could oft en decide to take this  ‘ negative 
obligations ’ approach when examining the procedural standards at national level. Th is 
would imply that the ECJ simply declares that EU law precludes certain procedural 
rules at the national level. Th e ECJ then leaves it to the member states to provide for the 
appropriate arrangements. Th is would be diff erent when a positive obligations approach 
is used. In such an approach the ECJ would itself defi ne which type of arrangement 
needs to be made at the national level. Th e ECJ limits the discretion given to the member 
states and, as a consequence,  ‘ taking the positive actions then becomes a matter of EU 
law instead of national law ’. 17 Taking this approach thus has a clear bearing on the 
allocation of a specifi c power at either national level or at EU level. In that respect, 
making the distinction between positive and negative obligations is of importance in 
view of the division of competences between the EU and the member states. 
 Also in the EU context, there can thus be a fi ne line between imposing a negative or 
a positive obligation on the member states. Th e member states could in both contexts 
be required to take certain actions to comply with the judgment of the Court. Th e main 
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diff erence between positive and negative obligations then is that positive obligations 
are actually and specifi cally formulated by the ECJ itself, while in case of negative 
obligations it merely assesses whether the member states have not as such violated the 
negative obligations which already follow from EU fundamental principles or from 
primary or secondary EU law. In addition, the defi ning features of positive and positive 
obligations in relation to the case-law of the ECtHR, as provided above, can be helpful 
too. Positive obligations are generally about individual cases that show that the EU and 
the member states have been inactive in response to individual circumstances. 
 11.3.  EXAMPLES OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN 
THE CASE-LAW OF THE ECJ 
 Taking into account the defi nition of positive obligations, as well as the specifi c 
distinction between positive and negative obligations that applies within the EU context, 
this section sets out various examples of positive obligations that may be found in the 
case-law of the ECJ. Th ese examples have been derived from a study of literature on this 
subject; they also follow from an analysis of the more recent case-law of the ECJ, which 
covers the period of the entry into force of the Charter until mid 2016. 18 A categorisation 
is made of the obligations which the Court has set for the EU institutions (section 
11.3.1.); and for the member states when they take measures as agents of the EU (section 
11.3.2.); where they derogate from the free movement rules (section 11.3.3.); and when 
they make use of optioning rules under EU law (section 11.3.4.). Th is distinction on the 
diff erent situations of application of fundamental rights has also been made in previous 
chapters. 19 Th ere, it has been explained that the scope for a development of positive 
obligations diff ers on the basis of the specifi c type of situation that applies. 
 11.3.1. POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS FOR THE EU INSTITUTIONS 
 Aside from the specifi c case of  T. Port discussed earlier, so far, there only appear to 
be positive obligations for the EU institutions at the procedural level. Th e ECJ has 
developed some positive procedural obligations for the EU institutions in its judgments 
in the  Kadi cases, where several actions had been brought fi rst before the General Court 
and later before the ECJ by individuals seeking annulment of certain EU Regulations 
implementing the UN sanctioning regimes. 20 Th ese regimes had listed Kadi (and 
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others) on the list of persons and entities that were associated with Usama Bin Laden, 
the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban, so that their assets could be frozen and travel 
bans imposed. In its judgments on these cases, the ECJ has spelled out quite clearly that 
the EU authorities needed to inform the persons and entities subject to such sanctions 
of the grounds for their placement on that list and that they needed to ensure that the 
persons and entities involved were able to make their views known within a reasonable 
time aft er placement on the list. 21 Th ese positive procedural obligations had clearly 
not been provided for under the applicable EU Regulations, nor were they at the time 
met by the competent authorities. 22 As a result of the interpretation of the ECJ of the 
rights of defence, clear changes have needed to be made in order to make up for the 
procedural shortcomings related to these sanction decisions. 
 Th ere also is a procedural obligation to be found in the judgment of the General 
Court in the case of  LTTE v. Council . 23 Th is case was about the decision of the Council 
to freeze the funds of a terrorist organisation on the basis of a decision to that eff ect 
of a third country. Th e General Court made clear in the case of  LTTE v. Council that 
when the Council adopts this kind of decision, it must thoroughly verify whether the 
protection of the rights of the defence and the right to eff ective judicial protection in 
that third-country is indeed equivalent to the level of fundamental rights guaranteed 
by the EU. Th e Council would thus have to undertake certain investigations into 
the compliance with fundamental rights in third countries to ensure that it protects 
fundamental rights eff ectively. More recently, the ECJ also has held that the Commission 
is under an obligation to check for the compliance with fundamental rights by third 
countries in the case of  Schrems . 24 In this case, the ECJ had to review the validity of 
a decision that had been taken by the Commission on the basis of Directive 95/46. 25 
Th is decision involved the United States providing an adequate level of protection of 
personal data for the purpose of the transfer of data and the free movement of data of 
EU citizens to the United States. In its judgment, the ECJ explained that it had serious 
concerns as to whether there were any rules adopted in the United States intended to 
limit interference with the fundamental rights of persons whose data was transferred 
from the EU to the United States. 26 It appeared that access to such data could easily be 
obtained by the authorities in the United States with the objective of the protection of 
national security. Moreover, it was unclear whether there were remedies available for 
persons whose privacy rights would be interfered with by those measures. Th e ECJ thus 
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decided to annul the Commission ’ s decision. Th e ECJ also clarifi ed, potentially with a 
view to a new decision that would have to be taken by the Commission, that it needs to 
periodically check whether the level of protection in a third country is liable to change, 
and also when evidence is provided to that eff ect. 27 
 Th e obligations which are formulated in these types of cases thus require particular 
procedures to be followed and to be established by the EU institutions. Th e judgments 
of the ECJ (and of the General Court) also provide a specifi cation of how the rights of 
defence and the principle of eff ective judicial protection are to be guaranteed. 
 Another positive procedural obligation which was formulated by the ECJ can be 
found in the case of  Gascogne . 28 Th e ECJ held that a remedy needed to be provided to 
allow undertakings to bring a complaint for damages as a result of lengthy competition 
law procedures. Th e ECJ directly formulated this obligation on the basis of the 
judgment of the ECtHR in the case of  Kudla v. Poland , which holds that states must 
take measures to ensure that the right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR is guaranteed 
within a reasonable time. 29 In the case of  Gascogne , the ECJ specifi cally found that, to 
ensure respect for Article 47 of the Charter, a remedy should be made available before 
the General Court to claim for damages if the procedure that challenges a decision of 
the European Commission in the fi eld of competition law is not completed within a 
reasonable time. 30 
 11.3.2.  POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS FOR THE MEMBER STATES IN 
THE AGENCY SITUATION 
 As compared to the previous section, a wider variety of positive obligations can be 
found with respect to the fundamental rights obligations that must be fulfi lled by the 
member states when they are acting as agents of EU law. As shown below, a range of 
positive obligations can be found which mainly require the national courts to ensure 
the enforcement, sanctioning and eff ective application of EU law at national level. Next, 
some positive obligations for the administrative authorities and for the legislature at 
national level will be discussed. 
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 33  ECJ  27 March 2014 ,  C-314/12 ,  UPC Telekabel Wien , para. 57. 
 34  ECJ  26 June 2007 ,  C-305/05 ,  Ordre des barreaux francophone and germanophone and others , para. 28; 
and  ECJ  29 January 2008 ,  C-275/06 ,  Promusicae , paras 68 and 70; and  ECJ  6 December 2012 ,  Joined 
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 Mangold , para. 77; and  ECJ  19 January 2010 ,  C-555/07 ,  K ü c ü kdeveci , para. 51; and ECJ 19 April 2016, 
C-441/14,  Danski Industri , para. 37. 
 36  See  ECJ  4 June 2013 ,  C-300/11 ,  ZZ , paras 57 – 58; and ECJ 5 June 2014, C-146/14 PPU,  Mahdi, 
para. 62. 
 11.3.2.1.  Positive Obligations for the Member States ’ Judiciaries 
 Th ere are several examples where the ECJ established that judicial remedies need to be 
made available to allow individuals to challenge infringements of the rights they have 
under EU secondary law. Th is has been held necessary, for example, in a case to protect 
the rights of an employee under EU law  vis- à -vis an employer, and in a case to enable an 
individual to challenge decisions on the grant of certain EU subsidies. 31 As a basis for 
inferring this type of procedural obligation, the ECJ referred to Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, 
as well as Article 47 of the Charter, which all enshrine principles of eff ective judicial 
protection. 32 Such procedural obligations may also be based on diff erent grounds, 
however. In the case of  UPC Telekabel Wien , for example, the Court used the right of 
individuals to freedom of information under Article 11 of the Charter as a basis for 
imposing an obligation on the member states to provide a remedy. 33 Th is was necessary 
to allow internet users to claim their rights of information before their national courts 
in a situation where an injunction was imposed on internet service providers to end 
infringments of intellectual property rights, which could result in interference with the 
right of information. 
 Furthermore, according to the case-law of the ECJ, national courts must be able to 
exercise several far-reaching powers to ensure that fundamental rights are protected 
in cases on EU law. Th e ECJ has established that national courts have an obligation to 
interpret national law in conformity with certain fundamental rights which must be 
protected under EU law, such as the right to intellectual property, the right to privacy 
and the right to the protection of personal data. 34 If necessary, national courts may also 
need to set national provisions aside if they confl ict with such fundamental rights, in 
particular the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of age. 35 In this context, the 
ECJ has also required national courts to have available special techniques and special 
rules that enable them to review the legality of removal decisions in situations where 
information on the reasons for the removal are not made public for reasons of state 
security. 36 Following the case-law of the ECJ, national courts must, further, be able to 
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set aside an administrative decision and substitute that decision by ordering alternative 
measures. All these requirements could require judicial powers to be amended or new 
ones to be introduced. In some of these cases, the ECJ clearly makes the national courts 
responsible for the protection of certain fundamental rights between private parties. 
Similarly, the ECtHR has imposed positive obligations on the national courts to ensure 
such protection in horizontal situations. 37 
 Next, the case of  L é ger shows that the national court can incur an obligation to 
undertake certain (small) investigations to secure the protection of fundamental 
rights. 38 In this case, the ECJ was asked to determine whether homosexual men could 
be permanently excluded from taking part in voluntary blood donation on the basis of 
the health risk they posed due to their sexual behaviour. Th e ECJ held that the national 
court was required to examine whether this group did indeed experience a heightened 
risk of acquiring an infectious disease on the basis of current medical, scientifi c and 
epidemiological knowledge, in order to avoid unwarranted discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation. 39 
 Lastly, the ECJ has established that individuals must be able to claim compensation 
in their national courts for damages caused by Member States ’ failure to implement EU 
law correctly, which is necessary to secure the eff ectiveness of EU law. 40 Th e ECJ has 
clarifi ed that this obligation also applies when national courts have failed to secure the 
correct application and interpretation of fundamental rights in the application of EU 
law to cases between private parties. 41 Again, certain remedies would need to be made 
available, or specifi c rules established, to allow such claims to be brought at national 
level. 
 11.3.2.2.  Positive Obligations for the Member States ’ Administrative Authorities 
 Increasingly, the ECJ is determining the procedural standards that must be met by the 
national administrative authorities if they adopt such decisions on the basis of EU law. 42 
In areas such as tax law, customs law, asylum and immigration law, the ECJ has established 
that individuals must be heard by the national authorities before decisions are taken 
that may adversely aff ect their interests, and that such decisions must be suffi  ciently 
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reasoned so to allow those individuals to challenge those decisions. 43 Sometimes, the 
ECJ leaves little discretion to the member states and it may even expressly prescribe 
the new procedures that need to be created to comply with the announced positive 
obligations. 44 Th e ECJ has, moreover, determined in the case of  Abdida that member 
states may need to make provision for the basic needs of a third-country national 
who suff ers from a particularly serious illness while awaiting the appeal of a transfer 
decision (see also section 11.5.4.). All these obligations in the examples mentioned were 
not expressly provided for by the applicable EU legislation. 45 
 11.3.2.3.  Positive Obligations for the Member States ’ Legislatures 
 Very exceptionally, the ECJ has imposed an obligation of a legislative nature on the 
member states. In the case of  Chatzi , the ECJ established that the national legislature 
was required to take measures to ensure that due account is taken of the particular 
needs of parents of twins within the parental leave regime. 46 Th is obligation was not 
specifi cally provided for under the applicable EU Parental Leave Directive, which only 
required Member States to meet certain minimum standards. Instead, it was imposed 
by the ECJ on the basis of the protection of the principle of equal treatment (see also 
section 11.5.2.). 47 
 11.3.3.  POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS FOR THE MEMBER STATES WHEN 
DEROGATING FROM THE FREE MOVEMENT RULES 
 Th e situation where member states derogate from EU (free movement) law forms a 
rather special category in which member states are protecting fundamental rights 
within the scope of EU law, as discussed in chapter 9. 48 Here, the member states are 
advancing the obligation to protect fundamental rights as part of their justifi cation for 
restricting a free movement provision. In some cases that have been brought before 
the ECJ it is clear that the member states are acting on the basis of their (own) positive 
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obligation to protect fundamental rights. In the case of  Schmidberger , for example, the 
member state at issue was taking legal as well as practical measures to ensure that a 
demonstration could take place at a polluting motorway. 49 Th is case was brought to 
the ECJ because it caused interference with the free movement of goods. Also in the 
case of  Familiapress , the ECJ examined measures that had been taken on a member 
states ’ initiative to ensure the right to freedom of expression which seemed to restrict 
the free movement of goods. 50 In this latter case, a specifi c law had been adopted by 
Austria prohibiting prize competitions. Th is was likely to obstruct the exercise of 
the free movement of goods, in this case for a German magazine containing puzzle 
prize competitions. In its judgment, the ECJ recognised that the maintenance of press 
diversity aimed to help safeguard freedom of expression which is protected by Article 
10 ECHR. 51 However, the ECJ also required the national court to undertake a study 
of the Austrian press market, to determine whether the Austrian law indeed aimed to 
ensure the maintenance of the press. 52 In that respect, it has been argued by scholars 
that the ECJ also imposed a positive obligation on the national court. 53 
 Th e cases of  Schmidberger and  Familiapress , however, primarily appear to provide 
examples of where a positive obligation of the member state that is based on national 
law or on the Convention creates a confl ict with the EU free movement rules. Th e case 
of  Berlington shows a diff erent example. 54 Th is case was about the introduction of a 
new licensing system for the operation of slot machines in Hungary as part of a new 
policy of games of chance. Th e ECJ found that this system caused a restriction on the 
free movement of services. It clarifi ed that in revoking the licences of operators which 
did not comply with the requirements under the new policy, the national legislature 
was under an obligation to either allow the holders of those licences a transitional 
period of suffi  cient length to adapt to the new licensing system or otherwise provide 
reasonable compensation. 55 In formulating this obligation, the ECJ referred to the case-
law of the ECtHR which contains such requirements in relation to the protection of the 
right to property. 56 Th e ECJ thus may establish a certain remedial or corrective positive 
obligation on the basis of the protection of fundamental rights, which member states 
need to fulfi l when they seek to justify the EU free movement rules. 
Intersentia274
Th e Limits of Fundamental Rights Protection by the EU
 57  See ECJ 21 December 2011, Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10,  N.S. and others , para. 94. Th e notion 
of positive obligation is further discussed in the context of the Dublin Regulation in the Opinion of 
AG Trstenjak in C-245/11,  K , paras 70 – 71; and in the Opinion of AG J ä ä skinen in C-4/11,  Puid , paras 
60 – 64. 
 58  See section 11.5.2. 
 59  See section 3.3.2. on the diff erent types of positive obligations in the case-law of the ECtHR. 
 11.3.4.  POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS FOR THE MEMBER STATES WHEN 
APPLYING OPTIONING RULES 
 In the specifi c case of  N.S. and Others the ECJ formulated a positive obligation in 
relation to the member states ’ so-called optioning rules. Th e ECJ held that the member 
states were responsible for ensuring that asylum seekers were not sent back to another 
member state under the Dublin Regulation if there were substantial grounds for 
believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 4 
ECHR. 57 Th is case is discussed in more detail below, so it does not need to be examined 
in any great detail here (see section 11.5.3.). 58 
 11.4.  THE TYPES OF POSITIVE OBLIGATION WITHIN THE 
CONTEXT OF EU LAW 
 Th e analysis of the case-law of the ECJ shown above demonstrates that only certain 
types of positive obligations are, so far, to be found. Th e case-law in particular 
demonstrates the recognition of a range of procedural types of positive obligations. 
Many such obligations have been developed by the ECJ for the national authorities, and 
mostly for the national courts. Oft en, in fact, the national court incurs responsibility 
that fundamental rights are indeed actively protected within the context of EU law. 
 It is also notable that the obligations which the ECJ has formulated in its case-law 
can mainly be classifi ed as obligations of an intrinsic and of a supportive nature. 59 
Intrinsic types of positive obligations require measures to be taken so that fundamental 
rights can actually be enjoyed by individuals. Looking at the case-law of the ECJ, there 
are many examples of where procedures and remedies need to made available so that 
individuals can enjoy the rights which are granted to them under EU law. Supportive 
positive obligations are necessary to secure that public authorities do in fact comply 
with the negative obligation to protect fundamental rights. Oft en, the establishment of 
the judicial powers and necessary are also necessary to ensure that fundamental rights 
are protected within the relations between an individual and an EU institution or a 
member state. 
 Th ere are, however, also some examples of positive obligations in the case-law of the 
ECtHR that aim to ensure the protection of fundamental rights in private relations. 
Some of the procedural obligations that have been established are, in particular, applied 
in disputes between two private parties. Most clearly, in the case of  UPC Telekabel Wien , 
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the requirement to provide for a remedy at national level was imposed to ensure that 
an individual could claim his or her right to the protection of information  vis- à -vis an 
internet service provider. Also in the case of  Chatzi , on the right to parental leave for 
twins, the imposition of the positive obligation was relevant to secure the protection 
of the fundamental rights of an employee  vis- à -vis and employer, thus between two 
private parties. 
 Moreover, the case of  Abdida seems to show that there also can be a social dimension 
related to positive obligations under EU law. Th e provision of basic needs seemed to be 
warranted on the basis of the clear vulnerability of a seriously ill individual, especially 
while awaiting for a decision on an asylum application. 
 11.5.  RESPECTING THE LIMITS OF EU LAW ? 
 In this section, fi ve selected judgments of the ECJ are examined in more detail to 
assess how far the ECJ can go in developing positive obligations, keeping in mind the 
theoretical and legal framework that has been set out in part II. Th e cases discussed 
here have been subjected to academic debate and academic criticism. Discussion of 
these particular fi ve cases allows an evaluation of whether such critiques are justifi ed 
from the perspectives presented in part II. Th e discussion starts with one example in 
which the ECJ decided not to recognise a positive obligation (the  Grant case), followed 
by four other examples where the ECJ decided diff erently, which have already been 
mentioned in earlier chapters (the cases of  Chatzi ,  N.S. and others ,  Abdida and  T. Port ). 
 11.5.1.  THE  GRANT CASE 
 In the Court ’ s judgment on the  Grant case, which was delivered in the late 1990s, the ECJ 
decided that discrimination based on sexual orientation was not specifi cally prohibited 
under Community law. 60 Some scholars have criticised this judgment, 61 stating that the 
ECJ unwarrantedly denied the recognition of a positive obligation of a legislative kind 
for the Community to protect discrimination based on sexual orientation. 62 It is thus of 
interest to determine whether or not there was indeed scope for the ECJ to accept this 
positive obligation. 
 In the case of  Grant a female employee of South-West Trains Ltd had asked for the 
grant of travel concessions for her female partner. South-West Trains refused to grant 
the concession, because it only allowed such concessions in the case of unmarried 
partners if the partner was of the opposite sex. Th e ECJ was asked about the lawfulness 
of this discrimination by the national court, as Community law had specifi cally 
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prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex as regards pay under Article 119 TEC 
(now Article 157 TFEU). Also, a Directive had been adopted to implement the principle 
of equal treatment more generally in the context of access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion and working conditions. 63 Th e ECJ decided, however, that the 
situation in the  Grant case fell outside the scope of application of Community law. 64 In 
its judgment, the ECJ explained that it did not concern a case of sex discrimination. It 
held that  ‘ travel concessions are refused to a male worker if he is living with a person 
of the same sex, just as they are to a female worker if she is living with a person of 
the same sex ’. 65 Th e ECJ further looked into how the EU ’ s member states had treated 
same-sex relationships as regards opposite-sex relationships and marriages. In that 
regard, the ECJ took into account the case-law of the ECtHR, from which it derived 
that relationships of same sex and of opposite sex and marriages could not yet generally 
be treated alike throughout the diff erent states parties. 66 Th e ECJ therefore concluded 
that an interpretation of discrimination on the basis of sex that would include sexual 
orientation  ‘ does not in any event appear to refl ect the interpretation so far generally 
accepted of the concept of discrimination based on sex which appears in various 
international instruments concerning the protection of fundamental rights ’. 67 In 
addition, it held that: 
 although respect for the fundamental rights which form an integral part of those general 
principles of law is a condition of legality of Community acts those rights cannot in themselves 
have the eff ect of extending the scope of the Treaty provisions beyond the competences of the 
Community. 68 
 According to the ECJ, to include the situation of Ms Grant within the scope of 
application of EU law, would mean that a confl ict with the limited competences would 
arise. Fundamental rights protection could therefore not be granted on the basis of 
Community law. If the Court had accepted a broader reading of the scope of application 
of EU law, which means that it would have needed to accept that the situation did fall 
within the scope of Community law, then this could, implicitly, have given rise to a 
certain positive obligation for the member states. 69 Considering that they did not yet 
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, the member states would have had 
to bring their national laws in line with the judgment of the ECJ, seeing that they were 
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also under an obligation to prevent sex discrimination under their national laws on the 
basis of Treaty provision and the Directive. 
 Th e decision of the ECJ not to recognise a positive obligation has been heavily 
criticised. Ahmed and Butler have held with respect to the judgment of the ECJ in the 
 Grant case that: 
 Th e ECJ made clear that even if it had interpreted discrimination based on sex to include 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, the absence of a positive act of the EU which in 
fact did so discriminate meant that the directives implementing former Article 119 were not 
breaching human rights standards binding upon the EU. Even if Article 119 failed to prohibit 
discrimination on all those grounds mandated by human rights standards, there would be no 
breach of or remedy under, the EU ’ s internal law, because Article 119 expressed the limits of EU 
competences. If, on the other hand, Article 119 had mandated discriminatory treatment in a 
way that was inconsistent with human rights standards, then there would have been a violation 
of its obligations to respect human rights and the EU would be under an obligation to correct 
that. Th us the EU ’ s internal human rights obligations would seem to be insuffi  cient in general 
to impose positive obligations. Th e EU ’ s internal human rights regime is interpreted only to 
curtail positive acts by the EU institutions, not to mandate positive acts by them. 70 
 Ahmed and Butler concluded that this judgment shows that the EU ’ s system of 
fundamental rights protection is fundamentally fl awed. Seeing that fundamental 
rights protection is constrained by the principle of limited powers, the ECJ would be 
precluded from imposing any type of positive obligations on the EU institutions or on 
the member states. Other scholars have also found that the ECJ ’ s interpretation of the 
term  ‘ sex ’ was too narrow and have argued that the ECJ should indeed have reached an 
opposite conclusion to ensure that the fundamental rights of Ms Grant were eff ectively 
protected. 71 
 Th e ECJ had shown in a previous judgment in the case of  P. v. S. that it was willing to 
take a more fl exible approach to the interpretation of sex discrimination, seemingly to 
prevent any gaps in the protection. 72 Advocate General Elmer referred to this particular 
judgment in his opinion in the case of  Grant . It showed, according to the Advocate 
General, that the ECJ did allow for an interpretation of the principle of equal treatment 
in a way that would work for gender discrimination in present-day society, and which 
could also be applied to prohibit the particular form of discrimination found in the case 
of  Grant . 73 In the case of  P. v. S. the ECJ had decided that the dismissal of an employee 
who was undergoing gender reassignment constituted a form of discrimination which 
was prohibited by the applicable equal treatment Directive. Th e ECJ had reasoned that 
 ‘ the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of sex is one of the fundamental 
human rights whose observance the Court has a duty to ensure ’ and that therefore  ‘ the 
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scope of the Directive cannot be confi ned simply to discrimination based on the fact 
that a person is of one or the other sex ’. 74 Th e ECJ decided that if  ‘ such discrimination 
is based, essentially if not exclusively, on the sex of the person concerned ’, it would be 
contrary to the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex. 75 
 Apparently, however, the ECJ found that declaring the case of  Grant to be within the 
scope of application of Community law would be a bridge too far. Although a more 
fl exible interpretation of Community law would have given a more eff ective protection 
of fundamental rights, this would have given rise to clear tensions with the principle of 
attributed powers. In its judgment in the case of  Grant , the ECJ specifi cally pointed out 
that including sexual orientation as a form of sex discrimination was not yet accepted 
by (all) the member states. Th e ECJ thus clearly took note of the fact that there was not 
suffi  cient consensus among the member states as to what discrimination on grounds 
of sex would mean. 76 It could for that reason also not be accepted that a power to 
prohibit discrimination on grounds of sex, as well as sexual orientation, had indeed 
been conferred to the Community or could be interpreted in that way on the basis 
of an interpretation based on the current standards of the member states. Th e ECJ 
seemed to have wanted to protect the horizontal division of powers towards the EU 
institutions as well. 77 In its judgment, it took particular note of the fact that the EU 
legislature had, in the meantime, been given a power to take certain legislative actions 
to respond to cases on discrimination based on sexual orientation. 78 It would thus be 
more respectful of the division of tasks between the ECJ and the EU legislature, if this 
issue was either addressed by the member states themselves or if the EU legislature 
undertook a particular form of action. 
 Th us the division of competences between the EU and the member states, as well as 
between the ECJ and the EU legislature, would have been directly aff ected if the ECJ 
had concluded in the case of  Grant that discrimination based on sexual orientation 
was at the time prohibited by Community law. 79 From the viewpoint of the principle of 
attributed powers, this judgment of the ECJ thus seems reasonable, especially as there 
did not appear to be any real consensus throughout the member states on this issue at 
that time. 
 11.5.2.  THE  CHATZI CASE 
 Th e judgment of the ECJ in  Chatzi shows an exceptional example of the formulation of 
the establishment by the ECJ of a legislative positive obligation for the member states to 
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ensure compliance with the principle of equal treatment. 80 Th e acceptance of a positive 
obligation in the  Chatzi case has been criticised, as discussed in chapter 7. 81 Here, it is 
further assessed to what extent such criticism was justifi ed. 
 To recall, and further explain, the  Chatzi case was concerned with the implementation 
by the Greek government of a specifi c provision laid down in the EU ’ s Parental Leave 
Directive. Under this Directive member states are required to ensure that employees 
have a right to parental leave of at least three months. 82 It was, however, unclear how 
the minimum obligation of parental leave would be calculated in the case of parents 
of twins. Ms Chatzi, who had become the parent of twins, applied for a fi rst term of 
parental leave, which in Greece had been set at nine months. Her application for a 
second term was refused by her employer. It was questioned by the national court 
whether this treatment complied with the principle of equal treatment, and it referred 
a preliminary question to the ECJ on this matter. 
 Th e ECJ found that the specifi c provision of EU law needed to be interpreted as far 
as possible in light of the principle of equal treatment. 83 It held that parents of twins 
fi nd themselves in a special situation. 84 Raising twins requires greater eff ort than raising 
a single child, but raising twins is not necessarily the same as raising two children of 
diff erent ages, according to the Court. Th is must as such be taken into account by the 
national legislature when implementing the obligations laid down in the Directive. 85 
Th e ECJ noted that the national legislature had a wide freedom to ensure the protection 
of the rights of parents of twins, and that measures could be envisaged such as allowing 
the parents of twins fl exibility as to when they would take leave on the basis of the age 
of the child, to provide for fl exible ways of organising work, material assistance in the 
form of access to childcare centres or fi nancial aid. 86 It was, the ECJ held, further for the 
national court to examine whether the national rules in fact did meet the specifi c needs 
of twins. Th e ECJ concluded its judgment by holding that: 
 read in the light of the principle of equal treatment, this clause obliges the national legislature 
to establish a parental leave regime which, according to the situation obtaining in the Member 
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State concerned, ensures that the parents of twins receive treatment that takes due account of 
their particular needs. 87 
 It was concluded in chapter 7 that it is rare for the ECJ to explicitly hold that the national 
legislature is required to ensure compliance with principles of fundamental rights. Th e 
ECJ is usually expected to hold that a certain provision is to be interpreted in light of 
a fundamental right in a certain way without clarifying what actions need to be taken 
by the diff erent branches of the state. 88 Th e imposition of this positive obligation by 
the ECJ in the case of  Chatzi , however, has received very critical reactions for other 
reasons. 89 It has, for example, been questioned whether the ECJ did in fact draw the right 
conclusion by fi nding that the parents of twins fi nd themselves in a diff erent situation 
compared to other parents, and it is unclear what comparator the ECJ has actually 
used in reaching that decision. More particularly, it has been questioned whether the 
ECJ was competent to impose the said positive obligations from the viewpoint of the 
division of powers between the EU and the member states. Th e Directive had only laid 
down an obligation for the member states to provide for a minimum period for parental 
leave of three months. Th erefore, it was argued, any type of protection that went further 
than this minimal obligation, that is, any situation in which the member states decided 
to provide a longer term of parental leave than strictly required, would fall outside the 
scope of application of EU law. 90 In that respect, it has been found problematic that the 
ECJ provided some particular suggestions as to the type of measures which the member 
states could take. 91 Th e ECJ indicated that, generally, a longer period of parental leave 
as well as a certain degree of fl exibility to take leave on the basis of the age of the 
child could be an option. Th e ECJ also suggested that fl exible ways of organising work 
could accommodate the needs of the parents of twins. 92 Such measures are clearly not 
demanded by the Directive and they would, indeed, still seem to belong to the policy 
areas of the member states. 93 
 On the basis of the conclusions reached in part II, it is nonetheless logical to argue, 
as the ECJ did, that the member states incur a positive obligation, as such, to ensure 
compliance with the principle of equal treatment as regards the period of parental leave 
from the perspective of the division of powers. In defi ning the period of parental leave, 
the member states are implementing an obligation of EU law, and they are therefore 
acting in that situation as agents of EU law, which clearly falls within the scope of EU 
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law. 94 In implementing this obligation, the ECJ could thus require the member states to 
ensure respect for the principle of equal treatment. In doing so, the ECJ seems to have 
attempted to close a gap that had been left  in the protection of fundamental rights by the 
EU legislature, as well as the national legislature. It may be argued that the regulation 
of parental leave for parents of twins had escaped the attention of the EU as well as the 
national legislature. 95 Th e ECJ in its judgment highlighted the fundamental nature of 
the principle of equal treatment as well as the right to parental leave, as they are both 
recognised by Articles 20 and 33(2) of the Charter. 96 Potentially, these provisions form 
important bases for formulating the said positive obligation. Still, however, the ECJ 
also acknowledged that the Parental Leave Directive had only provided for minimum 
harmonisation, and that the national legislature was given discretion in this area. 97 
 Perhaps in the  Chatzi case the ECJ further also specifi cally took into account that 
the protection of fundamental rights could have been secured best by the national 
legislature, to solve criticism that could be raised in relation to a more direct horizontal 
eff ect of fundamental rights in this case. 98 In this case, the ECJ was faced with questions 
raised by a national court on the protection of fundamental rights in a dispute between 
two private parties. Th e national court inquired what period for parental leave needed 
to be granted in the case of twins, with a view to that particular case. If the ECJ itself 
had determined the specifi c period that would be appropriate for the case of twins, 
this would have had a serious impact on the horizontal dispute. Th e employer could 
have incurred the additional burden of having to grant an extra term of leave. Seen 
from this perspective, perhaps, the approach of the ECJ in the case of  Chatzi should be 
welcomed. It will create greater legal certainty if the national legislature instead of the 
national courts provide solutions to the protection of fundamental rights. Th e ECtHR 
also has developed the concept of positive obligations in its case-law in order to secure 
the protection of fundamental rights between private parties indirectly. Th is way, the 
state itself is rendered responsible for the failure to provide protection of fundamental 
rights. 99 
 It is interesting to note that in other cases on the direct horizontal eff ects of 
fundamental rights, several Advocates General have taken the doctrine of positive 
obligations into account in their opinions. Th ey have discussed the concept of positive 
obligations as an alternative to imposing obligations directly on individuals in order to 
ensure the protection of the fundamental rights of other individuals. 100 On the basis of 
the case-law of the ECJ in the cases of  Mangold and  K ü c ü ckdeveci , national courts have 
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been required to ensure a certain type of direct horizontal eff ect of the principle of non-
discrimination in relations between private parties. Th e ECJ has been heavily criticised 
for this case-law, because the direct horizontal eff ect of fundamental rights is not yet 
accepted in all member states. 101 Th us the development of a positive obligation by the 
ECJ could, in fact, be seen as a helpful response to such criticism. 102 
 Th e judgment of the ECJ may, nevertheless, be criticised because the Court did 
not seem to respect the vertical division of powers when indicating all the specifi c 
measures that the member states could take to be able to fulfi l their positive obligation 
as mentioned above. Th e ECJ may have wanted to secure a more uniform interpretation 
in this context; that is, to secure the eff ective protection of EU law. Th is gives rise to 
diffi  culties, however, when certain measures fall within areas where the EU does not 
enjoy any powers. From the reasoning provided in its judgment in this case, it is unclear 
whether these measures were prescribed by the Court with the aim of protecting the 
uniformity and eff ectiveness of EU law. 
 Th e  Chatzi case clearly shows that although the ECJ may legitimately impose positive 
obligations on the basis of EU law, a certain tension with its limited powers can arise 
as soon as it gives more detailed guidance on how such a positive obligation could be 
fulfi lled. 
 11.5.3.  THE  N.S. AND OTHERS CASE 
 Th e case of  N.S. and others was discussed in chapter 9 as one of the clear examples 
where the ECJ has accepted that the member states are required to make use of their 
discretionary power under EU law to ensure fundamental rights protection. In this 
case, the member states were required to accept responsibility for dealing with an 
asylum application. 103 As argued in chapter 9, this case was concerned the application 
of an  ‘ optioning rule ’ under EU law by the member states, that is, Article 3(2) of the 
Dublin Regulation. 104 Th is provision gives the member state a choice of whether or not 
to make use of a specifi c power granted to them by EU law to ensure the protection 
of fundamental rights on the basis of national law or on the basis of the Convention. 
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For that reason, it was concluded in chapter 9 that there was only a limited scope for a 
development of positive obligations in this type of situation. 
 Th e ECJ decided in  N.S. and others that the member states and their national courts 
are under an obligation to prevent the transfer of an asylum seeker to a specifi c member 
state if this is necessary to secure the protection of the prohibition of inhuman and 
degrading treatment. 105 Th e ECJ thereby imposed a positive obligation on the member 
states to prevent asylum seekers from being exposed to a serious risk of a violation of a 
fundamental right in another member state. 106 
 In arriving at its decision, the ECJ expressly took into account the judgment of the 
ECtHR in the case of  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece , which was very relevant to the  N.S. 
and others case. In  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece , the ECtHR decided that Belgium had 
violated Article 3 ECHR by sending asylum seekers back to Greece as this knowingly 
exposed them to conditions of detention and living conditions that amounted to 
degrading treatment contrary to Article 3. 107 Serious concerns had arisen at the time 
over the reception of asylum seekers in Greece and over their access to the asylum 
procedure. In the case of  N.S. and others , the ECJ was given the opportunity to decide 
whether the member states would still be required, under the Dublin Regulation, to 
comply with the general obligation to transfer asylum seekers to the member state of 
fi rst arrival. 108 Th e national courts of the United Kingdom and of Ireland had inquired 
whether the member states were under an obligation to use their power under Article 
3(2) of the Regulation if an asylum seeker would be exposed to a serious risk of treatment 
in the member states of fi rst arrival which was contrary to fundamental rights, such as 
the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment guaranteed under Article 4 of the 
Charter. 
 Th e ECJ explained in  N.S. and others that where the member states exercise the power 
granted to them under Article 3(2), they are implementing EU law within the meaning 
of Article 51(1) of the Charter, and they must therefore comply with the EU standards 
of fundamental rights. Taking into account,  inter alia , the case-law of the ECtHR on 
this subject matter, the ECJ held that: 
 to ensure compliance by the European Union and the Member States with their obligations 
concerning the protection of fundamental rights of asylum seekers, the Member States, 
including the national courts, may not transfer an asylum seeker to the  ‘ Member State 
responsible ’ within the meaning of Regulation No 343/2003 where they cannot be unaware that 
systemic defi ciencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers 
in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would 
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face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of 
Article 4 of the Charter. 109 
 Th is interpretation seems wholly justifi able in light of the eff ective protection 
of fundamental rights, and it also follows, to a certain degree at least, from the 
interpretation of fundamental rights given by the ECtHR on this issue. Rather than 
providing constraints on the use of the member states ’ discretionary powers, however, 
the ECJ thereby obliged the member states to make use of their discretionary power 
under EU law to ensure that fundamental rights would be protected. 110 
 Arguably, given the conclusions reached in chapters 8 and 9, there seems only limited 
scope for the ECJ to actively shape the positive obligations which the member states 
need to fulfi l in this respect because of the division of powers between the EU and the 
member states in this case. 111 Th e Dublin Regulation only regulates the procedures 
that member states need to follow in order to prevent forum shopping by asylum 
seekers throughout Europe and to ensure rapid and eff ective procedures for asylum 
seekers. 112 More substantive protection of asylum seekers ’ fundamental rights is in 
principle left  outside the scope of this Regulation. Th e Dublin Regulation applies the 
principle of mutual recognition. 113 Th e member states would therefore have to observe 
fundamental rights protection on the basis of national law and relevant international 
(human rights) law instruments. If required by those laws, member states could make 
use of the discretionary power that is granted to them under the Regulation to be able 
to derogate from this general rule. 114 Th is discretionary power has become known as 
the  ‘ sovereignty clause ’ ; one that thus seems to fall outside the regulatory competence 
of the EU. 115 Th e ECJ therefore was not expected to be able to give concrete and active 
direction on the policies which the member states pursued in this fi eld, and also it 
was not able to require the member states to make use of their powers in specifi c 
circumstances. 116 
 Surely, it could be argued that EU law, which in some respects had to a large degree 
harmonised the procedural obligations of the member states, had actually caused the 
interference with the fundamental rights to take place. Th e EU Regulation had, aft er 
all, provided a basis to send asylum seekers back to the member state of fi rst arrival. 
For that reason, it could be argued that there was an indirect competence for the EU 
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to compensate for this. Th ere is a certain connection to be made here between the 
acts of the EU and potential fundamental rights infringements. It could therefore be 
argued, as suggested in chapter 8, that, because of the serious nature of the violation of 
fundamental rights in this case, the ECJ could apply the protection of EU fundamental 
rights and impose a positive obligation on the member states. 117 Potentially, a version of 
the  ‘ reverse Solange ’ doctrine could also be applied, which allows the ECJ to scrutinise 
fundamental rights protection in areas where the EU does not enjoy power, when 
the essence of the protection of fundamental rights is at stake. 118 Th e application of 
this doctrine, which suggests that there is a more general power of the EU to protect 
fundamental rights in the member states is controversial, however. 119 It has also been 
suggested in chapter 8 that there is little scope for a development of positive obligations 
on the basis of this power. 120 
 Another approach, which has been suggested by Canor, perhaps would fi t better with 
the division of powers between the EU and the member states. Canor argued that in 
the case of  N.S. and others , the ECJ actually re-interpreted the obligations laid down 
under the Regulation in light of fundamental rights to ensure that the mechanism 
of the Dublin transfers was valid. 121 Th e system established by EU law was clearly 
fl awed, and needed to be declared invalid, or as happened in this case, be repaired. 
By formulating the obligation for the member states to check whether other member 
states complied with fundamental rights, the ECJ actually  ‘ rescued ’ the validity of the 
Regulation. 122 Th is technique of  ‘ reconciliatory interpretation ’ can be considered to be 
respectful of the subsidiary position of the ECJ  vis- à -vis the EU legislature, as discussed 
in chapter 7. 123 If this reasoning were to be be applied, the ECJ would have needed to 
review the situation in  N.S. and others as one where the member state acts as an agent 
of EU law. EU law in principle mandates the member states (under Article 3(1) of the 
Regulation) to send asylum seekers back to the member state of fi rst arrival. When a 
member state decides to return an asylum seeker to the member state of fi rst arrival, 
they are clearly applying a specifi c obligation laid down in EU law, and they can be 
expected to comply with EU fundamental rights protection. As submitted earlier, when 
member states actually act as agents of EU law, positive obligations could be imposed 
in line with the indirect competence to protect fundamental rights. 
 Nonetheless, it would still seem that this solution must be used carefully. Muir has 
held in response to the decision of the ECJ in the case of  N.S. and others that: 
 a signifi cant consequence is that the existence of EU legislation on a matter closely intertwined 
with fundamental rights matters, but not specifi cally designed to regulate fundamental rights 
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protection, becomes a vehicle to create an EU obligation (supervised by EU institutions and 
national courts) for the Member States to be alert to the fundamental rights records of their 
peers. 124 
 In a substantive sense, compliance with fundamental rights is not intended to be 
harmonised by the Dublin Regulation. Th erefore, the obligation to comply with 
fundamental rights should remain accessory to the specifi c obligation laid down in EU 
law. In the judgment of  N.S. and others , the ECJ also seemed keenly aware of the fact 
that it was entering into an area for the most part belonging to the sovereign powers of 
the member states. Th e ECJ attempted to limit as much as possible the impact that its 
judgment would have in respect of the extension of the powers of the EU. Th e ECJ stressed 
that the obligation only arose in the exceptional situation of  ‘ systemic defi ciencies ’ of 
the other member states. 125 Th is entails that  ‘ there are substantial grounds for believing 
that there are systemic fl aws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for 
asylum applicants in the Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman or degrading 
treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter  … ’ . 126 
 While the ECJ thus had decided in the  N.S. and other case to provide for fundamental 
rights protection by imposing a positive obligation on the member states and their 
national courts, it would have been more in line with the principle of attributed powers 
if it had applied a diff erent approach to interpreting the powers of the member states 
under EU law in line with fundamental rights standards. As argued earlier, there is a 
clearer basis for imposing the positive obligation within the scope of the application of 
EU law by member states when they act as agents of EU law, and within the limits of an 
indirect competence to protect fundamental rights in that situation. 
 11.5.4.  THE  ABDIDA CASE 
 In the  Abdida case, the ECJ has decided that member states need to adopt interim 
measures as well as provide for the basic needs of a third-country national who is 
seriously ill and is awaiting the results of an appeal to a decision that he or she must 
return. 127 Th e ECJ has developed these positive obligations on the basis of the principle 
of  non-refoulement , and the right to eff ective judicial protection. As will be explained, 
the provisions of the Directive, which brought this situation within the scope of EU law, 
did not specify that such obligations needed to be fulfi lled by the member states on the 
basis of EU law. 128 It is interesting to explore how the ECJ went about developing these 
obligations, since the formulation of procedural positive obligations by the ECJ in its 
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case-law is generally received critically because the EU only enjoys limited powers in 
this area. 129 
 In the  Abdida case, there is a clear connection between the positive obligations 
that were defi ned by the ECJ on the basis of fundamental rights provisions and the 
obligations of the member states which were already defi ned by the applicable Directive. 
Th e Directive on the common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals, required member states to provide for eff ective 
remedies to appeal a return decision, and for corresponding powers to be given to 
the authority or body responsible for reviewing the return decisions, including the 
possibility to temporarily suspend the enforcement of the return decision. 130 Th e ECJ 
held that this meant that the Directive did not necessarily require a return decision to be 
suspended as soon as an appeal was lodged. 131 Th e Directive also required the member 
states to take into account as far as possible the principle that  ‘ emergency health care 
and essential treatment of illness are provided ’ when a removal was postponed because 
the removal would violate the principle of  non-refoulement . 132 Th e ECJ admitted that 
the Directive does not specifi cally say that basic needs would have to be provided by the 
member states if an appeal is made. In both situations, however, where interim mesures 
are provided a well as where basic needs are provided, it clearly could be argued that the 
member states were acting as agents of EU law, because they were acting on the basis 
of more general obligations laid down by the Directive which applied to that situation. 
 In developing procedural obligations for the member states in its case-law, the ECJ 
generally holds that when EU law does not provide detailed rules for the procedural 
protection of rights which individuals derive from EU law, the principle of national 
procedural autonomy applies and it is for the member states to apply their own 
procedural rules. 133 Member states are required to ensure, on the basis of the principle 
of loyal cooperation as contained in Article 4(3) TEU, that their procedural rules 
comply with the principle of equivalence and eff ectiveness. Th ese principles mean that 
the procedural rules may not be less favourable than those relating to similar actions 
of a domestic nature, and also that the procedural rules may not make it impossible in 
practice to exercise rights which individuals derive from EU law. In some cases, the 
ECJ has stressed that EU law does not, in principle, require member states to provide 
for new remedies other than those that already exist at national level. 134 It has been 
held that by using this approach, the ECJ intends to develop only negative obligations 
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for the member states, while it is only in exceptional cases that the member states may 
need to make available new procedures and/or new procedural rules in this context. 135 
Th erefore, when, as in the example of  Abdida , the ECJ clarifi es that member states incur 
an obligation to provide for interim measures, such an approach can be considered 
rather intrusive, given the limited powers which the EU enjoys in that area. 
 It is interesting to fi nd that the ECJ did not in fact express clear concern for the division 
of powers of the EU in its judgment in  Abdida . Th e ECJ specifi cally established that the 
provisions of the Directive were, as stated in the recital, to be interpreted with respect 
for the fundamental rights and dignity of the person concerned. 136 Indeed, perhaps for 
that reason, the ECJ considered that the EU enjoyed an indirect competence to protect 
fundamental rights in the context of the Directive, which should be used to protect 
procedural rights as well. It may have used the concept of an indirect competence 
to fi ll the specifi c gaps that appeared to have been left  by the EU legislature and the 
national legislature, in order to be able to provide fundamental rights protection in 
circumstances that might not have been foreseen. 
 Some scholars have held that fundamental rights provide a stronger basis than 
the principle of the eff ective protection of EU law to allow for positive procedural 
obligations to be established. 137 At the same time, EU law provides a clear basis in 
Article 19 TEU, which requires member states to provide remedies suffi  cient to ensure 
eff ective legal protection in fi elds covered by EU law. 138 Th erefore, some scholars have 
discussed whether the EU already enjoys a broader power to be able to establish positive 
procedural obligations for the member states. 139 
 In the  Abdida case, the ECJ specifi cally found support for the development of positive 
procedural obligations on the basis of the case-law of the ECtHR. 140 Th e ECJ referred 
to the judgment of the ECtHR in the case of  Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy which 
contains a requirement for the states parties to take positive measures in the form of 
interim measures to ensure respect for the right to an eff ective remedy. 141 Th erefore, the 
case of  Abdida shows that the rights of the Charter, in combination with the positive 
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obligations developed in the case-law of the ECtHR, provide an important basis for the 
imposition of a positive (procedural) obligation on the member states, even though the 
ECJ could also have referred to a Treaty provision (Article 19(1) TEU) that provides for 
a limited competence of the EU to impose positive procedural obligations. 142 
 Th e ECJ in  Abdida also imposed an obligation on the member state to provide for the 
basic needs of a third-country national who is seriously ill and awaits the outcome of 
an appeal to a decision for return. It could be argued that the development of this type 
of obligation is problematic, because the EU does not really as such enjoy a power to 
regulate these kind of social needs, which in organisational and fi nancial terms, could 
be of a burdensome nature. 
 It could, however, be argued that there may also be a clear indirect competence in 
this case to provide such protection in relation to obligations which the member states 
must fulfi l as agents of EU law. Th is is, as held earlier, clearly the case in the situation 
of  Abdida . It would then be necessary that such obligations remain accessory to the 
obligation that was defi ned in the Directive itself, however. Interestingly, in this regard, 
the ECJ also explained certain limits on the obligation imposed: 
 Th e requirement to provide emergency health care and essential treatment of illness under 
Article 14(1)(b) of Directive 2008/115 may, in such a situation, be rendered meaningless if 
there were not also concomitant requirement to make provision for the basic needs of the third 
country national concerned. It should be noted, however, that it is for the Member States to 
determine the form in which such provision for the basic needs of the third country national 
concerned is to be made. 143 
 Th us, the ECJ expressed clear awareness of the discretion which the member states enjoy 
in this area. Th e approach developed by the ECJ in the case of  Abdida therefore seems 
fully respectful of the principle of attributed powers, while the Court was also able to 
secure an eff ective protection of fundamental rights in an area where the member states 
act as agents of EU law. 
 11.5.5.  THE  T. PORT CASE 
 Th e  T. Port case is one of the rare examples where the ECJ has clearly defi ned a positive 
obligation for the EU institutions. 144 For that reason, it is relevant to the discussion in 
this chapter. It is also of interest, as will be explained, because it seems that the ECJ 
actually restricted the power of the member states to provide protection of fundamental 
rights, and potentially fulfi l their own positive obligations. 
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 Th e  T. Port case was explained to some extent in the fi rst section of this chapter, in 
particular to be able to clarify the distinction between positive and negative obligations 
in the context of EU law. 145 To recall, in this case the ECJ held that the Community 
institutions were required to take measures to protect the fundamental rights of a 
trader in the transition to the common market (in bananas). 146 A specifi c regulation 
was established, namely Regulation 404/93 to replace various national arrangements. It 
introduced a particular system of tariff  quotas for the import of bananas diff erentiated 
for ACP bananas (from African, Caribbean and Pacifi c Countries) and third-country 
bananas. 147 Th e quota system was exhaustively regulated by the Community Regulation. 
Only the European Commission was given powers to take measures  ‘ to assist the 
transition from arrangements existing before the entry into force of this Regulation 
to those laid down by this Regulation, and in particular to overcome diffi  culties of a 
sensitive nature ’. 148 Th is left  no room for the national authorities to grant further licences 
or relief. Port, an undertaking which imported third-country bananas faced particular 
hardship as a result of the Regulation, which established a strict regime for the import 
of those bananas. Port had obtained its licences based on an unusually low quantity 
of bananas imported, due to a breach of contract by a Colombian supplier in previous 
years. As a result of the limited licence, Port was unable to meet future (fi nancial) 
obligations concluded under long-term contracts. Initially, Port ’ s requests for additional 
licences were refused by the national authorities and the national courts did not provide 
for interim relief. Th e German  Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) 
concluded that Port ’ s constitutional right to property was irreparably infringed and 
the  Verwaltungsgericht (administrative court) imposed interim measures. At the same 
time the  Verwaltungsgericht referred a preliminary question to the ECJ addressing the 
failure of the European Commission to exercise its own powers under Article 30 of the 
Regulation to take measures regarding the transition from national arrangements to the 
Regulation ’ s measures which were intended  ‘ in particular to overcome diffi  culties of a 
sensitive nature ’, as this could have satisfi ed the needs of Port. 
 Th e ECJ concluded that the Community institutions were under a positive obligation 
to act in protection of Community fundamental rights. 149 Th e Commission had, 
however, been given broad discretion under the Regulation to take such transitional 
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measures. It was therefore required, according to the Court, to take transitional 
measures in derogation of the general rules under the Regulation to accommodate 
individual traders who could not predict the consequences of their actions aft er the 
establishment of the common market in bananas. 150 
 From a fundamental rights perspective and a perspective of indirect competences, it 
is logical in this case that the EU institutions incurred a duty to take measures to protect 
fundamental rights if their actions breached the fundamental rights of particular 
individuals. In the case of  T. Port , it could be held that the Community had caused 
infringements of the fundamental rights of traders by taking measures to organise 
a common market in bananas. Moreover, with a view to the transitional period, the 
Community legislature expressly allowed the Commission to act in cases of hardship 
if it was considered necessary to protect fundamental rights. Th e Court, as a protector 
of fundamental rights of undertakings, transposed this seemingly discretionary 
competence into a positive obligation. Th e eff ective protection of fundamental rights 
was in this way ensured at the supranational level. 
 From a perspective of subsidiarity, however, it would seem far less logical to impose 
on the Commission a requirement to provide protection of fundamental rights. 151 
Even though this concerned an area of exclusive powers of the EU, it still could be 
relevant to take national arrangements into account. As a supranational institution, 
the Commission is not directly aware of individual cases of fundamental rights 
infringements. Th e national authorities are placed much closer to the undertakings 
and can (more quickly) take certain actions that would cater to their specifi c needs. 
If the national courts had decided to grant additional licences to the undertaking, this 
would seem to have directly aff ected the protection of the principles of supremacy 
and the principle of eff ectiveness of EU law, however. Th e national courts could only 
adopt interim measures under the specifi c circumstances which the ECJ defi ned in its 
judgment on the basis of previous case-law. 152 
 Th erefore, in this specifi c case, it appeared that the only option to fi ll the gap in the 
protection of fundamental rights was to impose an obligation on the Commission to 
adopt transitional measures which would off er relief to Port. Th is would also provide 
for the protection of the primacy and eff ectiveness of EU law. It could be held that 
in these circumstances, the member states no longer enjoyed any fundamental rights 
powers, because all their powers in this area had been succeeded to the Community. 
Th e approach of the ECJ could, from that point of view, be held to be in line with 
the division of powers between the EU and the member states. At the same time, this 
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example shows that, from the more general perspective of subsidiarity, protection of 
fundamental rights protection would perhaps have been better off ered at the national 
level. 
 11.6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 Th is chapter has shown that the case-law of the ECJ includes a small variety of judicial, 
administrative and legislative positive obligations which must be complied with by the 
member states, and a few procedural positive obligations that must be met by the EU 
institutions. Such positive obligations were clearly formulated by the ECJ in relation 
to specifi c obligations or acts that were defi ned by EU secondary or primary law. 
Moreover, the measures which the ECJ required to be fulfi lled in the cases discussed 
could also be derived from the fundamental rights provisions which the ECJ mentioned 
in its judgments. It is clear from the outset, moreover, that the positive obligations 
discussed in this chapter oft en concern a supportive type of positive obligation, and 
are mostly of a remedial nature. Apparently, there must always be a connection to 
certain obligations which must be fulfi lled by the member states under EU (secondary 
or primary) law. 
 Th e examination of some specifi c and controversial cases by the ECJ has shown 
that the ECJ may need to be careful in accepting positive obligations in its case-law. 
As explained in this chapter, by indicating that certain measures need to be taken to 
ensure the protection of fundamental rights, the ECJ may directly shift  the power to 
take measures from the national level to the EU level. Th is could raise questions if the 
EU does not enjoy clear powers in the specifi c area at issue. First, a development of 
positive obligations by the ECJ may be limited because the specifi c legal basis for taking 
legislative actions under the EU Treaties applies only to certain actions (see the  Grant 
case). In other cases, it may be agreed that there is a suffi  cient basis under EU law to 
impose a legislative positive obligation on the member states, but that the ECJ would 
still be interfering in the member states ’ sovereign powers if it indicates too clearly what 
kinds of measures the member states should take to fulfi l such a positive obligation 
(see the  Chatzi case). In two of the cases discussed (the  N.S. and others case and the 
 Abdida case), the ECJ found clear support for the development of positive obligations 
on the basis of the judgments of the ECtHR even though, as has been argued, there 
was actually quite some tension because of the limited powers of the EU in those areas. 
As explained, the ECJ could possibly solve such tension by explaining under what 
circumstances the member states indeed incurred the respective obligations, as well as 
by clarifying that the member states could actually still enjoy either their sovereign or 
discretionary powers under EU law. 
 One specifi c case (the  T. Port case) has shown that it can also become necessary for 
the ECJ to impose a positive obligation on the EU institutions, because the EU enjoys 
an exclusive power in a certain area. Th is example, however, showed that, because 
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of the principle of subsidiarity, there can be good reason to ensure the protection of 
fundamental rights at national level instead. 
 If the ECJ wishes to further legitimise the development of positive obligations, it may 
need to pay attention to the limited powers of the EU in its judgments. At the same 
time, the ECJ may also want to ensure in its judgments that fundamental rights are 
protected in an eff ective manner. Th e ECJ does not always clearly show the underlying 
rationales in its judgments. Th e ECJ could in the future express such reasons more 
clearly, especially if it receives further criticism for lack of a clear justifi cation of 
developing positive obligations under EU law. 
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 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 12.1.  INCORPORATING POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS TO 
PROTECT FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EU LAW ? 
 Th e main purpose of this study was to establish whether there is scope for recognition 
of a concept of positive obligations to protect fundamental rights under EU law and, 
if so, in what manner the ECJ could develop a doctrine of positive obligations in its 
case-law. To fi nd answers to these questions, this study, fi rst, has drawn inspiration 
from the case-law of the ECtHR. Part I of this study has explained in what way states 
can incur positive obligations to protect fundamental rights under the Convention, 
and what the eff ects are of the recognition of such positive obligations by the ECtHR. 
In addition, part I has dealt with the criticisms related to this development. It has  inter 
alia explained that states ’ obligations in relation to the protection of fundamental 
rights have been expanded on the basis of the recognition of positive obligations; these 
obligations may require burdensome measures to be taken by states; the development of 
positive obligations creates a certain amount of legal uncertainty; and the establishment 
of positive obligations by the ECtHR may come close to political decision-making. 
Th ese types of criticism have (partially) been overcome by the principles that have 
been established by the ECtHR in its case-law. Th e ECtHR has explained that positive 
obligations form part of the eff ective protection of fundamental rights, and that states 
nowadays have the power to infl uence the enjoyment of individual ’ s fundamental rights. 
Th e ECtHR also recognises that states are given discretion when choosing the measures 
to provide protection, and that certain limits apply to the scope for positive obligations 
under the Convention. Th ese principles, as well as their more specifi c elaborations, 
have been held to be of special interest if the ECJ were to recognise similar kinds of 
positive obligations. 
 Part II of this study has explored the system of EU fundamental rights protection and 
some of its specifi c limitations, in order to fi nd out whether, and to what extent, this 
allows for a similar development of positive obligations to take place. Specifi c attention 
was paid to the ECJ ’ s own institutional characteristics and its judicial culture; to the 
issue of the limited competences of the EU; and to the limited scope of application of 
EU fundamental rights. 
 On the basis of the review of the relevant legal provisions, case-law and legal theory, 
this study has shown that, under certain conditions, there is scope for the development 
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of positive obligations under EU law. Th is development implies that the ECJ will defi ne 
certain actions that need to be taken by the EU institutions or the member states to 
protect certain fundamental rights if such actions have not already been specifi ed by 
secondary EU law. Several examples provided in the case-law of the ECJ show that the 
ECJ has already been willing to formulate certain kinds of positive obligations. Such 
positive obligations appear to be directed mainly at the member states, and they are 
oft en of a procedural nature. Th e member states have, for example, been required to 
introduce certain procedural requirements to ensure the eff ective protection of EU law 
at national level, and to take certain preventive measures to comply with the prohibition 
of inhuman and degrading treatment of individuals within and outside of the EU. Such 
a development is necessary and inevitable. Gaps could appear in the protection of 
fundamental rights in situations falling within the scope of EU law, which might not, 
or even could not, have been foreseen by the EU legislature or in the implementation 
of EU legislation at the national level. It has been argued that provisions on EU 
fundamental rights, especially those laid down in the Charter  – in combination with 
provisions of primary and of secondary law which bring such situations within the 
scope of application of EU law  – can provide a relevant basis for the ECJ to impose 
positive obligations on the EU institutions and on the member states. It was concluded 
in  chapter 10 , however, that this  ‘ gap-fi lling ’ through imposing positive obligations can 
only be accepted if it is acknowledged that the EU has an indirect competence to protect 
fundamental rights in relation to the explicit powers which have been conferred on it 
by the member states. 
 Surely, this implies a rather modest development of positive obligations in 
comparison to the case-law of the ECtHR. As a result of the limited competences of 
the EU, the protection of fundamental rights by the EU authorities remains accessory 
to the regulatory activities for which the EU has been conferred specifi c powers. Th e 
analysis of several specifi c examples of positive obligations in the case-law of the ECJ 
has shown that criticism may be raised over this development in view of the limited 
competences of the EU to protect fundamental rights. In some areas and situations, the 
EU enjoys no, or very limited, powers, which will infl uence the degree to which the ECJ 
can formulate positive obligations, as well as the kinds of positive obligations it might 
accept. Moreover, there are limited procedural possibilities for the ECJ to establish 
certain positive obligations for the EU institutions or the member states. Generally, the 
initiative is taken by national courts to refer relevant questions to the ECJ, instead of by 
individual claimants bringing procedures directly before this Court. 
 Th ese main conclusions and answers to the main questions of this study are 
explained in more detail in the following sections of this chapter. First, a more detailed 
explanation is given of how the specifi c legal system of the EU allows for a development 
of positive obligations, especially taking into account the fi ndings that have followed 
from the analysis of specifi c case-law examples in  chapter 11 (section 12.2.). Aft er that, 
several contrasts are shown to the development of positive obligations by the ECtHR to 
further clarify what kind of development of positive obligations could take place under 
EU law (section 12.3.). Next, special attention is paid to the diff erent types of positive 
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obligations that exist (section 12.3.1.); the procedural limitations that apply within the 
context of EU law (section 12.3.2.); the political character of positive obligations under 
EU law (section 12.3.3.); and the specifi c judicial style of the ECJ (section 12.3.4.). 
Aft er this, some recommendations are made as to how the ECJ could further develop 
a doctrine of positive obligations in its case-law (section 12.4.). Lastly, this chapter 
refl ects on a question that has oft en been raised in the literature, that is, whether the 
development of positive obligations within the context of EU law can be expected to 
give rise to competence creep or whether, in view of the limits of EU law, certain gaps 
in protection can be expected to arise (section 12.5.). 
 12.2.  A LIMITED SCOPE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER EU LAW 
 12.2.1.  THE RELEVANCE OF SECONDARY EU LAW AS A FRAMEWORK 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 Development of  ‘ positive obligations ’ within the context of EU law can be said to take 
place only if the ECJ were to defi ne an obligation for an EU institution or for the member 
states to take measures to protect fundamental rights which are not already specifi ed 
by EU (secondary or primary) law. Th is is the basic defi nition of positive obligations, 
explained in the introductory chapter of this study. 1 Within the context of EU law, in 
general, provisions of secondary EU law spell out the specifi c rights which individuals 
may invoke and the corresponding obligations which states could incur. Th erefore, 
in contrast to the Convention, there is less need for defi ning positive obligations on 
the basis of general fundamental rights. In that respect, the legal framework for the 
protection of fundamental rights under EU law is clearly very diff erent from that created 
by the Convention. To illustrate this further, it must be recognised that the EU has 
been given specifi c competences to adopt legislation which it could use to ensure the 
protection of some fundamental rights. In the area of privacy protection, for example, a 
fairly detailed regulative framework has been adopted defi ning what rights individuals 
may invoke under EU law and what legislative and procedural obligations the member 
states must comply with. In that area, the national courts and the ECJ can therefore 
generally turn to secondary EU law to determine the scope and the meaning of the 
protection of fundamental rights which can be provided on the basis of EU law. Seeing 
that general fundamental rights provisions play a much less important role within the 
context of EU law than they do in the Convention context, there is less urgency for the 
judicial development of positive obligations. When adopting certain policies, the EU 
legislature may have already settled for certain solutions that could be used to secure 
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the protection of fundamental rights eff ectively. Th is also explains why only a very 
limited development of positive obligations under EU law has taken place. 
 Still, fundamental rights can have an important role to play in EU law, that is, as 
tools to interpret provisions of secondary EU law, to determine the validity of those 
provisions, and to fi ll certain gaps.  Chapter 11 has shown various examples in the 
case-law of the ECJ of situations in which EU secondary law did not provide suffi  cient 
clarity regarding the measures that needed to be adopted to ensure fundamental rights 
compliance. In those situations, certain gaps appeared, because specifi c procedures or 
regulations had not been provided at the EU level, nor by means of implementation at 
the national level. 2 One of the clearest examples is that the ECJ has needed to clarify 
that national courts must be able to adopt interim measures to eff ectively secure the 
application of EU law at national level and to protect the principle of eff ective judicial 
protection. 3 Th e ECJ has also held that such interim measures need to be provided by 
national courts in the specifi c situation of a third-country national who is seriously ill, 
and is awaiting the results of an appeal against a decision that he must return to his 
country of origin. Th en, such interim measures are necessary to secure the principle 
of eff ective judicial protection as well as the principle of  non-refoulement . 4 In addition, 
the ECJ has defi ned that the member states must further provide for the basic needs 
of the individual in such a situation. Secondary EU law did not impose such specifi c 
obligations on the member states, but they needed to be formulated by the ECJ on the 
basis of fundamental rights provisions. Such cases show that the EU legislature, and 
the national legislature, may not always be able to fully foresee what actions, remedies 
and judicial powers will be necessary to ensure the protection of fundamental rights 
in relation to the tasks that must be executed on the basis of EU law. In particular, the 
needs of certain vulnerable individuals might not be foreseen. As a consequence, gaps 
can appear in the protection of fundamental rights in situations that can fall within the 
scope of EU law. 
 Th e Charter and the EU Treaties provide various legal bases that could be used to 
determine what actions are necessary to protect fundamental rights. Such legal bases 
have been set out in  chapter 8 and are especially relevant for the EU in the exercise of 
its indirect competence to protect those rights (see further below). 5 Th e EU may need 
to ensure, for example, that remedies are provided for by the member states on the 
basis of Article 19(1) TEU in fi elds covered by EU law. Also, any interferences with 
the fundamental rights under the Charter must be provided for by law on the basis 
of Article 52(1) of the Charter. Th ese are obligations that need to be met by the EU 
institutions in the exercise of their explicit competences, and by the member states in 
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the implementation of EU law at the national level, and could thus give rise to actions 
of a procedural or of a legislative nature. Th ese legal bases are also especially relevant 
for the ECJ to take into account if gaps in the protection are discovered. 
 However, even in these situations of gap-fi lling, the ECJ must still carefully take 
the specifi c framework of secondary EU law into account to be able to determine the 
scope of the rights and the obligations which it may establish. Oft en (the preambles 
to) Directives and Regulations will specify which fundamental rights must be taken 
into account by the competent public authorities. Directives and Regulation may also 
include provisions or recitals that help to clarify that there is no scope for such action 
at the EU level. Th e power to take certain actions may then have been retained at the 
national level. 6 
 12.2.2.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS ON 
THE BASIS OF AN INDIRECT POWER TO PROTECT 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 Th e question of the EU ’ s fundamental rights competences is of clear importance in 
relation to the development of positive obligations by the ECJ. Based on the principle of 
attributed powers, the EU can only take action in fi elds for which it has specifi cally been 
conferred competences to do so. Article 51 of the Charter also specifi cally requires that 
the competences of the EU are not aff ected or expanded on the basis of the protection 
of fundamental rights. When defi ning positive obligations under EU law, it is therefore 
necessary that a certain competence to adopt measures can be construed under EU law. 
 Th e EU clearly does not have a general competence to take action to protect 
fundamental rights, and many scholars have therefore expressed fear that a development 
of positive obligations within the context of EU law would either lead to competence 
creep or to gaps in protection. 7 It has been explained in  chapter 8 , however, that there is 
suffi  cient ground to argue that the EU enjoys both a specifi c and an indirect competence 
to protect fundamental rights, and that those competences need to be taken into account 
by the ECJ in formulating positive obligations. 8 Indeed, in some specifi c areas, such 
as privacy protection and non-discrimination, the EU has been conferred a specifi c 
competence to take action. Moreover, in areas where the EU has been conferred explicit 
competences to take (legislative) action, for example in the area of asylum law or in the 
area of free movement law, it can be argued that there also is an indirect competence for 
the EU to secure the protection of fundamental rights. On the basis of Article 6 TEU, 
and in particular Article 51(1), there is a general requirement for the EU institutions 
and the member states, in so far as they act within the scope of EU law, to respect 
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and even promote the fundamental rights in relation to their actions. Th erefore, some 
competences can be construed to incorporate positive obligations into EU law. 
 Th e indirect competence for the EU to ensure active protection of fundamental 
rights must be construed narrowly, however. Given the principle of attributed powers, 
the actions which can be taken on the basis of such an indirect competence must be 
seen as accessory to the actions for which there is an explicit basis in the EU treaties. 
Also, certain limits in relation to the explicit competences of the EU must be respected. 
For example, the full harmonisation of national law is excluded in the areas of asylum 
law and privacy law. Hence, in defi ning positive obligations, the ECJ must take into 
consideration that the general competence to protect fundamental rights remains at 
national level and that the national authorities remain competent to make their own 
choices as to how to provide protection of fundamental rights. 
 Th ese limitations further became apparent from the analysis that was undertaken in 
 chapter 11 on the establishment of several kinds of positive obligations by the ECJ in 
its case-law. When certain types of actions are not defi ned by provisions of secondary 
and primary EU law, such as in the area of national procedural law, then it may also 
be concluded that they do not form part of the competences of the EU. Th e ECJ thus 
needs to pay attention to the division of powers between the EU and the member states 
in defi ning positive obligations. Th e ECJ could, for example, decide to formulate a 
procedural positive obligations for the member states because the EU enjoys an indirect 
competence that needs to be used to ensure that the actions of the EU eff ectively protect 
fundamental rights. However, the ECJ may then still need to clarify that the member 
states enjoy a great deal of discretion in the area of national procedural law. 
 12.2.3.  THE DIVISION OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN THE EU 
AND THE MEMBER STATES 
 Chapter 8 has explained that in most cases where fundamental rights could be aff ected 
under EU law, the EU enjoys shared or complementary competences. 9 Th is means that 
additional reasons are needed to be able to decide why certain actions need to be taken 
at EU level rather than at the national level. 
 First and foremost, the principle of subsidiarity provides a relevant consideration. 
Th is principle intimates that by reason of scale or eff ects, action is better taken at 
the EU level than at the national level. It can be diffi  cult to apply this criterion to 
fundamental rights cases, since in most cases it would seem that action is taken best 
at national level by the national authorities, as they are closest to the individual, the 
circumstances of a case, and the specifi cities and demands of their societies and legal 
systems. Transnational dimensions to the protection of fundamental rights are not 
always readily apparent. One clear example that can be mentioned here, however, is the 
area of privacy protection, where personal data may  ‘ physically ’ cross borders. 
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 However, there are also other arguments that can be made to show that fundamental 
rights are protected more eff ectively at the EU level. Th e degree of interconnectedness 
of EU acts and fundamental rights infringements could provide an important 
consideration arguing for preventive and remedial measures to be established by the 
EU, or for compensation to be made for the harm that is caused by the adoption of 
certain policies. It may also be argued that fundamental rights are best secured at EU 
level if there is a risk that EU free movement law will indirectly lead to a lowering of the 
fundamental rights standards of the member states. Th e establishment of fundamental 
rights standards at the EU level might further be explained, because it is also in the 
interest of securing the primacy, unity and eff ectiveness of EU law itself. Th ese diff erent 
arguments are relevant for the EU legislature in deciding when to take action, and they 
could also provide further support if the ECJ were to formulate a relevant positive 
obligation on the basis of EU law. 
 Although the arguments outlined above are oft en raised, some scholars have, instead, 
looked at other principles and arguments. In particular, as addressed in  chapter 8 , 
they have referred to principles of state responsibility under international law and the 
principles developed in the case-law of the ECtHR. 10 It is argued that the EU itself 
is bound to comply with the obligations arising from the protection of international 
human rights treaties to the extent that the member states are no longer able to protect 
those rights and obligations autonomously as a result of the transfer of competences 
to the EU. In that situation, the EU must incur positive obligations if, in a similar way 
to states, it can be considered to have the means to provide protection and to have 
knowledge of an actual risk of fundamental rights infringements taking place. It has 
been explained in this study that such arguments can be relevant mainly and only in 
areas where the EU enjoys exclusive powers. In those situations, there is generally no 
discretion at the national level to ensure the protection of fundamental rights. Th e ECJ 
must therefore also take this into account when deciding whether to accept positive 
obligations in such areas. 
 Even in cases on exclusive competences, it may still be most useful to look at principles 
which are relevant in areas of shared and complementary competences to determine 
whether and at what point positive obligations need to be developed under EU law. 
Th e member states may already have a specifi c legal and administrative framework that 
could be used to eff ectively secure fundamental rights. Th e ECJ would thus not always 
have to formulate  ‘ new ’ positive obligations. In cases of exclusive competences, the ECJ 
may have to make sure, however, that the member states indeed use their regulatory 
frameworks and procedures to secure protection of fundamental rights. Th ey would 
have to be put under an obligation, because they might otherwise fi nd that they do not 
have discretion to apply those rules and procedures under EU law. If the application of 
such national rules and procedures were to be considered to undermine the eff ectiveness 
and unity of EU law, however, the ECJ would have to decide to impose new positive 
obligations on the member states or on the EU institutions. 
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 12.2.4.  LIMITED SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF EU FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 
 Chapter 9 of part II has specifi cally looked into the question of the limited scope of 
application of EU fundamental rights. Article 51(1) of the Charter importantly requires 
that EU fundamental rights only apply to the member states when they implement 
Union law. Th e ECJ therefore can only accept positive obligations which can be held to 
fall within the scope of EU law. For positive obligations to be recognised, there needs 
to be a connection that can be made between a certain type of positive obligation and 
a provision of EU law. Th e development of positive obligations under EU law thus 
generally requires that a specifi c right or obligation has already been recognised in the 
EU Treaties and/or in secondary EU law. As has been explained above, this provision of 
EU law is also very much relevant in determining to what extent there is a competence 
for the EU institutions or the member states to take certain actions to ensure the eff ective 
protection of fundamental rights. Th e ECJ cannot recognise positive obligations which 
have no clear connection to rights and obligations that have been laid down in EU law, 
because this would mean that the ECJ would be over-extending the powers of the EU. 
 Th e ECJ has developed a broad scope of application of EU fundamental rights which 
could be considered useful where positive obligations need to be formulated. It has 
been explained that three types of situations can be distinguished in this regard. Th e 
member states are either acting as agents of EU law, they are derogating from the 
free movement rules, or they are applying so-called optioning rules, which means 
that they have a choice to adopt their own sovereign policies within the framework 
of EU law obligations. It is foremost in the fi rst type of situation, thus in the agency 
situation, that several kinds of positive obligations could legitimately be developed by 
the ECJ. In this type of situation, most logically either a specifi c fundamental rights 
competence or an indirect fundamental rights competence of the EU applies. However, 
in the situation where member states are derogating from the free movement rules or 
where they are applying their optioning rules, it is far less logical to impose positive 
obligations, because it is more diffi  cult to construe that an indirect competence has 
been given to the EU to protect fundamental rights. Th e ECJ would easily be interfering 
in the sovereign powers of the member states, and it must therefore be very careful in 
formulating positive obligations, especially if they are of a legislative kind. Th is point 
has further been proven by the analysis undertaken in  chapter 11 of the  N.S. and others 
case. 11 Th e ECJ formulated a positive obligation for the member states in this case to 
prevent inhuman and degrading treatment of asylum seekers who are sent back to 
another member state on the basis of the Dublin Regulation. It could arguably do so 
on the basis of the indirect competence under EU law to protect fundamental rights, 
however, there is limited scope for a development of the positive obligation on the basis 
of the member states ’ discretionary powers that have been granted to them under EU 
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law to apply their own sovereign policies. Th e ECJ could also decide to refer, again, 
to the member states own policies and regulations as a means of ensuring eff ective 
fundamental rights protection. 
 12.3.  CONTRASTS WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE 
OBLIGATIONS BY THE ECtHR 
 Th e conclusions provided in the foregoing sections have already revealed that the scope 
for a development of positive obligations under EU law is much more limited than that 
under the Convention. Th is section aims to further clarify some contrasts between the 
development of positive obligations by the ECtHR and the ECJ. In turn, this will help to 
identify what can, and what cannot, be expected in terms of a development of positive 
obligations by the ECJ. 
 12.3.1.  A WIDE VARIETY OF TYPES OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 Part I has discussed the various types of positive obligations that can be recognised 
within the case-law of the ECtHR. 12 In addition to the main distinction between 
procedural and material kinds of positive obligations made by the ECtHR, several 
typologies developed by scholars have been discussed. Th ese typologies help to clarify 
the diff erent eff ects of some types of positive obligations, as well as their potentially 
problematic nature, and they can be of interest for the EU context as well. Only a few 
types of these positive obligations would be expected to be developed by the ECJ to 
protect fundamental rights on the basis of EU law. 
 Chapter 11 has shown that the case-law of the ECJ has mainly defi ned procedural 
obligations, which oft en need to be complied with by the national courts. 13 Th e ECJ 
rarely defi nes obligations of a legislative kind. 14 It can, however, be concluded that there 
is a basis under EU law that allows the ECJ to further develop positive obligations, 
including those of a legislative kind. Th is basis is provided by the specifi c fundamental 
rights competences of the EU and the scope of application of EU fundamental rights as 
discussed above. However, it may be diffi  cult for the ECJ to develop positive obligations 
to legislate, mainly because of the specifi c procedural context in which it can provide 
fundamental rights protection. Th e ECJ is mainly engaged in a dialogue with the 
national courts, and it is therefore logical that the ECJ will primarily impose obligation 
on the national courts to ensure the eff ective protection of fundamental rights. 
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 Also, of the types of obligations found in the ECtHR ’ s case-law, it can be seen that 
mainly intrinsic and supportive types of positive obligation are accepted in the case-
law of the ECJ. Th e intrinsic type of positive obligation requires states to set up certain 
institutional and organisational measures, such as a court system, so that fundamental 
rights can be enjoyed by individuals. Indeed, the case-law of the ECJ provides various 
examples of where procedures and/or legal provisions had to be introduced to provide 
protection of rights falling within the scope of EU law. Th e supportive type of positive 
obligation essentially requires states to ensure that they comply with their (negative) 
obligation not to interfere with an individual ’ s fundamental rights. Th e case-law of 
the ECJ on positive obligations also oft en shows a relationship with certain positive 
acts of the EU institutions or the member states. Th e obligations were imposed with 
the aim of preventing fundamental rights infringements in relation to such acts, or to 
provide for compensation. Th e recognition of both types of positive obligations can be 
explained because there must be a certain competence that is already defi ned within 
the EU Treaties and/or in legislative instruments of secondary EU law. Fundamental 
rights provisions cannot by themselves constitute a basis for action to be taken by the 
EU. Instead, based on the principle of attributed powers, actions undertaken by the EU 
institutions and the member states are in principle defi ned in primary or secondary 
EU law. Th erefore, any positive obligation which may arise on the basis of fundamental 
rights protection in relation to those situations, do so in addition to and within the 
scope of certain legislative, administrative or executive obligations that have already 
been defi ned by EU law. Th e actions of the EU are oft en not primarily oriented towards 
the protection of fundamental rights, but rather towards fulfi lling certain objectives 
in areas, such as the internal market, in which the EU has specifi cally been conferred 
competences to undertake actions. If there is no clear connection to EU law, active 
measures to protect fundamental rights would instead have to be based on national law, 
potentially in combination with the Convention. Such measures could then be expected 
to fall outside the scope of EU law. 
 Th erefore, as a result of the limitation that fundamental rights protection can be 
based on EU law only if there is a clear connection to an obligation or a right that is 
already defi ned under EU law, various kinds of positive obligations are precluded from 
being developed within the EU context. 
 Th e case-law of the ECtHR recognises a wider variety of types of positive obligations. 15 
Aside from procedural types of positive obligations, the ECtHR has imposed obligations 
of a material type, which could involve legislative measures (for example to ensure the 
legal recognition of rights of same-sex couples) or more practical measures (for example 
to ensure that demonstrations can proceed safely). Th ese obligations, furthermore, may 
not only be supportive or intrinsic in nature, but they even may be autonomous, which 
means that states may incur them without there being a very clear connection between 
the Convention provisions and the positive obligation concerned. 
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 Th e ECtHR ’ s case-law also clearly shows horizontal types of positive obligations. 
Th ese types of positive obligations aim to protect fundamental rights in the relations 
between private parties, instead of vertical positive obligations, which are obligations 
that aim to protect the fundamental rights in the relation between the state and the 
individual. 
 Th ere seems little scope for a development of positive obligations of a more horizontal 
kind within the EU context. Vertical types of positive obligations are more likely to be 
recognised in the case-law of the ECJ, because fundamental rights provisions generally 
either aim to prevent the EU institutions ’ actions and the member states actions in the 
implementation of EU law negatively interfering with fundamental rights, or to ensure 
that remedies are provided and compensation can be given for the harm that is caused 
by the policies of the EU. 
 However, it must be recognised that the distinction between vertical and horizontal 
types of positive obligations can be quite diffi  cult to make. 16 Oft en, there are positive acts 
of the state involved in the case-law of the ECtHR on positive obligations, even when 
the underlying confl ict appears to be one between private parties. Conversely, some 
of the positive obligations in the case-law of the ECJ may appear to have a horizontal 
dimension as well. Th ere are some examples that demonstrate that obligations are 
imposed to protect the rights of internet users  vis- à -vis an internet service provider, or 
the rights of an employee  vis- à -vis an employer. Moreover, it can be argued that some 
of the case-law of the ECJ shows that obligations are imposed to protect the rights of 
certain vulnerable individuals, such as homosexual men or asylum seekers, not only 
against state action, but also against acts by other private individuals. 
 Nevertheless, even in those cases where the ECJ imposes positive obligations with 
a clearly horizontal eff ect or even of a directly horizontal nature, they can be imposed 
only in relation to concrete measures which states must already adopt in a certain area 
on the basis of EU law. Th us, horizontal types of positive obligations could be developed 
within the EU context only in relation to concrete legal norms that are laid down in EU 
legislation. 
 Th us, while there appears to be little scope for a development of horizontal positive 
obligations, it is relevant to take into account that, in comparison to the ECtHR, the 
ECJ more clearly requires a certain direct horizontal eff ect to be given to EU law and 
to fundamental rights at the national level. 17 Also, concrete norms established in EU 
Directives and Regulations may have a clear impact on the obligations which private 
parties need to fulfi l in their relations with other private parties. Th e case of  Google 
Spain is a good example that illustrates that a private corporation ( Google ) can be 
confronted with an obligation on the basis of EU law, in this case to secure the rights 
to privacy of an individual when certain search results are generated. 18 By contrast, the 
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ECtHR has always imposed positive obligations on states to secure the protection of 
fundamental rights in horizontal situations. 
 Overall, it must be concluded that there is limited room for the acceptance of a 
wide variety of types of positive obligations on the basis of EU law. Before any type of 
fundamental rights requirement can be imposed, there must be a connection to rights 
or obligations that have already been laid down by EU law. Only then a development 
of positive obligations could be expected, which are most likely to be of a supportive 
or an intrinsic nature. Th is also means that there is little scope for a development of 
autonomous positive obligations, that is, obligations which are not clearly related to 
states ’ negative obligations following from the fundamental rights that it protects. Aft er 
all, there must always be a relevant connection to EU law to allow the EU institutions 
or the member states to take certain actions on the basis of which (active) fundamental 
rights requirement can be imposed. Th is also explains that the ECJ might impose some 
positive obligations with horizontal eff ect, but only in limited circumstances. 
 12.3.2.  PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS 
 Within the context of EU law, the development of positive obligations can be primarily 
expected to take place under the preliminary reference procedure. 19 National courts 
play a very important role in the protection of EU fundamental rights and there is only 
limited room for individuals to actively bring procedures before the ECJ to challenge 
the omissions in the protection of fundamental rights within the context of EU law. 
In comparison, positive obligations are developed by the ECtHR in relation to the 
complaints which individuals directly bring before the ECtHR, albeit, of course, aft er 
having exhausted the domestic remedies. 
 Th is shows that the development of positive obligations in the EU context is to an 
important extent dependent on the willingness of the national courts to refer cases 
to the ECJ. National courts may decide to provide for the protection of fundamental 
rights on the basis of their own national laws and/or on the basis of the case-law of the 
ECtHR rather than on the basis of EU fundamental rights. Th ey could refrain from 
sending questions to the ECJ as regards the interpretation of fundamental right that are 
guaranteed by EU law if they were to consider that such questions fall outside the scope 
of application of EU law. 
 Secondly, this explains that most of the positive obligations that have been developed 
in the case-law of the ECJ are directed at the national courts. As mentioned above, 
the ECJ does not seem inclined to directly develop any legislative obligation but it is 
instead there to provide answers to the questions that are raised by the national courts. 
Moreover, it appears that the ECJ oft en still leaves room for the national courts and 
the national authorities to decide how they could ensure an eff ective protection of 
fundamental rights. 
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 Th ere are thus some procedural limitations for the development of positive 
obligations in the context of EU law. If these procedural limitations would raise a 
signifi cant barrier for the rights of individuals to be addressed and positive obligations 
to be imposed, it might nonetheless still be possible to bring a complaint before the 
ECtHR. Th e ECtHR accepts complaints that are brought against one of the member 
states of the EU and it will exercise review if the member states have discretion in 
their implementation of EU law at the national law. In that respect, there may be some 
potential for the ECtHR to further develop positive obligations that are relevant for the 
member states to comply with, even in the context of EU law. Th is development might 
aff ect the autonomous interpretation of EU law and it might not be in the interest of 
individuals who seek protection, because the procedures before the ECtHR can be long 
and cumbersome. It is therefore important that the ECJ uses the opportunities available 
to develop fundamental rights. Here, it can be recognised that compared to the ECtHR, 
the EU system of fundamental rights protection provides for some potentially swift  
procedures to ensure the protection of fundamental rights. If certain measures of the 
states or the EU institutions must be taken to ensure eff ective protection of fundamental 
rights, individual litigants and courts may therefore look at EU law as a source of such 
protection. As EU law nowadays penetrates into various areas of law, such as asylum 
law, environmental law and privacy law, EU law might further be regarded as a relevant 
framework to take into account regarding a development of positive obligations. 
 12.3.3.  THE POLITICAL CHARACTER OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
 One of the main criticisms that has been expressed towards the development of positive 
obligation by the ECtHR is that it would interfere with political decision-making. 20 Th e 
question as to what actions need to be taken by public authorities must, in principle, 
be answered by democratically elected and politically accountable bodies. Th is is, in 
particular, important when it involves high (fi nancially) burdensome measures, or 
when it concerns very sensitive or complex economic, social or technical aff airs. For 
that reason, the political nature of positive obligations is of continuing concern to the 
ECtHR, and requires it to tread very carefully. It could be expected that the ECJ would 
be criticised in a similar way if it were to determine the concrete actions which should 
be taken by the EU institutions or by the member states on the basis of provisions of 
fundamental rights. Generally, such actions would need to be determined by means of 
secondary EU law or by national authorities based on the discretion explicitly given. 
By establishing positive obligations, the ECJ could be criticised for interfering in the 
political decision-making process of the EU institutions and/or the member states. 
Just like the ECtHR, aft er all, the ECJ is not democratically elected, nor is it politically 
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accountable. Moreover, it is similar to the ECtHR in that it is placed at the supranational 
level, and may therefore not be in the best position to make decisions on the actions 
that need to be taken by national authorities. 
 Yet, the ECJ operates in some respects in a rather diff erent political sphere as 
compared to the ECtHR. Th e ECJ is, for example, directly empowered to review the 
legislation which has been adopted by the EU institutions and it may directly provide 
interpretations of EU primary law and secondary legislation. 21 Th is may mean that it 
could go further in developing specifi c positive obligations for the EU institutions. 
 So far, the ECJ has developed very few positive obligations for the EU institutions, 
and to the extent that it has done so, such obligations are only of a procedural kind. 
Th is may be because EU law must oft en be further implemented at national level. It 
may also be because the ECJ aims to be respectful of the choices that have already 
been made by the EU legislature and does not easily overturn those choices. Th e ECJ 
has, in comparison, formulated many more positive obligations for the member states. 
Although this may have to do with the procedural limitations within the EU context for 
a development of positive obligations, as has been explained in the previous subsection, 
this may also be explained by the deference that the ECJ aff ords to the EU legislature. 
National courts may indeed also inquire about the validity of EU legislation and perhaps 
the omissions of the EU legislature in certain areas. 
 Th e ECJ could decide to apply a technique of reconciliatory interpretation in 
reviewing the legislative acts of the EU institutions. Th is technique aims to re-interpret 
EU legislation to ensure that it is valid in light of principles of EU law, such as 
fundamental rights. Th is technique has been used by the ECJ in several cases that have 
been discussed in this study, and it has the eff ect of imposing positive obligations for 
the member states. 22 It is expected, therefore, that positive obligations that might be 
politically sensitive will only be formulated for the member states and not for the EU 
institutions. 
 Also, the specifi c EU legal framework can guide the ECJ in determining the scope 
and the meaning of the rights of individuals, the obligations of states, and the division 
of powers between the EU and the member states. Some political choices may already 
have been made, for example that certain powers which should be used to protect 
fundamental rights should remain at the national level (see section 12.2.). 
 For the ECJ, it is of special interest that the Charter has been draft ed much more 
recently than the Convention. Th e ECJ can therefore be expected to use the provisions 
of the Charter, in combination with EU primary and secondary law, as important 
guidance when determining the scope and the limits for accepting a certain positive 
obligation. Th e horizontal provisions of the Charter are especially relevant, for example 
Article 51(1) which has been mentioned earlier. Th ese horizontal provisions determine 
the scope of application and lay down important principles for determining the 
interpretation of the rights laid down in the Charter. Article 52(5) of the Charter also, 
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for example, provides for an important limitation to the scope for a judicial development 
of positive obligations of the  ‘ principles ’ that are guaranteed in several provisions of 
the Charter. Although it is still somewhat unclear which provisions contain principles 
instead of rights, it can be expected that the social and economic rights of the Charter 
contain principles, and therefore require actions to be taken fi rst by the political bodies 
of the EU and/or the member states. Th us, contrary to the Convention, the Charter 
provides more guidance for the ECJ as to which interventions and obligations would 
or would not be acceptable. On the basis of this legal framework, the development of 
positive obligations by the ECJ would seem to raise less diffi  culties as compared to the 
development of positive obligations by the ECtHR. 
 As mentioned above, the ECJ has also developed only a limited type of positive 
obligation for the member states, that is, mostly of a procedural kind or of an intrinsic 
and supportive kind (see section 12.3.1.). Th e latter types of positive obligations very 
closely and logically relate to the fundamental right itself. A supportive obligation is 
rather directly related to the negative obligation not to interfere with fundamental 
rights. Seeing that the negative obligation traditionally follows from the protection of 
fundamental rights, it could be argued that it would oft en be legitimate for the ECJ to 
recognise such positive obligations as compared to positive obligations which have a 
much more autonomous nature. 23 
 Still, the ECJ must, just like any other court, be very careful in imposing positive 
obligations, because certain legal or procedural requirements may not directly follow 
(textually) from the specifi c provision that guarantees the fundamental right in 
question. Th e ECJ may for that reason be advised to clearly indicate all the relevant 
legal bases and provide for careful reasoning to explain why a certain obligation can 
reasonably be imposed. To ensure the imposition of positive obligations on the member 
states, the ECJ may need to consider whether there is suffi  cient acceptance of a certain 
interpretation of fundamental rights. It could have regard to whether a certain type 
of action is already undertaken at the national level and it could in particular have 
resort to the case-law of the ECtHR, which may contain a relevant positive obligation. 
Moreover, as with all positive obligations that could be imposed by the ECJ, it must 
be taken into account that, in contrast to negative obligations, there are in principle 
various ways which can be used to comply with positive obligations. Considering 
that positive obligations lead to active undertakings for states, they can, although not 
necessarily, lead to considerable organisational and/or fi nancial burdens. Th e ECtHR 
has therefore oft en recognised that positive obligations are obligations of means rather 
than obligations of result. 
 Th e ECJ, thus, just like the ECtHR, needs to be careful in formulating positive 
obligations because of the political nature these obligations can have, as well as their 
potential political and fi nancial impact. Here, it can seen that the ECJ is in a less diffi  cult 
position than the ECtHR, because the ECJ can rely on a comprehensive legal framework 
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of primary and secondary EU law to underpin its choices, as well as on the case-law of 
the ECtHR. However, the ECJ must clearly pay attention to the limited competences of 
the EU in the fi eld of fundamental rights protection to avoid criticism over the potential 
eff ects of some positive obligations. 
 12.3.4.  THE SPECIFIC ROLE AND THE JUDICIAL STYLE OF THE ECJ 
 Th e ECJ and ECtHR each defi ne positive obligations in rather diff erent ways. As 
already explained, the ECJ oft en interprets fundamental rights in the framework of the 
preliminary reference procedure. Th is means that it primarily focuses on answering the 
specifi c questions that have been presented by the national courts. In its preliminary 
rulings, the ECJ oft en provides for only rather formal and terse reasoning, especially 
so where it concerns the protection of fundamental rights. It may, therefore, not very 
clearly reveal if and how positive obligations are established within the context of EU 
law. Also, the ECJ oft en reasons on a case-by-case basis and usually does not provide 
very elaborate explanations of its judgments. Th e judgments of the ECJ may, therefore, 
bring little clarity over the specifi c rights which individuals are entitled to on the basis 
of fundamental rights under EU law, and they may not claify to the competent 
authorities what specifi c obligations they need to comply with and which limitations 
will apply. In comparison, the ECtHR much more clearly indicates in its case-law that 
it imposes either negative or positive obligations on states parties. It has developed 
a clear doctrine of positive obligations in its case-law and, as a result, it can refer to 
several lines of case-law on the concept of positive obligations which it has developed 
and refi ned over the years. 
 Th e style used by the ECJ and the ECtHR in their case-law is thus very diff erent. 
Th is may also be related to the very diff erent roles played by these courts. Th e ECtHR 
must respond to complaints of individuals on the violation of their fundamental 
rights in relation to very specifi c circumstances. Th e ECtHR thereby aims to deliver 
judgments which provide for individual justice, while it also aims to play a broader role 
in developing certain minimum standards that can be taken into account by states and 
their courts. In contrast, the ECJ must secure the correct interpretation and application 
of EU law in many diff erent areas. Th e protection of fundamental rights is only one 
subject which is dealt with by the ECJ. Th e EU Treaties and the various instruments 
of secondary law, such as Directives and Regulations, contribute to the functioning of 
the EU internal market or the area of freedom of security and justice without internal 
frontiers. Th e primary subjects of the judgments of the ECJ are the EU institutions and 
the EU member states and their courts; they concern individual persons to a much 
lesser extent and much less directly. Th e ECJ has mainly chosen to apply the same 
style of (formal) reasoning in fundamental rights cases as it applies in other cases, and 
it has been slow in developing clear fundamental rights doctrines, such as a positive 
obligations doctrine. 
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 24  See for a further discussion sections 7.6.2.2. and 7.6.2.3. 
 25  See the examples discussed in section 11.5. 
 Th ere are, however, concerns over the legitimacy of the decisions of the ECJ in the fi eld 
of fundamental rights. 24 Th e ECJ has oft en been criticised for not taking fundamental 
rights suffi  ciently seriously. Some of the decisions it has taken in the fi eld of fundamental 
rights, on the basis of very formal and brief reasoning, are criticised for not suffi  ciently 
addressing the concerns that are related to the protection of fundamental rights. Many 
scholars have criticised the role the ECJ has played in the fi eld of fundamental rights, 
fi nding that the ECJ has done too little. Especially in more recent times, the ECJ has 
received criticism because it has decided to make less reference to the judgments of 
the ECtHR in its case-law and has started to focus on an autonomous interpretation 
of the Charter. Th e analysis of several cases in  chapter 11 has, in particular, shown that 
the ECJ can be criticised for the way that it imposes a positive obligation. 25 It has been 
criticised for rejecting certain positive obligations in its case-law, as well as for the way 
in which it has decided to accept some positive obligations. 
 In balancing the various demands made and fi nding a way out,  chapter 7 concluded 
that the ECJ would have to focus, in particular, on the concerns that are raised by the 
national (constitutional) courts on the protection of fundamental rights within the 
EU context. It would need to respond more elaborately to the questions raised by 
the national courts, also if they were to refer questions on positive obligations. Aft er 
all, the national courts of the member states are important in securing that questions 
are brought to the ECJ, allowing the ECJ to interpret EU law in a uniform and eff ective 
manner. Th e analysis in  chapter 11 has shown, moreover, that considerations of 
attribution of power are of the utmost importance in positive obligations cases. It has 
been shown there that by imposing active requirements on the member states to ensure 
the protection of fundamental rights, the ECJ could shift  the power to take measures 
from the national level to the EU level and it can, therefore, be criticised. Th e division 
of competences may need to be addressed by the ECJ if it is to further develop positive 
obligations in its case-law, and it should pay special and express attention to this in its 
reasoning. 
 12.4.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A 
DOCTRINE OF POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS BY THE ECJ 
 To the extent that the ECJ actually has the opportunity to further develop the scope 
of positive obligations under EU law, this section aims to provide some suggestions 
which the ECJ could incorporate. It has already been argued that the ECJ should pay 
more visible attention to the limits related to the competences of the EU when it defi nes 
positive obligations. Questions could otherwise be raised as soon as the ECJ were to 
defi ne certain types of obligations for the EU institutions or the member states on 
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 26  See section 7.5.3. where the  ‘ fundamental rights-friendly ’ approach of the ECJ in the case of  Willems 
and others is explained. 
 27  Th is fear is particularly raised by Stubberfi eld (2012). 
 28  Th e following is partly based on Beijer (2015). 
 29  See sections 3.2.6. (on the methodology used by the ECtHR to discover positive obligations) and 3.5. 
(on the limitations to the scope for the development of positive obligations). 
 30  See further section 6.9.1. on this point. 
the basis of fundamental rights. As discussed in section 12.2., the EU enjoys specifi c 
fundamental rights competences, as well as an indirect fundamental rights competence. 
In respect of the latter, it has been argued that this competence must be explained 
narrowly. Th e actions which can be taken on the basis of such an indirect competence 
must be accessory to the actions for which there is an explicit basis in the EU treaties. 
Also, limits apply because of the character of the explicit competence to which such a 
positive obligation is related. Th e ECJ could make clear that the general competence 
to protect fundamental rights remains at national level. If the ECJ were to fi nd that 
there is no basis to accept a positive obligation on the basis of EU law, it could make 
clear that the member states are still free to provide fundamental rights protection on 
the basis of their own national law, as well as on the basis of the standards developed 
under the Convention. 26 Th is would avoid it being criticised for not paying suffi  cient 
attention to the eff ective protection of fundamental rights, and it could also prevent 
the member states from  ‘ hiding ’ behind the obligations they have been given under 
EU law in a particular fi eld. 27 Th e protection of fundamental rights can indeed be seen 
as complicated by the fact that in some areas of EU law rules apply which derive from 
various sources of international law. 
 Th is study holds that ECJ can draw inspiration from the case-law of the ECtHR in 
developing a positive obligations doctrine. 28 It contains some important principles 
for determining as well as limiting the scope of positive obligations. 29 Th e case-law 
of the ECtHR may arguably include more far-reaching positive obligations for states 
than the ECJ could ever develop, as has been explained above. However, the principles 
developed therein could help the ECJ to provide for more clarity and certainty, as well 
as stronger legitimacy for the development of positive obligations. In particular, the 
legitimacy of a development of positive obligations would benefi t from more elaborate 
explanations as to the existence of the legal basis, the scope and the limits concerning 
certain specifi c positive obligations. Th e ECtHR ’ s doctrine of positive obligations may 
provide useful inspiration here. 
 Th e ECJ could fi rst of all rely on specifi c judgments of the ECtHR that are relevant to 
justify a particular kind of positive obligation and that can be translated to the specifi c 
context of EU law. Th e Convention as well as the case-law of the ECtHR are considered 
to provide important sources that must be taken into account by the ECJ in interpreting 
fundamental rights on the basis of Article 52(3) of the Charter. 30 It is also in the interest 
of consistency that the ECJ secures that fundamental rights are interpreted in the same 
way under the Charter as they have been interpreted under the Convention. If the 
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 31  See e.g. ECtHR 19 February 1998, no. 22729/93,  Kaya v. Turkey , para. 106. 
 32  Th e ECtHR has even expressed that the scope of states ’ positive obligations is inherently limited under 
the Convention, see e.g. ECtHR (adm. dec.) 14 May 2002, no. 38621/97,  Zehnalova and Zehnal v. the 
Czech Republic . 
ECJ wanted to provide for a diff erent or a more specifi c interpretation of a positive 
obligation, it could do so on the basis of the autonomy of EU law, but it would then need 
to further justify its choices. 
 Th e doctrine of positive obligations of the ECtHR contains (at least) two relevant 
approaches that would further be useful for the ECJ. First, the ECJ may want to take 
into account that the ECtHR generally grants member states a margin of appreciation 
in fulfi lling positive obligations. 31 Fundamental rights provisions are naturally phrased 
very broadly and therefore they generally leave choices to be made with regard to the 
measures that can be taken. Moreover, it is evident that there are many possible ways 
to comply with positive obligations, which may be more or less resource-demanding or 
politically sensitive. A supranational authority may not be in the best position to decide 
on a particular form of protection at the national level, and it is mainly for that reason 
that the ECtHR has given considerable leeway to the states to determine how they want 
to comply with their obligations under the Convention. Similarly, the ECJ may want 
to adopt an approach to expressly make clear that it grants member states discretion 
in fi nding appropriate measures at the national level to comply with the fundamental 
rights obligations that need to be fulfi lled on the basis of EU law. At the same time, 
however, the ECJ ’ s position is somewhat diff erent than that of the ECtHR, as has been 
discussed in section 12.3. In particular, because of the judicial set up of the EU system, 
the ECJ may be asked to provide quite clear indications as to the obligations which 
member states need to fulfi l. National courts sometimes refer very specifi c questions to 
the ECJ and thus expect clear indications. Also, the ECJ may itself want to provide quite 
clear indications as to the measures which member states must take to protect EU law 
to ensure that EU law is applied uniformly. Again, the ECJ could then be expected to 
further clarify why one specifi c type of measure would be better than another. Insofar 
as there are diff erent possibilities to meet the aims of a certain positive obligation, 
however, it could be expected that the ECJ would leave suffi  cient room for making 
choices at national level. 
 Secondly, in dealing with concerns over the burdens that may be imposed on member 
states in securing fundamental rights protection, the ECJ may especially want to take 
into consideration the limitations which apply to the scope of positive obligations. 
Th e ECtHR generally does not require states to incur  ‘ impossible or disproportionate 
burdens ’ in the protection of fundamental rights. 32 Positive obligations are in principle 
obligations of best eff orts rather than of result. Th e ECtHR understands that the eff ective 
protection of fundamental rights may give rise to measures which have fi nancial 
implications, especially where social and economic measures need to be taken. Th ere 
is obviously a limit to what states can achieve. Th e ECtHR has acknowledged this by 
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 33  See e.g. ECtHR 20 March 2008, nos. 15339/02 to 15343/02,  Budayeva and others v. Russia , para. 175; 
and ECtHR 9 December 1994, no. 16798/80,  L ó pez Ostra v. Spain , para. 51. See further section 3.5.3. 
 34  See Xenos (2012), pp. 100 – 107. 
 35  See section 3.5.1. 
 36  See sections 1.1.3., 8.3.5. and 9.2.2. 
requiring states only to take  ‘ reasonable measures ’. 33 States parties must actually provide 
the organisational and fi nancial means to allow eff ective protection. 34 Furthermore, the 
ECtHR only accepts positive obligations when public authorities have knowledge, or 
should have had knowledge, of the infringement of the fundamental rights of certain 
individuals, or groups of individuals, and their causes. 35 Th e ECJ could express such 
principles in cases where it enjoys only limited competences and where it enjoys only 
shared or complementary competences. 
 12.5.  EXPANSION OF COMPETENCES OR GAPS IN THE 
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ? 
 It has been argued that a development of positive obligations within the context of 
EU law could lead to an expansion of the competences of the EU. Th is means that 
if the ECJ were to impose certain active obligations on the EU institutions or the 
member states on the basis of the provisions of fundamental rights, the competences 
of the EU would be over-extended. If the ECJ were, however, to consider that there 
would be no competence to accept positive obligations, this could instead lead to gaps 
in the protection of fundamental rights. Th ese fears, which have been expressed by 
diff erent scholars, have been discussed in several places in this study, especially in the 
introductory chapter. 36 It has even been suggested by some scholars that the accession 
of the EU to the Convention would be necessary, so that the ECtHR could start 
establishing the positive obligations that would be relevant for the EU context. In view 
of the conclusions that have been reached on the basis of this study, some fi nal remarks 
will be made here on the discussions over the expansion of competences and the gaps 
in the protection of EU fundamental rights protection. 
 Starting with the potential extension of the EU ’ s competences, fi rst, reference can be 
made to the conclusions that have been reached regarding the scope for a development 
of positive obligations by the ECJ as explained in section 12.2. Th is has shown that there 
is room for positive obligations to be established on the basis of the competences that 
have been given to the EU. Th e EU has some specifi c as well as indirect competences 
which can be used to justify a development of positive obligations within the context of 
EU law, so that it can be ensured that the policies of the EU comply with the relevant 
negative and positive obligations to protect fundamental rights. Th is implies that an 
extension of the competences of the EU does not necessarily need to take place. Surely, 
now that that the EU Treaties do not bring great clarity over the limits that apply, and 
the expansion of the EU competences generally remains an issue of concern, there is 
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 37  See sections 8.3.4.2. to 8.3.4.4. 
 38  See sections 9.3.1. and 9.3. 
indeed a risk that EU law can provide a basis for interference in areas which fall outside 
the sphere of direct competence of the EU. 37 Th is does not mean, however, that positive 
obligations could never be imposed. Instead, it demands additional awareness by the 
ECJ of the limits relating to the fundamental rights competences of the EU, in particular 
those that concern the indirect competences for the EU to protect fundamental rights. 
Also, the ECJ needs to be very careful in developing positive obligations for the 
member states in situations where they derogate from the free movement rules, and 
where they apply their optioning rules under EU law. Of particular importance is the 
principle of loyal or sincere cooperation, laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, which requires 
the member states to take  ‘ all appropriate measures to fulfi l the obligations arising out 
of the Treaty ’. Th ese obligations may extend to areas where the EU does not enjoy any 
legislative powers and, again, it may be expected that the ECJ would generally be careful 
in developing far-reaching obligations there. 
 Looking at the cases which have so far reached the ECJ, it has been shown that the 
ECJ is usually very careful in imposing (potentially burdensome) obligations on the 
member states. It has defi ned a legislative obligation for the member states in very few 
cases. In the particular context of the development of positive procedural obligations 
at national level, the ECJ has even stressed that it is only in exceptional situations that 
the member states are required to introduce new remedies at national level to ensure 
the protection of fundamental rights. In principle, the ECJ thus relies on the procedural 
arrangements that have already been provided for at national level. In respect of the 
situation where the member states derogate from EU law, and when they apply their 
optioning rules, the ECJ has also been very careful in imposing obligations. Such cases 
may raise questions in view of the division of powers between the EU and the member 
states; however, since the ECJ has only developed some small positive obligations of a 
procedural kind, at the momet, there does not seem to be a reason for much concern 
here. 
 More generally, it can be seen that the ECJ has been paying attention to the limited 
competences of the EU to protect fundamental rights, by clarifying that there are 
limits to the scope of application of EU fundamental rights which relate to the limited 
competences of the EU, and also by determining in some cases that the member 
states still enjoy certain sovereign powers under EU law. 38 Th us, the ECJ seems intent 
in guarding the limited competences of the EU in the fi eld of fundamental rights 
protection and, so far, an expansion of competences on the basis of a development of 
positive obligations does not seem to have taken place. 
 Next, there is the risk of gaps in the protection of fundamental rights which could be 
the consequence of the limited scope for accepting positive obligations under EU law. 
Again, it is submitted that such fears are not necessarily well-founded. On the one hand, 
indeed, it must be admitted that there are various kinds of positive obligations which 
cannot be established on the basis of EU law. Seeing especially that there is no general 
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 39  It can be important to take into account that the scope for the application of national fundamental 
rights standards cannot undermine the unity, primacy and eff ectiveness of EU law on the basis of the 
 Melloni ruling of the ECJ, see section 6.8. 
 40  See section 6.8. 
 41  For a further explanation of these cases, see section 6.8. and 11.5.3. 
competence for the EU to take action, there is no basis to accept positive obligations 
to respond to certain issues that require a concerted action across the diff erent policy 
fi elds of the EU. Th ere is limited scope, for example, to take more comprehensive action 
to protect the rights of minorities in Europe, which may cut across the diff erent policy 
fi elds of the EU. However, the EU would really need to be conferred with a specifi c 
competence by the member states to take such actions. 
 Also, to the extent that EU law does not provide for a full or exhaustive harmonisation 
of national law, there is in principle scope for the protection of fundamental rights 
on the basis of national law. In most situations where EU fundamental rights apply, 
the EU enjoys a shared competence or a complementary competence, which generally 
leaves discretion for the member states to provide for (farther-reaching) protection of 
fundamental rights. It has already been concluded that there are few situations where 
EU law exclusively applies, so in many cases national laws still apply. 39 Th e primary 
responsibility for the protection of fundamental rights thus still lies at the national level. 
It must be held in mind that the member states have already developed a legal framework 
and (procedural) mechanisms and institutions to provide for such protection. Th ey can, 
therefore, also be required to respond to the positive obligations that are developed by 
the ECtHR in relation to the rights that are guaranteed under EU law. 
 Specifi c problems can, however, arise in the context of EU law if the member states 
fail to provide suffi  cient protection of fundamental rights on the basis of national law. 
Th is especially applies in several areas of EU law where the member states need to 
cooperate on civil and criminal matters and asylum and immigration matters, on the 
basis of the principle of mutual recognition. Th is means that the member states must 
cooperate on the basis of the presumption that other member states provide a suffi  cient 
level of fundamental rights protection. Th ere may therefore not be any harmonisation of 
the applicable fundamental rights standards. 40 Cases have been brought before the ECJ 
as well as the ECtHR on situations which revealed serious concerns over the adequacy 
of the protection of fundamental rights in some member states. Th e cases of  N.S. and 
others as well as  Aranyosi and C ă ld ă ru of the ECJ have revealed serious problems 
regarding, respectively, the reception of asylum seekers as well as access to asylum 
procedures, and the conditions of detention. 41 In these areas, some member states seem 
to have failed to comply fully with the positive obligations they have incurred under 
the Convention. Because of the lack of EU competences on such matters and because 
of the principle of mutual recognition, there can be little room for the ECJ to interfere 
in the compliance with such obligations by the member states. Instead, the ECJ could, 
perhaps, only decide to point out that the member states have positive obligations that 
they need to comply with within the framework of the Convention. Th e ECJ could 
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reinforce the obligations which the member states need to comply with in their own 
respective competence spheres, however. If necessary, the ECJ may also decide to 
make exceptions to the principle of mutual recognition so that it can be ensured by the 
national courts that the eff ective protection of fundamental rights is not put at risk. Th is 
particular area thus gives rise to certain complications on how the standards of EU law, 
national law and the Convention interrelate and there are diff erent competence spheres 
of the EU and the member states to take into account. It is an especially important area 
that is of continuing concern for the ECJ as well as for the ECtHR, and it is unclear 
whether the principle of mutual recognition can be applied and an eff ective protection 
of fundamental rights can still be secured in those situations. 
 As a fi nal and last point then, what does all of this say about the desirability of the 
accession of the EU to the Convention ? It can generally be held, on the basis of the 
conclusions that have been provided, that the accession of the EU to the Convention 
is not strictly currently necessary because the system of fundamental rights protection 
at EU level provides certain legal basis and procedural mechanisms that could be used 
to ensure the recognition of positive obligations at EU level. Th ere continue to be 
doubts, however, over the adequacy of the protection of fundamental rights provided 
by the EU institutions (including the EU Courts), seeing that they also have other 
interests to protect, and because of the fact that there are very limited standing rights 
for individuals, which forces them to rely on the national courts to address gaps in 
the protection of fundamental rights under EU law. Especially in the area of criminal 
law, where legislative instruments are increasingly adopted, there are concerns over 
the adequacy of the remedies that are provided under EU law for individuals and for 
the national courts. So if, in future years, specifi c cases show that such fears over the 
genuine protection of fundamental rights by the EU and the ECJ are justifi ed, it could 
become necessary for cases to be brought directly by individuals before the ECtHR to 
complain about the protection of fundamental rights by the EU institutions. 
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